| Great Power Confrontation in the Indian Ocean The Geo-Politics of the Sri 
  Lankan Civil War by 
Mahdi Darius  Nazemroaya, Global Research, October 23, 2009  
	
		| In  the so-called Western World double-standards were applied to the final  chapter of the Sri Lankan Civil War. While the U.S. and its allies  supported the military actions of Georgia to secure its territorial  integrity by bringing South Ossetia and Abkhazia under its control  through force in 2008 they did not do this in regards to Sri Lanka in  2009. In essence the actions of the Sri Lankan and Georgian governments  were almost exactly the same: establishing government control of  break-away territory through the use of military force. Yet, the  reaction of the U.S. and its allies were contrastingly different in  both cases. Georgia received support and Sri Lanka did not...
 The reason that the U.S. and its  allies supported Georgia and not Sri Lanka is tied to the encirclement  of Eurasia. If there was no Chinese port being built in Sri Lanka or  any ties between the Sri Lankan government and China the reaction of  the U.S. government would have been much different. Most probably the  American reaction would have been the same as when Israel acts against  Palestinian civilians or when Saddam Hussein, as an American  ally, gased the Iraqi Kurds.
 
 The people of Sri Lanka from the  Tamils to the Sinhalese are in the cross-hairs of a much larger and all  enveloping global struggle... The U.S. and its  allies would ensure that this sea route is less secure for the  Chinese by taking Sri Lanka out of the orbit of China and its allies.  Even the balkanization of Sri Lanka could lead to a Tamil state that  would most likely be allied to the U.S. and India...
 |  The support and positions of  various foreign governments in regards to the diabolic fighting between  the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan military, which cost the lives of  thousands of innocent civilians, says a great deal about  the geo-strategic interests of these foreign governments. The position  of the governments of India and a group of states that can collectively  be called the Periphery, such as the U.S. and Australia, were  in support of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) or  Tamil Tigers, either overtly or covertly. Many of these  governments also provided this support tacitly, so as not to close any  future opportunity of co-opting Sri Lanka after the fighting was over.
 In contrast, the governments of a group of states that can jointly be called Eurasia  as a collective entity, such as Iran and Russia, supported the Sri  Lankan government. The polar nature of the support by Eurasia and the  Periphery for the two different combating sides in the Sri Lankan Civil  War betrays the scent or odour of a much broader struggle. This is  a struugle that extends far beyond the borders of the island of Sri  Lanka and its region.
 
 Why is this so? Much of the answer to such  a question has to do with the formation of a growing alliance in the  Eurasian landmass against the international domination of the U.S. and  its allies. This Eurasian alliance was formed on the basis of  the growing cohesion between Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, and their allies  that has seen the animation of the Primakov Doctrine. The Shanghai  Cooperation Organization (SCO), a security body with real military  dimensions that has been called “the NATO of the East” within some  foreign policy circles is a real symbol of this geo-political dynamic.  In 2009, the last chapter of the Sri Lankan Civil War was very much a  theatre within this process.
 
 Enter the Chinese Dragon: The start of Sri Lankan Estrangement from the U.S. and India
 
 2007  was a milestone year for Sri Lanka. On March 12, 2007, Colombo agreed  to allow the Chinese to build a massive naval port on its territory, at  Hambantota. An agreement on the construction of the port was finalized  and signed by the Sri Lankan Port Authority with two Chinese  companies, the China Harbor Engineering Company and the Sino Hydo  Corporation. [1] The Sri Lankan government’s decision was mostly formed  on the basis of economic benefits and Chinese support to end the  fighting on their island.
 
 What followed was the estrangement of  Sri Lanka from the U.S. and India. It has been a U.S. policy to  encircle China and to prevent it from building any ports or bases  outside of Chinese territory. As a result, the U.S. shortly cut its  military assistance to the Sri Lankan military. [2] Indian support for  the Tamil Tigers also increased through pressure on Colombo to make Sri  Lanka a federal state with autonomy for the Tamils. Beijing threw its  political weight behind Colombo and also began sending large arms  shipments to Sri Lanka. As an additional comparison, Chinese aid to Sri  Lanka in 2008 was about a billion U.S. dollars, while U.S. aid was only  7.4 million U.S. dollars. [3]
 
 It is from 2007 onward that Sri  Lanka became a part of the alliance in Eurasia through its agreement  with China and its subsequent estrangement from the U.S. and India. By  the end of 2007, Sri Lanka had entrenched itself in the geo-strategic  trenches with Russia, Iran, and China. These reasons and not  humanitarian concern(s) are the primary rationale for support provided,  in one way or another, to the Tamil Tigers by the governments of India,  the U.S., Britain, Japan, Australia, Canada, and the European Union.
  
 
 Sri Lankan Military ties to the Moscow-Beijing-Tehran Axis
 
 Chinese  military ties with Sri Lanka started in the 1990s, but it was in   2007 that Chinese and Sri Lankan military relations started to flower.  According to Brahma Chellaney of the Centre for Policy Research in New  Delhi, India: “China’s arms sales [were] the decisive factor in ending  the military stalemate [in the Sri Lankan Civil War.]” [4] In April,  just one month after the 2007 agreement between the Sri Lankan Port  Authority and both the China Harbor Engineering Company and the Sino  Hydo Corporation, China signed a major ammunition and ordnance deal  with the Sri Lankan military. [5] Beijing also transferred, free of  charge, several military jets to the Sri Lankan military, which were  decisive in defeating the Tamil Tigers. [6]
 
 Iran and Russia  also began to rapidly develop their military ties with Sri Lanka  after Colombo agreed to host the Chinese port in Hambantota. In this  regard, Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran all have cooperation and military  agreements with Sri Lanka. The visits of Sri Lankan leaders and  military officials to Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing in 2007 and 2008 were  all tied to Sri Lankan preparations to militarily disarm the Tamil  Tigers with the help of these Eurasian states.
 
 China, Russia,  and Iran all ultimately helped arm the Sri Lankan military before the  last phase of the Sri Lankan Civil War. For the Eurasian alliance the  aim of ending the Sri Lankan Civil War was to ensure the  materialization of the Chinese port and to prevent any possibility of  regime change in Colombo, which would ensure the continuity of a Sri  Lankan government allied to China, Russia, and Iran. Along with Sri  Lankan officials, the governments of Iran, Russia, and China believed  that unless the Tamil Tigers were neutralized as a threat that the U.S.  and its allies, in possible league with India, could make attempts to  overthrow the Sri Lankan government in order to nullify the Sri Lankan  naval port agreement with China and to remove Sri Lanka from the orbit  of Eurasia. In this context, they all threw their weight behind Sri  Lanka during the fighting in 2009 and in the case of China and Russia  at the U.N. Security Council.
 
 Associated Press (AP) reported on December 23, 2007:
 
  In the wake of the United  States Senate slashing military assistance to Sri Lanka, the Russian  Federation has stepped in to fill the vacuum, sending the first ever  top level military delegation to Colombo to discuss military  cooperation. A high level Russian military delegation led by  [Colonel-General] Vladimir Moltenskoy last week met Defence Secretary  Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, Army Commander [Lieutenant-General] Sarath Fonseka  and Air Force Commander, Roshan Goonathilake and had visited several  major military installations in the island. [Colonel-General]  Molpenskoy, a veteran combat General in the Russian Army was formerly  the operational commander of the Russian Forces in Chechnya. [7] The Russian Federation, China,  and Iran also all face their own separatist movements like Sri Lanka.  All four nations see these movements as being supported by outside  players for geo-strategic reasons. In 2007, not only did Moscow, like  China, move in to fill the vacuum of military supplies left by the U.S.  government after Sri Lanka agreed to build the Chinese naval port; the  Kremlin also sent Colonel-General Vladimir Moltenskoy who oversaw the  Russian military campaign against the separatist movement in Chechnya.  Moltenskoy arrived in Sri Lanka as a military advisor to Colombo.
 The aid of Tehran was also crucial for the Sri Lankan military. The Island,  a Sri Lankan news source reported: “Iran had come to Sri Lanka’s rescue  (...) when an LTTE [or Tamil Tiger] offensive had threatened to  overwhelm the [Sri Lankan] army in Jaffna [P]eninsula. Sources said  that several plane loads of Iranian [military] equipment were made  available immediately after Sri Lanka sought assistance from the  Iranian leadership.” [8] The Island also reported, before the  arrival of a high level Iranian military delegation to Sri Lanka in  2009, that Iran, which is “widely believed to [sic.; be] a  leading strategist in” the use of tactical boats, and Sri Lanka “have  over the year developed strategies relating to small [tactical] boat  operations.” [9]
 The extent of the help Iran, Russia, and China  provided to Sri Lanka also included economic support within the  framework of the Sri Lankan military preparations leading to the  assaults on the Tamil Tigers in 2009. The Hindu on September  21, 2009 published an article partially revealing the depth of the  level and importance of the help that Sri Lanka had been receiving from  Iran alone:
 Iran has extended by another  year the four-month interest-free credit facility granted to Sri Lanka  after President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to Iran in November 2007,  state-run Daily News reported on Monday. It said that consequent to  talks with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian  government granted the facility from January 2008 to August 31. In 2008, Sri Lanka imported  crude oil under this facility to the tune of $1.05 billion, nearly all  of its requirements, easing the pressure on the country’s foreign  exchange requirements in a year of significance for the government’s  war with the LTTE [or the Tamil Tigers]. An additional three-month  credit package at a concessionary rate of interest was also  accommodated in Sri Lanka’s favour on September 3 [2009] at a meeting  between the representatives of the countries in Tehran. [10] Chinese Naval Interests and Energy Security Concerns and Sri Lanka    
 Why  a Chinese port in Sri Lanka? Why in Sri Lanka of all places? Sri Lanka  is situated at a vital maritime corridor in the Indian Ocean. This  position is at a vital juncture in the maritime shipping paths of the  Indian Ocean that is important for trade, security, and energy  supplies. This is why Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing stand behind Colombo.
 
 The  Chinese naval port under construction and at Hambantota is part of a  New Cold War to secure energy routes. [11] Most of the energy  supplies going to Asia pass the southern tip of Sri Lanka.  It is for  this reason that the Chinese have included Sri Lanka within their  project of establishing a chain of naval bases in the Indian Ocean to  protect their energy supplies coming from the Middle East and  Africa. Myanmar (Burma) is also part of this project and in many cases  the pressure on the governments in both states is linked to their  agreements to build Chinese ports with Beijing.
 
 In league with  China, Iran also has naval ambitions in Sri Lanka and the broader  Indian Ocean as part of an initiative to protect the maritime routes  between itself and China. China and Iran have both been expanding their  naval forces. This is part of a growing trend. The seas and bodies of  water around all Eurasia from the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the Red  Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, and the the Arabian Sea to the  Bay of Bengal, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea have all  been under heavy militarization over the years. In no point in history  have the oceans seen such large numbers of warships at one time.  This militarization process on the waves of Eurasia is ultimately tied  to controlling movement and encircling the Eurasian landmass in a  coming showdown.
  
 
 Sri Lanka enters the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
 
 In  2009, Sri Lanka joined the SCO, as did Belarus. The entry of Sri Lanka  into the Eurasian organization was announced at the SCO conference in  Yekaterinburg, where the light was on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad following the  election riots in Iran. While the SCO put its weight behind the  re-election of the Iranian President, Sri Lanka thanked the  organization for its collective support against the Tamil Tigers.
 
 Both  Sri Lanka and Belarus, which is also a member of the  Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), entered the  SCO as dialogue partners. [12] The entry of Sri Lanka into the SCO as a  dialogue partner confirms its strategic ties and alliance with Russia,  China, and Iran. Dialogue partner status in the SCO puts Sri Lanka  under the umbrella of China and Russia. Although it is not spelled out  in Article 14 of the SCO Charter, a dialogue partner can request  protection and defensive aid under such a relationship. Dialogue  partners are also financially tied to the SCO, which facilitates their  integration into the coming Eurasian Union that will emerge from the cohesion of Russia, China, Iran, and their partners.
 
 Sri Lanka and the Broader Conflict in Eurasia
 
 In  the so-called Western World double-standards were applied to the final  chapter of the Sri Lankan Civil War. While the U.S. and its allies  supported the military actions of Georgia to secure its territorial  integrity by bringing South Ossetia and Abkhazia under its control  through force in 2008 they did not do this in regards to Sri Lanka in  2009. In essence the actions of the Sri Lankan and Georgian governments  were almost exactly the same: establishing government control of  break-away territory through the use of military force. Yet, the  reaction of the U.S. and its allies were contrastingly different in  both cases. Georgia received support and Sri Lanka did not.
 
 In  addition, Georgia was legally obligated under international agreement  not to use any military force to solve its internal conflict, but Sri  Lanka was not. In legal terms, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, before the  conflict, also enjoyed autonomous statuses within the framework of  Georgia as a polity. This in no means justifies any of the deaths in  Sri Lanka or the fighting in Georgia, but it does illustrate that  double-standards were applied.
 
 The reason that the U.S. and its  allies supported Georgia and not Sri Lanka is tied to the encirclement  of Eurasia. If there was no Chinese port being built in Sri Lanka or  any ties between the Sri Lankan government and China the reaction of  the U.S. government would have been much different. Most probably the  American reaction would have been the same as when Israel acts against  Palestinian civilians or when Saddam Hussein, as an American  ally, gased the Iraqi Kurds.
 
 The people of Sri Lanka from the  Tamils to the Sinhalese are in the cross-hairs of a much larger and all  enveloping global struggle. In the scenario of a possible conflict with  the U.S. and the Periphery the maritime route that passes by Sri Lanka  would be vital as an energy lifeline to the Chinese. The U.S. and its  allies would ensure that this sea route is less secure for the  Chinese by taking Sri Lanka out of the orbit of China and its allies.  Even the balkanization of Sri Lanka could lead to a Tamil state that  would most likely be allied to the U.S. and India, which may grant them  military bases that would be in close proximity to Chinese positions in  Sri Lanka.
 
 
 Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) specializing in geopolitics and strategic issues.
 
 NOTES [1] Sri Lankan gov’t, Chinese companies sign port building agreement, Xinhua News Agency, March 13, 2007.
 
 [2] US out, enter Russia, Associated Press (AP), December 23, 2007.
 
 [3] Jeremy Page, Chinese billions in Sri Lanka fund battle against Tamil Tigers, The Times (U.K.), May 2, 2009.
 
 [4] Ibid.
 
 [5] Ibid.
 
 [6] Ibid.
 
 [7] B. Muralidhar Reddy, Iran extends credit facility to Sri Lanka, The Hindu, September 21, 2009.
 
 [8] Shamindra Ferdinando, High level Iranian military delegation due in Colombo, The Island, October 9, 2009.
 
 [9] Ibid.
 
 [10] US out, enter Russia, Op. cit.
 
 [11] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, The Globalization of Military Power: NATO Expansion, Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), May 17, 2007.
 
 [12] B. Muralidhar Reddy, SCO dialogue partner status for Sri Lanka, The Hindu, July 18, 2009.
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