SRI
LANKA:
THE
UNTOLD
STORY
Chapter
35:
Accord
turns
to
discord
By
K
T
Rajasingham
Courtesy: Asia Times (Link www.atimes.com)
Excerpts:
When
India
was
about
to
sign
the
peace
accord
with
Sri
Lanka,
on
July
29,
1987,
it
selected
nearly
500
exiled
militants,
who
were
resident
in
the
Tamil
Nadu
state,
except
those
from
the
LTTE,
to
be
given
refresher
courses
in
arms,
in
a
remote
area
in
the
state
of
Uttrapradesh,
in
North
India.
Also,
according
to
the
accord,
India
took
with
them
the
remainder
of
the
exiled
militant
groups
in
Tamil
Nadu,
to
surrender
their
arms
and
take
part
in
the
envisaged
democratic
political
process.
These
included
the
Eelam
People
Revolutionary
Left
Front
(EPRLF),
the
People's
Liberation
Organization
of
Tamil
Eelam
(PLOTE),
the
Tamil
Eelam
Liberation
Organization
(TELO)
and
Eelam
National
Democratic
Liberation
Front
(ENDLF).
The
ENDLF
was
popularly
known
as
"Three
Stars",
indicating
the
three
ethnic
communities
living
in
the
traditional
Tamil
homeland,
and
it
was
a
breakaway
group
of
PLOTE,
formed
under
the
tripartite
leadership
of
"Paranthan
Rajan"
alias
Gnanasegeram,
Eeswaran
and
Douglas
Devananda
formerly
of
the
EPRLF.
Later,
Eeswaran
was
removed
and
Douglas
Devenanda
left
to
form
the
Eelam
People's
Democratic
Party
(EPDP)
with
the
blessing
of
Ranasinghe
Premadasa,
who
had
succeeded
J
R
Jayewardene
as
the
second
elected
president
of
Sri
Lanka.
....
But
as
the
crisis
dragged
on,
violent
clashes
began
between
September
30
and
October
4
between
the
LTTE
and
Sinhalese
residents
in
the
Trincomalee
district.
At
least
18
people
were
killed
and
5,000
left
homeless.
As
the
clashes
mounted,
the
Sri
Lankan
government
accused
the
Indian
army
of
doing
nothing
to
protect
Sinhalese
civilians.
Colombo
threatened
to
send
the
IPKF
packing
if
it
could
not
bring
the
Trincomalee
district
under
control.
The
Sri
Lankan
Navy
on
October
2
apprehended
17
LTTE
men
traveling
in
a
boat
off
the
coast
of
Point
Pedro.
The
navy
disarmed
them,
took
off
their
necklaces
with
cyanide
capsules
and
took
them
to
Palaly,
where
the
Sri
Lankan
Army
and
the
IPKF
had
their
bases.
It
unfolded
that
two
of
the
men
were
prize
catches
-
Pulendran,
the
regional
commander
of
the
LTTE
for
Trincomalee
and
Kumarappah,
the
regional
commander
of
the
LTTE
for
Jaffna.
The
Sri
Lankan
government
had
earlier
offered
1
million
rupees
each
of
the
two
Tamil
militants.
The
Sri
Lankan
government
alleged
that
the
17
militants
were
acting
in
breach
of
the
accord
by
transporting
arms
from
Tamil
Nadu,
and
also
in
breach
of
Sri
Lankan
immigration
formalities.
The
government
insisted
that
the
militants
be
brought
to
Colombo
for
questioning.
The
news
spread
like
a
wildfire
and
the
LTTE
screamed
"foul",
saying
the
arrests
were
a
violation
of
the
accord
under
which
all
militants
had
been
granted
amnesty.
In
reply,
the
government
said
that
the
amnesty
only
pertained
to
the
pre-accord
period
and
that
the
17
armed
men
were
in
violation
of
the
accord.
The
LTTE
rightly
pointed
out
that
the
September
28
agreement
signed
by
it
with
India
allowed
the
Tigers
to
retain
their
weapons.
President
J
R
Jayewardene
spoke
to
the
nation
on
the
state
television,
Rupavahini,
for
two
successive
days,
explaining
first
that
the
17
LTTE
militants
detained
at
Palaly
were
smugglers,
and
that
they
were
not
covered
by
the
accord.
He
told
the
nation
that
the
detainees
had
been
caught
on
the
high
seas
while
in
the
act
of
smuggling
arms
from
Tamil
Nadu.
It
was
a
significant
lapse
on
the
part
of
the
Sri
Lankan
government
not
to
exhibit
the
alleged
arms
and
ammunition
seized.
The
LTTE
said
that
the
militants
were
traveling
in
a
slow
fishing
trawler
from
Jaffna
to
Tamil
Nadu
to
bring
back
office
equipment
and
furniture
from
their
Tamil
Nadu
office.
They
also
claimed
that
they
had
requested
the
IPKF
high
command
to
assist
them
in
transporting
the
equipment,
but
the
IPKF
had
ignored
their
request.
They
further
stated
that
only
Pulendran
and
Kumarappah,
the
regional
LTTE
commanders,
were
armed,
according
to
agreement,
as
an
act
of
self-defense.
Lalith
Athulathmudali,
the
Sri
Lankan
National
Security
Minister,
when
contacted
by
journalists,
said
that
the
17
would
be
transported
to
Colombo
and
made
to
pose
before
television
cameras
and
then
be
released.
The
LTTE
appealed
to
the
Indian
government
to
prevent
their
men
from
being
transported
to
Colombo.
Depinder
Singh
flew
to
Colombo
to
urge
the
president
not
to
move
the
militants
to
Colombo.
Jayewardene
refused
to
relent.
Indian
High
Commissioner
Dixit
dashed
to
Colombo
from
Delhi
to
prevail
on
the
president,
but
he
was
adamant.
In
the
meantime,
the
LTTE's
second
in
command
Mahattaya,
alias
Mahendrarajah,
was
granted
permission
to
meet
the
detainees
at
the
Palaly
base.
Depinder
Singh
in
his
book
The
IPKF
in
Sri
Lanka,
described
the
situation
as
follows,
"Caught
in
a
cleft,
as
it
were,
I
flew
to
Colombo
and
saw
General
Ranatunge
and
the
president
to
explain
the
LTTE's
position
and
apprehensions
and
seek
release
of
the
prisoners.
Apart
from
obtaining
assurance
that
the
prisoners
would
not
be
tortured,
or
shown
on
TV,
I
could
make
little
headway.
In
my
meeting
with
the
president,
he
asked
what
was
the
strength
of
the
Indian
Army
and
the
Southern
Command
and
why
a
large
army
with
such
a
proud
record
had
not
been
able
to
bring
the
LTTE
to
heel.
He
added
that
he
was
under
great
pressure
from
all
political
parties
including
his
own
to
withdraw
the
IPKF.
I
replied
that
our
endeavor
to
resolve
the
problem
peacefully
as,
otherwise,
we
would
be
back
to
the
pre-July
1987
position.
I
also
added
that,
since
we
were
refining
our
tactics
and,
hopefully,
better
control
would
ensue.
This
appeared
to
satisfy
the
president;
it
certainly
cheered
him
up.
Nirrupon
Sen,
the
First
Secretary
of
our
High
Commission,
[the
High
Commissioner
was
away]
remarked
that
my
use
of
the
word
'refine'
had
impressed
the
president.
Though
I
had
been
unsuccessful
in
my
mission
of
preventing
the
SLAF
[Sri
Lankan
Armed
Forces]
taking
the
LTTE
prisoners
to
Colombo,
we
tried
one
more
shot
which
was
to
get
New
Delhi
to
recall
Mani
Dixit,
who
was
enjoying
some
well
earned
leave
to
speak
to
the
president.
Mani
rejoined
on
October
4,
1987
and
met
the
president
who,
unfortunately,
remained
adamant.
Back
in
Jaffna,
meanwhile,
Mahataya
had
sought
and
secured
permission
to
visit
the
prisoners
who
were
then
located
in
Palaly,
I
am
convinced
that
during
this
visit
he
distributed
cyanide
capsules
as
the
prisoners
had
been
thoroughly
searched
earlier
and
could
not
have
come
to
be
in
possession
of
cyanide
through
any
other
sources."
-
pages
82-83
The
diplomacy
of
Jayewardene
and
the
Sri
Lankan
government
prevailed.
Until
the
last
moment,
the
IPKF
was
confident
that
the
LTTE
detainees
would
not
be
allowed
to
leave
Jaffna.
The
IPKF
threatened
to
block
with
armored
cars
any
Sri
Lankan
plane
intending
to
fly
the
prisoners
to
Colombo
on
October
5.
By
4:30
in
the
afternoon,
IPKF
received
instructions
from
New
Delhi
to
abandon
all
efforts
and
allow
events
to
take
their
own
course.
"Mr
Pirabakaran
was
furious
when
he
was
informed
of
the
final
decision.
He
felt
he
was
obliged
to
fulfill
the
last
wishes
of
his
cadres
in
custody.
Mr
Pirabakaran
and
his
commanders
each
took
off
his
cyanide
capsule
and
hung
it
around
Bala
and
Mahataya's
neck
with
instructions
to
deliver
it
to
the
captured
cadres.
Garlanded
with
cyanide
capsules,
Bala
and
Mahataya
reluctantly
and
hesitantly
visited
the
cadres
on
the
decisive
day
of
their
transfer."
Will
to
Freedom
by
Adele
Balasingham,
page
139
When
people
heard
of
the
arrangements
to
take
the
detainees
to
Colombo
they
flocked
in
thousands
in
front
of
the
Palaly
base,
demanding
to
see
the
detainees,
without
success.
The
Sri
Lankan
government,
in
demanding
that
the
detainees
be
flown
to
Colombo,
ignored
the
advice
and
appeals
of
the
IPKF,
as
well
as
strongly
worded
warnings
of
communal
disharmony
if
anything
happened
to
the
detained
militants.
The
government
had
its
own
designs
of
getting
the
IPKF
involved
in
a
confrontation
with
the
domineering
LTTE
in
the
near
future,
and
persisted
in
transporting
the
militants.
When
Sri
Lankan
soldiers
moved
to
the
take
the
militants
to
Colombo,
IPKF
soldiers
stood
by
as
passive
on-ookers.
But
on
the
tarmac,
on
October
5
at
about
5:30
in
the
evening,
those
17
LTTErs
swallowed
cyanide
capsules
and
12
of
them
died
instantly,
including
Pulendran
and
Kumarappah,
and
three
died
later
in
the
IPKF
hospital
at
Palaly.
The
incident
was
a
turning
point
in
the
Indo-Sri
Lankan
peace
accord,
as
anticipated
by
the
Sri
Lankan
government.
The
death
of
the
Tamil
militants
resulted
in
scenarios
never
anticipated
by
the
Indian
government.
India
was
reduced
to
a
pawn
in
the
cleverly
manipulated
move
of
the
wily
president
of
Sri
Lanka,
who
began
to
dictate
the
pace
of
events
and
by
which
New
Delhi
eventually
became
the
scapegoat
of
the
century.
"The
LTTE's
reaction
was
swift
and
savage,"
was
how
it
was
described
by
Depinder
Singh
as
LTTE
militants
took
retaliatory
steps
to
avenge
the
deaths
of
their
colleagues,
with
many
casualties.
The
IPKF
went
on
maximum
alert,
but
the
accord
of
peace
was
turning
into
a
discord
of
antagonism.
"On
October
6,
1987,
the
Chief
of
the
Army
Staff
General
Sunderji
flew
into
Palaly
where
he
was
briefed
about
the
situation.
It
was
apparent
that
the
political
decision
to
employ
force
against
LTTE
was
already
taken.
However,
he
was
en
route
to
Colombo,
where
the
Defense
Minister
K
C
Pant
was
proceeding
the
same
evening
for
a
meeting
with
the
Sri
Lankan
president.
Having
met
the
latter
on
October
4,
I
had
no
doubt
about
the
riot
act
he
would
read
out
to
compel
the
IPKF
to
use
force.
My
recommendation
to
General
Sundarji
was
that
we
must
not
go
in
for
the
hard
option
because,
if
we
did,
we
would
be
stuck
in
insurgency
situation
for
the
next
20
years.
I
was
admonished
not
to
adopt
a
defeatist
attitude
to
which
my
reply
was
that
I
was
not
being
defeatist,
merely
realistic.
The
chief
then
flew
off
to
Colombo.
I
am
not
privy
to
what
transpired
there,
but
next
day,
HQ
IPKF
received
direct
instructions,
in
clear,
from
the
chief
in
Colombo
to
use
force
against
the
LTTE."
The
IPKF
in
Sri
Lanka
By
Lieutenant-General
Depinder
Singh,
Page
84
General
Krishnaswamy
Sunderji,
the
Indian
Army's
Chief
of
Staff,
rejected
the
realistic
advice
given
to
him
by
Depinder
Singh.
Comparing
Sundarji's
style
and
approach
in
Sri
Lanka
with
Field
Marshal
Sam
Manekshaw,
the
Chief
of
Staff
of
the
Indian
Army
in
1971,
India
Today
in
its
May
15,
1988
issue
alleged,
"Sri
Lanka
was
another
case
of
Sundarji's
style
of
rushing
into
things
too
fast
with
an
eye
to
impress
the
political
leadership."
India
Today
magazine
has
alleged
that
Sundarji's
hawkish
posture
and
his
desire
to
please
the
political
leadership
made
him
rush
into
the
decision
to
use
force
against
the
LTTE
against
the
situation
report
and
advice
given
to
him
by
the
IPKF
leadership.
"General
Sunderji
ordered
the
commencement
of
what
is
known
as
'Operation
Pawan'
on
October
6,
1987."
Assignment
Colombo
by
J
N
Dixit,
page
212
The
IPKF
came
to
broker
peace
and
order
in
the
country,
now
it
had
become
the
party
for
escalating
violence.
The
IPKF
launched
several
demonstrative
raids
in
the
Jaffna
Peninsula
following
Sunderji's
order.
On
October
8,
the
IPKF
raided
the
printing
presses
and
offices
of
the
pro-LTTE
regional
Tamil
dailies
Eelamurasu
and
Murasoli,
and
arrested
journalists
and
workers.
They
also
raided
the
office
of
Eelanadu,
the
pioneer
regional
Tamil
daily,
arrested
journalists
and
closed
down
the
paper.
They
also
raided
transmission
facilities,
such
as
the
television
station
Nitharsanam
and
the
radio
station
of
the
LTTE,
rendering
them
ineffective.
"To
keep
the
Tamil
public
in
the
dark
concerning
their
military
maneuvers
and
to
suppress
local
and
international
criticism
of
possible
military
excess
and
atrocities
of
war,
the
Indian
army
launched
sudden
and
swift
operations
against
the
free
media
in
Jaffna
in
the
early
hours
of
the
morning
of
October
10
[The
author
has
made
a
mistake
with
the
date],
just
a
few
hours
after
the
major
military
onslaught.
The
printing
presses
of
Eelamurasu,
Murasoli
were
blasted
with
explosives
and
the
journalists
were
arrested.
Audio
and
television
stations
were
attacked
and
all
transmission
facilities
rendered
ineffective.
The
world's
largest
democracy
carried
out
the
heinous
crime
of
striking
down
the
very
instrument
of
democracy,
the
media
of
the
people
of
Jaffna,
to
stifle
their
freedom
of
opinion
and
expression."
The
Will
to
Freedom
by
Adele
Balasingham,
page
143
"The
IPKF
units
launched
attacks
against
the
media
and
television
centers
of
the
LTTE
in
Jaffna
between
October
7
and
11
and
also
started
taking
direct
control
of
the
Jaffna
Peninsula.
The
operation,
however,
commenced
somewhat
disastrously.
The
IPKF's
plans
to
capture
the
entire
leadership
of
the
LTTE,
including
Prabakaran,
from
their
headquarters
in
the
Jaffna
University
grounds
ended
in
a
shambles."
Assignment
Colombo
by
J
N
Dixit,
page
213
The
IPKF
imposed
a
curfew
in
the
peninsula,
followed
by
helicopter
gunship
patrolling
the
region.
At
the
beginning,
the
people
of
Jaffna
thought
the
Indians
who
had
came
to
protect
the
Tamils
would
be
friendly
and
helpful,
and
they
did
not
take
the
imposition
of
the
curfew
seriously.
It
began
to
dawn
on
them
the
seriousness
of
the
Indian
army
when
helicopter-gunship
began
to
pound
artillery
shells
and
fire
at
those
who
violated
the
curfew.
On
October
9,
exchanges
of
fire
between
the
Indian
army
and
the
Tamil
militants
took
place
and
by
that
time
reports
also
emerged
that
the
Indian
army
had
arrested
more
than
131
Tamil
militants,
along
with
their
weapons,
ammunition,
explosives
and
communication
equipment.
In
the
afternoon,
according
to
available
reports,
the
LTTE
militants
attacked
a
post
of
the
Madras
regiment,
at
Tellipalai,
with
mortars
and
small
arms.
Again
on
the
same
afternoon,
it
was
alleged
that
LTTE
militants
ambushed
a
Central
Reserve
Police
Force
(CRPF)
convoy
in
the
same
area,
killing
four
CRPF
men.
The
Indian
government,
which
announced
on
October
7
that
it
would
"use
the
strongest
measures
to
deal
with
all
those
who
seek
to
undermine
the
implementation
of
the
Indo-Sri
Lankan
agreement",
awaited
the
IPKF
to
take
on
the
LTTE.
Krishna
Chandra
Pant,
the
Indian
Defense
Minister,
declared
that
the
LTTE
would
no
longer
be
accommodated.
President
Jayewardene
revoked
the
amnesty
given
to
the
LTTE,
outlawed
the
group
and
announced
a
reward
on
1
million
rupees
on
the
head
of
V
Prabakaran.
Pant
was
told
by
Jayewardene,
firmly,
to
incapacitate
the
LTTE
without
further
delay.
On
October
9,
the
military
offensive
code
named
Operaion
Pawan
(Wind)
against
the
LTTE
to
wrest
control
of
Jaffna
was
launched.
New
Delhi
had
taken
a
political
decision
to
pin
down
the
LTTE
to
safeguard
the
Indo-Sri
Lankan
Accord.
The
IPKF
planned
to
capture
Jaffna
town,
dividing
the
area
of
operation
into
two
sectors.
The
area
north
of
Elephant
Pass
was
called
the
Jaffna
sector
and
the
contingency
plan
was
put
under
the
54th
Infantry
Division,
and
the
remainder
was
called
the
Trincomalee
sector,
under
the
36th
Infantry
Division.
The
IPKF
estimated
the
strength
of
the
LTTE
at
around
1,500
in
the
Jaffna
peninsula.
This
figure
was
later
increased
to
2,500
by
the
militant
group's
urgent
reinforcement
arrangements.
About
75
percent
of
the
militants
were
armed
with
AK47
and
G3
automatic
rifles,
light
and
medium
machine
guns,
mortars
and
rocket
launchers.
The
IPKF
anticipated
that
approaches
to
Jaffna
would
be
heavily
defended
by
the
LTTE
in
successive
defense
tiers,
as
these
had
been
prepared
against
the
Sri
Lankan
Army.
Dipender
Singh
writes
that
the
reason
in
selecting
to
take
Jaffna
was
follows,
"It
was
selected
because
Jaffna
had
come
to
symbolize
LTTE
power
and
authority
and
one
that
had
withstood
all
efforts
made
by
the
SLAF
to
capture
it.
Furthermore,
the
LTTE
were
urban
guerillas
and
it
was
in
this
town
that
they
had
their
headquarters,
training
facilities,
munitions
making
factories
and
caches
of
arms
and
ammunition.
It
was
necessary,
therefore,
to
wrest
control
of
this
symbol
to
bring
the
LTTE
back
into
the
mainstream."
The
IPKF
in
Sri
Lanka,
page
90
The
fight
to
take
the
Jaffna
city
was
launched
on
October
10
and
continued
up
to
October
25.
According
to
Dipender
Singh,
the
casualty
figures
during
the
period
of
October
11
to
November
30
1987
were
as
follows:
IPKF:
killed
-
17
officers,
26
junior
commissioned
officers
and
276
ordinary
soldiers;
wounded
-
53
officers,
67
junior
commissioned
officers
and
919
ordinary
soldiers;
LTTE:
killed
1,100.
The
IPKF
Overall
Force
Commander
failed
to
give
any
details
of
causalities
sustained
by
non-combatants.
According
to
reports
from
various
citizen
committees
in
the
region
as
well
as
from
local
human
rights
groups,
more
than
1,000
civilians
were
killed
in
the
campaign
to
take
the
control
of
Jaffna.
In
eastern
Sri
Lanka,
Tamils
as
well
as
Muslims
were
alleged
to
be
victims
of
indiscriminate
or
reprisal
killings
by
both
sides,
as
well
as
rapes.
[A comment It is estimated that more than 6000 Eelam Tamils were killed in the IPKF operation in Sri Lanka. While exact figures are of some value, we should not get distracted away from resolving the fundamental problem. Calculated killing of a single Tamil, for being a Tamil, by an armed force of another nation - be it Sinhalese or Indian- should be enough of a reason to decimate the whole battalion of them by any means.]
The
IPKF
operation
in
Sri
Lanka
turned
out
to
be
one
of
the
biggest
Indian
diplomatic
and
military
debacles
ever.
Billions
of
dollars
in
taxpayers'
money
was
wasted
in
an
adventurist
experiment.
To
date,
successive
Indian
governments
have
failed
to
appoint
an
impartial
inquiry
commission
into
the
Sri
Lankan
fiasco.
The
IPKF
captured
Jaffna
Peninsula,
which
led
the
entire
North
and
Eastern
provinces
degenerating
into
shambles.
The
entire
Tamil
region
fell
under
Indian
occupation.
More
than
2
million
Tamils
were
internally
displaced.
Jaffna
was
without
an
administration
as
the
administrators,
the
LTTE,
had
fled
to
outlying
forest
areas
in
the
Vanni
region,
where
they
set
up
camps,
regrouping
and
preparing
for
guerilla
warfare.
The
war-weary
Tamils
of
Jaffna
gradually
moved
from
churches,
Hindu
temples
and
school
buildings
back
to
their
houses,
but
they
were
disappointed
to
see
their
houses
raised
or
ruined
due
to
artillery
fire.
In
areas
such
as
Chunnakam,
Mallakam,
Uduvil,
Manipay,
Maruthanamadam
and
Inuvil,
more
than
100
civilian
bodies
were
found
by
the
Chunnakam
Citizen
Committee,
of
which
this
writer
was
a
member.
The
deaths
were
widely
attributed
to
the
IPKF.
When
the
IPKF
decided
to
launch
its
campaign
against
the
LTTE
in
Sri
Lanka,
Tamil
Nadu
Chief
Minister
M
G
Ramachandran
was
in
a
hospital
in
Baltimore,
in
the
United
States,
undergoing
treatment.
M
G
Ramachandran,
the
matinee
idol
turned
political
leader,
had
all
along
supported
the
Tamil
cause
in
Sri
Lanka.
According
to
Sachi
Sri
Kantha
in
his
book,
MGR
Movies
Revisited
and
other
essays,
MGR
viewed
the
young
Tamil
rebels
(especially
the
LTTE
and
its
leader
Prabakaran)
as
fighting
for
a
worthy
cause
against
oppression.
When
the
LTTE
was
labeled
as
"The
private
army
of
Mr
M
G
Ramachandran
the
present
Chief
Minister
of
Madras"
MGR
retorted
strongly,
as
reported
in
Time
magazine
(May
11,
1987),
"Tamil
groups
are
spearheading
the
fight
against
the
fascist
action
of
the
Jayewardene
regime
and
they
should
be
congratulated
and
helped."
This
view
has
to
be
interpreted
from
the
perspective
of
M
G
R's
life-long
philosophy
of
"fighting
the
evil
forces".
For
four
decades,
M
G
R
preached
for
the
downtrodden
Tamil
masses
via
Tamil
movie
screens,
a
simple
philosophical
theme
-
"fight
for
your
rights".
"The
Eelam
issue
also
provided
a
psychological
tonic
to
M
G
R
in
his
last
years
in
his
legendary
career.
It
gave
an
opportunity
to
contribute
to
the
history
of
his
land
of
birth.
It
is
well
known
that
displaced
individuals
keep
affectionate
spots
of
their
land
of
their
birth,
and
this
affection
reaches
a
climax
when
they
near
the
end
of
their
lives.
M
G
R
was
a
displaced
individual
and
fate
had
it
that
he
was
moved
to
Tamil
Nadu
as
a
toddler
from
Kandy
[in
Sri
Lanka],
the
place
of
his
birth.
Though
he
earned
fame
in
Tamil
Nadu,
M
G
R
was
treated
as
an
outsider
in
the
political
arena.
Thus
an
active
role
in
the
Eelam
issue
would
have
given
M
G
R
a
psychological
uplift
to
influence
the
history
of
his
land
of
birth.
It
can
be
asserted
that
other
ranking
Indian
politicians
would
not
bother
to
engage
themselves
with
Eelam
issues
as
M
G
R
was,
since
they
do
not
possess,
the
'birth
identity'
M
G
R
had
with
Sri
Lanka."
-
pages
9-10
K
Mohandas,
in
his
book
M
G
R:
The
Man
and
the
Myth,
wrote,
"Though
officially
I
did
not
have
anything
to
do
with
the
accord,
and
whatever
might
be
its
terms
or
fate,
I
was
closely
following
the
developments.
I
felt
that
the
induction
of
IPKF
was
a
wrong
step
fraught
with
grave
consequences
to
the
image
of
India
and
the
morale
of
the
Indian
Army.
There
were
naturally
wide
protests
from
all
Tamil
Nadu
political
parties,
except
sections
of
the
TNCC(I)
and
the
AIADMK.
I
got
a
call
one
night
from
M
G
R
undergoing
medical
tests
at
Brooklyn
Hospital,
USA.
He
asked
me
to
update
him
on
the
political
developments
with
particular
reference
to
the
Sri
Lankan
Tamil
issue.
I,
after
gently
reminding
him
that
I
was
no
longer
the
intelligence
chief
and
therefore
had
no
access
to
classified
information,
gave
him
my
opinion
as
a
layman
that
the
induction
of
the
IPKF
was
a
blunder
which
should
immediately
be
rectified.
He
said
something
which
was
inaudible,
but
he
sounded
very
weak
and
tired."
-
pages
163-164
Again
as
a
continuation
of
the
above
telephone
conversation,
Attar
Chand
in
his
book
M
G
R:
My
Blood
Brother,
reflected
the
sentiments
of
the
Chief
Minister
of
Tamil
Nadu
as
follows:
"The
July
29,
1987,
agreement
between
Rajiv
Gandhi
and
the
Sri
Lankan
President
Jayewardene
received
only
a
lukewarm
endorsement
from
M
G
R.
He
appeared
to
have
been
disappointed
with
the
turn
of
events
in
Jaffna
after
the
agreement
began
to
be
implemented.
Available
reports
suggest
that
he
was
bitter
at
the
way
IPKF
was
put
in
the
situation
of
fighting
and
killing
cadres
of
the
LTTE,
and
he
had
expressed
himself
strongly
in
a
letter
to
Rajiv
Gandhi
from
Baltimore,
where
he
was
convalescing.
The
prime
minister
had
to
send
a
special
emissary
from
Vancouver
to
Baltimore
to
explain
the
government's
stand
and
also
persuade
M
G
R
to
be
more
emphatic
in
his
support
for
the
agreement."
-
page
104
A
P
Venkateswaran,
a
reputed
senior
diplomat
and
formerly
the
secretary
to
the
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
India,
who
was
sacked
by
Rajiv
Gandhi,
made
the
announcement
of
his
sacking
in
a
televised
news
conference
in
a
most
undiplomatic
and
unconventional
way,
in
February
1987.
In
an
interview
with
Asia
Week
dated
March
4,
1988,
he
said
as
follows:
Question:
Should
India
have
gone
into
Sri
Lanka?
Venkateswaran:
I
think
it
was
a
mistake
in
the
manner
we
did
it,
without
careful
evaluation
and
working
out
the
full
package
of
devolution
of
powers
for
autonomy
to
the
Tamil
provinces.
It
is
also
important
that
the
Tamil
leadership
be
associated
with
the
accord.
In
today's
context,
the
individual
cannot
decide
for
people
without
their
consent.
Now
we
have
the
sorry
spectacle
of
both
Sinhalese
and
Tamils
fiercely
opposed
to
the
accord.
Question:
Was
India's
military
action
against
Tamils
warranted?
Venkateswaran:
The
purpose
of
a
peacekeeping
force
is
not
to
take
sides
with
one
or
other
of
the
opposing
groups,
but
to
separate
them,
so
as
to
avoid
a
conflict.
However,
today
we
have
the
IPKF
waging
a
full-scale
offensive
against
the
very
group
which
it
was
ostensibly
sent
to
protect.
It
is
ironic
that
the
causalities
among
the
civilian
population
in
the
Northern
and
Eastern
provinces
have
been
higher,
as
a
result
of
this
offensive,
than
the
announced
causalities
of
either
the
IPKF
or
the
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam.
Question:
How
else
can
insurgency
be
curbed?
Venkateswaran:
Historically
speaking,
there
is
no
instance
of
insurgency
being
quelled
by
armed
action
of
security
forces,
except
in
the
case
of
the
communist
insurgency
in
Malaysia.
But
the
situation
as
well
as
the
circumstances
there
were
very
different
from
what
prevails
in
the
Tamil
areas.
Question:
Should
India
halt
the
operation?
Venkateswaran:
We
have
blotted
our
copybook
badly
both
politically
and
militarily.
It
will
take
decades
to
remove
the
bitterness
which
has
been
created
by
our
military
action
in
the
Tamil
provinces.
Let
us
hope
that
this
bitterness
will
not
spill
over
to
Tamils
in
our
own
country.
It
is
high
time
that
the
effort
at
armed
suppression
of
those
opposed
to
the
accord
ceases
and
political
process
be
restored.
All
along
we
have
been
pronouncing
on
the
futility
of
attempting
a
military
solution
to
the
problem
and
have
consistently
advocated
a
political
solution.
It
will
behoove
us
to
follow
the
advice
we
have
been
offering.
Question:
What
are
the
long-term
implications
of
the
Indian
action
in
Sri
Lanka?
Venkateswaran:
We
have
sown
seeds
of
bitterness
for
decades
even
among
the
people
of
Tamil
ethnic
stock
in
Sri
Lanka.
Sooner
or
later
the
Indian
forces
will
have
to
withdraw
whether
peace
is
restored
or
not.
One
can
say
definitely
that
when
this
happens,
we
will
have
left
Sri
Lanka
in
worse
mess
than
we
have
went
in.
........
For
additional
views
please
read
a
series
of
articles
"India's
Vietnam."