In a noteworthy departure from the usual US-based-think-tank recommendations on Sri Lanka, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has come out with a more sensible suggestion.

In an article dated 1 June 2000, CSIS has recommended ‘A loose confederal structure” with ‘explicit recognition of the Tamils as a collective group’ and ‘stronger guarantees of their inclusion in power at the national level’, as a possible solution. It said,

“The 1995 proposals called for greater devolution of power within a structure closely resembling the present Sri Lankan provincial arrangement. These proposals should have been a good starting point when they were first launched. Under present circumstances, however, there is no chance of engaging the LTTE on that basis. The only chance would lie in a much more radical approach to power sharing. A loose confederal structure, with some kind of explicit recognition of the Tamils as a collective group within it and with stronger guarantees of their inclusion in power at the national level, might be more successful. Two draft Canadian constitutions proposed that certain legislative changes would require a "double majority" of both English and French-speaking parliamentarians; an analogous provision might be useful…”

CSIS describes itself as ‘a public policy research institution dedicated to analysis and policy impact.’ CSIS is the only institution of its kind that maintains resident experts on all the world's major geographical regions. This is reflected in the greater appreciation of the fundamentals of the Sri Lanka conflict shown in this article.  

Teresita C. Schaffer, a former US ambassador to Sri Lanka is the director of the CSIS South Asia Program.

In spite of this ‘departure’, which is certain to be opposed by the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan government, the article is generally pro-government and anti-LTTE. For example, it says,

‘More ominously, the military situation badly undercuts the Norwegian government's effort to arrange new talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The Norwegian role became publicly known in January, and the government had been consulting with the other political parties, including the principal opposition party, the United National Party (UNP), to develop a common negotiating approach...’

This gives the impression that the military action by the LTTE is what has undercut the peace efforts. The fact that the Norwegians started the process more than 11 months ago, and all through that period until November 99, Sri Lanka pursued several successful military campaigns against the LTTE is not mentioned.

The article also gives the impression that the government has been genuine in its discussion with other political parties to develop a common negotiating approach. The fact is, the government that keeps badgering the opposition party, UNP, for not cooperating with its ‘peace efforts’, has done nothing yet to garner support for its (fatally diluted) devolution proposals even from its own party members!

It also couldn't resist the perpetual bogeyman of Tamil Eelam re-igniting separatism in India.

‘... the LTTE represents a force for instability in the region, and there is concern that they might re-ignite otherwise dormant separatist sentiments among India's Tamils.’

For an analysis on this subject please see Will Tamil Nadu Secede
when Eelam is born?, at this website.

The article, in its conclusion, takes an unnecessary parting shot at the LTTE,

‘The LTTE's quasi-state in northern Sri Lanka was a harshly repressive place, criticized from within as well as without for arbitrary justice and intolerance.’

Broad characterization of this sort is what keeps the Sri Lanka government encouraged to continue in its warpath. The 1990-95 period, when LTTE ruled Jaffna, had its positive aspects as well, and should not be forgotten.

In general, this paper is a welcome departure from the usual US think- tank publications that encourage continuation of the war.

Sri Lanka (and the Sinhala people), however, will be angered, and one can expect several groups (media, Sinhala nationalists and even the 'National Peace Council') to launch a multi-pronged attack against this suggestion.

[Full text of the article]

Related Article by CSIS
1. Sri Lanka: What Lies Ahead? (March 1, 1999)
2. Sri Lanka at the Crossroads (January 3, 2000)