SRI LANKA’S JUDICIARY:
POLITICISED COURTS, COMPROMISED RIGHTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1

II. A LEGACY OF DIMINISHING INDEPENDENCE .....................................................2
   A. THE COLONIAL AND POST-INDEPENDENCE JUDICIARY .................................................................2
   B. THE 1972 CONSTITUTION’S REJECTION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE ..........................................3
   C. THE 1978 CONSTITUTION’S AMBITIOUS EMBRACE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE ......................3
   D. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF SRI LANKAN COURTS ....................................................................4

III. JURISDICTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE COURTS ...........................................5
   A. THE CONSTITUTION’S BARRIERS TO JUDICIAL ACTION ................................................................5
   B. EMERGENCY LAWS......................................................................................................................6
      1. Emergency regulations.......................................................................................................... .......6
      2. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). ......................................................................................8

IV. POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE JUDICIARY.....................................................8
   A. APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT ....................................................................................8
      1. The president’s appointment power .........................................................................................8
      2. The constitutional council.......................................................................................................9
      3. The chief justice .....................................................................................................................10
   B. REMOVAL OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES ...................................................................................12
   C. APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS IN THE LOWER COURTS ..........................................................13
      1. The JSC and the Seventeenth Amendment ................................................................................13
      2. Appointments and removals by the JSC ....................................................................................14
   D. INTIMIDATION OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES ..................................................................................15

V. FAILURE TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS..............................................16
   A. THE ABSENCE OF REMEDIES FOR ILLEGAL DETENTION IN LOWER COURTS................................16
      1. Detention and magistrate courts...............................................................................................16
      2. Habeas corpus ............................................................................................................................20
      3. The failure to discourage illegal detention by damages actions and criminal prosecution......20
      4. Remedies in the Supreme Court.................................................................................................21
   B. THE SUPREME COURT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW .....................................................................22

VI. THE SUPREME COURT, EXECUTIVE POWER AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY .............................................................................................................24
   A. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNITARY STATE .......................................................................24
      1. The PTOMS case .......................................................................................................................25
      2. The demerger case ....................................................................................................................25
   B. THE SUPREME COURT AND EXECUTIVE POWER .........................................................................26
      1. The checkpoints and eviction cases ...........................................................................................26
      2. The Waters Edge and Lanka Marine Services cases.................................................................26

VII. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................28
### APPENDICES

A. Map of Sri Lanka .........................................................................................................................30
B. Sri Lanka’s Court System ............................................................................................................31
C. Glossary of Abbreviations ...........................................................................................................32
D. About the International Crisis Group ........................................................................................34
E. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia Since 2006 ............................................................35
F. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ....................................................................................................38
SRI LANKA’S JUDICIARY: POLITICISED COURTS, COMPROMISED RIGHTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Sri Lanka’s judiciary is failing to protect constitutional and human rights. Rather than assuaging conflict, the courts have corroded the rule of law and worsened ethnic tensions. Rather than constraining militarisation and protecting minority rights, a politicised bench under the just-retired chief justice has entrenched favoured allies, punished foes and blocked compromises with the Tamil minority. Its intermittent interventions on important political questions have limited settlement options for the ethnic conflict. Extensive reform of the judicial system – beginning with a change in approach from the newly appointed chief justice – and an overhaul of counterproductive emergency laws are essential if the military defeat of the LTTE is to lead to a lasting peace that has the support of all ethnic communities.

At independence in 1948, Sri Lanka had a comparatively professional and independent judiciary. New constitutions in 1972 and 1978, however, cut back on the judiciary’s protection from parliamentary and presidential intrusions. The 1978 constitution vested unfettered control of judicial appointments in presidential hands. Unlike other South Asian countries, no strong tradition or norm of consultation between the president and the chief justice developed. Nor did predictable rules immune from manipulation, such as promotion by seniority, emerge.

The Seventeenth Amendment, enacted in October 2001, attempted to depoliticise a range of public institutions, including the judiciary, by establishing a constitutional council. The council limited the power of the president to make direct appointments to the courts and independent commissions. Since 2005, however, Presidents Chandrika Kumaratunga and Mahinda Rajapaksa have wilfully ignored this constitutional limit by refusing to convene the constitutional council. An increasing proportion of President Rajapaksa’s appointees to the higher court have been from the attorney general’s office. The result is benches stacked to favour the government. The 1978 constitution’s system for removing judges is also broken. Vested in parliamentary control, impeachment is only ever threatened on thinly veiled political grounds against judges who have broken with a ruling coalition. No effective mechanism exists to sanction corrupt or abusive judges.

At the same time, the recently retired chief justice, Sarath N. Silva, chose to exercise his powers in ways that further sapped the independence of the lower courts and the Supreme Court. Through the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), he controlled appointments, transfers and removals of lower court judges. He used those administrative powers to punish judges out of step with his wishes and to reward those who toed the line. Police and other politically influential constituencies used their close ties to the chief justice to influence judicial decisions. Fear of sanction by the JSC has undermined judges’ willingness to move aggressively against the police or the military, particularly in cases involving the rights of Tamil detainees. Entrenching this problem are informal local networks of contacts and collaboration between police, judges and the bar. In part as a result of these ties, there are no effective checks on endemic torture in police custody.

Formal constitutional and statutory rules further undermine judicial independence, deepening Sri Lanka’s political and ethnic crises and compounding harms to human and constitutional rights. Most importantly, Sri Lanka has two sets of emergency laws – regulations issued under the Public Security Ordinance, No. 25 of 1947, and the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) – which impose severe limits on courts’ jurisdiction and authority to prevent abusive detention and torture. Emergency regulations and the PTA are used disproportionately in Tamil areas and against Tamil suspects. Without the repeal or radical reform of these laws, continued political alienation of Tamils is virtually assured.

Neither the local magistrate courts nor the provincial high courts provide remedies for illegal or abusive detention under either the emergency laws or the criminal code. Threshold review of detention decisions by magistrates is superficial. The “habeas corpus” remedy putatively available in the high courts rarely suc-
ceeds in gaining releases. Some relief can at times be found by filing a “fundamental rights” application in the Supreme Court. But distance, the difficulty of travel, especially for Tamil litigants, and the cost of hiring one of a limited pool of Colombo-based Supreme Court lawyers create impassable barriers for most litigants.

The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Silva did little to alleviate this deficit of justice. To the contrary, its recent opinions tried to cut off options for raising claims in international forums. Silva’s court also intervened at crucial moments in the political process to strike down negotiated agreements designed to address Tamil concerns, thereby strengthening political hardliners among Sinhala nationalist parties and deepening the ethnic divide. While the court has been lauded for recent judgments protecting some rights and invalidating corrupt government contracts, these opinions do not pose a substantial challenge to excessive power of the executive presidency. Judicial interventions against corruption have been sufficiently unpredictable that they provide no real incentive to future office holders to refrain from misusing state resources.

The June 2009 retirement of Sarath Silva and the appointment of the most senior member of the Supreme Court, Asoka de Silva, as the new chief justice offer an opportunity for urgently needed reforms to begin. The new chief justice should take immediate steps to depoliticise the JSC, press for a speedy resolution of the constitutional council case currently pending before the court and begin to establish a more favourable climate in the courts for fundamental rights cases and for those challenging detentions under emergency laws. The JSC, chaired by the new chief justice, should order magistrates in areas where LTTE suspects are being held to use their wide powers to visit and monitor the conditions of the more than 10,000 surrendered or suspected members of the LTTE now in state custody. For any reforms to have lasting impact, however, they will need political support from an empowered bench and active bar willing to resist an executive that has shown little commitment to an independent judiciary.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the President and Government of Sri Lanka:

1. Reconstitute immediately the constitutional council under the Seventeenth Amendment by appointing the slate of nominees already forwarded by the government and the opposition parties and commit to respecting the council’s judicial appointments until a more independent and effective mechanism for judicial selection is operational.

2. Negotiate with the opposition parties in good faith to amend the Seventeenth Amendment to reduce political parties’ involvement in the constitutional council, and instead include members of the Supreme Court selected by lot, president’s counsel of long standing and representatives of civil society organisations with demonstrated experience and knowledge concerning judicial selection, constitutional law and fundamental rights.

3. Repeal sections of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations No. 1 of 2005 and the Emergency (Prevention and Prohibition of Specified Terrorist Activities) Regulations No. 7 of 2006 (and all previous emergency regulations that may remain in force at present) that authorise detention without charge outside areas of ongoing military hostilities, that derogate from the criminal procedure code and that criminalise conduct involving the exercise of free speech and association rights.

4. Move the administration of the legal framework set out in Emergency Regulations and the PTA from the defence ministry to the justice ministry, with clear civilian oversight over the national security apparatus, especially with regard to detentions and detainees’ access to justice.

To the Government and Opposition Parties in Parliament:

5. Amend the provisions of the 1978 constitution concerning the judiciary in order to:

   a) allow actions against the president for the non-performance of mandatory legal duties, e.g., by the way of writs of *certiorari*, *prohibition* or *mandamus* (Article 35);

   b) prohibit by law sitting judges from holding other remunerative and/or administrative positions during their tenure on the bench or from securing such posts on commissions or otherwise after their retirement; and

   c) create an independent judicial tribunal for the adjudication of charges of misconduct or incapacity of members of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, where members of said tribunal would be chosen by lot and would exclude any judges who were alleged to be connected in any way with the alleged offences.

6. Enact a contempt of court law limiting and imposing procedural constraints on the imposition of contempt sanctions in line with the 2005 views of the UN Human Rights Committee.
7. Amend Chapter III (in particular Article 15) and Chapter XVIII of the constitution, the Public Security Ordinance, and the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions) to state that derogations from and restrictions on constitutional and human rights are limited by law to be consistent with the constraints imposed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

8. Overrule the *Singarasa* judgment of the Supreme Court by legislation or constitutional amendment, clarifying Sri Lanka’s compliance with the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and committing to following the views of the Human Rights Committee in past and future cases concerning compensation and other remedies.

9. Enact legislation requiring the immediate publication and wide public dissemination of any regulations (including emergency regulations) issued by the government and opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, with the provision of necessary funding.

To the Constitutional Council (once reestablished):

10. Follow a rule of seniority in appointments to the higher judiciary except in cases where the constitutional council makes a public finding that compelling reasons exist for declining to promote a judge.

11. Place a moratorium on the promotion of officials from the attorney general’s office to the higher judiciary, permitting appointments from the attorney general’s office only after there is numerical balance between career-judge appointees and appointees from the private bar on the one hand, and members of the attorney general’s staff on the other in those courts.

To the United National Party (UNP):

12. Express publicly the party’s commitment to reforming the constitution’s judicial appointment and removal system and the elimination of the emergency powers of arrest, detention and prosecution without full due process protections under the Public Security Ordinance and the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions) (PTA), until constitutional amendments can be passed to improve those processes.

To the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka:

13. Task publicly the registrar of the Supreme Court with independent responsibility for assigning judges to benches of the court in specific cases by random lot, and bar any judge of the court from taking any role in the selection of benches.

14. Publish clear rules for when benches of more than three judges will be formed in cases raising challenges to administrative or executive action and when appeals or re-hearings from three-judge benches will be heard by larger benches of the court.

15. Publish clear standards for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretionary fundamental rights jurisdiction, including rules that ensure that challenges to ongoing detentions are addressed speedily even pending the filing of any criminal charges, that victims of torture and their families receive adequate compensation, and that all petitioners are protected from improper coercion or violence while their cases are pending.

16. Even in the absence of legislation requiring the publication of Supreme Court opinions, direct the registrars of the higher judiciary to publish immediately and disseminate widely judgments from those courts in Sinhala, Tamil and English.

17. Order the expeditious adjudication of challenges to the president’s non-application of the Seventeenth Amendment.

To the Judicial Service Commission (JSC):

18. Promulgate clear rules to ensure due process protections and publicity in proceedings against judges for misconduct in the JSC, including the requirements that judges be notified of the specific charges against them; that judges have an opportunity to respond in writing and with the aid of counsel; that any findings of misconduct be promptly made available to the judge; and that JSC decisions can be appealed to Supreme Court panels.

19. Publish a schedule of appointments and transfers for magistrate judges that minimises uncertainty or manipulation in the location and duration of appointments; derogations from the schedule should be open to appeal to the commission and allowed only under publicly stated exceptional circumstances.

20. Promulgate rules requiring all settlements between police and victims of torture to be subject to approval by a magistrate judge, who should ensure that victims are not subject to undue pressure in reaching settlements and that the settlement is fair.
21. Order magistrates to use their wide powers to visit and monitor conditions in detention centres housing surrendered and suspected LTTE members; and organise training workshops for magistrates to equip them to use their monitoring powers more effectively.

To the Attorney General:

22. Expand the role of state counsel in the magistrate courts, tasking them with the role of providing a check on police prosecution of ordinary crimes to ensure against the use of torture or other forms of abusive treatment or discrimination.

23. Expedite investigations and prosecutions of disappearances, illegal detention, torture or killings by state actors.

To the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Other International Donors:

24. Ensure that any further funds dispersed on the justice sector are not used as mechanisms for leverage by political actors or factions within the judiciary.

Colombo/Brussels, 30 June 2009
SRI LANKA’S JUDICIARY: POLITICISED COURTS, COMPROMISED RIGHTS

I. INTRODUCTION

On the evening of 27 September 2008, a grenade was thrown into the house of prominent Sri Lankan human rights lawyer J.C. Weliamuna.1 It shattered windows but did not harm Weliamuna, his wife or two young children.2 The incident stunned Sri Lanka’s legal community, normally insulated from direct violence, but was part of a longstanding pattern of intimidation and more subtle manipulation of the judicial system.3 As a result, the Sri Lankan judiciary’s ability to fairly adjudicate legal questions implicating the sensitive political and human rights issues at the heart of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict has been deeply compromised.

At a local level, magistrate courts supervise criminal and military detention but rarely intervene to prevent or condemn ill-treatment, torture or prolonged illegal detention. Provincial high courts can issue “writs of habeas corpus” as remedies for illegal detention, but with little effect. While the Supreme Court provides partial relief in some detention cases and torture, its location in Colombo and the difficulty of travel for litigants, especially Tamils from the north and east of the island, render that option unavailable to many potential petitioners.

The Supreme Court under recently retired Chief Justice Sarath Nanda Silva also emerged as a pivotal, unpredictable and contentious political actor. The court has issued populist judgments condemning fiscal improprieties and a handful of decisions constraining some of the Rajapaksa government’s anti-terrorism policies, but in disputes touching on the core of executive power, the Supreme Court has not acted. In cases related to the ethnic conflict, the court has reached out to invalidate arrangements fashioned to achieve difficult political compromises. This has entrenched an unflinching vision of Sinhala4 nationalism, political centralisation and the unitary state that runs counter to effective forms of devolution of power and power-sharing.

This report, based on interviews with lawyers, litigants, current and former judges and magistrates, and government officials, examines the role of both inferior and higher courts in Sri Lanka’s violent political and ethnic conflicts. It explains how formal constitutional and statutory rules and the practices of police, judges and government officials have undermined the independence of those tribunals. The net result is unprincipled discretion exercised in ways that further the goals of powerful political actors, while undermining the rule of law, deepening the political crisis and compounding harm to human and constitutional rights.

Without addressing this corrosion, Sri Lanka is unlikely to forge the stable political compromises that might now be available with the military defeat of the LTTE. Courts presently provide no guarantee of personal security or redress against arbitrary state violence, let alone the possibility of transitional justice, necessary for a transition from violence. They are more likely to destabilise political compromises that could help mitigate Sri Lanka’s enduring social fissures. Much needs to be done to insulate judges from political and other improper influences and to allow them once more to guarantee elementary civil and political rights and to play their crucial part in moving Sri Lanka from war to lasting peace.

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1 Such attacks are part of a larger human rights crisis in Sri Lanka. See Crisis Group Asia Reports No125, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, 14 June 2007; and No146, Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage, 20 February 2008.
4 In everyday usage, Sinhala and Sinhalese are often interchangeable. In this paper, Sinhala will be used in all cases except when referring to the ethnic group as a collective noun, as in “the Sinhalese”.

II. A LEGACY OF DIMINISHING INDEPENDENCE

The precolonial Sinhala kingdoms had a multi-tiered judiciary headed by a “Maha Naduwa”, or Great Court, until its abolition by the British in 1815.5 The contemporary court structure emerged from colonial institutions, particularly those imposed by nineteenth-century British governor generals. Surprisingly, colonial-era courts evinced a high degree of independence.

A. THE COLONIAL AND POST-INDEPENDENCE JUDICIARY

Under Dutch rule, Colombo, Jaffna and Galle provinces each had a Court of Justice.6 British rule in 1798 overhauled the courts and introduced English common law and institutions. An 1833 Charter of Justice reorganised the judiciary by creating a “Supreme Court of the Island of Ceylon”, a High Court of Appeal, five provincial courts and a lower tier of district courts.7 This basic structure is still discernible today.

An “old boy’s club”8 recruited largely from the civil service until 1939, the colonial judiciary nevertheless had a reputation for independence and professionalism.9 Judges would “not infrequently assert their independent position to the manifest detriment of the Government”.10 In 1937, for example, the Supreme Court overturned a governor’s deportation order against English labour activist Mark Anthony Bracegirdle, who had protested restrictions on estate workers’ organising efforts.11 Freeing Bracegirdle, the court rejected the state’s argument that “the safety of the State is a matter of paramount concern and every other principle must give way to the safety of the State”.12

Independence in February 1948 did not change the courts’ basic architecture.13 Post-independence courts inherited from their colonial antecedents customs and expectations of independence from political influence. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of England, a supervisory body for Sri Lanka courts during the early post-colonial period, confirmed this. It explained in 1964 that “the importance of securing the independence of the judges and maintaining the dividing line between the executive was appreciated by those who framed the [Sri Lankan] Constitution”.14 The Privy Council also held that while the 1947 Soulbury Constitution – which governed the island for the first quarter-century of independence – did not “confer a power of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation on the courts … the courts exercised such power on the ground that it was implicit in the Constitution”.15

Little came of this judicial review power. The Soulbury Constitution contained few means to judicially enforce rights.16 The only attempt by a court to strike down a law as in conflict with the constitution came in 1956, when the district judge of Colombo invalidated the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956, which had made Sinhala the official language.17 Be-

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11 Patrick Lawrence, Conversations in a Failing State (Hong Kong, 2008), pp. 28-29.
12 Quoted in M.J.A. Cooray, Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, op. cit., p. 58.
13 All then-applicable jurisdictional ordinances remained in force. J.A.L. Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri Lanka, op. cit., p. 487. Judges of the Supreme Court were to be appointed by the governor general and served without diminishment of salary until the age of 62, with one possible twelve-month extension. M.J.A. Cooray, Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, op. cit., p. 69.
16 Section 29 did state that “[n]o such law shall” infringe on rights of free speech or religious exercise, or impose special privileges or disabilities based on religious or communal identity. M.J.A. Cooray, Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
17 L.J.M. Cooray, Constitutional Government in Sri Lanka 1796-1977, op. cit., p. 272. The act, also known as the “Sinhala only” act, “effectively ended the two-language formula
power to review legislation after enactment. Appeals to the Privy Council in London were abolished.\textsuperscript{23} A 1973 administration of justice law abolished the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, creating instead a single Supreme Court comprising some, but not all, of the dismissed judges.\textsuperscript{24} The cabinet of ministers appointed all judges, while the justice minister had broad authority to transfer them.\textsuperscript{25} Judges, as before, could be removed for misconduct by parliament.\textsuperscript{26} Between 1972 and 1978, not one fundamental rights case was adjudicated.\textsuperscript{27}

C. The 1978 Constitution's Ambivalent Embrace of Judicial Independence

The current constitution, adopted in 1978, reversed course and strengthened judicial independence, but without abandoning key constraints on judicial power. It abolished the constitutional court, moving all judicial powers back into a hierarchy of courts headed by a Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{28} It mandated not only a Supreme Court but also a Court of Appeal and a system of high courts.\textsuperscript{29} The new constitution also included a section captioned “independence of the judiciary” that mandated judges exercise their powers “without being subject to any direction or interference proceeding from any other person except a superior court, tribunal, institution or other person entitled under law to direct or supervise such judge”.\textsuperscript{30}

Chapter III of the 1978 constitution listed eight fundamental rights, including free speech, association and conscience; freedom from torture and illegal detention; and equality.\textsuperscript{31} Chapter III took a “minimalist” approach

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\textsuperscript{24} Wickramaratne, *Fundamental Rights in Sri Lanka*, op. cit., p. 87
\textsuperscript{25} Marasinghe, *Evolution of Constitutional Governance*, op. cit., p. 147.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Art. 116(1) of 1978 constitution. Article 116(2) made it a criminal offence to interfere with the judiciary.
\textsuperscript{31} Arts. 10-17 of 1978 constitution.
to human rights, taking no account of developments in civil and political rights since the 1950s, or economic, social and cultural rights. Finally, the constitution allowed more restrictions on rights – including on the presumption of innocence and the immunity from ex post facto criminal punishment – than are permissible under international law.

The United National Party (UNP) government’s unwillingness to tolerate alternative centres of political power soon undermined the judiciary’s new independence. President J.R. Jayawardene used the 1978 constitution to stack the judiciary with allies. Article 163 of the new constitution terminated the service of all judges of the Supreme Court and the sole high court then existing, requiring all the judges to swear a new oath. While all nineteen judges were forced to resign, seven were not reappointed. Some junior judges were shifted to the Supreme Court. More senior judges were relegated to the new Court of Appeal. The result was “naked and unashamed … ‘court-packing’”. 35

On 11 June 1983 three Supreme Court judges’ homes were stoned by crowds brought in on government-owned buses. Police failed to respond to the judges’ calls for aid. Two days earlier, the same judges had ruled against a police sub-inspector for illegal arrest and fined him 25,000 rupees ($500 at the time). 36

According to one senior lawyer, the protesters were UNP supporters. In September 1983, parliament imposed in the Sixth Amendment a new oath requirement. While no judges lost their positions, the Sixth Amendment underscored the fragility of their tenure. 38 Finally, in 1984, the government convened a parliamentary select committee that investigated a speech critical of government policy given by then-Chief Justice Neville Samarakoon, but declined to remove him. 39 As a result, most judges refrained from aggressive application of constitutional rights. 40

D. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF SRI LANKAN COURTS

The 1978 constitution created a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeal and provincial high courts. Lower courts – most importantly the district courts and magistrate courts – are created by the Judicature Act, No. 2 of 1978. The Supreme Court comprises a chief justice and six to ten judges. It has unique authority to assess the legality of legislation, to provide advisory opinions to the president, to serve as a court of last resort for the lower judiciary, and to hear cases implicating the “fundamental rights” created by the 1978 constitution. Next in the judicial hierarchy is the Court of Appeal, which hears appeals from the high courts and has power to issue writs of habeas corpus or injunctions against unlawful executive action. Many cases in that tribunal involve challenges to the legality of government actions rather than constitutional challenges.

At the provincial level are high courts, which hear serious criminal cases and have power to adjudicate habeas corpus applications. At the base of the hierarchy are magistrate courts, which largely hear criminal cases, and district courts, largely devoted to civil matters. In magistrate courts, criminal cases are generally prosecuted by the police and in the absence of defence counsel.

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40 “The court could have looked to India for a very different model of a Supreme Court, but we have not developed a tradition of activism [like the Indian Supreme Court] or even of facing up to the executive”. Crisis Group interview, fundamental rights lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
41 See appendix B for a chart showing the structure of the judiciary.
42 M.J.A. Cooray, Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, op. cit., p. 275.
48 Crisis Group interviews, lawyers and magistrate judge, Colombo, Kandy and Anuradhapura, November 2008. Despite the absence of representation, magistrate courts can impose
Two other offices play important roles. The justice ministry is responsible for budgetary matters, legislative drafting and legal aid provision.\textsuperscript{49} The attorney general’s office is responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases and appears in Supreme Court and Court of Appeal proceedings where the constitutionality or legality of a statute or executive action is called into doubt.\textsuperscript{50} The attorney general “plays a dual role”, both advising the government on the legality of counter-terrorism and other government measures and also prosecuting when those measures step across a constitutional line.\textsuperscript{51} The contradictions of the role have often led to clear conflicts of interest, as human rights advocates have frequently noted.\textsuperscript{52} The attorney general’s department has, with few exceptions, failed to investigate and prosecute effectively massacres and disappearances cases.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{49} Crisis Group interview, state counsels, Colombo, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{50} Crisis Group interview, state counsel and lawyers, Colombo, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{51} Crisis Group interview, former senior state counsel, Colombo, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{52} See “Sri Lanka: Has the Attorney General Violated the Penal Code?”, Asian Human Rights Commission, 5 December 2008, available at www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2008statements/1794/. The International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP), an ad hoc panel appointed by the Sri Lankan president to oversee a special commission of inquiry into a series of high profile human rights cases in early 2007, was a frequent and forceful critic of the attorney general’s department’s conflict of interest. For their numerous statements on the issue, see www.iigep.org/press-releases.htm.

\textsuperscript{53} Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

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**III. JURISDICTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE COURTS**

The judiciary today has lost its freedom from political influence. Courts abet human rights violations on a daily basis. The Supreme Court compounds political conflict and hinders compliance with international law. This weakness derives from two major sources: flaws in the legal and jurisdictional constraints on judges, and manipulation and direct interference by the executive, sometimes via the chief justice. The 1978 constitution contains several provisions that hinder or eliminate courts’ ability to serve as an effective check on the executive power. Compounding these barriers are the Public Security Ordinance, No. 25 of 1947 (as amended), and a torrent of “emergency regulations” from the executive. This section addresses purely legal constraints. The following section deals with political manipulation.

**A. THE CONSTITUTION’S BARRIERS TO JUDICIAL ACTION**

The 1978 constitution defines and channels higher courts’ jurisdiction in ways that constrain the courts’ efficacy as a check on executive overreach. The Supreme Court has “sole and executive” jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of laws, including constitutional amendments, except that challenges must be lodged within one week of the bill being placed on parliament’s order paper.\textsuperscript{54} The cabinet can abbreviate and require the court to reach a verdict within 24 hours.\textsuperscript{55} Further, the court’s determinations can be overruled in most cases by a super-majority of two thirds of parliament.\textsuperscript{56} A 1997 International Commission of Jurists study examined this jurisdiction over the constitutionality of laws and found it “so restricted as to be largely illusory”.\textsuperscript{57} This remains true today. While some bills are reviewed at this early stage, the 1978 constitution has created a system of de facto “pre-enactment review” akin to that of the 1972 constitution.\textsuperscript{58} Further, the constitution bars absolutely suits against an incumbent president. It also limits the filing of constitutional “fundamental rights” challenges against

\textsuperscript{54} Arts. 120 & 121(1) of the 1978 constitution.

\textsuperscript{55} Art. 122(2) of the 1978 constitution.

\textsuperscript{56} Art. 82(5) of the 1978 constitution. Amendments that change specified fundamental aspects of the constitution must be enacted by referendum. Arts. 83(a) & 85(2).


\textsuperscript{58} Crisis Group interview, Colombo, November 2008.
“executive and administration” to the Supreme Court only.29

The limitation on forums for fundamental rights cases imposes an even heavier burden on those living outside Colombo. They must not only travel to Colombo but also find a fundamental rights lawyer in the city; few are to be found outside the capital.60 Travel for Tamil litigants is especially difficult.61 Since a suit must be filed within one month of the violation,62 those unaware of their remedies or lacking quick access to counsel lose their right to file.

Fundamental rights litigation in the Supreme Court is also difficult in fact-heavy cases, such as those involving allegations of torture by police or military officials.63 The Supreme Court does not hold hearings or gather factual evidence. Lawyers must develop their arguments solely on the written pleadings without an opportunity to introduce testimonial evidence. Allegations beset by claims and counter-claims – as charges of torture or illegal detention often are – are difficult to sustain. There is no appeal to address errors of fact or law.64

B. EMERGENCY LAWS

With weak constitutional constraints on derogation from fundamental rights, little prevents the frequent and unfettered invocation of Sri Lanka’s two sets of emergency powers: emergency regulations issued under the Public Security Ordinance (PSO), No. 25 of 1947, and the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions) (PTA). Both the PSO and PTA exploit the constitution’s provisions for derogation and weaken the protection of rights significantly. Purportedly deployed against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) only, both the PSO and the PTA are routinely used against Tamils in matters unrelated to terrorism.65

1. Emergency regulations

Emergency regulations are promulgated under Section II of the PSO.66 It vests the executive with open-ended authority to promulgate “emergency regulations” that override otherwise applicable laws (except the provisions of the constitution) and cannot be challenged in court.67 Since the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1987, the proclamation of a state of emergency has been made immune from judicial challenge.68 Since independence, at least seventeen sets of emergency regulations have been issued pursuant to the PSO on topics as diverse as “terrorist activities, special administrative arrangements, high security zones [and] … procurement”.69 More frequently than not, Sri Lanka has been in a state of emergency.70 There is no systematic publication of regulations. Many are only haphazardly available. The regulations themselves are fragmentary.71 On occasion, the English and Sinhala versions have been found to be inconsistent.72

65 Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, Colombo and Trincomalee, November 2008.
67 Part II, § 5, Public Security Ordinance, No. 25 of 1947. Section 7 of the PSO states that such regulations override laws, and section 9 precludes criminal prosecution for acts done pursuant to any emergency regulation.
68 Art. 154j(2) of the 1978 constitution, which states that a proclamation under the PSO “shall be conclusive for all purposes and shall not be questioned in any Court”, was adopted through the Thirteenth Amendment in order to overrule a Supreme Court decision – Joseph Perera v. Attorney General (1992) 1 SLR 199 – allowing such challenges.
Despite its 1956 promise to repeal the PSO, the SLFP, like its rival the UNP, has relied heavily on emergency regulations. Before President Rajapaksa entered office, regulations permitting arrest without a warrant and prolonged detention without trial already were in force. A 1989 regulation (No. 17) already allowed the defence secretary to detain persons to prevent them from “engaging in acts inimical to national security in the future”.

Other regulations dispensed with search warrants and allowed police to dispose of corpses without notifying the deceased’s family. Regulations from the 1990s expanded detention powers.

The Rajapaksa administration has supplemented these wide-ranging powers since emergency rule was re-imposed nationwide in 2005 by the preceding administration of President Kumaratunga. Of greatest significance are the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations No. 1 of 2005 and the Emergency (Prevention and Prohibition of Specified Terrorist Activities) Regulations No. 7 of 2006. The 2005 regulations allow the secretary of the defence ministry to order the military or police to detain a person for up to a year to prevent acts “prejudicial to the national security or the maintenance of public order”. The regulation contains no clarification of this vague standard. A new August 2008 regulation expands the government’s power by allowing it to detain a person for a further six months. In addition, the 2005 regulations vest police with broad search and seizure powers and allow the use of confessions made to police, in contrast with normal criminal law and with no effective safeguards against abuse. It is left to the defendant to prove a confession was coerced.

The 2006 regulations criminalise loosely defined offences of “terrorism”, “specified terrorism activities” and “transactions” with terrorist groups in terms more sweeping than other countries’ approaches. As one legal analyst has noted, the “transactions” prohibition of Regulation 8 issued in 2006 renders “virtually any act of, for example, journalists, civil society organisations and even private landlords” potentially criminal if a link to a terrorism suspect is alleged. In one high-profile case, charges have been filed under emergency regulations against Tamil journalist Tissanayagam based on his writings.

The emergency regulations offer no effective judicial review against arbitrary or discriminatory application of these broad rules. Detainees should be brought before a magistrate within fifteen days but the magistrate cannot order release. For offences established under the 2005 regulations, detainees must be produced be-


80 Edirisinghe, “Emergency Rule”, op. cit., p. 187. Human rights advocates and organisations within and outside of Sri Lanka have long advocated that if confessions are to be allowed the burden should be reversed: the police should have to convince the court that proper procedures were followed and protections against abuse were in place in order for a confession to be admissible. Faced with a lengthy court procedure necessary to challenge confessions, most defendants plead guilty in exchange for reduced time in jail. When challenged, however, many confessions are thrown out. Crisis Group email communications, Sri Lankan human rights lawyers, June 2009.


83 Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008. J.S. Tissanayagam, a prominent Tamil journalist, was arrested on 7 March 2008 along with two other Tamil journalists. Held without charges for nearly six months under emergency regulations, he was eventually indicted under the PTA. He is currently on trial, charged with bringing the Sri Lankan government into disrepute, creating ethnic disharmony and aiding and abetting “unknown persons” in terrorism. The government’s case rests on two articles he wrote in 2006 criticising the government’s military campaign and its impact on civilians and on an alleged confession which Tissanayagam claims was coerced.

fore a magistrate within 30 days but cannot be released without “written approval of the Attorney General”.

2. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)

Parliament enacted the PTA in 1979 as a temporary response to growing unrest in the Northern Province. It was made permanent in 1982. Its provisions apply regardless of whether there is a declared emergency. Section 9 allows the justice minister to order a person detained without judicial review for renewable periods of three months, up to a total of eighteen months, if the minister “has reason to believe or suspect that any person is connected with or concerned in any unlawful activity”. The person is to be presented to a magistrate, however, within 72 hours of their initial detention under Section 7 of the ordinance.

The PTA differs from emergency regulations in that it requires ministerial involvement in detention decisions. Like emergency regulations, however, the PTA deprives judges of any authority to release prisoners on bail. Section 6 allows police to arrest persons and detain them for three days without judicial supervision, and to search their home without a warrant. Section 16 deviates from the standard criminal procedure code by making confessions to judges admissible. No provision of the PTA requires the detaining authorities to inform a prisoner of the reasons for the detention. The PTA also restricts free speech by criminalising certain forms of political expression and requiring prior approval for certain publications.

Legal constraints on the courts’ supervisory authority act in tandem with practical and political intrusions. The executive uses its powers of appointment to influence the courts directly. Political influence is also filtered through the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), which is responsible for the appointment, transfer and discipline of judges in the lower courts. Although no Supreme Court judge has ever been removed for misconduct, judges are periodically reminded that impeachment is in the hands of partisan political actors. Finally, the recently retired chief justice wielded his powers of assigning and transferring judges and his control of World Bank funds and other resources to influence judges for political ends.

A. APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT

1. The president’s appointment power

The 1978 constitution initially vested the president with power to appoint judges to the higher courts constrained only by the stipulated age limits for different courts. The president is not obliged to consult either parliament or the judiciary in making appointments. In 1997, the Supreme Court stated that the constitutional scheme assumes but does not mandate “co-operation between the Executive and the Judiciary”.

Appointments to the judiciary until the 1970s traditionally came from the pool of career judges in the lower courts, with judges elevated by seniority. Despite this tradition, there is also a long history of executive

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85 Section 21(1) of Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations No. 1, Gazette No. 1405/14 (13 August 2005).
90 Arts. 107(1) & (5) of the 1978 constitution.
91 Silva v. Bandaranayake, [1997] 1 SL 92, 94. By contrast, the Pakistan Supreme Court held in 1996 that the Pakistani constitution, while it contained no textual requirement of consultation, by design entailed “effective[,] meaningful, [and purposive]” consultation” between the executive and the chief justice in appointments. Absent “very sound reasons”, a chief justice’s recommendation is binding. Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1996 Supreme Court, 324, 363-367. In India, moreover, although the constitution again commits judicial selection to seemingly absolute discretion, “deviation from the seniority rule … is considered as an executive interference in the judiciary”. T.R. Andrujina, “Judicial Accountability: India’s Methods and Experience”, in Judges and Judicial Accountability (Delhi, 2003), pp. 106-107.
92 There are a few notable exceptions such as Chief Justice Neville Samarakoon and Justice Jaya Pathirana, who both came from private practice. Wijenayake, Independence of the Judiciary in Sri Lanka Since Independence, op. cit., p. 20.
The manipulation of judicial appointment to punish disfavoured judges and to promote political allies. In 1988, for example, when the post of chief justice opened up, the most senior judge of the Supreme Court was conspicuously passed over in favour of a judge seven years his junior. The president made “no secret” of the fact that the former was disfavoured because of his dissenting judgment in the case challenging the Thirteenth Amendment. As a result of such presidential appointments, “any criteria there once were [for the appointment of justices and the chief justice] have fallen by the wayside”.

The president can also influence judicial outcomes by stacking the courts with lawyers from the attorney general’s department, who are generally pro-government in disposition. While not unqualified, a preponderance of former government lawyers shifts the higher courts’ sympathy to government positions. Many legal observers believe the attorney general’s department has become “increasingly politicised” during President’s Rajapaksa’s tenure. He also appointed an unusually large number of junior members of the attorney general’s staff to the higher courts.

Accelerating appointment of members of the attorney general’s department has a knock-on effect upon the lower judiciary. Since the 1978 constitution expanded the number of levels within the judicial hierarchy, explained one former Supreme Court justice, it has become more difficult and time-consuming for career judges to progress from being district judges into the higher judiciary. “Too many career judges are overtaken by people from the attorney general’s office” as they climb the now-longer judicial ladder, observed one former magistrate judge. While career judges find it more difficult to enter the higher judiciary, state counsels are appointed younger and have long tenures in office. Ambitious and talented lawyers without political connections have little incentive to work their way up through the judiciary, since they will quickly be overtaken by peers within government.

This problem is especially acute for Tamil lawyers. “By design or otherwise”, a senior Tamil lawyer observed, recent appointees to magistrate and district courts in the Tamil-speaking areas of Jaffna, Mannar and Vavuniya have been in their 40s and 50s. At the normal rate of career advancement, these judges will have to retire before being elevated to senior judicial office. In the future, there may be a shortage of Tamil judges to appoint as the number of Tamils working in the lower courts is decreasing. Many young Tamil professionals opt to leave the country to make careers rather than risk discrimination or violence.

2. The constitutional council

On 3 October 2001, parliament unanimously enacted the Seventeenth Amendment, creating a ten-member constitutional council tasked with appointing members of the higher judiciary. Once nominated, the president “shall … forthwith make the respective appointments”. The Seventeenth Amendment represented one of the first efforts to impose constitutional constraints on the misuse of executive power. The amendment, however, placed that check within the parliament despite historically weak legislative resistance to the executive presidency. The constitutional council failed to include members of the judiciary or sectors of civil society that have been watchdogs on the presidency. It has failed its mission in part because of the weakness of parliamentary will and in part due to President Rajapaksa’s willingness to disobey a clear constitutional command.

94 Ibid, p. 87.
96 Crisis Group interview, former Supreme Court justice, Colombo, November 2008.
98 Crisis Group interviews, fundamental rights lawyer and former senior state’s counsel, Colombo, November 2008.
99 In 2008, he appointed for the first time ever an additional solicitor general – a middling career position – to the Supreme Court. Crisis Group interviews, Colombo, November 2008. Previously, it had been assumed that only full solicitor generals could be appointed directly to that court.
100 Crisis Group interview, Colombo, November 2008.
101 The attorney general’s office has thus become “a place to make a career”, including a fast track to judicial office. Crisis Group interview, state counsel, Colombo, November 2008.
104 Art. 41A of 1978 constitution. The council compromises the speaker, the prime minister, the leader of the opposition, one presidential appointee, five people nominated jointly by the prime minister and the opposition leader, and one person agreed on by members of those parties other than those to which the prime minister or the opposition leader belong. See Crisis Group Report, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
105 Art. 41A(5) of the 1978 constitution.
The first council convened in March 2002 to begin its three-year term. It published an annual report with a “list of general criteria for disqualification”, creating a transparent and public measure for its work. Its judicial appointments largely followed “tradition” in drawing on members of the lower judiciary based on seniority, members of the attorney general’s department and some members of the private bar. The first council’s term lapsed in 2005, shortly before President Rajapaksa took office. Since his inauguration, President Rajapaksa has not reconvened the council. He has taken advantage of the gap to make direct appointments to both the courts and national commissions.

Initially, the president justified his refusal to convene the council by pointing to the “deliberate delay” of minority parties the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in choosing a tenth council member. Rajapaksa rejected the opinion of his own attorney general that the JVP, then part of the government, could not be considered a minority party. Even when the TNA and JVP agreed on a candidate, the president nonetheless declined to appoint him stating, among other things, that he wished first for a parliamentary select committee to investigate and report on the amendment. That select committee, on 9 August 2007, concluded that the council should be able to function with a quorum of six members, and recommended that the president’s interim appointments be dismissed so that new appointments could be made in accord with the Seventeenth Amendment. The president ignored its recommendations and continued to appoint judges without council involvement.

Legal scholars generally agree that the president’s refusal to convene the council has been “in bad faith”. But “[t]here is no ostensible way to force Rajapaksa” to convene the council as a result of the president’s constitutional immunity which extends even to clear non-performance of his legal duties. A lawsuit currently before the Supreme Court has led nowhere. In effect, the constitution enables its own violation.

3. The chief justice

The president’s unfettered appointment power includes selecting the chief justice of the Supreme Court. The chief justice in turn influences fellow judges of the Supreme Court and members of lower tribunals. The recently retired chief justice, Sarath Silva, is widely regarded as having played a central role in the judiciary’s current politicisation. His appointment is viewed as a “turning point for the judiciary”. He developed his position into an alternative political centre to the presidency. In the words of one lawyer in late 2008, “there are now two dictators in our system”. As a result, one commentator noted, “the court ceased to restrain government actions and indeed arbitrarily upheld the powers of government against citizens”. Another commentator described Silva as having “ruined [the judiciary] from within”. Silva’s style of judicial governance has left a problematic legacy for his successor.

108 Ibid, p. 54.
109 Ibid, p. 54.
113 As one legal scholar noted, “[t]his is not a valid excuse because the 17th Amendment is part of our Constitution, it is already law”. Rohan Ebrisinha, “The Continuing Violation of the Seventeenth Amendment: Yet More Unconvincing Excuses”, 3 March 2008, available at www.groundviews.org.
118 Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, “Why is the government so terrified of the 17th Amendment?”, Sunday Times, 8 March 2009.
120 Crisis Group interview, Colombo, November 2008. Another, who had practiced under several chief justices, explained that “not one of them had been as dominant of the Court as Sarath Silva”. Crisis Group interview, Colombo, November 2008.
121 Pinto-Jayawardena, “Subverted justice”, op. cit.
122 Lawrence, Conversations in a Failing State, op. cit., p. 69, quoting J.C. Weliamuna.
President Kumaratunga swore in then-attorney general Sarath Silva as chief justice on 16 September 1999. At the time, Silva was subject to two pending complaints of misconduct. The UN special rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers Param Cumaraswamy indicated concern about the appointment given the pending complaints. Two petitions in the Supreme Court challenged the appointment. Those petitions were heard and rejected by the Supreme Court’s seven most junior judges. That bench had been chosen by Silva, in a clear conflict of interest.

In his nearly ten years as chief justice, Silva used both traditional and innovative methods to control the judiciary. First, in a break from tradition, he assigned junior judges who were his close allies to decide on the panels (or benches) of judges for particular cases in the Supreme Court. By tradition, assigning benches had been the responsibility of the most junior judge, who placed judges randomly on cases. By directing who hears what cases, the chief justice wielded possibly decisive influence on outcomes. Early in his tenure, Chief Justice Silva ensured that justices with independent views, such as Justice Mark Fernando and Justice C.V. Wigneswaran, did not sit in significant constitutional cases.

Second, the chief justice also stacked the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), which is responsible for discipline and promotions in the lower judiciary. As discussed below, the JSC was a vehicle for Chief Justice Silva to ensure that lower court judges “toed [d] the line” he wished.

Third, the chief justice tightly controlled discretionary funding and training, with judges having to seek his approval for overseas travel, conferences and other side benefits. Between June 2000 and late 2007, the World Bank managed an $18.2 million judicial reform program that primarily funded “huge, mainly infrastructure” projects and had little success with its larger reform objectives. The chief justice chaired the program’s steering committee. According to one former Supreme Court justice, “Silva used the World Bank to extract personal favours… It was a patronage system.” Watchdog groups have complained that beyond new physical infrastructure, there is little evidence that the World Bank funds have benefited the courts.

Finally, the chief justice exercised significant influence through the attitudes he expressed while adjudicating. “When he takes cases lightly, this permeates the whole judiciary”, said one lawyer. Early in his

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131 Crisis Group interview, former Supreme Court justice, Colombo, November 2008.
133 It also included the ministers of finance, commerce and justice, the attorney general, and the secretary of the JSC.
135 In addition to the chief justice’s influence, the president also has patronage tools. Judges are eligible for discretionary appointments to statutory bodies such as the bribery commission, which by law must have two former Supreme Court justices. Crisis Group interview, member of the bribery commission, November 2008.
136 The stated aim of the project was to “improve upon the existing legal and judicial framework by making it more efficient, transparent and responsive to the needs of the public at large and of the private sector in particular”. See “Sri Lanka: The role of the Judicial Service Commission in World Bank reform project”, Asian Human Rights Commission, 28 February 2006, available at www.ahhrckh.net/statements/mainfile.php/2006statements/442/.
tenure, for instance, Chief Justice Silva made disparaging comments from the bench about the importance of detention and torture cases. In the following years, there was a marked decline in the number of fundamental rights petitions filed and judgments rendered.\(^{138}\)

As a result of these lever, Chief Justice Silva gained “a complete hold on both the JSC and the Court. He uses his juniors to get his own way”, said one former Supreme Court justice.\(^{139}\) One sign of this control was the near-complete absence of dissenting opinions in the court’s judgments under Silva.\(^{140}\) This is in clear contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, when dissent was common.\(^{141}\)

In June 2009, President Rajapaksa appointed as chief justice Asoka de Silva, the most senior justice on the court – regrettably without involvement of the constitutional council. The appointment offers a chance to reverse the former chief justice’s legacy of a hyper-politicised judiciary. De Silva is known as a cautious, capable and fair jurist, without his predecessor’s strong and highly political personality. He is expected to work more closely and cooperatively with his colleagues on the court. His experience as a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda gives him a welcome familiarity with international legal practices and perspectives. Whether the new chief justice seizes the opportunity will help determine whether the judiciary reclaims its constitutional role as a check on abuses by the executive and legislative branches which have deepened Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict.

### B. REMOVAL OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES

Under Article 107(2) of the 1978 constitution, the president may remove a Supreme Court justice only if a third of all sitting members of the parliament sign a resolution for removal and then two thirds vote for a finding of “proven misbehaviour” or incapacity.\(^{142}\) No Supreme Court justice has ever been removed in this manner. With parliament elected under a system of proportional representation, no government since the 1980s has gained enough seats to assemble the necessary two-thirds vote.\(^{143}\) While this prevents the too-easy removal of justices for partisan reasons, it also prevents action even when clear grounds for impeachment exist.

There were two efforts to impeach Chief Justice Silva based on alleged misconduct either before or after his appointment.\(^{144}\) The first was cut short by President Kumaratunga’s proroguing of parliament in July 2001.\(^{145}\) The second attempt failed when, once again, the president dissolved the legislature.\(^{146}\) These failed attempts signal that justices can avoid investigation of serious allegations of misconduct or corruption if they have the president’s support. Before the president cut short the first impeachment effort, the Supreme Court inserted itself into the parliamentary impeachment process by accepting for review three fundamental rights petitions challenging impeachment. It issued an injunction against the speaker seeking to short-circuit the removal of its own head judge. Parliament ignored this injunction,\(^{147}\) but the injunction undermined the court’s impartiality, and provided the political branches with a precedent for ignoring judicial orders in the future.

In other cases when removal of justices has been raised, it has been based not on “proven misbehaviour” or incapacity but political enmity. In 1984, for example, the investigation of Chief Justice Neville Samarakoon was motivated by President Jayawardene’s dissatis-

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\(^{139}\) Crisis Group interview, November 2008.

\(^{140}\) In its recent report, the IBA stated: “the Chief Justice’s excessive influence over other members of the judiciary, and particularly over most other Supreme Court judges, means that there is a real, though unspoken, reluctance for judges to issue dissenting opinions, with fewer than five reported opinions dissenting from the Chief Justice having been issued in the past ten years in the Supreme Court”. “Justice in retreat: A report on the independence of the legal profession and the rule of law in Sri Lanka”, IBA, op. cit., p. 32.

\(^{141}\) Crisis Group interviews, lawyers and legal scholars, November 2008. Dissenting opinions from three-judge panels of the high court have generally been considered a prerequisite for the rehearing of a case by a larger panel of judges.

\(^{142}\) Parliament has issued standing order 78A to regulate impeachment proceedings, which requires that a select committee be formed to investigate charges and report within a month. Committee findings are not disclosed absent a finding of guilt. Wijenayake, *Independence of the Judiciary in Sri Lanka Since Independence*, op. cit., p. 15.


\(^{144}\) Crisis Group interview, Colombo, 14 November 2008.


\(^{146}\) Lawrence, *Conversations in a Failing State*, op. cit., p. 73.

faction with his former ally. Initial votes on whether to convene a select committee fell along party lines. According to the committee report’s own account, the chief justice had criticised corruption in the political branches and nepotistic efforts to secure patronage appointments on his own staff. The select committee found no misbehaviour but a “serious breach of convention”, and warned that Samarakoon’s behaviour had “imperilled the independence of the judiciary and undermine[d] the confidence of the public in the judiciary.” A recent effort to investigate another Supreme Court justice, Saleem Marsoof, in 2008, for a speech he gave criticising the government’s non-implementation of the Seventeenth Amendment, also foundered at the select committee stage.

C. APPOINTMENTS AND REMOVALS IN THE LOWER COURTS

1. The JSC and the Seventeenth Amendment

The JSC is “vested” with power over the “appointment, transfer, dismissal, and disciplinary control” of lower court judges. While still chaired by the chief justice, the two other judges on it, per Article 112(1), were initially selected by the president. The president has delegated to the JSC authority to handle those

issues for high court judges. The constitution says nothing, however, about how the JSC’s powers are to be exercised or the procedures to be used when imposing penalties. Nor has the JSC promulgated rules on these matters.

Before 1999, most promotions within the lower judiciary followed a seniority rule. Promotions and transfers were done in a predictable manner. Judges would be assigned for fixed three-year slots to specific courts. “Everyone knew the rules, and they were followed”. Newer judges were first assigned to a position far from Colombo, and then rotated on a predictable basis to new, gradually better stations.

During Chief Justice Silva’s tenure, the JSC was troubled. Silva rejected the tradition of appointing the two senior justices of the court. He removed from the JSC Justice Mark Fernando, a respected jurist with a long record of independence from the executive, with the stated goal of increasing its “diversity”. He then passed over the most senior Tamil judge, Justice C.V. Wigneswaran, in favour of more junior judges. “The two remaining judges on the JSC were then very weak.”

The deliberate sidelining of the constitutional council further undermined the JSC. Under the Seventeenth Amendment, the two members of the JSC other than the chief justice are to be appointed by that body. In February 2006, the two appointed members of the JSC, Justices Shiranee Bandaranayake and T.B. Weerasuriya, resigned from the JSC over differences with the chief justice about the use of its disciplinary powers. The president appointed two new members based on recommendations from the chief justice without input from the constitutional council.

150 Report from the Select Committee appointed to investigate and report to parliament on the allegations referred to in the resolution placed on the order paper of 5th September, 1984, for the presentation of an address to his excellency the President requesting the removal of the Hon. N.D.M. Samarakoon Q.C., from the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court”, parliamentary series no. 71, Colombo, 13 December 1984, p. 81.
152 Sonali Samarasinghe, “MR gets set to battle the judiciary as the war takes its toll on IDPs”, The Sunday Leader, 28 September 2008; and Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, Colombo, November 2008.
153 Arts. 114(1) & (6) of 1978 constitution.
154 Until 1972, authority to appoint, transfer or remove district court judges lay with a Judicial Service Commission comprising the chief justice and the two most senior justices of the Supreme Court. H.L. de Silva, Sri Lanka: A Nation in Conflict: Threats to Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, Democratic Governance and Peace, op. cit., p. 408; M.J.A. Cooray, Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, op. cit., p. 69. Abolished by the 1972 constitution in favour of cabinet control, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) was reconstituted under Article 112 of the 1978 constitution. Article 115 of the 1978 constitution also criminalises efforts to influence the JSC.

155 Crisis Group interview, former Supreme Court justice, Colombo, November 2008.
156 One former judge explained that the previous chief justice, G.P.S. de Silva, “was honourable but cautious”. Crisis Group interviews, retired judge and lawyers, Colombo, November 2008.
158 Crisis Group interview, former Supreme Court justice, Colombo, November 2008.
159 Crisis Group interview, senior lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
The June 2009 re-appointment of Justice Bandaranayake to the JSC is a positive step that holds out some hope that the JSC may be able to move away from the politicised legacy of the former chief justice.\textsuperscript{162}

2. Appointments and removals by the JSC

As early as November 2001, an International Bar Association delegation found “consistent complaint[s] relating to improper judicial supervision under the auspices of the JSC and [Chief Justice Silva]”.\textsuperscript{163} The World Bank also found that “complaints against the judiciary are not always investigated”.\textsuperscript{164} The UN special rapporteur on the independence of lawyers and judges, Malaysian jurist Param Cumaraswamy, in addition has expressed concern about “allegations of misconduct on the part of Chief Justice Sarath Silva” in the exercise of JSC powers.\textsuperscript{165}

There is currently no established procedure for evaluating judges on the basis of which transfers, promotions and punishments can be decided in a relatively fair and objective manner.\textsuperscript{166} The earlier, more predictable schedule of transfers and appointments has been “abandoned”, leaving judges uncertain as to where they will be living and whether they will rise or fall in the hierarchy.\textsuperscript{167} This creates opportunities for abuse. Judges who did not decide in favour of friends and political allies of the chief justice have been removed or transferred to unfavourable locations. By contrast, allegations of impropriety or misconduct against the former chief justice’s allies were not pursued in the JSC.\textsuperscript{168}

One case in particular highlights the scope for abuse of the chief justice’s and the JSC’s discretionary power. According to one former magistrate, Chief Justice Silva, while attorney general, intervened in a pending criminal case before the magistrate and sought dismissal of charges against his allies. The attorney general does not normally appear in criminal cases; his intervention was reportedly through back-channels rather than a formal legal filing. On becoming chief justice, Silva pressed charges of misconduct against the same magistrate, alleging he had told police at a checkpoint that he was a high court judge, not a magistrate judge. In the JSC proceeding, this magistrate was not allowed to see the findings against him or to know why the JSC reached those findings.\textsuperscript{169} When the magistrate vigorously challenged them in the JSC, he was denied the right to call witnesses and told that his earlier refusal to help the attorney general could also be grounds for dismissal.\textsuperscript{170} The magistrate appealed, but the JSC neither considered nor ruled on that appeal.

The magistrate then submitted a communication to the Human Rights Committee, a UN body established under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In July 2008, this body concluded the dismissal had been arbitrary and lacked basic procedural guarantees.\textsuperscript{171} Nothing came of this communication. The former magistrate judge observed that: “In general, judges are not independent” of political influence. “Judges are very scared. The chief justice’s secretary can just phone anyone”, and get the result he wants.\textsuperscript{172}

Another judge who had sat in various magistrate and district courts inside and out of Colombo was removed by the JSC after having a falling out with former Chief Justice Silva while secretary of the judges’ association. He too noted that Silva had attempted to influence outcomes of cases by offering benefits to judges who would decide the way he wished.\textsuperscript{173}

Former judges and legal analysts agree that the JSC had become a conduit for those with connections to the former chief justice. This includes not just the present government, but also elements of the Buddhist

\textsuperscript{163} “Sri Lanka: Failing to Protect the Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary”, IBA, op. cit., p. 21.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{166} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{167} Crisis Group interviews, senior lawyer and former magistrate judge, Colombo, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{168} A magistrate judge with whom Crisis Group spoke gave the example of a Colombo magistrate judge who had violated ethics rules but remained in office. Crisis Group interview, 19 November 2008; and Ivan, An Unfinished Struggle, op. cit., pp. 164-167.
\textsuperscript{169} In 2001, Chief Justice Silva told an International Bar Association delegation that judges received copies of the proceedings. “Sri Lanka: Failing to Protect the Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary”, IBA, op. cit., p. 22. This no longer appears to be the case.
\textsuperscript{170} Crisis Group interviews, Colombo, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{171} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{172} Crisis Group interview, former magistrate judge, 19 November 2008.
\textsuperscript{173} Crisis Group interview, former magistrate judge, Colombo, November 2008.
Sangha and business figures. One magistrate, Hiran Ekanayake, was dismissed as “mentally unfit” after he refused to “finish … briefly” a set of cases in which the chief justice had an interest. Ekanayake had earlier been abruptly transferred from Thambuthegama, near Anuradhapura, after pushing an investigation into a political bombing possibly linked to the SLFP. Other instances of JSC intrusion have cut short inquiries into human rights violations allegedly committed by the Sri Lankan military. For instance, in prosecutions involving the disappearance of Fr. Jim Brown in Jaffna and the killing of seventeen Action contre la faim (ACF) aid workers in Mutur, both in August 2006, magistrate judges were ordered to transfer the cases to new judges just as they neared their investigation’s end.

These examples are not outliers. One former judge estimates that at least twenty judges were pushed out by Chief Justice Silva. “Mainly these judges refuse to do something”, he explained, “They refuse to do something the chief justice wants, or make an order against the justice’s friends [or] Buddhist monks [who are close to him]”. Pretexts were often found to penalise judges not in the good graces of the chief justice.

In addition, the manner in which JSC proceedings are conducted raises due process concerns. According to former lower court judges who have faced proceedings in the JSC, judges are still not always informed of the evidence against them or of the ultimate disposition of charges. The JSC instead suggests they resign rather than being dismissed. Because a formal dismissal makes it difficult for the judge to return to private practice, many judges will resign rather than fight charges.

The JSC was not the only vehicle for the chief justice to exercise influence. According to former magistrate judges, the chief justice also appointed allies as the secretary to the Judges’ Institute, where all lower court judges train. That position served as a conduit for messages to and from the chief justice, where judges would signal the places they wished to be posted and the chief judge would select judges for favoured treatment.

D. INTIMIDATION OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES

Compounding the pressure on judges, lawyers face intimidation or violence, as in J.C Weliamuna’s case, when they act on behalf of politically unpopular clients or detained persons. Lawyers dealing with police detention decisions have been detained themselves and harassed or beaten. In October 2008, for example, one lawyer was detained and threatened in Bambalapitiya police station in Colombo after he advised his client in detention not to confess, invoking police wrath. In addition, lawyers and litigants are also constrained by the threat of contempt of court. A lack of clear rules for imposing contempt sanctions yields uncertainty about the consequences of criticizing the courts. In February 2003, a Supreme Court bench imprisoned a teacher who had filed fundamental rights applications and had raised his voice in a hearing. The teacher lodged a complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee, which in turn condemned the “severe and summary penalty” that had been imposed with “no reasoned explanation”. Possible litigants expressed concern that if they were to try to use such international channels in the future, however, they

174 Crisis Group interviews, Colombo, November 2008. The former chief justice has close relations to the Sangha. He appears on local television weekly explaining Buddhist principles and is closely associated with a politically influential meditation centre in Colombo.

175 Lawrence, Conversations in a Failing State, op. cit., pp. 92-93; and Ivan, An Unfinished Struggle, op. cit., pp. 287-290.

176 Chan, op. cit., p. 10; “From Welikade to Mutar and Potuveli”, University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), UTHR(J), special report no. 25, 31 May 2007; and “The Second Fascist Front in Sri Lanka”, UTHR(J), special report no. 29, 21 February 2008, appendix III. In March 2009, the magistrate in the Fr. Jim Brown case, Mrs. Srinithy Nandasekaran, was named a finalist for the U.S. State Department’s “Women of Courage Award”.


too would be at risk of contempt sanctions. A draft contempt of court law, approved by the bar council and later published by the non-governmental Asian Human Rights Commission, was sent to the government, but no action has been taken on it.

Professional organisations provide little effective constraint on judiciary or protection against intimidation. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL), formed in November 1994, insists strenuously that it is a non-partisan organisation that zealously protects the profession’s interests. Other lawyers disagree. Lawyers representing criminal and military detainees, and even former judges, variously label the BASL “docile”, “a mouthpiece for those in power” and a “disaster”. With the exception of statements issued in the wake of the grenade attack on J.C. Weliamuna and the assassination of editor Lasantha Wickrematunge, the BASL has no record of defending lawyers or judicial independence. By contrast, in June 2001 the BASL adopted a resolution requesting parliament’s speaker abstain from convening a select committee to investigate charges of misconduct against Chief Justice Silva.

V. FAILURE TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Improper political considerations have thus entered the judiciary through the appointment process and the threat of politicised removals, thanks to the wide discretionary powers of the chief justice, especially as they have operated through the JSC. As a result, lower courts are reluctant to challenge illegal detentions or coercive interrogations by government actors. The Supreme Court, too, has proved unwilling to provide adequate remedies in such cases. The court has also limited options available under international law and hindered domestic advocates’ ability to call the government to account for gaps in the domestic incorporation of international human rights.

A. THE ABSENCE OF REMEDIES FOR ILLEGAL DETENTION IN LOWER COURTS

Military or police detention can be challenged in three ways in the lower courts. First, when a person is detained under either the criminal procedure code or under emergency laws (the PSO or PTA), that person must at some point be presented to a magistrate. Second, a person subject to prolonged illegal detention can file a “writ of habeas corpus”, which is a procedure for challenging a detention’s legal basis. Third, a fundamental rights petition can be filed in the Supreme Court. None of these options provides an effective check on detaining authorities. Nor can victims of torture easily obtain damages after the fact.

1. Detention and magistrate courts

Magistrate courts are the judiciary’s first point of contact with detainees. In both military and criminal detention, however, magistrates are largely unable to constrain either illegal and abusive detention or torture. This is partly due to limits imposed by the emergency

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186 See Basil Fernando and Shyamali Puvimanasinghe (eds.), Sri Lanka: Towards a Contempt of Courts Law (Hong Kong, 2008), pp. 27-35. The national Human Rights Commission, the Editors Guild and other civil society organisations made a range of submissions to a Parliamentary Select Committee in 2003 in support of a comprehensive contempt of court statute embodying established principles accepted across the British Commonwealth. The select committee’s term was not renewed after the dissolution of parliament in late 2003 and no further government action has been taken. Crisis Group interviews, lawyers and civil society activists, Colombo, May 2009.
188 Crisis Group interviews, Colombo, November 2008.
189 Sunday Leader editor Lasantha Wickrematunge was an outspoken critic of alleged corruption by government and military officials and the social costs of the war. He was murdered in a commando-style attack by gunmen on a Colombo street on 7 January 2009.
190 Ivan, An Unfinished Struggle, p. 357.
laws on the scope of a magistrate’s inquiry into a detention, and partly due to practical problems with how magistrate courts function.

Police are responsible for arrests and prosecutions of minor criminal offences. Most torture occurs in police custody immediately after the initial arrest.\textsuperscript{192} Police engage in torture, in part, because they lack the basic tools necessary to investigate effectively. For unskilled but ambitious officers, torture leading to confessions is perceived as the easiest road to promotion.\textsuperscript{193} Torture also disproportionately affects the poor.\textsuperscript{194} Given its pervasiveness in police custody, when and how a prisoner can secure bail is especially important.\textsuperscript{195} Under the criminal procedure code, police must present a detainee to a magistrate within 24 hours. This rule is routinely violated.\textsuperscript{196} Except for serious offences, such as possession of weapons, bail is available from the magistrate court.\textsuperscript{197} According to one experienced criminal lawyer, the most frequently brought charge involves possession of illegal alcohol.\textsuperscript{198}

Magistrates and police maintain close relations that render effective oversight by the former of the latter illusory. Magistrates are generally appointed to places other than their towns of origin.\textsuperscript{199} They rely on police for protection. Although a conflict of interest, police often provide judges with services such as driving their children to school.\textsuperscript{200} Police also are repeat players in the magistrate’s court, where they prosecute cases. Magistrates and police are linked from the beginning by collegial and social connections. As a result, judges are generally unwilling to challenge aggressively police detention and treatment decisions.\textsuperscript{201} A lawyer from Ampara, for example, explained that “judges believe in good faith in what police say.”\textsuperscript{202} In contrast, criminal defendants, who often appear without a lawyer, are ill-equipped litigants. Further, many “magistrates are insensitive…. They believe that everyone is a criminal and that they need to be beaten once or twice before they will admit what they’ve done”.\textsuperscript{203} Sensitivity to human rights is not part of judicial training.\textsuperscript{204}

This network of close ties extends to include lawyers. Only a limited pool of lawyers will work in any particular magistrate court, and lawyers generally practice only in their local courts. In the provincial capital Anuradhapura, for example, there are up to 80 lawyers who work all the courts.\textsuperscript{205} Lawyers often come from the same social sphere as police officials.\textsuperscript{206} Further, they depend on a local client base when appearing in either magistrate or district courts. As a result, local lawyers are more often than not unwilling to take on cases that seem directly to challenge police, who may be of use in a subsequent case.\textsuperscript{207}

After arrest, police often “suggest” a lawyer. The clear implication is that those lawyers will be the only ones

\textsuperscript{192} Crisis Group interviews, human rights activists and lawyers, Colombo, November 2008. See also Basil Fernando, “Police Torture in Sri Lanka”, UPI Asia, 16 November 2007, at www.upiasia.com. For comprehensive reports that document the prevalence of torture in detention in Sri Lanka, see “Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 29 October 2007, available at www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2008statements/1591/ (blaming pervasiveness of torture on an absence of political will and the incentives for police to curry favour with political authorities by suppressing social mobilisation among the poor).

\textsuperscript{193} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008. See also Statement of Manfred Nowak, UN special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 29 October 2007, available at www.unhchr.ch/hurricane/hurricane.nsf/0/F493C88D3AFDCDBEC1257383006CD8BB7?opendocument.


\textsuperscript{195} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008. See also Statement of Manfred Nowak, UN special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 29 October 2007, available at www.unhchr.ch/hurricane/hurricane.nsf/0/F493C88D3AFDCDBEC1257383006CD8BB7?opendocument.

\textsuperscript{196} Otherwise it must be sought from the provincial high court.

\textsuperscript{197} Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, Western Province, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{198} Crisis Group interview, present and former magistrate judges, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{199} Crisis Group interview, lawyers, Western Province, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{200} Crisis Group interview, lawyers, Western Province, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{201} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{202} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{203} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Anuradhapura, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{204} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{205} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.

\textsuperscript{206} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
who can successfully seek bail or secure a sentence without imprisonment. The police, and in some cases the magistrate or court clerk, will receive a portion of the lawyer’s fee in exchange for the light sentence.\textsuperscript{208} As a consequence, defendants are often under pressure to plead guilty, to pay a relatively small fine (often around 5000 rupees, or $50) or a short sentence in lieu of risking prolonged imprisonment, perhaps based on coerced evidence.\textsuperscript{209} This pressure to plea bargain has a perverse knock-on effect: judges often look at whether a person has a prior conviction in assessing the threat of an undesirable transfer by the JSC.\textsuperscript{212} Given these examples, “judges are scared of transferring after training their attention on detention cases.”\textsuperscript{214} Especially for young Tamil men who are by default suspected by police, this creates a vicious circle. Unwarranted attention from police justifies later unfair treatment by the justice system. The situation of Tamil defendants is made worse by the fact that almost all police and court officials are Sinhalese, very few of whom speak Tamil.\textsuperscript{211}

A further disincentive to meaningful judicial oversight is the threat of an undesirable transfer by the JSC.\textsuperscript{212} “The police can always inform the JSC, which can then put pressure on the magistrate”, explained lawyers with one human rights organisation.\textsuperscript{213} Lawyers identified judges in Jaffna and Trincomalee who had been transferred after training their attention on detention cases.\textsuperscript{214} Given these examples, “judges are scared of not being promoted or of being transferred [to unfavourable places] and they want to be in the good books of the chief justice and the president”.\textsuperscript{215} Judges with qualms about following instructions from the JSC “simply avoid political cases”.\textsuperscript{216}

The situation under the emergency laws is worse as a judge has little power to grant any real remedy for illegal or abusive detention.\textsuperscript{217} A judge has no power to order release, even if a person is being ill-treated or detained for manifestly improper reasons. As one magistrate judge explained, “under the emergency regulations, we simply can’t give bail” and so no effective action is possible.\textsuperscript{218} Bail applications under the regulations are instead channelled to the attorney general, who often does not reply for months to a release request.\textsuperscript{219} Indeed, in some provincial towns, such as Trincomalee, there is often no state counsel in the magistrate court to triage bail requests.\textsuperscript{220} In detention cases involving the emergency laws, moreover, representation is harder to find than in criminal cases. In Trincomalee, there is only one lawyer who will provide counsel in such cases.\textsuperscript{221}

Detaining authorities are supposed to issue a receipt to the family and to notify the national Human Rights Commission. In practice, neither may happen, and there is no way to enforce either requirement.\textsuperscript{222} Even when the Human Rights Commission is informed, lawyers report that it generally does little.\textsuperscript{223} In normal criminal cases, detainees have a right to seek counsel; in emergency cases, they are often denied access to a lawyer. The first time to seek counsel may be when they are presented to a magistrate court weeks or months after the first detention.\textsuperscript{224} Family members, especially of Tamil detainees, are often too frightened to seek legal counsel out of fear of being detained themselves if they protest.\textsuperscript{225}

The emergency regulations impose no requirement on police to publish a list of detention facilities where people are held.\textsuperscript{226} Detainees are often held in parts of police or military facilities that are inaccessible to lawyers.\textsuperscript{227} They are often moved from the place of their arrest. Those from Tamil-majority Vavuniya and Trincomalee are routinely brought to Sinhala-majority Anuradhapura.\textsuperscript{228} Detainees from Mannar, Anuradhapura and Trincomalee are routinely brought to Sinhala-majority Anuradhapura.\textsuperscript{228} Detainees from Mannar, Anuradhapura and Trincomalee are routinely brought to Sinhala-majority Anuradhapura.
puru and Vavuniya are shifted to Kandy.229 Because detainees are kept incommunicado or moved from the place of arrest to other prisons, sometimes without notification to family or counsel, it is hard to make an accurate tally.

Prior to the mass surrender and arrests in the weeks following the military defeat of the LTTE, one human rights group estimated that some 1,500 people were detained under the emergency laws.230 That number is now at least 10,000 as the government has established a series of new detention centres to house those identified as or suspected of being members of the LTTE from among the nearly 300,000 people displaced by fighting in the Northern Province.231 While the Supreme Court does not have the authority to intervene directly in the management of detentions, magistrates do have the power to visit and monitor any place of detention in the country at any time. Given that most magistrates have been reluctant to use this power, the JSC can and should insist that they do so. The JSC might also consider organising a training program to help equip and encourage magistrates to carry out this crucial aspect of their job more effectively.

Such a limited judicial role in detention results in little protection against torture. Under both the PTA and the emergency regulations, detaining authorities are supposed periodically to present a detained person to a magistrate.232 While judges cannot order release, this could be a chance to ensure no torture is occurring and to facilitate access to counsel. In practice, however, judges almost never intervene even if there are visible signs of torture. One lawyer who represents detainees observed that even when tangible evidence of physical abuse is presented during interim presentations judges sometimes refuse to record it — even though they are mandated by law to do so.233 Another lawyer observed that judges sometimes will not even ask to see a prisoner, but nonetheless sign off on continued detention.234 With such lax scrutiny, police can detain someone illegally and then file a backdated detention order that enables lengthier detention than even the malleable contours of the emergency laws provide.235

Even after detention authority has expired and no charge filed, release is not guaranteed. A lawyer based in Kandy explained that if a person is detained under the emergency laws, and there is no evidence of wrongdoing, he or she can still be charged with having a past connection with the LTTE, such as having trained in the past with it. Indeed, it is often in the interests of an ambitious arresting officer to do so.236 There is also often considerable delay between an arrest under the emergency law and charges. In one instance, a person detained in September 1997 under the PTA was not indicted until December 1999, and then subjected to superseding indictments between then and January 2001. More than three years elapsed between the initial detention and the effective indictment.237

Lawyers throughout Sri Lanka concur that “practically nothing can be done that’s effective” in cases of detention under the emergency law. The best option is to “get a lawyer so that the authorities know that someone is watching the case”, explains one advocate. In the cases of young Tamil men this offers only very limited protection.238

Emergency laws also have a disproportionate effect on Tamils. In predominantly Sinhala areas, neither emergency regulations nor the PTA are used frequently, but when they are, the majority of those detained are Tamils.239 Routine criminal investigations that sweep up Tamil suspects are sometimes converted into terrorism cases, with detention covered by the emergency laws, simply because of the suspect’s ethnicity.240 One lawyer in the Eastern Province observed that Sinhala and Tamil suspects seized at road blocks will be treated differently, with Tamils more likely to be detained under the emergency laws and Sinhalese under regular crimi-

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231 „Sri Lanka holding over 9,000 ex-Tamil rebels”, Agence France-Presse, 26 May 2009.
232 The Supreme Court has stated that magistrate must visit or otherwise view the detainee. Weerawansa v. Attorney General, (2000) 1 SLR 387; and Pinto-Jayawardena, “Subverted justice”, op. cit.
238 Crisis Group interview, lawyers, Colombo, Kandy, Trincomalee and Anuradhapura, November 2008.
239 It is unclear why the PTA is relied upon for detentions in some areas and emergency regulations in others. It is hard to see any pattern in the use of either law. While the PSO’s emergency regulations have formed the basis for detentions in the Eastern Province, the PTA was used in Kandy in 2008 as the legal authority for detentions of largely Tamil youth after an attack on a police officer with a claymore mine. Crisis Group interview, lawyers and human rights advocates, Colombo, Kandy and Trincomalee, November 2008.
nal laws.\textsuperscript{241} Once a case has been labelled terrorism-related, the attitude of judges changes: “They view the problem as being one of terrorism, and their view is that everyone must cooperate”, explained a lawyer for a human rights organisation. “There is a shared mentality between the police, the army and the JSC and a collective approach to the problem”.\textsuperscript{242} Tamil litigants are further disadvantaged if they use Tamil lawyers. Explained one senior Tamil counsel, “there is an unusual suspicion of who you are”.\textsuperscript{243}

2. Habeas corpus

The writ of habeas corpus, the procedure borrowed from English common law for challenges to unlawful executive detention, is not an effective constraint on police or military detention. Until the mid-1990s, police would respond to a habeas corpus writ by simply denying they had custody of a petitioner.\textsuperscript{244} In December 1994, the Court of Appeal ended this practice. It ruled that the mere assertion by the police that they had not arrested and detainted a suspect was not enough to end judicial inquiry if there was some evidence of the petitioner’s initial detention.\textsuperscript{245} Even once this evasive practice ended, the government vitiated the utility of habeas by dragging out proceedings. In the late 1990s, “many cases took five or six years”, with upward of 30 hearings, to be decided.\textsuperscript{246}

Lawyers who handle detention and custodial torture cases view habeas as even more enfeebled. One experienced lawyer called it a “very limited remedy”.\textsuperscript{247} Another said flatly that “habeas is not used today because it is not effective”.\textsuperscript{248} According to one lawyer who has filed habeas petitions in the past, petitions will be referred back to the magistrate court in those cases where there is doubt about who is detaining a person. Even when a case is not referred, high court benches tend to be “not so good”.\textsuperscript{249} Once a judge sees a detention order signed under the emergency regulations, detention will typically be found lawful.\textsuperscript{250} Judges will also accept government representations that they intend to indict a person and not grant any relief pursuant to the habeas action.\textsuperscript{251}

3. The failure to discourage illegal detention by damages actions and criminal prosecution

A third way to discourage state misconduct is through criminal prosecutions or civil suits against detaining authorities. But few lawyers, especially outside Colombo, are willing to undertake such damages cases. Representing torture victims puts a lawyer at odds with the police, and thus against their allies, the magistrates. This may imperil his or her other cases, and hinder his or her ability to get new cases.\textsuperscript{252} “For a verdict to be granted, a lawyer has to be on the good side of the local magistrate”, explained one lawyer, “so they are reluctant to do anything that is contentious”.\textsuperscript{253}

Even senior lawyers in Colombo have experienced negative repercussions from police from taking on torture cases. One lawyer who also handles intellectual property cases explained that once he started taking on torture cases, the Colombo police would decline to carry out search warrants lawfully authorised in his commercial litigation.\textsuperscript{254} Even when a case goes forward, explained another lawyer, judicial proceedings are extremely slow. Often, police will pressure victims or their families into accepting settlements that undervalue damages claims. Because courts do not supervise these settlements, families often settle for significantly less than they could.\textsuperscript{255} In one case, a torture victim, Gerald Mervin Perera, was shot and killed – allegedly by gunmen hired by the police officers accused of his torture – while his damages case was under consideration.\textsuperscript{256}

Advocates noted that they have had some successful actions in the Supreme Court in damages cases where the plaintiff had secured medical records of the tor-\textsuperscript{250} Crisis Group interview, lawyers, Colombo and Trincomalee, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{251} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{252} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Anuradhapura, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{253} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{254} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
\textsuperscript{255} Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Colombo, November 2008.
tured. When the attorney general determines there is credible evidence of torture, no state counsel will appear on behalf of the officer to defend a case—a policy first instituted by Sarath Silva when he headed the attorney general’s office. One study, however, has concluded that while the court has awarded compensation in cases involving criminal detention, it rarely does so in “cases relating to the war between the Government and the [LTTE]”.

In any case, the attorney general’s office does not vigorously prosecute criminal cases involving serious human rights violations. Cases against state officials, when they do happen, take “many years” to prosecute, and the delays in torture cases are “even longer” than on other charges—a serious matter when even normal criminal charges can take up to ten years. One cause of delay in criminal proceedings is “non-summary proceedings”. These are threshold inquiries in which a magistrate court reviews prosecution evidence to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to hear a case involving serious charges in the high court. Initially intended as a screening device to conserve judicial resources, non-summary proceedings now are used in most or all criminal cases in the high courts, delaying prosecutions.

4. Remedies in the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court showed itself capable of responding with flexibility and resourcefulness to past waves of human rights violations. In June 1990, after the JVP insurgency led to thousands of detainees being held for prolonged periods in Boossa detention centre near Galle, the court issued rules allowing a new “epistolary jurisdiction” that detainees could invoke by writing letters to the court. Petitions were referred to the bar association for representation. Having relaxed its procedural rules in light of changed circumstances, the court also read the PSO’s limitations on jurisdiction narrowly and went on to invalidate emergency regulations even though its power to do so was in question.

Today, a so-called “fundamental rights” petition in the Supreme Court may be the sole avenue of relief open to a person detained without charge, given the unwillingness of magistrate judges to intervene and the failure of habeas corpus as a remedy in the high courts. Unfortunately, such petitions provide at best a partial and erratic remedy. Lawyers observe that the court has unfettered discretion to allow or deny leave to proceed in any fundamental rights case, and that its decisions are “arbitrary”. Moreover, “a practical difficulty in invoking [fundamental rights jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is] the ‘one-month rule’.” Many people do not or cannot file in that brief window, and as a result lose their ability to file suit.

While a fundamental rights filing in the Supreme Court will not always yield release, or a judgment that a detention was illegal, it can push the state into ending indefinite detention and on occasion spur release. This process, moreover, is considerably swifter than habeas in the high court, “where the court will issue notices,

263 Basil Fernando, “Can a dysfunctional policing system be reformed?” in article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, vol. 6, no. 2 (2007), p. 15. The petition gets its name from the court’s jurisdiction under Article 126(1) to hear cases concerning the constitution’s list of “fundamental rights”.
264 According to lawyers who file such cases in the Supreme Court, the typical procedure is to file an application for relief challenging illegal detention. The application is skeletal because the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Silva developed a means of dealing with those cases that entails no briefing. The court will neither grant nor deny leave to proceed. Rather, the panel of judges will request a response from the attorney general’s office. The court will generally give the attorney general between one and three months to respond. The attorney general will return within the stipulated time, informing the court that the detainee is either to be charged criminally or released. Crisis Group interview, lawyers and human rights organisations, Colombo, Trincomalee and Panadura, November 2008.
the state will set dates, and everything will take months and months”.269 For some litigants, as a result, the Supreme Court has proved a “saviour”. One businessman who was detained by the police and whose investments were revoked by the government explained that the Supreme Court was instrumental in ensuring his release and in preventing the arbitrary revocation of commercial licenses.270 A former justice, on the other hand, argues that the court has become much more timid than in the 1980s. He contends the difference followed from judges’ “basic tendency to think in communal terms”, which meant they gave more attention to human rights in the 1980s, when most victims were Sinhalese, than now, when all but a few victims are Tamil.271

In any case, the Supreme Court is not a realistic option for many litigants. Few lawyers outside Colombo are versed in fundamental rights or Supreme Court practice for many litigants. Few lawyers outside Colombo In any case, the Supreme Court is not a realistic option for many litigants.272 Most people living outside Colombo cannot afford or are simply unable to travel to Colombo. Still fewer lawyers are willing to appear in cases of detention and torture. One of those who does noted that the number of such lawyers could be counted on one hand.273 Further narrowing the pool of possible representation, Chief Justice Silva reportedly treated several fundamental rights lawyers who used to take such cases with such contempt that they ceased to take cases to the Supreme Court.274

B. The Supreme Court and International Law

In two important and related cases, Chief Justice Silva’s Supreme Court undercut or minimised Sri Lanka’s international human rights commitments. The court acted from a strong ideal of sovereignty that parallels the aggressive vision of territorial integrity championed by many Sinhala nationalists and President Rajapaksa’s efforts to limit international supervision and awareness of the conflict with the LTTE. Its judgments, however, have undermined the protection of Sinhalese as much as Tamils by international human rights instruments. Their most significant beneficiary is the Sri Lankan government.

On 11 June 1989, Sri Lanka acceded without reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).275 Sri Lanka ratified the Convention on Torture on 3 January 1994.276 Like most Commonwealth countries, Sri Lanka follows the “dualist” model for the reception of treaty law into the domestic legal system, whereby international law does not become part of domestic law unless it is contained in existing legislation or incorporated by subsequent legislative action.277 Rights established by the 1978 constitution and domestic legislation currently fall far short of those found in the ICCPR and ICESCR. Fewer rights are granted and deeper derogations from them are allowed.

In an attempt to demonstrate Sri Lanka’s commitment to human rights and openness to international scrutiny, the government of President Chandrika Kumaratunga ratified 1966 Optional Protocol to the ICCPR in October 1997.278 With this, Sri Lanka also acceded to an international enforcement mechanism, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a UN body created by the 1966 ICCPR. The HRC receives reports from signatory states about ICCPR rights. Under the Optional Protocol, the HRC may also receive “communications” from individuals who claim violations by the state. It may then formulate and forward “views” about the individual’s case to the state. Such HRC proceedings are “in no sense a continuation or appeal from the judicial proceedings (if there were any) in the state in which the dispute originated” and have no binding effect on the state.279 At the same time, the HRC is the highest international authority on compliance with the ICCPR and states parties to the Optional Protocol undertake to comply with its views.280 Signatory states also have the obligation to respond to HRC’s opinions even if courts are not required to change their rulings to comply.

276 For a useful listing of Sri Lanka’s international treaty obligations and its engagement with the relevant treaty bodies, see www.bayesky.com/bycategory.php/state/162.
280 The Sri Lankan state is required to respond formally to the HRC even if the courts do not choose to follow the HRC’s recommendations.
In two cases, the Supreme Court has hedged and limited these international law commitments. The first case, *Singarasa*, arose out of the criminal conviction of a Tamil man detained in the Eastern Province in 1993 under the PTA.\(^{281}\) His conviction was based on a confession made to a police officer. At trial Singarasa denied that he had ever made a confession at all, arguing, among other things, that his signed confession was in Sinhalese, a language he did not even speak. After his appeals were denied, Singarasa lodged a communication with the HRC, arguing that the PTA’s provisions enabling the use of confessions to police, and its rule that defendants had to show a confession was coerced, violated the ICCPR’s fair trial guarantees. The HRC agreed. It recommended that the government should give Singarasa “an effective and appropriate remedy”. With this ruling in his favour, Singarasa refiled in the Supreme Court, contending that the use of the confession had violated his fundamental rights under Article 13 of the Sri Lankan constitution.\(^{282}\)

The Supreme Court rejected Singarasa’s claims.\(^{283}\) The court barely addressed Article 13, the basis of Singarasa’s argument. Rather, it chose to ask and answer a question neither Singarasa nor the government raised: whether the government of Sri Lanka had validly entered the Optional Protocol under which the HRC could receive individual communications. The court reasoned that the presidential signature of the Optional Protocol amounted to “a conferment of public rights” that properly belonged to parliament, and that the HRC’s power to issue communications was an assignment of “judicial power” inconsistent with the 1978 constitution.\(^{284}\) The court in effect invalidated Sri Lanka’s ratification of the Optional Protocol.

The *Singarasa* judgment raises numerous troubling questions. The court reached out to invalidate a treaty whose status was not directly relevant to the issues in the case and without any briefing from either party. More important, it did so based on incorrect assumptions about the HRC. Contrary to the court’s argument, the HRC does not issue binding rulings or adjudicate rights, public or otherwise. Its views are merely advisory; they are not revisions of a Sri Lankan court’s judgment but the means by which Sri Lankan citizens can receive a considered second legal opinion which Sri Lankan courts are advised to take into consideration. As a result, there were no grounds for considering the president’s ratification of the Optional Protocol an unconstitutional assignment of judicial power to an international body. The ratification of the protocol – as with any treaty under Sri Lankan law – was fully within the executive president’s powers. It would only be the decision to incorporate the protocol’s rights into domestic law – for instance, by making HRC opinions binding on Sri Lankan courts – that would require parliament’s approval.

The court’s decision has sown unnecessary and continuing confusion. Viewed through a domestic lens, the Optional Protocol no longer binds Sri Lanka. Arguably, this means that its citizens can no longer seek the HRC’s views. Indeed, to do so might expose a person to contempt sanctions from a Sri Lankan court. Viewed through an international law lens, however, Sri Lanka is still bound by the Optional Protocol. Countries cannot use their domestic law to void international law commitments. Hence, the Supreme Court’s view does not bind the HRC or any other actor; nor is it an excuse for non-performance of international law obligations, such as the obligation of the state to respond to HRC communications. The net result is uncertainty about Sri Lankan citizens’ access to an important international forum.

The *Singarasa* judgment is also inconsistent with the court’s approach to judicial independence in other areas. While the court has never strayed against the tight bonds imposed by the emergency regulations and the PTA, which dramatically curtail judicial review, it treated an advisory and non-binding communication from an international body as an invasion of the courts’ domain. This apparent inconsistency is rooted in a deeper continuity: in reviewing the emergency laws and responding to the HRC, the Supreme Court has prioritised national sovereignty and territorial integrity as defended by a strong executive to the point of being willing to sacrifice even the mere possibility of a remedial avenue.

A second important ruling arose from President Rajapaksa’s March 2008 request for an advisory Supreme Court opinion on whether Sri Lanka was in compliance with its ICCPR obligations. This followed in part from concerns raised by *Singarasa* but also because of worries about Sri Lanka’s continued eligibility for the European Union’s Generalised System of Preferences Plus (known as GSP+), which depends on a state’s

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\(^{282}\) Details of the case are drawn from an examination of the petition and the state’s response in that case, and also Crisis Group interviews, Suriya Wickremasinghe and R.K.W Goonesekere, counsel for Singarasa, Colombo, November 2008. Singarasa’s lawyers did not raise the HRC ruling as a legal basis for relief. They did, however, refer to it in their oral arguments and urged the court to take the opinion into account. The court’s reference to the Optional Protocol in its judgment was neither surprising nor misplaced.

\(^{283}\) *Singarasa v. Attorney General*, op. cit.

ratification and implementation of various treaties, including the ICCPR.  

The court rejected several arguments from petitioners to conclude that Sri Lanka gave “adequate recognition” to the ICCPR and that “individuals within the territory of Sri Lanka derive the benefit and guarantee of rights as contained in the [ICCPR].” The court did not grapple with, let alone resolve, the many ways in which Sri Lankan law falls far short of the ICCPR’s requirements. It did not address, for example, Article 15 of the constitution, which allows greater derogation from constitutional rights than the ICCPR permits. The court instead relied on legislation enacted to introduce the ICCPR into domestic law, even though that law is “formulated on terms substantially and significantly different from the corresponding provisions of the ICCPR.” Finally, its opinion did not address the state’s ongoing failure to protect rights and prosecute state actors who violate those rights.

The advisory opinion on the ICCPR made the court a full member of the government’s diplomatic and political campaign to evade international opprobrium for the country’s manifest shortfalls in rights protection. The decision was soon hailed in the government press as “a landmark ruling endorsing Sri Lanka’s human rights commitments.” Like Singarasa, it elevated national sovereignty and executive power over an honest reckoning of the human rights situation.  

In other cases, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Sarath Silva used the constitution to promote a strong executive and an aggressive understanding of a unitary state. By cutting off efforts at political devolution, the court has narrowed options for accommodating Tamil and Muslim interests in a constitutional settlement to the ethnic conflict. Judgments seemingly restraining executive and emergency powers have either been incidental to the central political aims of President Rajapaksa’s administration or have been ignored. Recent rulings on corruption within the executive have been too haphazard to deter future abuse by government officials.

A. The Supreme Court and the Unitary State

Silva’s Supreme Court issued two judgments that limited options for devolution of power by favouring a unitary vision of the state. In both cases, the court reached out to decide an issue when it arguably lacked jurisdiction to do so. The resulting decisions can be defended as plausible readings of the constitution’s text but needlessly reduced the constitutional flexibility that will likely be needed to craft devolution or power-sharing schemes able to respond to the legitimate political claims of Sri Lanka’s ethnic minorities.

The court has not always been committed to an absolutist ideal of national sovereignty. In October 1987, the court rejected challenges to the Thirteenth Amendment, which implemented the July 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord by creating and empowering new provincial councils. In a divided judgment, a five-four majority held that most aspects of the new provincial bodies were consistent with the “unitary state” protected by Article 2 of the 1978 constitution, and hence did not trigger a more stringent referendum process for constitutional amendment used when changing specified core parts of the constitution. Anxious to avoid such
a referendum, the Jayawardene government changed those aspects of the Thirteenth Amendment that the court had isolated as problematic, and enacted the bill.294

1. The PTOMS case

In July 2005, the court issued an interim stay order invalidating the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS) between the government and the LTTE for coordinating aid delivery after the December 2004 tsunami.295 The case arose on petitions filed by the JVP and the Jathika Hela Urmaya (JHU). These parties argued that the government could not enter an agreement with the LTTE and that its expenditure mechanism did not comply with public finance and accounting provisions of the constitution.296 The court rejected the first argument, but accepted the second. It declared that “the rule of law, transparency and good governance” prohibited the aid disbursements without the constitution’s specific accounting mechanisms. It also rejected the location of the PTOMS regional committee in then LTTE-controlled Kilinochchi, accepting the petitioners’ argument that the lack of an “environment of freedom” would prevent its effective operation.297 The Supreme Court’s interim order suspended the operation of PTOMS only temporarily, but effectively ended the process of negotiating with the LTTE over aid distribution.

The PTOMS judgment is legally contestable because it is unclear how the petitioners, who based their claims on Article 12’s equality right, had been harmed by the disbursement of aid to others. Not only did the court not explain how the petitioners had standing to file a case, but in its judgment did not address how possible misuse of funds could constitute a violation of equality. Similarly, the court’s ruling on the regional committee’s location lacks a clear basis in the constitution, while reflecting a strongly nationalist and “unitarist” view of governance, hostile to power-sharing between the centre and regions.298 The judgment will likely discourage future efforts to reach political compromises via devolution and power-sharing.

2. The demerger case

The second important decision concerned the merger of the Eastern and Northern Provinces under the Indo-Lanka accord of 29 July 1987. Among its obligations under that agreement, the Sri Lankan government agreed to “form one administrative unit, having one elected provincial council” of those two provinces.299 Under Article 154A(1) of the constitution introduced by the Thirteenth Amendment, President Jayawardene merged the two provinces in November 1987.300 A merged north and east is a longstanding demand of Tamil nationalists and political parties, as it would create the basis for political autonomy in the region they claim as the traditional Tamil homeland. Sinhala nationalists – and many Muslims – oppose the creation of a single Tamil majority province, seeing it as a step towards a separate state.301

In October 2006, the court invalidated the merger at the behest of three residents of those provinces who asserted they had been denied the right to vote in a referendum promised in 1987.302 As in the PTOMS case, the court reached out to decide an issue even though the petitioners arguably lacked standing to bring a case. Article 126 requires a petitioner to file within a month of the violation, but the court accepted the argument that there was “a continuing infringement of the right to equal protection of the law” and invalidated the presidential proclamation forming one

297 Weerawansha v. Attorney General, op. cit., p. 18. Specifically, it held that funds from bilateral and multilateral donors had to be placed into the national Consolidated Fund pursuant to Article 149(1) of the constitution, rather than disbursed by the regional committees established by the PTOMS. This conclusion suggests that the court believes no pooling of fiscal governance would ever be feasible.
298 The result “was a signal of Sarath Silva’s support for the ultra-nationalist” pole of Sri Lankan politics, explained one lawyer. Crisis Group interview, Colombo, November 2008.
administrative unit out of the two provinces.\textsuperscript{303} Such flexibility starkly contrasts with the harsh line taken in detention and torture cases. Since the merger had been completed through an emergency regulation, the court also had to invalidate that by holding that the constitution permitted only parliament, and not the executive, to merge provinces. This is also one of the rare instances the court invalidated an emergency regulation.

The demerger case has “transformed the terms of the debate, so it’s impossible now to envisage a new merger of the two provinces.”\textsuperscript{304} The decision is significant because the court stretched its procedural rules to favour a strongly Sinhala nationalist position over a longstanding demand of all Tamil parties. Again, a political decision, achieved at the expense of much political capital, was undone at the request of parties at the far end of the political spectrum.

B. THE SUPREME COURT AND EXECUTIVE POWER

1. The checkpoints and eviction cases

In two other widely publicised cases, the court has issued rulings in favour of plaintiffs using fundamental rights litigation to challenge security and counter-terrorism measures. Neither judgment, however, has constrained the state’s emergency powers to a significant degree.

First, in a June 2007 fundamental rights application filed by the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a local research and advocacy organisation, the Supreme Court granted a preliminary injunction against a decision by the secretary to the defence ministry, and brother of the president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, to evict Tamil residents of boarding houses in Colombo and to bus them to Vavuniya. In the early morning of 7 June 2007, the army raided Tamil guesthouses in the capital and gave lodgers 30 minutes to gather belongings and leave Colombo. At least 376 Tamils were evicted before the Supreme Court stepped in.\textsuperscript{305} The defence secretary justified the decision by arguing that the number of Tamils in Colombo was “an immense problem for the security forces” and that the capital would be safer if all Tamils “without valid reasons” were expelled.\textsuperscript{306} The eviction provoked domestic outcry, including from some government ministers, and protests from Indian and European governments.\textsuperscript{307} Prime Minister Ranasinghe Wickramanayake later expressed “regret” over the expulsions, which he described as a “big mistake”.\textsuperscript{308}

The Supreme Court’s intervention against the eviction is a lonely example of judicial protection of basic rights. Rather than undermining President Rajapaksa’s power, however, the decision may have shored it up. The decision rejected a hardline approach taken by one government faction led by the defence secretary in a case where a tough approach alienated important domestic and international constituencies. Without having to repudiate the defence secretary publicly, the president could use the Supreme Court judgment to justify a retreat from a policy that was proving too politically costly to sustain.

In the second case, the court invalidated the use of checkpoints on the Galle-Colombo road to block traffic on that major thoroughfare. The validity of the checkpoints was taken up in the course of a case concerning an arrest. One fundamental rights lawyer observed that the court did not need to address the checkpoints’ legality, but had reached out to do so.\textsuperscript{309} It issued an extremely popular judgment that dealt with security measures that were an irritant to the whole population, even as it did little to remedy the pervasive unequal treatment and harassment of Tamils at checkpoints.\textsuperscript{310} The judgment has largely been ignored, however: checkpoints remain throughout Colombo and the rest of the country.

2. The Waters Edge and Lanka Marine Services cases

In two cases known as Waters Edge and Lanka Marine Services, the Supreme Court invalidated contractual arrangements between the state and private parties based on alleged financial improprieties. These opinions have been lauded by many political observers in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{303} Wijesekera v. Attorney General, op. cit. pp. 22-23.
  \item \textsuperscript{304} Crisis Group interview, director of research organisation, Colombo, November 2008.
  \item \textsuperscript{306} B. Muralidhyar Reddy, “Profiling problem”, Frontline, 24 October 2008, p. 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{307} “Lanka SA steps in, halts eviction of Tamils from Colombo”, Times of India, 8 June 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{308} Muralidhar Reddy, “Sri Lanka PM expresses regret”, The Hindu, 11 June 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{309} Crisis Group interview, Colombo, November 2008.
  \item \textsuperscript{310} Other judgments fit this pattern. For example, in October 2008, the court ordered the government to reduce domestic electricity tariffs, a move that a “massive impact on middle class households”. “CJ does it again: Supreme Court cushions shock therapy”, The Sunday Leader, 26 October 2008.
\end{itemize}
Sri Lanka as “significant blow[s] against the system of executive presidency”. But it is unlikely these opinions will have the positive impact imagined by commentators. The Lanka Marine Services and Waters Edge cases are best understood as exercises in judicial populism in which the court takes highly symbolic action to great public acclaim that has little or no structural effect. When core presidential authority or policy is at stake, the court has declined to act. Rather than serving as a check on the executive the judiciary acts as an adjunct to executive policies and power.

Waters Edge concerned a sale of state land in Colombo initially acquired for public purposes but then left idle and sold to private developers for development as a golf course. The court invalidated the sale of the land as a violation of “public trust”, and fined former President Kumaratunga three million rupees ($26,000) to “remind present and future” office holders of their fiduciary obligations to the state. It also required the treasury secretary to appear before them and submit an affidavit undertaking never to hold government office again. Lanka Marine Services involved the privatisation and tax treatment of a state-owned firm involved in fuel supply facilities in the Colombo port. The firm’s shares had allegedly been sold by the government at a deeply discounted rate to a private entity without proper ex ante valuation by the government. Again, the court voided the transaction and fined the government officials involved, including the sitting treasury secretary.

In both cases, the court voided deals based on a petition filed by a member of the public. If this expansion of the right to challenge government business dealing stands, it constitutes a dramatic expansion of possible litigation. The court also broke new ground by in fact holding against a former president. Article 35 is quite clear that immunity only attaches to a sitting president, but the limits of this provision had never been tested. More troubling, however, was the court’s unprecedented decision to set aside the whole arrangement and to sanction the treasury secretary the way it did. The new remedy of restitution instead of compensatory damages raises concerns: the land involved in the Waters Edge case had been sold on to third parties, whose rights to the land had been nullified without their being granted a hearing by the court. Moreover, the court singled out the treasury secretary, an official who did not play a major role in the deal, and in effect imposed quasi-criminal sanctions on him without the benefit of a criminal trial and its attendant procedural protections.

In the end, none of the corruption cases challenge the core of presidential power. At best, the Waters Edge and Lanka Marine Services cases may cause executive officials to “think twice” before exploiting their positions for fear that a later Supreme Court may be hostile to them. But even this threat can be discounted: a president simply has a greater incentive to stack the bench and stay in office longer. While the checkpoints and the evictions cases might seem like defeats for the

313 Mendis and Senanayake judgment, op. cit., p. 60.
315 Asanga Welikala, “The Supreme Court decision on the privatisation and liberalisation of fuel bunkering facilities at the Colombo Port”, Montage, August, 2008, p. 32.
318 The decisions, in addition, are further evidence of a decisive rupture between now retired Chief Justice Silva and his former mentor President Kumaratunga. In August 2005, in another controversial judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that President Kumaratunga’s second term ended a year earlier than she had believed because of the timing of her second-term oath. (Certified copy of Thero v. Dishanayake, Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, 27 January 2008.) Kumaratunga had sought an advisory opinion from the court in the face of protests from the UNP about the election’s date. Despite the fact that he had administered the oath, Chief Justice Silva not only sat on the panel that heard this case, but wrote the decision against President Kumaratunga. While the constitutional text arguably supports the result in that case, the chief justice’s adjudication of the legality of his own actions again raises deep concerns about both the appearance and the substance of judicial neutrality. For a thorough and thoughtful treatment of the complex legal issues, see Rohan Edrisinha, “President Kumaratunga’s ‘Second Term’: An unconstitutional beginning?”, Moot Point (2000), p. 41.
320 Crisis Group interview, former Supreme Court justice, Colombo, 12 November 2008.
executive, any constraints imposed by the court on presidential power have been ad hoc and unlikely to have enduring effect. In cases implicating core powers or policies, the court has refrained from issuing any order which would entail direct conflict with the government. The court has thus avoided issuing a judgment in the fundamental rights application challenging the president’s failure to appoint the Constitutional Council, although it did grant leave to proceed in those cases in July 2008 and proceedings are ongoing.322

When the stakes are high, the executive has simply ignored the court’s rulings. One case in which the government declined to enforce the court’s judgment concerns the clearance of slums in the Slave Island neighbourhood of Colombo in July 2007 in preparation for a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation conference. Even though the court issued an injunction against the slum clearance, the Urban Development Authority and the defence ministry continued to destroy about 47 houses and evict about 400 people, protesting that, “Nobody informed us of the Supreme Court order”.323 While the Supreme Court issued subsequent orders requiring resettlement of those displaced, the damage to the court’s authority was already clear. 324 In a 2009 case involving oil hedging contracts, the government flatly refused to obey Supreme Court orders. The Court backed down.325

VII. CONCLUSION

“The independence of the judiciary can be regained – by following the rules”326

With the end of the military conflict with the LTTE and the appointment of a new chief justice there is, in principle, a real opportunity for significant judicial reforms. The willingness of the president, parliament, the attorney general and the chief justice to make the necessary changes will go a long way towards deciding whether or not Sri Lanka will grasp its current unique chance to forge a sustainable and just peace.

A first step toward restoring judicial independence would be a return to an orderly appointment and transfer of judges in both the lower and appellate judiciary. For the higher courts, restoration of the constitutional council is necessary to reduce the courts’ politicisation. President Rajapaksa, however, has demonstrated unwavering opposition to appointment of the council, accurately seeing that body as a potentially significant constraint on presidential power. International and domestic advocacy should be focused on ending this rejection of the constitution’s clear command. One of the first tests of the new chief justice will be how he handles the litigation on this issue currently before the court.

Reconstituting the constitutional council is only the first step. The appointment mechanism for judges ought to be disentangled from political considerations. Once the council is again functioning, parliament should negotiate an amendment to the Seventeenth Amendment to reduce political parties’ involvement in the constitutional council, and include in their stead members of the Supreme Court selected by lot; president’s counsel of long standing; and representatives of civil society with demonstrated knowledge of constitutional law and fundamental rights. The aim of such a body would be to mitigate political influence in judicial appointments. It should adopt a strong presumption of promotion by seniority for all appointment, with written explanations for when a decision is made not to appoint from the lower judiciary. Appointments from the attorney general’s office should be reduced and limited to senior department lawyers only.

Recent history also suggests that the removal of judges “should not be left to the politicians”.327 Reforming

the removal system would not necessarily require constitutional change, only new legislation. There is a constitutional, as well as a practical, need to amend the process by creating a special court to hear such cases. That court could be composed of three judges of the Supreme Court drawn by lot, obviously excluding by law any judge implicated in the charges.

Appointments and removals in the lower judiciary also need reform. Even if the constitutional council is restored, and the two members of the JSC are appointed through that mechanism, the JSC should issue clear schedules and rules for appointments, transfers and disciplinary proceedings. The JSC’s decisions against a judge should be open to appeal to rotating panels of Supreme Court justices drawn by lot. Separate procedures should be crafted for instances where the chief justice is subject to investigation.

With the decisive military defeat of the LTTE, there is both the need and opportunity for a fundamental reform of Sri Lanka’s extensive and often abused emergency laws. Provisions in the emergency laws concerning arrest, detention and derogation from routine criminal procedures (e.g., the handling of confessions) and those that criminalise free speech and the exercise of associational rights should be removed immediately. The application of the PTA should be suspended pending thorough parliamentary review of all emergency regulations. The administration of the legal framework set out in emergency regulations and the PTA should be moved from the defence ministry to the justice ministry, with clear civilian oversight over the national security apparatus, especially with regard to detentions and detainees’ access to justice.

Problems in the application of routine criminal laws also arise due to the close nexus between lawyers, judges and the police around the magistrate courts. Minimising torture requires dissolving this network. To start, the presence of state counsels in the magistrate courts should be required. These government lawyers could prosecute cases instead of police, as well as being tasked with winnowing out weak cases. The state should also invest more in making free legal counsel available to criminal defendants in the magistrate’s courts. Currently, detainees have no option but to turn to private lawyers. The Legal Aid Commission provides funds only in civil cases; its lawyers look at criminal cases with disdain. Assigning legal aid lawyers to magistrate courts with a mandate to ensure fair representation, and in particular to identify and provide counsel in cases in which torture or coercion has led to confessions, would be an important remedial step.

Chief Justice Asoka de Silva has the chance to make a significant and positive impact on the judiciary. To do so, he will have to decide how to deal with pending political cases, such as the Seventeenth Amendment litigation; how to manage the JSC; what signal to send to the rest of the judiciary on fundamental rights cases; and perhaps most important, how to relate to his predecessor’s legacy: will de Silva continue to pursue the Sinhala Buddhist populism of the former chief justice or forge a path that helps create the space for political and constitutional accommodation of minority claims?

The current failure of the judiciary to protect fundamental rights and promote political compromise, however, is the result of both a breakdown of institutions and a failure of political will. Fixing institutions and reforming laws will therefore only have a limited effect until political actors, and especially the presidency, feel the political cost of ignoring or infringing on judicial independence. Absent a concerted effort by the bench and bar, the political costs of interfering with the judiciary will remain minimal. So long as that remains the case, Sri Lankans of all ethnicities will continue to lack access to a reliable forum for the adjudication of state violations of their basic constitutional and human rights – and a unique opportunity to forge a lasting peace may be lost.

Colombo/Brussels, 30 June 2009

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328 In 1984, Chief Justice Neville Samarakoon pointed out that a provision of the 1978 constitution guaranteed that the judiciary would hear all matters except those concerning parliamentary privileges. Suriya Wickremasinghe, Of Nadesan and Judges, op. cit., pp. 15-16. Logically, this means that the constitution requires the judiciary to be involved in the removal of judges.

APPENDIX B

SRI LANKA’S COURT SYSTEM

SUPREME COURT
- presided over by the chief justice with six to ten other judges
- has jurisdiction over constitutional matters, fundamental rights, final appellate jurisdiction
- consultative jurisdiction, jurisdiction in election petitions and on breach of parliamentary privilege
- sits in Colombo

COURT OF APPEAL*
- presided over by the president of the Court of Appeal, with six to eleven other judges
- handles appeals from lower courts
- writs of habeas corpus
- sits in Colombo

HIGH COURTS
- responsible for all prosecutions on indictment
- appellate and revisionary jurisdiction over decisions of magistrate and primary courts
- jurisdiction over powers of provincial councils as set out in the provincial list
- admiralty and commercial jurisdiction
- appeals from labour tribunals, agrarian tribunals and small claims courts
- courts in Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matale, Batticaloa, Jaffna, Chilaw, Negombo, Gampaha, Kelani, Kurunegala, Kandy, Awissawella, Ratnapura, Badulla, Anuradhapura

DISTRICT COURTS
- exclusively civil jurisdiction – civil suits, revenue, trust, insolvency and testamentary matters other than such matters as are assigned to any other court by law
- courts in 54 judicial districts

MAGISTRATE COURTS
- original criminal jurisdiction on all matters in the form of “non-summary” procedures – except in cases where indictments have been issued in high courts
- first point of contact for judiciary with detainees under emergency laws
- wide-ranging but rarely used powers to visit and monitor places of detention
- courts in 74 judicial divisions

* Beginning in 2008, there are provincial courts of appeal for civil cases in all the provinces. All new appeals in civil cases in districts courts go to the relevant provinces and no longer to the Court of Appeal in Colombo. Appeals from the high courts in all provinces go to the Court of Appeal in Colombo.


APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACF  Action contre la faim, French aid organisation, seventeen of whose aid workers were murdered in August 2006 in the eastern town of Mutur. Government investigations have led nowhere.

BASL  Bar Association of Sri Lanka, formed in 1994, is a professional organisation and interest group representing lawyers in Sri Lanka. It has 72 branches and nearly 9,000 members.

CPA  Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lankan think tank formed in 1996; instrumental in filing public interest litigation before the Supreme Court.

GSP+  Generalised System of Preferences Plus, through which the European Union extends preferential access to its markets to developing countries; eligibility is determined based on compliance with international human rights treaty obligations.

HRC  Human Rights Committee, United Nations body of eighteen experts that meets three times a year to consider the reports submitted every five years by UN member states on their compliance with the ICCPR; one of eight UN-linked human rights treaty bodies. In states that have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, individuals may also submit complaints to the Human Rights Committee seeking an advisory opinion on their case when all domestic avenues of justice have been exhausted.

ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, international treaty opened for signature, ratification and accession at the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966, entered into force on 23 March 1976.


JHU  Jathika Hela Urumaya, National Sinhala Heritage party. Known from 2000 to 2004 as Sihala Urumaya (Sinhala Heritage), it promotes a strong Sinhala nationalist ideology, promises corruption-free politics and has nine members of parliament, including eight Buddhist monks.

JSC  Judicial Service Commission, consists of the chief justice (chairman) and two other judges of the Supreme Court. Responsible for appointment, promotion, transfer and dismissal of judges.

JVP  Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front), the largest and longest-standing Sinhala nationalist party. It led armed insurgencies against the state in 1971 and 1987-1989. Its more nationalist and pro-government wing led by Wimal Weerawansa broke from the party in April 2008 to form the Jathika Nidahas Peramuna (National Freedom Front). The JVP currently has 24 seats in parliament, reduced from the original 38 seats it won at the last parliamentary election in 2004.

LTTE  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Tamil nationalist group founded in 1976, waged an armed separatist struggle in the north and east. Defeated militarily in May 2009, it lost many commanders including founder-leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. The group still maintains a presence overseas and although factionalised, dominant post-war thinking under new de facto leader Selvarasa Pathmanathan favours politics over war.
PSO  Public Security Ordinance no. 25 of 1947, authorises the declaration of a state of emergency, extendable each month by parliament. It is the basis for emergency regulations issued by the executive that authorise detention of persons, seizure of property, search of premises and suspension of existing laws. Used extensively to combat Tamil insurgency; many Tamils have been detained under its provisions without trial.

PTA  Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions) Act no. 48 of 1979, permanently enacted in 1982, provides for detention of up to three months at a time and a total of eighteen months to be issued by the defence ministry and imposes severe limits on courts’ jurisdiction and authority to prevent abusive detention and torture. The PTA, like the PSO, has been used disproportionately in Tamil areas and against Tamil suspects.

PTOMS  Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure, proposed mechanism for shared decision-making between the LTTE, the government and Muslim representatives for the distribution of aid in the north and east in the aftermath of tsunami; opposed by Sinhala nationalists and deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

SLFP  Sri Lanka Freedom Party, centre-left party founded in 1951 by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike after breaking with the UNP. It instituted socialist economic policies in the 1970s. In power under Bandaranaike’s daughter President Chandrika Kumaratunga from 1994 to 2005 as the main constituent party of the People’s Alliance coalition, it is now led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

TNA  Tamil National Alliance, a coalition of smaller Tamil parties that supported the LTTE, currently with 22 members in parliament from the north and east.

UNP  United National Party, centre-right political party formed in 1946 and currently the main opposition party. It was founded by D.S. Senanayake and is at present led by Ranil Wickremasinghe, prime minister from 2001 to 2004.
APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

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The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

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