There is a well-known saying
in the lighter vein that diplomats are people who go to another country to lie about their
mother country. The Sri Lanka foreign affairs ministry reversed that saying last week when
it regaled Sri Lankans with sunshine stories about Lakshman Kadirgamar's diplomatic
triumphs in South Africa. By
a mixture of facts, comments, exaggeration, understatements, twists and interpretations of
great latitude, the ministry sought to convey an impression to Sri Lankans that South
Africa was going to come down really hard on the LTTE. This was in a sense a case of
diplomats indulging in 'terminological inexactitudes', about developments in another
country to their mother country, instead of the other way about.
What exactly has our big game hunting
foreign minister achieved by the great South Africa safari? How successful has he been in
the search for his constant quarry - the Liberation Tiger?
The foreign ministry news releases are
glowingly positive. Mandela will not permit LTTE office in South Africa,' is one heading.
'South Africa vows not to let the LTTE get a foothold in South Africa', says another.
Taking their cue from the information dished out by our foreign ministry mandarins the
local media, particularly the state-controlled sector, has really gone to town.
Reading, listening to or viewing these
would give the reader, listener or viewer the impression that Kadirgamar has really messed
it up for the Tigers in South Africa. All that is lacking is a picture of 'Bwana'
Kadirgamar clad in khaki shorts standing with rifle in hand over a dead tiger with a
triumphant foot planted on its carcass.
But, alas, life does not have such
picturesque storybook endings. There are no quick fixes in the sphere of international
relations. Kadirgamar's expedition to South Africa deserves some critical examination in
order to dampen the undeserved enthusiasm that it has been engineered to evoke.
Bailing out of Britain?
There is, first of all, the point about the LTTE wishing to relocate its international
secretariat housed in London to South Africa. Colombo apparently has information that the
Tigers are worried about the new anti-terrorism legislation enacted by Britain and want to
move out.
The idea is that the clauses about
planning terrorist activity aboard on British soil and about collecting money for
terrorist activities are so lethal that the Tigers have no option but to shift from
London. South Africa seems the best option for the LTTE, it is felt. So the preemptive
strike by Kadirgamar.
But the question is whether this basic
assumption on the part of Sri Lanka is substantially correct?
Firstly the new legislation in Britain
will not change the 'legal geometry' much in relation to the LTTE. Establishing clearly
that such and such and organisation is a front organisation for the LTTE is not an easy
task. Establishing further that money collected by these organisations is being channelled
to the war chests in Sri Lanka is even harder. The problem is compounded by the fact that
the LTTE could always infiltrate existing organisations or start new ones. Moreover it
would be difficult to gather precise information as long as authorities come up against
the 'wall of silence' barricading the Tamil community.
Secondly there is the point about
conspiring or planning terrorist activity. Terrorism itself has to be defined. Such a
definition, as it relates to Sri Lanka, has to be accepted by a British tribunal. Assuming
the activities of the LTTE are indeed 'terroristic,' it has to be established that such
activity is being planned in Britain. Again, it is an open secret that the LTTE conducting
a military campaign in Sri Lanka does not, cannot and will not plan or conspire in Britain
for these. It is both illogical and impractical.
There is also the well known fact that it
is LTTE supreme Prabhakaran who plans all major moves. The line of authority begins in Sri
Lanka and extends abroad, not vice versa. Besides, Kadirgamar himself has stated on other
occasions that any firm assurance regarding negotiations has to be given by Prabakharan
himself and not by his representatives aboard. So it is clear that LTTE organisations are
powerless when it comes to planning explicit 'terrorist' activity.
Another point being missed in Sri Lanka
is that the new legislation mainly targets Irish terrorism . The fact that such
legislation had the scope to cover other terrorist groups too is only incidental. There is
no international targeting of the LTTE in Britain so far. There does not seem to be any
inclination on the part of Britain to deliberately single out the LTTE. In fact the Brits
seem to be still entertaining notions of playing honest broker or at least facilitator in
future government-LTTE talks. The Liam Fox initiative is still there on paper. Britain is
also pressing for talks and it is Colombo that is not responding positively. Under these
circumstances there does not seem any possibility that Britain would use the new
legislation in a manner that would compel the LTTE to relocate from London. Britain would
not like to lose its leverage with the LTTE at this point of time.
There are other aspects to the situation
too. Even if the LTTE is specifically outlawed in Britain, that does not mean that 'Tiger'
activity would cease automatically. India and the USA designated the LTTE specifically and
banned it. But Tiger activity continues in those countries under various guises and
banners. In fact, the LTTE is challenging the ban legally in both countries. So even if
Britain did so, that would not mean the end of the road for the LTTE even in Britain.
There is also the question of the
structure of the LTTE abroad. Although the nomenclature 'international secretariat'
suggests a highly centralised headquarters, that is not so in reality. The LTTE overseas
is highly decentralised with different branches in different countries performing
different functions.
The international secretariat was
established by former LTTE Jaffna commander Kittu. The impressive title was his
brainchild. While he functioned as secretary-general, the international secretariat was
the hub of overseas LTTE activity. Later when Thilagar was in charge, there was a
functional shift to continental Europe. Today the secretariat at St. Catherine's Road is
manned by Ramachandran alias Anton Rajah. Even the communiques released by it are drafted
elsewhere. The secretariat was only a distributing outlet.
Even before the new anti-terrorist
legislation was passed, there has been a systematic effort by the LTTE to promote the
'Eelam House' as the repository of all things Tamil. This does not mean that the LTTE will
downgrade the international secretariat to the point of extinction. It will try to keep it
functional as far as possible. But it would be futile for anyone to think that the
secretariat by itself is indispensable. Nowadays it is only a coordinating body. So it can
be seen that although the secretariat by itself is not centralised, the LTTE does find
some utility in maintaining it in London.
This is because of the importance of
London itself. For an organisation like the LTTE, maintaining an international office for
disseminating propaganda to non-Tamil persons and to engage in efficient lobbying can be
successful only if located in places like London, Paris, Geneva or New York.
Although greater Toronto has the largest
concentration of Tamils in the west, the LTTE does not have a propaganda secretariat there
because the location is not suitable.
If London is not available, then the LTTE
would opt for Geneva. In that sense, shifting the international secretariat to South
Africa would be detrimental to propaganda and lobbying by the LTTE. One may even inquire
flippantly from Kadirgamar whether it would have not have been better to let the LTTE
'bury' its secretariat in South Africa instead of trying to prevent it.
Unlikely move
Against this background it seems quite unlikely that the LTTE is indeed planning to
relocate its international secretariat to South Africa.
It is also well known that the LTTE is
already in South Africa. The Tigers have a number of legitimate organisations in SA that
are overtly sympathetic and supportive. It also has some front organisations. So in terms
of propaganda, lobbying, fund raising, arms procurement etc, the Tigers have already a
set-up in place in SA.
What the LTTE may want to do is to open
an official branch of the LTTE in South Africa. The Tigers do not have an official LTTE
branch anywhere else. They function through a network of front organisations for obvious
reasons.
But South Africa is the best and possibly
the only country where it could established its own, official branch. Such a branch can
also be a fallback guarantee if and when the west gets positively hostile to the Tigers.
But what Kadirgamar has accomplished is
to forewarn the South African authorities of the LTTE trying to shift their international
secretariat to South Africa and request them not to allow it.
Apparently the South Africans themselves
were puzzled abut this as they did not have an inkling about such a move being
contemplated by the LTTE. There are grounds to believe that the South African missions
abroad, particularly in London, have a better insight into the workings of the Tigers than
Sri Lankan intelligence.
Any assurance that the LTTE would not be
allowed to relocate their international secretariat becomes meaningless if no such move
was actually being contemplated. Thus Kadirgamar's advance intelligence was a complete
surprise. So it could have been either really smart intelligence on the part of Sri Lanka
or a terrible lapse.
It remains to be seen whether Kadirgamar
was properly briefed about the situation. Incidentally it is worth recalling that the
solitary intelligence operative stationed at our mission in London was hoodwinked only
recently by an alleged 'LTTE' stool pigeon' who had been systematically feeding him wrong
information.
Apart from the question of the
international secretariat, there is also the information about LTTE training camps in
South Africa. It is alleged that persons trained there are brought over to Sri Lanka to
fight.
The situation is being compared to what
prevailed in India some years ago. Tamil militant camps were established in Tamil Nadu and
thousands of youths including the LTTE obtained training. More importantly, Tamil youths
were also trained in North India. The training was done with the knowledge and
facilitation of both the central and state governments. In addition, some groups had
independent training too.
Comparing the Indian situation then with
the South African situation now would lead to a false analogy. The training camps were
started in India only because of four factors.
Firstly, it was not possible for Tamil
militants not controlling even an inch of territory in 1983 to establish large scale
training camps anywhere in the north-east at that time. Secondly, none of the Tamil groups
had the financial resources initially to conduct such large-scale training camps. Thirdly,
they did not have access at that time to large quantities of arms, ammunition or
explosives. Fourthly, they did not have experts to provide sophisticated training.
But later on when the groups were in a
position to control territory, generate resources, obtain adequate weapons and procure
trainer personnel, they began to shift training camps to north and east Sri Lanka. The
LTTE dismantled all its training camps in India by 1987. Even the other groups used only
Sri Lankan soil for training when they raised the Tamil National Army in 1989-90. Training
camps in India were necessary only at a particular phase of the evolution of the Tamil
armed struggle. Training camps abroad, despite the short distance between India and Sri
Lanka, became redundant.
Today, the LTTE controls extensive tracts
of land in the Wanni and the east. It has the resources, expertise and materials to
conduct intensive and sophisticated training right here in Sri Lanka.
The performance of the Tigers in recent
combat provides testimony to their skilful training. In fact, the LTTE is in a position to
conduct an international training school in the northeast if it desires.
It is totally unnecessary for the LTTE to
conduct training camps in faraway South Africa for their cadres. It is impractical and
illogical to recruit and transport cadres all the way there when training is possible on
your home terrain.
So the allegation about the LTTE having
training camps in South Africa seems unbelievable. So too is the allegation that the
Tigers are training South African Tamils there. Is it not better and easier for the LTTE
to bring these so called 'trainees' over here?
What then is the truth behind these
allegations and charges?