“.... By turning down Colombo’s appeal, New Delhi has shown a sense of realism and a perfect understanding of the nature of the war. In the past, India had to pay a heavy price for its proactive involvement in the conflict because of its miscalculations and over confidence arising from a self-assumed central position in regional strategic affairs… Fighting Sri Lanka’s war when it does not really advance India’s critical interests is undesirable. It will once again be a no-win war for India. It will also reopen the wounds of the Indian peace keeping force. New Delhi has been quite conscious of its limitations and difficulties in undertaking another military role on the Island...”

- P. Sahadevan, Associate Professor 
Jawaharlal Nehru University 
[The Hindu May 12 2000.]

The aftermath of Elephant Pass has given rise to widespread expectations in the country that India would actively involve itself again in the affairs of its island neighbour. While the non-LTTE Tamils have always been yearning for positive Indian intervention, even some pro-LTTE sections are now wooing Mother’ India. The hope is that the Bharatiya Janatha Party led National Democratic Alliance government consisting of several parties favourable to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam would tilt in favour of the Tigers this time. The biggest U-turn however came from Sinhala hardliners who were earlier hostile to India. The very same elements who bitterly opposed Indian intervention in 1987-90 were now for it.

There was however a catch in this apparent change of heart. Although the request at face value was an invitation to India, there was an underlying condition. The invitation was for India to take up arms against the LTTE and help fight the war. India was expected to either join forces with the Sri Lankan forces or prosecute the war on its own. The bottom line however was that the LTTE had to be exterminated. There was no possibility of India being asked to help mediate a political settlement that would guarantee the basic rights and fulfill the legitimate aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamil people.

Ironically, the hawks clamouring for Indian intervention were vehemently opposed to the fruits of India’s earlier venture namely the 13th amendment and its consequences like the provincial councils and North-Eastern linkage. What became obvious was that if India even suggested that a political solution be worked out first as a prerequisite to militarily combating the LTTE, then Indian intervention would have become unwelcome, even resented. It was crystal clear that the requirement was to make war alone without any concern for Tamil rights and equality.

The Sinhala hardliners’ wishful thinking in this regard was in a sense historically consistent. In spite of the frenzied excitement over the current state of the country, what is woefully lacking even at this critical stage is any concern about the grievances and problems faced by the Tamils.

When the Tamils protested peacefully at Galle Face Green over Sinhala being made the sole official language in 1956, thugs were set loose upon them. Two cabinet ministers and about half a dozen MPs were behind this show of force against unarmed satyagrahis.

This tendency to terrify and suppress Tamil dissent was manifested throughout the years in the form of engineered anti-Tamil violence in 1958, ‘77, ‘81 and ‘83. Different reasons have been trotted out at different times. In 1958 it was the anti-Sri tar brush campaign. In 1983 it was the Thirunelvely explosion incident. Whatever the rationalisation, the assumption was that the Tamils could be beaten into submission through force. Even when the Tamils staged a satyagraha that paralysed the northeast in 1961 it was broken up by deploying the army and arresting the leaders. As the ethnic crisis escalated, the use of force became institutionalised and legalised. So this island nation that had everything going for it at the time of Independence and could have become an Asian Paradise is today a living hell. Now the war situation has reached a nadir that reminds one of the sayings by Malcolm X that, the chickens have come home to roost, when John F. Kennedy was killed.

In the context of a post-Independence history where the response to the Tamil problem has been that of an excessive reliance on force, the request by hard-line Sinhala elements that India should come and fight the war is understandable, though not acceptable. Some Indian journalists too share the hope that India should intervene militarily and fight the LTTE. The most notable among them is Prem Shankar Jha, the son of a former Indian foreign secretary, and brother of a former Indian envoy to Colombo and son-in-law of a current Indian cabinet minister. Of course Jha does not advocate an active deployment of Indian troops on ground but only massive air strikes. Regardless of whether the air strikes as envisaged by Jha would achieve its objectives or not, the lamentable factor is the reason he adduces for this proposed course of action.

Writing in the Outlook magazine, Jha says that if Eelam was realised then it would mean that it would expand to Tamil Nadu also. Separatist fires would be stoked there and Tamil Eelam would be the rear base for a separatist struggle there. Jha cites the late S. Thondaman as the authority for this gem of wisdom.

Apart from Jha, there have been others too in recent times stressing upon the need for India to intervene militarily on the side of Colombo. What is obvious in this line of thought is the total absence of morality. There are two broad reasons. One is that the creation of Tamil Eelam would encourage Tamil Nadu to secede and merge into a Pan Tamil state thereby weakening the unity of India. Secondly if the LTTE is allowed to succeed, it would have a demonstration effect on all movements fighting various governments in different countries in the region and elsewhere and imbue them with fresh confidence. Therefore the Tigers have to be crushed now.

The twin arguments for Indian intervention in Sri Lanka is not morally valid – only cynically pragmatic from a futuristic point of view. Sadly, almost all the proponents of Indian military intervention in Lanka realise and accept that the Tamils have been victimised and are in need of urgent help. But the prescription is not a separate state of Tamil Eelam under the LTTE.

As such the Tamil armed struggle has to be crushed in India’s interests. Of course some lip service is being paid towards the suffering of the Tamils. But again the Tamils have to live within a united Sri Lanka. In spite of the long trail of broken promises by Sinhala politicians from the time when James Peiris and E. J. Samarawickrema hoodwinked Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam to the on-going dilution of the so called devolution package by Chandrika Kumaratunga, Tamils are asked to accept a united Sri Lanka. There is absolutely no consideration of the desire expressed by the majority of the Northern and Eastern province Tamils in the general elections of 1977 when they voted for the sovereign, secular state of Tamil Eelam as stated in the Tamil United Liberation Front manifesto.

Before the Sri Lankan Tamils are asked to sacrifice their democratic aspirations on the dubious altar of Indian unity it would be prudent to examine the validity of the fears expressed about Tamil Nadu secessionism.

One can understand the motivations and compulsions of Sinhala hardliners when stressing this factor, but one is puzzled when Indian commentators dwell on this. Such paranoia can only mean that they have neither understood the basis of Indian unity and the transformed nature of Tamil nationalism in India. Moreover they are oblivious to the strong undercurrents of Sri Lankan Tamil nationalism and its aspirations.

The partition of India was a result of an emphasis on religion by Jinna.

Pakistan was a theocracy based on the religious unity of Islam. The greatness of India was its opting for secularism, instead of a mirror image response to Hinduism as the core value. This was because the enlightened architects of modern India realised that a multi-religious, multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic society could not be unified by the dominance of the single largest entity alone. The birth of Bangladesh saw the failure of theocracy. But India despite the tensions and prophesies of doom still flourishes as a united country. When linguistic problems arose the device of language based states helped alleviate them.

We in Sri Lanka went the wrong way when the so-called Sinhala Buddhist majority asserted its numerical superiority and imposed its dominance on others.

The road to ruination was clear from the time religious dignitaries took the lead in saving the country and political leaders started talking about religion.

The Sinhala hardliners, who plunged this island into chaos through their shortsighted chauvinism, realise their limits and are now trying to entice India into doing the dirty work for them. After years of trying to subjugate the Tamil people through oppressive policies, the expectation is that India should sink into this morass too. Instead of learning from the Indian example and pursuing a policy of accommodation, the aim still is to rely on force, external or otherwise.

After Independence the most successful separatist movement was in Tamil Nadu or Madras as the state was known then. The separatist tendency formed the ideology of the Dravidian movement and was based on anti-Brahmin, anti-North Indian notions. When China attacked India the Dravidian Munnetra Kazgagham led by C. N. Annadurai demanded that it be included in the “roll call of honour” to defend India. The DMK also realised that its extremist demands while eliciting some support would never garner enough to win the state elections. He decided that the Dravida Nadu cry should be abandoned if the DMK wanted to capture state power. Besides the other Dravidian states of Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka were not enamoured of the Dravidian ideology. The decision by the Indian government to ban separatism only helped the DMK to drop what had now become a constraint. So the party formally disavowed separatism. Also unlike Sri Lanka the Indian Tamils were not subjected to deliberate discriminatory policies.

The DMK that had 15 seats in 1957 won 50 in 1962 after they dropped separatism. Tamil nationalism found it easier to assert itself under the aegis of Indian unity as opposed to it. The faulty decision of the Indian government in trying to impose Hindi in the state in 1965 resulted in mass agitation spearheaded by the DMK. 1967 saw the DMK ride the crest of a wave. Ever since 1967 the Dravidian movement underwent various splits; nevertheless the state continues to be ruled by one or other Dravidian party and not the Congress or some All-Indian party. The DMK enthroned Tamil as the state’s official language, adopted a two-language formula and changed the state name from Madras to Tamil Nadu etc. The city name too was changed to Chennai two years ago. The DMK changed its policy to that of regional autonomy. In recent times Tamil Nadu parties have begun sharing power at the centre too and have participated in several governments. The current regime has eight ministers from Tamil Nadu.

Tamil Nadu in that sense is a great success story where a once separatist movement has metamorphosed into a powerful example of national unity and integrity. With the computer revolution and the opening up of the economy, the state is booming industrially and blooming economically. The state that once witnessed several instances of self-immolation over Mother Tamil, strongly resisted attempts recently by the state government to remove English as the medium of instruction in primary schools. Even the politicos who talk about the glory of Tamil send their children to English medium schools. The Tamil of Tamil Nadu has found his or her place under the Indian sun as equal citizens. There is absolutely no need for Tamil Nadu to secede from India simply because Tamil Eelam is created. Entertaining doubts on this score is tantamount to degrading and insulting the political sensibilities of a people who have shown in recent times to elect different parties to the state assembly and parliament in very interesting circumstances.

Given the flourishing Indian economy the problem if ever would be for the fledgling Tamil Eelam to seek union with India and not attract Tamil Nadu the other way.

Likewise it also does not seem plausible that if ever Tamil Eelam becomes a reality, those at its helm would seek to promote secessionism in India. The Sri Lankan Tamils are not fools to realise that any untoward provocation by them would prompt India to move in and annex the nascent state to prevent long term consequences. Besides, the new state will be heavily dependent on India for many things. Its protector will have to be India. The Hindu-Tamil heritage will make it India’s staunchest ally. After a debilitating armed struggle the Sri Lankan Tamil people known for their common sense and pragmatism would not promote a separatist struggle in Tamil Nadu against the all-powerful India. That would only weaken them. Also will the Sri Lankan Tamils numbering about 3 to 4 million prefer to be subsumed by a majority of 55 million Indian Tamils and lose their identity? Let us be realistic. While cultural, social and economic bonds with Tamil Nadu will certainly continue, a political union just does not seem possible.

But what has been happening in recent times is that wrong moves by the powers in New Delhi are fuelling hawkish sentiments in Tamil Nadu. The symbolic breaking of a TV set by Karunanidhi to signal his protest against the false propaganda by the Doordharshan against Sri Lankan Tamils in 1988 is a case in point. So too was his refusal as chief minister to welcome the Indian army that returned home after killing “my Tamil brethren” in 1990. Recently when stories of India supplying arms to Colombo began appearing in the Indian press Karunanidhi threw a tantrum, saying fellow Tamils were going to be hunted down. This and other developments indicate that allowing this problem to fester may have some impact but not serious enough to foment serious secession. There is of course a small group of Tamil separatists who are excited by the LTTE. This again is a negligible group and does not pose any serious threat to Indian unity.

The other argument about other struggles being inspired by the LTTE’s perceived success is downright laughable. The future of these struggles depends to a great extent on the justice of their cause and the response to it by the governments concerned. If the order of the day is to simply suppress legitimate dissent without addressing the causes, then one shudders to think of the future of these struggles.

Under these circumstances the best possible course for India would be to mediate in the Sri Lankan situation and bring about an amicable settlement.

That would help douse, if any, secessionist tendency in the country. It would also help subdue political passions in Tamil Nadu. New Delhi has signaled its preparedness for it. (The Sunday Leader exclusively reported last week that India was preparing to mediate). Now both, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, as well as Prime Minister Vajpayee, have gone on record publicly indicating their willingness to do so.

But there is a problem. India will step in only if requested by Sri Lanka as well as the LTTE. For the Tigers to do so there are two immediate problems. Firstly India has banned the LTTE and is expected to extend the ban from today (May 14) for a further two years. No party can be expected to accept as a mediator a country that has banned it. This is obvious and understandable. So if India is really sincere about its intention to mediate then a serious rethinking on the ban on the Tigers is necessary.

Secondly, Indian leaders have gone on record saying that any proposed settlement has to be within the Sri Lankan constitution and have also emphasised the unity and sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. This again is problematic. In the first place the major grievance of the Tamils is against the constitution as it exists. All the discrimination meted out in the past has a constitutional basis. It is the constitution that has placed the Tamils in a subservient status. Even President Kumaratunga has accepted it and her envisaged solution is a new or revised constitution. So for the Indian government to say it has to be within the current constitution raises an area of unwanted ambiguity.

There is also the insistence on unity and territorial integrity etc. By making its position known India is laying down certain prerequisites and preconditions. It is not correct for an impartial mediator to state these at the outset. It could be evolved in a gradual manner but not imposed from above. The only way to inspire Tamil confidence would be to enter the process with a clean slate and work from there.

If India feels it must emphasise its commitment to Sri Lanka’s unity then it should couple that along with another equal assertion that it is for a restructuring of the Sri Lankan state. The only way possible to ensure the unity of Sri Lanka is to change its unitary structure into a confederation. If India feels that stating so at the outset would evoke Sinhala resentment then it would very likely be perceived by the Tamils as being partisan.

India has also adopted a hands-off policy towards Sri Lanka for long. This was particularly felt by the Sri Lankan Tamils. As long as the war for peace strategy was seen as being successful there was no concern displayed.

None of the massive human tragedies like the 1995 exodus or the current medical situation in the Wanni etc., evoked any humanitarian response from New Delhi. It is therefore a questionable fact when New Delhi talks now of humanitarian assistance. The reasons for this changed thinking and desire to mediate are patently visible.

It takes two to tango. If India seeks mediator status it can only be with the joint consent of both the government and the LTTE. So it is imperative that the Tamil side is enthused with Indian bona fides on this issue first.