As Civilian Deaths in the Civil War Climb, Government Shows Little Appetite for Peace

by Robert Muggah, Toronto Star, February 24, 2008

Sri Lanka is quietly sliding into a humanitarian nightmare. Since the election of the nationalist government of Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005 and the resumption of war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) late last year, the number of civilian deaths has jumped sharply. In the past six weeks, more than 180 Tamil, Muslim and Sinhalese citizens have been killed, many with bullets through their temples. Reprisal targeting of Sinhalese – usually by way of explosives – is on the rise.

The international donor community is at a loss as to what to do. A Norwegian-brokered ceasefire in early 2002 was expected to usher in a new era of peace after decades of civil war. The United States, Japan, the European Union (EU) and others rapidly introduced carrots and sticks to encourage a serious devolution of power and alleviate suffering. In the wake of the devastating tsunami in late 2004, it was widely hoped that a spirit of reconciliation might emerge from a legacy of tragedy. But these efforts were spectacular failures.

The present government displays little appetite for peace. Much like previous administrations led by Jayawardane, Premadasa or Kumaratunga, Rajapaksa claims that a military solution to the LTTE question is within his grasp. The current government differs in one important respect: It has dropped all pretense to negotiate a political settlement.

When it refused more than $4 billion (U.S.) in conditional aid in favour of war, donors feared they had overplayed their hand. And despite a procession of U.S., Japanese, Norwegian, Canadian and Indian diplomats flying to the capital, Colombo, to address the suffering of civilians, the government refused to implement even cosmetic changes to enhance due process or redress.

The efforts of South Asia's regional power, India, have yielded comparatively little to stem Sri Lanka's slide into violence. Although India has long played a Janus-faced role in Sri Lanka, it is alarmed by the contagion effects of the long-running war. The UN Refugee Agency estimates that more than 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees are languishing in southern India and thousands more have sought safe haven since the resumption of war. While this has irritated India's own sizable Tamil population, the Sri Lankan government's repressive tactics risk triggering militarization in refugee camps and at home.

If the current military strategy does not change course, the Sri Lankan war will likely continue without end. As the daily challenges facing NATO coalition forces in Afghanistan show, while battles may be won, wars are just as easily lost. Sri Lanka's government does not appear to have learned this lesson. Civilians are paying the price of this war, as direct casualties in the north and east and as the "new poor" due to spiralling inflation and unemployment in the south.

Because the next round of presidential elections is not until April 2010 and the war remains popular with the Sinhalese majority, it is unlikely that the violence will decline in the near term. The government is so heavily invested in the logic of war that any reversal may lose it future votes. Paradoxically, cries of indignation from outsiders, and even from the domestic human rights lobby, may actually strengthen the government's hand.

The outside world is watching with a sense of déjà vu. The war has claimed more than 75,000 lives since the early 1980s, and more than 1 million people have been internally displaced. While horrified by the scale of killing, international donors are exhausted and more inclined to withdraw than pursue strategic engagement. Meanwhile, the domestic opposition is scattered, terrified of being spirited away in the ubiquitous white vans that troll the streets. Short of a spectacular reversal in the military fortunes of either side or a major economic crisis, the situation will likely simmer on.

While the international community should avoid aggravating the situation, there are at least four ways it could potentially keep Sri Lanka from collapsing entirely.

First, cautious diplomatic pressure must continuously be applied in order to convince the government and the LTTE that a military solution is not viable. The international community should recall that it supported the proscription of the LTTE as a "terrorist organization" several years ago. If Western and Eastern governments are to stimulate dialogue, they will need to be sensitive to both parties' positions and their own role.

Second, if rebuffed, the U.S. and the EU could consider withdrawing the country from the General System of Preferences, which applies reduced taxes and levies to certain Sri Lankan exports, such as tea and textiles. Such a tactic would signal disapproval of the country's state of governance and could reduce its capacity to wage war.

Third, because there are no international observers to monitor human rights in Sri Lanka, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could appoint a special envoy to the country. An envoy could begin documenting the scale of armed violence, which is currently under-reported owing to fear, attacks on reporters and self-censorship.

Fourth, given regional implications or even little-used article 99 of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council should be encouraged to take up the issue. On the recommendation of a special envoy, the council can identify political and economic sanctions to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. Perhaps most important, such measures could potentially restrict arms imports to the country.

The human costs are almost certainly set to rise in the coming months. A massive military offensive is being planned that will lead to more deaths and more displacement. Without concerted engagement, the situation will worsen further still.

Robert Muggah (Muggah@hei.unige.ch) is research director of the Small Arms Survey in Geneva and is the author of Relocation Failures: A Short History of Internal Displacement and Resettlement in Sri Lanka (forthcoming).