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The
returns of peace in Sri Lanka: the development cart before the conflict resolution horse? [Excerpts] |
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Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah
Please send any feedback to
danny.sriskandarajahATmagd.ox.ac.uk Forthcoming
in the Journal of Peacebuilding & Development Vol. 2, June
2003. Abstract
The current peace process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is unprecedented on several counts: talks have never lasted this long, been this stable, or been at such a high level in the past. Also unprecedented, and perhaps key to early success of the process, has been an agreement (termed here as the “Killinochchi consensus”) between the main stakeholders that the first priority of conflict resolution in Sri Lanka is realizing the “peace dividend”. This has resulted in considerable action and cooperation on reconstruction of the war-torn Northeast and development of the island's economy. It is suggested here that, apart from their direct benefits, these efforts have two further aims: to bolster popular support of the peace initiative, and to foster and cooperation between the two negotiating sides ahead of discussions on more contentious issues. Also novel in the Sri Lankan case has been the willingness of international donors, particularly the international financial institutions, to get involved in the peace process well before a permanent solution has been achieved. While several questions remain about how substantial the development drive is, whether it has been correctly sequenced, and whether it can deliver a sustainable peace, it is also suggested here that a constructive and pragmatic approach to peacebuilding through development holds some promise in Sri Lanka, and perhaps elsewhere. I. Introduction
The signing of an indefinite ceasefire between the Government of Sri
Lanka[1]
and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February
2002 ushered in the most secure and promising period in the island's
troubled recent history. For the remainder of 2002, and until the time
of writing, these two protagonists have been negotiating a permanent
political settlement. Despite the progress to date, much remains to be
done to transform this period of non-war into a sustainable peace –
particularly as some of the most contested and potentially disruptive
political and military issues (e.g. disarmament, minority rights and the
design of appropriate political institutions) have yet to be addressed,
let alone resolved. An area where the two sides have agreed and cooperated – with the
active support of international donors and the business sector – is
the reconstruction of war-affected areas and island-wide economic
development.[2]
This has led to the emergence of what might be called the
“Killinochchi consensus”, termed after the town in under LTTE
control where many of the early negotiations have taken place and which
has emerged as the focal point in the drive to rebuild the Northeast.
Not only is the development imperative a shared priority, it has emerged
as a first priority in
conflict resolution; underpinning negotiations to date and, it is hoped,
paving the way for a permanent political settlement. Though many issues
remain uncertain and the outcome of the whole process by no means
guaranteed, it is perhaps timely and useful to review these attempts at
peacebuilding through development in Sri Lanka. This article examines the nexus between conflict, development and
peacebuilding in Sri Lanka; the interests and strategies of local and
international stakeholders who have shaped it; and the novel sequencing
of priorities that has been evident. The Sri Lankan case raises several
interesting and potentially important questions about the possibilities
of using economic levers to transform political conflicts; the ability
of international donors to ameliorate civil conflicts; and, more
generally, the relationship between state, society and market in plural
developing countries. It is suggested here that the Sri Lankan case may
be an instance in which joint and early action on securing the material
dividends arising from peace can, at least in the short-term,
consolidate efforts at conflict resolution. The following section deals briefly with the relationship between
conflict and development in Sri Lanka's recent history. Subsequent
sections analyse, in turn, the ways in which the development drive has
featured in peace negotiations and the role being played by the
international community in this process. A penultimate section examines
some of the challenges to peacebuilding in Sri Lanka that remain and a
concluding section dwells on the wider lessons that may be drawn from
the Sri Lankan experience. II.
Conflict & development
...When examining the causes, consequences and dynamics of Sri Lanka’s
conflict, it is clear that economic development is implicated in several
ways. First, access to key socio-economic resources such as education,
employment (particularly in the state sector), and regional development
has been a central political issue. Tamil concerns about discrimination
and Sinhalese perceptions of the relative advantages enjoyed by Tamils
can be seen as instrumental in the rise of communal politics (Sriskandarajah
2002a)
. Secondly, almost two decades of war has come at considerable cost to the
Sri Lankan economy. In the Northeast, there has been widespread
destruction of infrastructure, low levels of investment (public and
private), a collapse of agriculture, shortages in critical goods and
inputs, an absence or disruption of key markets for goods and services,
damage to ecosystems, disruption of education and, as a result,
large-scale internal and external displacement (Sriskandarajah
2002b)
. Island-wide, the direct and indirect economic costs of the war
have been estimated to run in the billions of US dollars (see, e.g., Grobar
and Gnanaselvam (1993); Kelegama (1999); and Arunatilake, Jayasuriya et
al. (2001)
). Further, a significant share of national output, including a
large share of public spending, was devoted to, or involved in,
war-related activities (Sarvananthan
2002)
. International involvement in the economy had been steadily
falling as a result of political uncertainty and perceived risk. However, it should be noted that despite the negative economic
consequences of war, Sri Lanka has made good progress in economic
development. The Sri Lankan economy continued to grow relatively rapidly
even at the height of the conflict, with annual Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth averaging around 4% over the last quarter century. While
Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP is low (at around US$850 per annum), having
enjoyed considerable success in education, health and welfare policies,
Sri Lanka rank in terms of the broader Human Development Index (HDI) (81st
out of 173 countries surveyed) is 18 places higher (UNDP
2002)
. Thirdly, although numerous military and political causes can be identified as to why the parties agreed to a ceasefire (e.g. military impasse; the government’s election promise of peace; foreign facilitation; domestic pressure from civil society; and the post-September 11 context), there was also an economic imperative at work. In 2001, the Sri Lankan economy experienced its first ever contraction since the country gained independence, with GDP estimated to have shrunk by 1.4% compared to the previous year. The fiscal picture was also looking dire with military expenditure and government deficits ballooning. It could be argued that, more than at any other time in the country’s recent history, the government could ill-afford to pursue its increasingly costly military strategy. For its part, the LTTE may also have been feeling the effects of limits placed on its ability to raise funds overseas by a ban on its operations in several countries... III.
Peace & reconstruction
Despite
the progress made since the ceasefire agreement, especially in improving
the livelihoods of people in the Northeast, there have been very few
concrete political breakthroughs. Admittedly, the LTTE has indicated
that it is prepared to settle for something short of full secession if
the terms are acceptable and both sides seem to have agreed that some
form of federal structure may be the best way forward. However, these
are hardly concrete steps and, in any case, their announcement has come
very late in the stage, some time after the key development-related
issues were discussed and acted upon. Apart from the direct benefits of pursuing reconstruction and
development, there are a further two instrumental advantages: at the
negotiating table, it is hoped that cooperation on economic matters will
build trust and, in turn, facilitate a political settlement; and, at the
popular level, it is hoped that greater economic prosperity and
stability, in the Northeast and elsewhere, will lead to greater public
support for peace process. The two are seen to be mutually reinforcing
and both have been made explicit by the negotiators: "We
must commence with matters that both sides can agree and start working
on, without wasting time on issues that are far ahead. We may deal with
them at the correct time when the environment is more conducive
following the confidence building measures" Government chief
negotiator quoted in (Daily
Mirror 2002)
. For
the current government, keen to be seen meeting its election promise,
economic recovery appears almost as important as political settlement: “In
the early stages of our talks with the LTTE, we are trying to resolve
some of the immediate practical needs of the people that can bring
relief and normalcy to our society.
Economic re-construction and development of the affected areas
will be a deciding factor in sustaining the momentum of political
negotiations. Development
is part of the healing process in a wounded, divided society.
The pressing day-to-day problems of the people need to be settled
as early as possible… The momentum of growth must be re-established”
(Wickremesinghe
2002)
. Bolstering popular support for the peace process is important not only
for its own sake but for ensuring the electoral survival of the current
government, particularly as the uneasy political “cohabitation” (see
note 1) in Colombo has meant that parliament could have been - and can still be – dissolved. The LTTE, for its part, has also embraced enthusiastically the idea of
reconstructing the Northeast before resolving the conflict. The
organisation has positioned itself as the de-facto
government of areas under its control and is keen to be seen as adopting
a developmental stance. In his appeal to donors in Oslo, the LTTE’s
chief negotiator emphasized the material basis upon which peace should
be built: “As
the negotiating process moves forward with a clear vision and strategy
to consolidate the current peace and to seek a permanent solution to the
ethnic conflict, there are growing expectations and hopes among the war
affected civilian population that their urgent existential needs and
wants will be addressed and redressed without delay. For the suffering
masses, peace and negotiations have little or no meaning unless they
gain the peace dividend in concrete monetary and material assistance
without delay” (Balasingham
2002)
.... IV.
Reconstruction & international support
...Box 2.
ODA as carrot and stick
...V. Reconstruction & political settlement? In economic terms, the strategy of the Killinochchi consensus seems to
be working. Sri Lanka’s economy is expected to have grown by over 3%
during calendar year 2002 and is expected to return to peak levels of
around 5% per annum GDP growth over 2003. The strongest areas of growth
in late 2002 (banking, real estate, insurance, transport and
communications) have all benefited from the reconstruction of the
Northeast and expanding service provision to the area (Sri
Lanka Department of Information 2003)
. The peace process has also favourably affected business
confidence. Investment levels rose considerably during 2002 and the
Colombo Stock Exchange closed the calendar year some 31% higher than the
start of the year. As the Sri Lankan Prime Minister has observed,
“business is good for peace and peace is good for business” (Wickremesinghe
2002)
. However, despite considerable trust building between the two main
protagonists since the ceasefire agreement, there is still a long way to
go before a permanent political settlement. The possibility of renewed
war always looms large. In the meantime, several questions remain about
how substantial the development drive is, whether it has been correctly
sequenced, whether it can deliver a sustainable peace and, indeed,
whether the end justifies the means. One concern about the Killinochchi consensus is whether it is no more
than political rhetoric aimed at giving a positive public gloss to
difficult negotiations. The amount of money actually being pledged by
donors is still relatively small and, in any case, much of it is in
loans not grants. Compounding this is the fact that there is relatively
little capacity in the Northeast to coordinate ODA flows and manage the
development process effectively (Sivaram
and Shanmugaratnam 2002)
. In such a situation, there may be significant levels of
under-utilization again. There have also been concerns that not enough
is being done to stimulate production and long-term development (Northeastern
Herald 2003)
, that the material benefits of peace (i.e. the peace dividend)
have not yet filtered to the people of the Northeast, and that the root
causes of conflict are not being addressed. However, these concerns can
be countered with the fact that, while commitments and action remain
relatively small at present, the development drive is gaining momentum.
Further, the institutions and policies being developed at present are
likely to have long-term impacts and therefore are of greater
significance than their present size or monetary worth. Conversely, at the same time that there are fears that the peace
dividend in the Northeast is insignificant, there are also fears that it
may be perceived to be too successful. If the government and donors are
seen to be favouring the Northeast, this may lead to growing resentment
in the South about the relative neglect of the rest of the country. In
turn, this may lead to diminished popular Sinhalese support for the
peace process and put the whole process at risk. However, while the
Northeast is certainly likely to receive the largest proportion of any
new funding, senior government officials and key donors have stressed
that the dividends of peace should accrue to the entire island. Regardless of whether the development process is actually working or
not, perhaps the most obvious concern about the strategy of
peacebuilding through development is whether the sequencing is
correct; that is, whether the negotiators have indeed put the cart
before the horse. There is, of course, a further question as to whether
this strategy is part of a well thought-out, intentional plan by
negotiators and/or the international community. This is an interesting
question, but one that is not central to the concerns of this article
and best left to historians. The challenge, for now and for the
immediate future, is how to transform this pause in conflict into a
permanent settlement, especially as the most contested issues have yet
to be dealt with adequately...
VI.
Conclusion The current peace process in Sri Lanka is unprecedented in its relative
success, its areas of emphasis, the range of stakeholders involved, and
the means employed. In the first year since the signing of the
ceasefire, the two sides have demonstrated that pragmatic cooperation on
the economic front can reinforce conflict resolution. This experience
highlights at least two important dyads that are of interest to
theorists of peace and conflict: the local/global and the
political/economic. First, in contrast to the relatively little attention paid by the
international community to the resolution of the Sri Lankan conflict
over the last two decades, the current peace efforts highlight the role
that international actors can play in a largely “internal” conflict.
Apart from the facilitation provided by the Norwegians, the donor
community has, perhaps contrary to expectations, shown a willingness to
get involved in a direct and material way. There is also evidence that
international actors are willing to be more flexible and pragmatic in
their approach – it is no longer, as Clare Short has pointed out,
business as usual for donors. Secondly, the Sri Lankan experience blurs the distinction between the
political (conflict resolution) and economic (reconstruction and
development) aspects of peacebuilding. Indeed, one implication of the
Killinochchi consensus is that the former can be an outcome of the
latter so that perhaps even the most intractable political disputes can
be resolved through the use of economic incentives and levers. Such a
view seems informed by a powerful neo-liberal logic that presents a
tantalizingly simple message: get the economics right and the politics
will fall into place. The view is certainly not new (it was put perhaps
most famously by Hirschman (1997
(1977))
in his description of material “interests” triumphing over
other, more base “passions”) but maybe there is something in the
emerging global political economy that aids its articulation. This
solution of modernizing the way out of conflict, of shaping incentives
so that key stakeholders have more to gain from peace than from war, is
also not limited to Sri Lanka. For example, two senior US business
figures suggest in a recent edition of Foreign Affairs that the
“The Economic Path Out of Conflict” in Israel/Palestine is more
economic development, investment and commerce. Their logic is also
tantalizingly simple: “Politics follows
commerce because commerce provides mutual benefits across the broad
expanse of the population, regardless of race, color, religion, or
ideology…[P]eace and goodwill only flourish when people have hope and
a vision of better lives for their children…Without economic
development and investment, there is no hope and no vision of better
lives ahead” (Abboud
and Minow 2002
, pp. 14 & 16). Yet, despite the encroachment of global economic pragmatism into the
domain of intra-state conflicts, there are few signs that the Sri Lankan
resembles the apolitical neo-liberal ideal. It may well be the case
that, in this post-Cold war, globalizing era, there is space for
substate and non-state actors to negotiate some degree of economic
sovereignty without being bogged down by the usual complications of
political sovereignty. However,
it is clear that, in Sri Lanka in any case, very familiar political
issues remain central: sovereignty, autonomy, territory, identity-rights
and command of violence. The LTTE may well be seeking de facto
economic self-determination, but this is a precursor to some form of de
jure political autonomy. In this sense, traditional concerns of conflict resolution will need to
be addressed. In particular, attention will still need to be paid to the
root causes of conflict: social, cultural, political as well as
economic. In the case of
the latter, the lesson drawn by Byrne
and Irvin (2001:425)
from Northern Ireland is equally applicable to Sri Lanka:
“economic aid on its own is not a panacea to resolve ethnic conflict
within Northern Ireland, but it can be a part of an overall
peace-building process that tackles structural inequalities that
contribute to the protracted nature of ethnopolitical conflicts”. In
the Sri Lankan case, it is still too early to tell whether the economics
are in fact right, let alone whether the politics will fall into place.
All that can be said with confidence is that first year of ceasefire has
been an experiment in coming up with novel solutions to old problems. In
the process, the development cart may indeed have been put in front of
the orthodox conflict resolution horse but there is hope yet that this
strategy will be productive. If the strategy works, then the outcome is
for Sri Lanka is likely to be very good: increased prosperity, human
security and political harmony. If it fails, then the situation is
likely to be very bad: renewed conflict, with both sides deploying more
resources than ever before and resolution made all the more difficult.
It can only be hoped that the stakeholders in the Sri Lankan peace
process realize that Sri Lanka cannot afford to fail. Bibligraphy
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