Boulders on Path to Peace

By: T. Somasekaram

In the 1960’s, there used to be road signs on the newly opened Ella-Wellawaya road leading from the up country to Kataragama saying, “Beware of falling rocks”. Rocks and boulders did come crashing down from the sheer cliff face which had been blasted through, sometimes blocking the road for days.

It appears that there will also be boulders blocking the path to peace. There is practically a unanimous and deep yearning for peace among all communities in Sri Lanka. The Government elected in December 2001 has embarked on this difficult path. But already one large boulder and two rocks have fallen on the road.

The boulder is the announcement by the JVP that two conditions must be met by the LTTE before talks commence, the two conditions being that the LTTE must renounce the demand for Eelam and lay down their arms. They have announced plans to hold demonstrations here and abroad in support of their view. Their logic is difficult to understand. It is like asking a woman who has struggled for 18 years to get a divorce, to withdraw her case and to talk of the terms of settlement thereafter.

Generally, I have found it difficult to understand the logic of the JVP. They created mayhem after the provincial councils were introduced in 1987. Harmless civilians were attacked and killed. The lowest voter turnout in any election since independence was in 1988, for the presidential election, where only 55% were able to vote. This was the national average. In the Districts of Matara, Hambantota and Moneragala, where the JVP was strong, the majority of voters could not vote. The national figure improved slightly for the General Election of 1989, when it became 63%. Two senior presiding officers were shot and killed, just for carrying out their election duties. Recently, Somawansa Amerasinghe announced that the number they killed was about 6,000. The government was shaken to its foundations by the JVP insurrection of 1988/89 but President Premadasa, after winning the election, extended the hand of friendship and I believe offered even a share of government power. As this was spurned, and the JVP made the blunder of announcing plans to attack the families of service personnel, the armed forces, led by the Ranjan Wijeratne-General Richard Algama team, were able to practically wipe out the JVP. People who had fled from the country in terror started returning and order returned.

The JVP are again a significant force, having 16 members in parliament. This is solely due to two reasons. One is the PR system and the other is the reduction of the cut-off point from 12.5% to 5%. Both these were measures adopted by President J. R. Jayewardene. Perhaps the JVP will thank him one day. If not for PR and the reduction of the cut-off point, they will not be present in parliament now.

Arriving at a settlement of the Tamil problem will be a long and arduous task. There will be many ups and downs and the peace process is likely to take years. It is best to not block genuine attempts at settlement, because if the conflict is left unresolved, it will come to haunt whatever political party that comes to power in the future, like the energy crisis at present. It would be instructive for interested persons to study the birth of Eritria, after a 30 year struggle with Ethiopia. The relevant articles can be accessed from the Internet or referred from any good encyclopaedia.

They may also reflect on the total cost of the conflict, not the budgetary allocation of the government and the cost of such disasters as Katunayake. When I first came to Colombo from Jaffna on entering the university almost 50 years ago, I was amazed at the absence of fences between residential houses. In Jaffna we were used to cadjan fences. Here there were just hedges, sometimes just about two feet in height. Anybody could walk over them. Now most houses have 8 foot parapet walls and sliding gates. All government institutions and private companies of any size have security personnel. They are no doubt needed in the present context but it is not productive labour. What are they producing — food, clothing, shelter or other goods? What is the total number employed as security personnel in the whole country? If peace and the ‘status quo ante’ can be restored, there will be much saving on security staff expenses alone.

More serious than the non-productive expense on security arrangements is the tearing apart of our peaceful social fabric. How crime has soared! Some of the crimes committed are so terrible that if the culprits are found, then Trials at Bar become necessary. Consider the case of the only young son of a successful businessman abducted for ransom and brutally killed. Consider the wiping out of an entire family in the suburbs of Colombo. The suicide rate is also extremely high. Consider also the loss from our gene pool. A young burgher girl emigrated to Australia and represented that country in the Olympics. A young Jaffna student has gone to Canada and is in the Canadian Chess team. There has been a significant ‘brain drain’ from both the Sinhala and Tamil communities, because the conditions in Sri Lanka are not conducive to their full flowering.

Let us get back to boulders and rocks. Apart from the JVP boulder, two smaller rocks have been laid on the path to peace by S. L. Gunasekera of the Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya and Gamini Weerakoon, Editor of The Island, in recent contributions to that newspaper (I am sure Mr. Weerakoon will publish this article and write a vigorous rebuttal, as in the past). The argument of both gentlemen is that earlier talks, with Presidents Jayewardene, Premadasa and Kumaratunga failed; ergo, the new talks will also fail. This prediction is faulty for many reasons. The most important is that it flies in the face of the universal truth of impermanence “annichavata sankara” enunciated by Lord Buddha. It is also faulty logic, on the basis of ‘reasoning from too few examples’. If one’s car does not start three times in the morning, only a pessimist will stop and start walking. It might start at the fourth try, after perhaps cleaning the terminals and tightening the leads. Similarly a computer programme might get thrown out thrice, but run beautifully, after some corrections, the fourth time. It pays to be optimistic and keep on trying. Best selling author Grace Metalious wrote 279 novels one after another but all were rejected. She did not give up. Her next try ‘Peyton Place’ was accepted for publication, became a best-seller overnight and she became a multi-millionaire. When asked for the secret of her success, she replied, “a strong back”. She had kept on trying in spite of the repeated failures till she succeeded. If one judges that a goal is worthwhile, then one must keep on trying till success is achieved.

First, let us examine some fundamentals. Is there a problem in Sri Lanka? I think all will agree that there is a problem. It is with the Tamils and this has been simmering and sometimes boiling over for the past 18 years. Is a military solution possible? There are some who will say “Yes”. They are welcome to hold that view and send their children and grandchildren to fight the war. My assessment is that a military solution is not possible. Just examine the track record. Starting as a small group of 12 or 13 persons, the LTTE has grown into a force that has held the Indian Army and the Sri Lanka Army at bay for 18 years. Even if they are reduced to the original 12 or 13 persons, they will grow again, as long as the causes are not removed. Just compare the rise of the JVP, after being practically wiped out twice, in 1971 and in 1989.

What are the causes of the problem? It is best not to get lost if defining the problem in words such as, ‘problems’, ‘aspirations’, ‘discrimination’, ‘traditional homelands’ etc. One can ask the question, “Do the Tamils feel threatened?” Living things react to threats to their life with a ‘flee or fight’ response. The Sri Lanka Tamils who were a docile, peaceful, disciplined, conservative society 50 years ago, have been fleeing from Sri Lanka or fighting the forces of the government for the past 18 years. Some qualified people may have gone in search of better pastures, as qualified Sinhalese have also gone. But the large majority leave because they feel threatened and see no future for them or their children in Sri Lanka.

A psychiatrist once told me that two parties contribute to every murder, the murderer and the murdered. He read out an illustration from that day’s newspaper. The heading was, “Younger brother kills elder brother over Rs. 2”. The heading reflected the facts in brief. But further reading showed that the murder took place because the elder brother had been a drunkard and a wastrel, who always returned home drunk and abused other members of his family. On the day in question, he had come fully drunk, abused his father in vile language and demanded another Rs. 2.00 to buy more arrack. The younger brother, who was a hard-working man who earned the money on which the family lived, had flown into a rage and stabbed and killed the elder brother. So, the drunken and abusive man who was killed and the younger brother who flew into a rage, had both contributed to the murder.

Similarly, the breakdown of the talks with the LTTE is not a one sided matter, with the LTTE to blame 100% and the Government totally innocent. This is a simplistic black and white portrayal, with the LTTE as black and the government as white.

One must not keep on dwelling in the past but we must remember the broad facts of the problem. From 1948 to 1958 there was peace among all communities. From 1958 to 1983, Tamils were at the receiving end of periodic violence. From 1983 to 1985, armed Tamil youth attacked the uniformed forces of the government and also eliminated Tamils who they regarded as traitors. One must remember not only the dark days of 1983 but what followed. Innocent Tamil civilians were attacked, harmed and sometimes raped and killed. One unforgettable landmark was when people going to Jaffna in a private bus at night were brutally massacred, between Anuradhapura and Medawachchiya. Only two survived, because the attackers ran out of bullets. Nobody was taken into custody or taken to courts.

Ordinary Tamil people started asking the armed groups whether this was the way they were being protected. The response of the LTTE was unfortunate it attacked worshippers at the Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura in 1985. Many similar attacks have followed, during the period 1985 to 2001. The armed forces of the Government have also not been innocent angels. Readers may judge how Tamil people will be treated, from the behaviour of some army personnel during the December 2001 general elections. How many Krishanti Kumaraswamys, how many bodies floating in the Bogoda lake, how many victims of aerial bombardment, the tragedy is endless.

Let us examine very briefly the failure of the attempts at settlement by three presidents. The strife started in earnest during President J. R. Jayewardene’s time. The Army was in occupation in Jaffna and regular confrontations were taking place. We who had homes in Jaffna then had a ringside view. Stalemate was reached by 1987. There were two classic and illustrative incidents. The Army officers bottled up inside Jaffna Fort, receiving their supplies by air, asked from the LTTE cadres outside the Fort for a tractor load of firewood and two sacks of mangoes using their loud hailer. The LTTE provided the firewood but declined the mangoes. In KKS, one day an Army garrison marched along the main road. Half an hour later, an LTTE group marched along the same route. They did not clash. I felt then that if the two fighting groups were asked to negotiate terms of settlement, they might have arrived at a workable solution. But President Jayewardene did not want a draw; he wanted victory.

He inveigled the Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi into an agreement. It was done secretively between the two governments, with hardly a contribution from the LTTE whose leader was practically kept under house arrest in New Delhi. The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed and there was a much publicised token hand-over of weapons at Palaly Airport, with General D. S. Attygalle receiving the first firearm from Yogi of the LTTE. Pirabaharan returned to Jaffna and announced at a public meeting in the Suthumalai Amman temple premises that they accepted the agreement. But two problems arose soon afterwards. An interim administration of five persons was to be set with a chairman. The LTTE was asked to submit three names for the post of chairman for President Jayewardene to appoint one, as done in the case of vice chancellors of universities. The first choice of the LTTE was a public servant from Batticaloa, the others were from Jaffna. President Jayewardene chose the third candidate, the municipal commissioner of Jaffna. The LTTE was seriously embarrassed, because the interim body had no one from Batticaloa. The next episode was the capture by the Navy of about 10 LTTE cadres, including two senior leaders, while they were travelling by boat to India. They had their personal weapons with them. They were taken into custody and kept in Palaly. Mr. Athulathmudali, the Minister of National Security wanted them brought to Colombo for interrogation etc. It was a dicey situation and Indian High Commissioner Dixit tried very hard for the detainees to be treated leniently. But all attempts failed; all of them took cyanide capsules and died a few hours before they were to be brought to Colombo. I think this episode ended what chance there was of the agreement working out. The Indian Army brought in more than 100,000 troops, their own vehicles, their own diesel etc. and advanced on Jaffna on three fronts and captured it, massacring many harmless civilians in the process. The LTTE withdrew into the Wanni and bided their time. Many people in the south are under the illusion that in a few more months, the Indian Army would have finished off the LTTE. But residents of the area know better. The Indian Army, by their behaviour, had become a hated army of occupation and it was a matter of time before they had to leave. The end came sooner than expected, because unlike the JVP, the LTTE accepted President Premadasa’s offer of peace and started negotiations and the Indian Army had no role left to play.

The talks with President Premadasa started and progress was made. Then came the crunch. The LTTE was prepared to enter the democratic path and contest elections to the NE Provincial Council. They wanted the council dissolved and the 6th Amendment to the Constitution repealed. But unlike President Jayewardene who had a 4/5th majority and an iron hold on the UNP, President Premadasa did not have a 2/3rd majority and the provincial council could not be dissolved without a constitutional amendment (The constitutional amendment and dissolution came after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Varatharaja Perumal, Chief Minister of NEPC). President Premadasa was not sure of getting sufficient support (even impeachment was tried later). It has been reported by persons close to the negotiations that in his heart of hearts, he also wanted to defeat the LTTE, which had been weakened by the Indian Army. A fundamental consideration that the LTTE had was, ‘Can President Premadasa actually deliver on an agreement?’. An agreement is like signing a contract; implementing the contract faithfully and in the long term is another matter. Most Tamils remember with sadness the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam and Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayakam agreements. The Premadasa-LTTE talks broke down and the harsh war erupted again.

The third attempt was by President Kumaratunga. She swept to power as the daughter of two prime ministers, on a peace platform. I too voted for her in 1994. But sad disappointment lay in store. Unlike Presidents Jayewardene and Premadasa, who had about 40 years of experience behind them and were tough and able men who had struggled hard to reach the top, power came easily to Mrs. Kumaratunga. She handled the talks in a very amateurish way, sending personal envoys. Natural questions in the minds of the LTTE would have been, “Does she have the backing of her ministers?”. Can she implement an agreement on a long term basis? Talks proceeded in a strange manner, with lengthy letters. A clear condition in the talks was that if either party was not satisfied with the progress of the talks, they could give one month’s notice and break the ceasefire. After many months had passed and in their view sufficient progress had not been made, the LTTE gave notice of one month. When this deadline expired, they did not strike immediately but extended the notice by another month. No progress was made and they broke the ceasefire and struck at Trincomalee harbour just after midnight of the second deadline. It was shocking and saddening, but they did give notice. So it is not all black and white, but both parties contributed to the sad situation we are in.

Now Ranil Wickremasinghe is embarking on the fourth try. Chances of success are better than earlier, because he had a ringside view of the three earlier attempts, as a member of the Jayewardene and Premadasa Governments and as the Leader of the Opposition during the attempt by President Kumaratunga. He signed the Liam Fox agreement and abided by it. He was not swayed into a panic reaction by the ‘Ali-Koti’ slogan by Mrs. Kumaratunga, the PA and JVP (reminiscent to us of the Sinhala Only in 24 hours by Bandaranaike pere) during the December 2001 election but stuck to the policy he had announced. He has a mandate to embark on talks.

Other propitious signs are that Lakshman Kadirgamar is out and Eric Solheim is back. We hope that Norway will play the role of neutral umpire and enable this sad chapter in Sri Lanka’s history to be closed.