by: D.B.S. Jeyaraj

“The LTTE doesn’t operate according to the concept of a separate state. We operate according to concepts and categories that are entirely different. We operate according to the concept of a homeland and self-determination. Homeland doesn’t mean separate state as such... Saying that the LTTE is fighting for an independent state has no relevance.”

Every dark cloud has a silver lining. True, but then, only the foolhardy optimist would strive to elongate that lining excessively to cover the darkness of the entire cloud. The desire by sections of the national and international media to paint a rosy picture of the preliminary round of talks between the United National Front (UNF) government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Thailand has led to sunshine stories of a colossal scale about Sattahip’s outcome.

While the Sattahip parley certainly proved satisfactory, nothing sensational occurred. Everything went off predictably well because both sides scrupulously avoided deep discussions about contentious issues.

Chief among the sunshine stories from Sattahip is the one about the Tigers giving up the Tamil Eelam demand. Different organs have outlined that aspect differently using terms like ‘scaled down,’ ‘toned down,’ etc. The point however, is unmistakably clear. The LTTE apparently is not keen on a separate state — Tamil Eelam — for which dream thousands of youths laid down their lives and paid countless sacrifices. It seems highly unlikely that a movement like the LTTE after waging a relentless struggle for decades and establishing a position of strength in the politico - military sphere is now prepared to jettison its secessionist demand at this premature stage.

If the Tigers have really stated explicitly and unambiguously that they are dropping their Tamil Eelam demand at this juncture, then it goes against the grain of all what they have stood and fought for in the past. Only the ignorant, naive and incompetent will believe, let alone project the viewpoint that the LTTE has entered talks after abandoning the Tamil Eelam demand particularly because of the powerful politico-military position they are in right now. Thus, if the Tigers have indeed stated that the Tamil Eelam demand has been dropped, any serious student of politics can only arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the LTTE is insincere in claiming so.

Eelam demand stands

In fairness to the LTTE, the simple truth is that the Tigers have never stated that they have given up the Tamil Eelam demand. In that context, it is indeed remarkable that much publicity is being given to a non-existent stance of the Tigers. Various people have commented publicly on this so called “positional shift” by the LTTE and the imaginary move is currently churning up a heated controversy. The reality however, is that the Tigers have never declared that the Tamil Eelam demand has been dropped. Moreover, it is not necessary for them to drop the demand as a pre-condition or prerequisite for entering talks. It is perfectly normal and even logical for an organisation to enter talks of such a nature without dropping the relevant demand.

Incidentally, the Tamil Eelam demand is not a brainchild or whimful fancy of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The proposal was mooted by several other leading Tamil politicians of a bygone era. It was not created in a vacuum but evolved gradually as a response to Sinhala chauvinist hegemonism masquerading as democratic majoritarianism. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) contested the 1977 July elections seeking a mandate for Tamil Eelam and obtained a preponderant endorsement by winning 18 of the 19 Tamil majority electorates in the north - east.

The fact that the Tigers have entered talks without giving up Tamil Eelam does not necessarily mean that they would want to confine the agenda for talks to that demand alone. It has been made very clear that the current talks are about finding a reasonable alternative to the Tamil Eelam demand. So the Tigers or any rational entity will not and cannot enter talks of this type while sticking uncompromisingly to the original demand. They are only discussing alternative solutions without abandoning their stated position. Distorting this reality with either bona fides or mala fides motives is not only foolish but can also be dangerously counterproductive.

In any case, it was self evident that the entire peace process got off the ground because it was implicitly understood that talks could not be about Tamil Eelam. When Norwegian special peace envoy Erik Solheim met LTTE Leader Prabhakaran on November 1, 2000 at Mallavi and returned to Colombo, he told the press that the process was aimed at finding a solution within ensuring the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Responding to a pointed question, Solheim said then that the Tiger leader was well aware of this and was proceeding on that premise.

After the UNF government came to power, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has constantly emphasised that all things except secession were negotiable. The unity and territorial integrity of the country were non-negotiable. The government delegation head, Prof. G. L. Peiris in his inaugural address in Thailand reiterated this position. In defining the parameters of the talks, Peiris stated very clearly that the unity and territorial integrity concepts were sacrosanct and elevated them to a maximal irreductibility.

Explore alternatives

Against that backdrop, harping constantly about the LTTE fighting for a separate state and going ga ga over imaginary acts of dropping the Tamil Eelam demand etc., can only be exercises in futility. This perhaps explains Balasingham’s comment that “the LTTE doesn’t operate according to the concept of a separate state” and “saying that the LTTE is fighting for an independent state has no relevance.” The LTTE at this point of time, is prepared to explore alternatives to Tamil Eelam. It may be amenable to giving up that demand only if as G. L. Peiris optimistically asserted those aspirations could be addressed within a united state.

Again, this flexibility and the preparedness to consider lesser solutions is nothing new. The LTTE along with the TULF and four other Tamil groups entered the Thimpu talks in 1985. Prabhakaran and Balasingham went to Bangalore in 1986. The Tigers went along with the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord for a while. It entered into a dialogue with the Premadasa regime in 1989-1990. When Kumaratunga came to power the LTTE entered peace talks again in 1994 and adhered to a short lived ceasefire in 1995. When the Norwegian facilitated peace process began the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire and was ready to sign a memorandum of understanding. It was the Kumaratunga - Kadirgamar duo that obstructed peace then. Even with Wickremesinghe, it was the LTTE that took the lead in matters like declaring a unilateral ceasefire, signing the ceasefire agreement.

Of course, all peace processes of the past failed. There is much debate on what caused these failures. While successive governments lay the blame at the door to the Tiger den, the LTTE in turn blames Colombo. The important thing however, is to take into account the continuing phenomenon of the LTTE participating at talks. All such exercises have been undertaken with the implicit understanding that the efforts involved were to identify an alternative and not demarcate the boundaries of Tamil Eelam.

While Sinhala hardliners may say that Tamil intransigence was the cause for peace bid failures in the past, a brief examination of recent history will reveal that Tamil political leaders have always been prepared to compromise on their original demands in the interests of a settlement. It had been Sinhala intolerance and bad faith in implementing even minor concessions that fuelled Tamil resentment to the stage of secession.

Even though Amirthalingam became opposition leader on the strength of parliamentary seats acquired through a mandate for Tamil Eelam, the TULF stalwart was always ready to negotiate for something lesser. The TULF stance then was that if the government proffered a viable alternative to Tamil Eelam the party would present it to the people, gain their consent and then disavow separatism. It was on this basis that the TULF opted to accept even the District Development Councils (DCC), a feeble caricature of a separate state. But, J. R. Jayewardene was unwilling to let even the DDCs work.

No compromise

While the TULF was ever ready to negotiate for something less it was not prepared to drop Tamil Eelam because of a ban on it. So when Jayewardene brought in the aftermath of the 1983 July anti-Tamil pogrom, the 6th Amendment to the constitution that disallowed separatism, the TULF took the honourable course of forfeiting their seats rather than take the oath of allegiance.

Thus, when the LTTE says it is prepared to participate in the search for a settlement short of Tamil Eelam, a familiar strand in Tamil politics is visible. Once again, the dominant Tamil political force of the day like the TULF of yore is ready to accept a viable alternative to Tamil Eelam opposes its core principles of homeland. The analogy ends there.

The LTTE unlike the TULF has reached this dominant position through force of arms and is in a far more powerful position vis a vis the government in Colombo than the TULF ever was. This position of strength and its ideological make up will not let the LTTE compromise for something far, far less than Tamil Eelam. So any viable alternative that the Tigers would be ready to accept has to incorporate the core principles of self-determination, homeland and nationhood. That simply put is the bottom line.

This was directly and effectively conveyed to the world at large by LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham at the press conference in Thailand. Reiterating that the Tigers were not in negotiations to pursue Tamil Eelam, Balasingham emphasised that the Tigers were operating at a different level with other concepts such as self-determination, homeland, etc. There was however, an explicit warning. If the three concepts were not enshrined in any forthcoming settlement or if oppression continued, the Tigers will use the right of ‘self - determination’ as a last resort and secede launching if necessary a separatist war again.

It is somewhat puzzling as to why an unnecessary controversy about the LTTE dropping the Tamil Eelam demand is on when all evidence available indicates everything to the contrary. Also, it would be myopic on the part of the south to lull itself into a sense of false consciousness that the LTTE is dropping Tamil Eelam when it really has not. What is of utmost importance is to realise that the LTTE really means business when talking about the core principles and other matters related to jettisoning the Tamil Eelam demand. It is imperative therefore, for South Sri Lanka to explore ways and means of evolving a viable alternative incorporating these principles instead of harping on the Tamil Eelam demand. The international dimension in this respect could cut both ways if the Tigers take their case to them.

Three core principles

The three core principles are not something extraneous in Tamil perception. They are perceived as the inherent rights of the Tamil people and not concessions. The Tamils would therefore, want these rights to be recognised as their right rather than treat them as concessions. The challenge at hand is to work out a solution incorporating these principles in a manner acceptable to the Sinhala and Muslim people also. These are issues that have to be addressed and not glossed over or ignored. These matters will not form part of the agenda in the earlier rounds of talks but addressing and hopefully resolving becomes inevitable at some point of time. Unless and until these problems are overcome and a radical re-structuring of the state and re-orientation of dominant ideology is effected, hopes of a final settlement are bleak.

The worry from a Sinhala perspective about the LTTE’s bona fides regarding peace must be noted too. The nagging doubt fuelled by Sinhala hard-liners is that the LTTE will not quit its separatist agenda and opt for a settlement within a united Sri Lanka. In the absence of a national media campaign to combat, contain or clarify this scepticism there is no doubt that this trend of thought will gather momentum in the coming months. Kumaratunga, the fallen peace angel, is likely to spearhead this anti-Tiger and by extension anti-UNF campaign. Kumaratunga has failed to distinguish between the LTTE’s genuine commitment to the search for peace and its dedication to the ideals that led to the birth and growth of the movement.

It is important to recognise that Velupillai Prabhakaran and his companions are firmly convinced that the Tamil national question cannot be resolved within a united Sri Lanka. There is no reason to doubt that the Tigers are not of this mindset even now. The difference now is that unlike in the past where the LTTE felt negotiations were useless because of its conviction that the Sri Lankan state could resolve the problem and therefore shunned talks, the Tigers re-oriented their approach and opted to enter talks. This change of heart cannot be because the Tigers had abandoned Tamil Eelam or even felt that Colombo could award them a satisfactory solution. It is more of a tactical shift. Instead of staying away from negotiations and being blamed as intransigent, the LTTE participates in the peace process to show that it is not averse to a negotiated peace.

Even if that state of mind prevails in the Tiger psyche, the talks need not be affected. However much the LTTE desires Tamil Eelam, the Tigers are yet willing to cooperate and participate fully with Wickremesinghe in the peace process.

The challenge

The LTTE approach must be viewed rationally in balanced fashion. Extreme perceptions should be avoided. Just because the LTTE has not abandoned its liberationist ideology of Tamil Eelam, there is no reason to say that no talks should take place because of this. The challenge therefore is to continue talks as much as possible and seek avenues of a negotiated settlement.

Even though the LTTE may not be in a position to openly state so, it is not entirely impossible that it may opt for a settlement within a united but not necessarily unitary Sri Lanka. If the essence of Tamil grievances can be redressed and aspirations accommodated within a re-structured state, then the Tamil Eelam demand may not be stressed upon. The state should be re-invented. In the words of the late Professor Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson, “a settlement ensuring, ‘separation without secession’ could be achieved.” Such a solution is highly imaginative and bold. What is envisaged here is an ‘associative structure’ between the two ‘solitudes.’

Hoping for such a solution within the next few years seems unrealistic. But temporary arrangements could be made while negotiations go on. Provisions like an interim administration for the north - east where pride of place is given to the LTTE or parties favoured by it should be established. The important thing is to prevent the peace process from collapsing and relapsing into a state of war. Whatever the ups and downs of the peace process, the country should be kept in a no war state. This is imperative if the economic fortunes of the island are to be revived or resurrected.