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Explaining the Sri Lanka ConflictPart 2by Gogol G, Voices in Exile, March 23, 2009
Part 1 here.
These are good questions and well-appreciated. I’d like to answer, but before I do, I’d like to say that soul-searching and empathy are steps towards reconciliation, and I’ve definitely done quite a bit prior to now. But my emphasis on the structural aspects of this conflict is due to the fact that I’ve followed events from before the beginning of the last peace process — our most significant effort yet — and I realized that since 2002, the effects of debilitating war, a shattered economy, and a tragic tsunami were not enough to bring people together. Something else was stronger than all of that. I also want to say that I don’t want to be pigeon-holed into a “side”. Yes, I’m Tamil. But I’m after a rectification of what’s unjust, that will forever be “my side”. I hedge my bets with the LTTE because it’s the most probable means to this, and I’m shamelessly candid enough to admit that I’ll switch to a better alternative at the drop of a hat.
We, as Tamils, must remember not to sugar coat the abuses of the Tigers or other groups in this war, for after this war, we need to be able to transition to something non-authoritarian. Of course, context is needed: The LTTE kicked out tens of thousands of Muslims from Jaffna, stating that they were working with the government. They’ve killed thousands of Sinhalese and Tamils, intentionally and unintentionally, as well as the other early militias (who may have sided with India). The Sri Lankan government has killed most of the 100,000+ civilians who died in this war, and most of them are Tamil. The Sri Lankan government killed 60,000+ Sinhalese in 2 weeks during the JVP rebellion in 1971 and thousands more Sinhalese again in 1989. The Tigers tightly control media in their areas. The government has never prosecuted the death of any journalist in 25 years (TARAKI: Media Under Threat in Sri Lanka - Part 3 of 3). The Tiger administration is not very open, and it’s not always efficient. The Sri Lankan government has gone from a majoritarian state to police state to dictatorship. But you’d have tunnel vision if you didn’t notice that the Tigers do some things better than the government. Its courts are fairer and faster, they have their own law college, and they offer lawyers trained at their law colleges to the defendants by default. You can’t bribe police (you’ll get fined if you try); waiters at their restaurants will not accept tips. It’s safe for girls at night; this is unheard of in South Asia.
I can see how the Sinhalese Buddhist regional-minority complex could have formed. Ever since the first elections in 1956, the same formula of pro-Sinhalese rhetoric and fear-mongering against Tamils that works so well to get them elected has made Sinhalese fear Tamils in the island to the point where they hate. But with 70 million Tamils nearby in India, this earns them a lot of enemies. Plus, in nearby China, there’s Buddhist Tibet. Yesterday was the 50th anniversary of the Dalai Lama fleeing, and he said, “Today, the religion, culture, language and identity — which successive generations of Tibetans have considered more precious than their lives — are nearing extinction; in short, the Tibetan people are regarded like criminals deserving to be put to death.” (UK Times, 3/9/09)
We also must recognize that compromise is necessary, but a fair compromise does not necessarily mean “give up half”. It’s not a commodity that can be quantified — it’s equality and justice for an entire persecuted ethnic group. The LTTE had ISGA proposals in 2004 where important federal-regional power relationships were left out so as to be negotiated, but the Sri Lankan government rejected that as “too much”. Until the structure is fundamentally changed, the different ethnic groups will remain polarized and hostile towards one another, with no bridge imaginably possible, and our worst-case scenarios may become reality soon enough.
Hi Daniel, I see what you’re saying about compromise — in the process of settling a conflict, you have to be willing to accept that justice won’t be fully served to progress ahead. That’s a good point. We need it ultimately, because issues like river resources, border security, and perhaps sea patrol will need to be shared. So long as the ethnic groups are structurally shielded from discrimination, even federalism (e.g., Swiss / Belgian / Canadian) would work. The hard part is getting to a point where the rulers are willing to agree. Blacks had an international boycott of South African apartheid; Gandhi had post-WWII devastation in Europe and an uncontainable number of supporters. Occupation only ends when it is no longer economically profitable to maintain. Once we get there, with no choice but to stop war forever, compromise will be necessary and key, like you said.
1. I think 50/50 is somewhat fair. It’s fair and makes as much sense as the parity of French and English in Canada, or how Quebec receives a net income from the Canadian government. Even if all Sinhalese ganged up on Tamils (e.g., colonize NE lands), they could be opposed. As it is now, Sinhalese get more than 75% seats, and we know how the story went. (Minority rights laws technically exist, but they have never been implemented seriously. The NE Tamils, in a coalition together, only get less than 10% of seats in the electoral system.)
2. No, I’ve heard that Tamils had 30-40% of the government jobs when the British left (Blowback, pp. 46-47). I see what you’re saying, it’s kind of unfair. (Tamils were preferred by the British, and their farmlands aren’t nearly as good.) But it’s no justification to say, “Anyone who can’t speak Sinhalese is fired” as promised in the 1956 election and delivered.
3. Yes and no to the Tamils opposing them. Yes — if we think the state needs to be challenged and only if challenging the state entails challenging Tamils who work with the state (e.g. paramilitaries). But many in the early militias meant well and yet their groups were decimated, and not all Tamil politicians deemed moderate, although a part of the government, worked hand-and-glove with it — no. But the paramilitaries’ leaderships became controlled by India, which had its own agenda — yes. Suicide bombing is a tactic. My argument about the label terrorism applies to ICG. Why were the suicide Air Tiger attacks “kamikazi”, but the 2001 Katunayake attack, where no civilians killed, “terrorist”? Thankfully, the near-suicidal missions in Normandy aren’t called this. There’s no good logic. The LTTE uses child soldiers, which is gruesome. The government uses child soldiers too. The government also kills dissenters, and instead of suicide, it drops banned cluster and fire bombs on civilians. So if we’re fair, we apply the label to both or neither. As I said previously, I’m against using the label “terrorism” (even in “state terrorism”, because that lends validity to the label; unfortunately already, when Chandrika Kumaratunga was president of Sri Lanka, she described previous Sri Lankan governments as “state terror” ). But we also should understand why a few kids flee home to join the LTTE; we can’t fully ignore their ability to think and act for themselves. Beate Arnestad made a good documentary about this in 2006, called “My Daughter The Terrorist” (glorifying neither side, deploring war, but showing the reasons why Tigers fight) — this is a quick 1-hr film, well worth watching: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j89ZVnfOqEw
4. I agree with you, Daniel, I find fault in the way that the LTTE has fought. Again, not for entirely the same reasons (2/3 of LTTE suicide bombs are at sea, and a majority of the rest are purely military). Rather, civilians get killed, society is authoritarian (if orderly), and societal equality hasn’t permeated very much yet. I think it’s silly for Tamils to deny this, but I think some might be scared that the context may be lost — and it shouldn’t.
5. I think how the world views the LTTE is also partly up to the world. They labeled Nelson Mandela’s ANC terrorist in 1960, Mandela was only delisted in 2008. It also depends on geopolitics, and whether it helps to demonize the LTTE for other reasons. The NE has no oil, but it has a nice harbour (google “String of Pearls”, or visit http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/indian_ocean/index.htm for full details of the implications). If Britain can designate Iceland a terrorist nation in October 2008 in order to seize its investments, how can the world trust that the terrorist label hasn’t been misused elsewhere? Iceland cannot remain a terrorist state forever. Final Thoughts:I ended up where I began — I am still proud of TVO for the stand they took to have an intelligent discussion in plain view for all to see. See my critique of TVO’s handling of the SL situation for more on that. The producer of The Agenda, Daniel Kitts, posted a set of questions to the “Sinhalese / pro-Colombo” section of the commentators with questions like, “Don’t you think Tamils have been discriminated? What about SLA abuses? Why not federalism?” As of yet, only one person has responded (username “i_hate_liars”), and those misguided comments speak for themselves. They only reaffirm mine, so there’s not much worth saying there. No one else has responded to Daniel’s last question with more credible answers. Many people are unaware of the context and roots of the Sri Lankan conflict or have a few misunderstandings, but would like to know more. They want to hear a fair and full honest explanation of everything. This page is a starting resource for those who wish to gain more insight into the conflict. In case you’re wondering, 90% of the information I presented above can be found in the following 2 books: Since this page doesn’t pretend to be the final word or answer all questions, you can help by doing one of two things: Correspondence can be sent to voicesinexile@gmail.com
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