It is all about ‘Balance of Power’by K. Gunaseelan
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It is all about maintaining ‘balance of power’ something similar to what the Sri Lanka army has been shouting so much for, and thereby against the ‘high security zones’ (HSZ) being dismantled to enable those who had been displaced as a result, to resettle again. The Sri Lankan army had argued against on the basis of ‘balance of power’ being tilted in favour of the LTTE. It is easily conceivable that even after the Sri Lanka Government and the LTTE had signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and in spite of peace prevailing in the ground, the Sri Lankan security forces have not stopped or curtailed upgrading their armed forces by recruiting more manpower and purchasing modern weapons. There is no secret about this. The defense budget is still the same as during the thick of battles. What else could be happening with all this money now? The Sri Lankan army trains at Chavakachcheri junction, the site of fierce
fighting between the LTTE and government troops (TIME, 2003) Now let us imagine what
the mindset and the thinking of the LTTE could be.
Can the LTTE remain quiet when the Sri Lanka military is allowed
to build up? The LTTE
will only get caught with its pants down
in the event the peace talks fail and war resumes! Even Dr. Balasingam, the LTTE theoretician, had said that their
negotiating strength depends on their fighting capability and if not,
even the present peace talks will see the same fate of the previous
pacts such as the Bandaranayake-Chelvanayagam pact and the Dudley-Chelva
pact made by the 'ahimsa' Tamil political-groups of the by-gone era. One should not assume that the Government of Sri Lanka is
whole-heartedly giving autonomy to the Tamils after all these years of
struggle. They never wanted
to, and they still may not want to if they can help it. The
Government was able deny justice to the Tamils only because Tamils could
not fight back. It is only now, and only after the LTTE proved its
military might in the battlefield, that they have reluctantly agreed to
think about a federal solution. If there is a way that they could
repeat the same deceit with the LTTE too as done with the previous Tamil
political-parties, even at the last moment, they will certainly do it.
It is only the fighting capacity of the LTTE that will continue the
pressure to achieve real permanent-peace. So the LTTE needs to keep
themselves in a strong position not only in manpower but also with
regards to its firepower as well. They
have to maintain the ‘Balance of power’ between the Sri Lanka
military and them even during this time period of peaceful atmosphere as
a final solution has not yet materialized.
The only practical thing that the LTTE could do at the present
moment when there is no restriction on the Sri Lankan military to
purchase hardware, is for the LTTE also to do the same.
But unfortunately that is not allowed to the LTTE even though
that is not the case for the Sri Lankan military.
So the LTTE had to get something done on the sly, if it were to
rightfully maintain its ‘balance of power’.
If not, in time to come, the fighting strength of the LTTE will
become over-powered by the Sri Lankan military and there would be no
need for talks thereafter! So if the LTTE had really smuggled arms illegally in contradiction of the MOU, it is really the MOU that is to be blamed and not the LTTE, as the MOU had not addressed this issue of maintaining the ‘balance of power’ between the two parties by also restricting the Government in purchasing military hardware. By allowing the Sri Lankan military to import hardware while denying the same to the LTTE will only grossly weaken the LTTE in the future, and drag the government into a state of apathy and assume that the Sri Lankan military has enough strength to wipe out the LTTE if the peace talks fails, and will ensure to that end. If the SLMM rushes to the
defense of the Sri Lankan military ignoring the grave humanitarian
concerns, to say that resettling the displaced civilians in their own
homes within the high security zones will grossly damage the fighting
capacity of the military, why not they say the same in favour of the
LTTE when the military is able to purchase military items while the LTTE
cannot -- which would grossly reduce the fighting capacity of the LTTE. If
it is right to argue on the basis of ‘balance of power’ for the Sri
Lankan forces and if the SLMM also agrees with that view, then why is it
not right for the LTTE also to argue on the basis of ‘balance of
power’ and the SLMM to accept it? (Or
else conversely, if the SLMM will deny the right of ‘balance of
power’ to the LTTE as regards to bringing arms, then why cannot they
also deny the right of ‘balance of power’ to the Sri Lankan army
considering the serious humanitarian issues involved in preventing the
displaced civilians being resettled within the acquired land of the
‘high security zones’) If what happened off Neduntheevu was
actually a failed attempt by the LTTE to smuggle arms, then for obvious
reasons the LTTE is in no position to explain their true fears, which
compelled them to do so. So
it is up to the Tamil support groups like the TNA, and the International
Tamil Organizations to come out with the possible mindset and fears of
the LTTE, and address the issue by bringing restrictions to the Sri
Lankan military also with regard to purchasing hardware.
Or else, the smuggling of arms should not be construed as a
violation of the MOU, and a distinction should be made between
‘bringing arms’ and ‘using it’.
As Dr. Balasingam said, having arms is a bargaining chip.
That does not mean you are going to use it!
‘Having’ (merely for ‘style’) and ‘using’ are two
different things altogether. The
government and the LTTE must be on equal terms if peace talks are to
succeed. There was
widespread speculation that the peace talks would collapse on this
incident even though it did not happen.
However, the fears were real.
It is all because there was a lack of equal terms in this respect
to the parties concerned. It is this type of inequality between both parties that bring risks to the success of the peace talks. So in the best interests of all, and for the benefit of all those who really want to see permanent peace dawn in Sri Lanka, we must argue vociferously against the unequal terms that still exist between the two sides. |