THE TAMIL VOTE
Barely
two weeks after President Chandrika Kumaratunga announced the
presidential election, which she will contest as the Peoples Alliance
(PA) candidate, her “War for Peace” strategy crumbled to dust before
her eyes. In the first week of November, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) launched Operation Oyatha Alaigal 3 and regained control of
most of the ground lost to the Sri Lankan armed forces over the past
two-and-half years in the Vanni. The reactions, fuelled by election
fever, of the Sinhalese ruling classes and their politicians and
ideologues are mixed, sometimes contradictory but always revealing.
The
first, knee jerk reaction was damage limitation, to salvage the fighting
reputation of the Sinhalese army. Kumaratunga’s PA Government in
general and the President in particular were faulted for setting
political goals for what supposedly is an essentially military task of
emasculating the LTTE’s capacity to wage armed struggle. “The sudden
collapse of army camps all over the Wanni, but particularly in its
eastern sector,” argued Jehan Perera, “could not have been due to
the LTTE's military strength or the army's military weakness alone”;
and he underlined the “criticism…against the Government for having
over-extended the army for political purposes”. (The Island,
23/Nov/99). The tenor of his article reflected in its title,
“Politicians’ failure makes reliance on army inevitable”, was a
subtle call for an unfettered military campaign driven solely by
strategic goals against the LTTE-led Tamil national movement.
The
vociferous right-wing elements among Sinhalese chauvinists were less
reticent in demanding absolute priority for the military solution. They
invoked the “threat from the North” syndrome. “Can Sri Lanka
survive with the victorious Tigers in de facto control of two-thirds of
our coast-line?…Can the 'Tiger-free' areas remain politically stable
with an aggrandizing North and East full of armed men with the most
sophisticated weapons?”, asked Tyran O Saurus (pseudonym)
rhetorically. After a vitriolic diatribe aimed at the LTTE, he/she
explained why the very success of Operation Oyatha Alaigal 3 precludes
negotiations. “A devolution of power at the behest of the enemy
savouring the flood tide of victory after decades of bloody struggle is
not a political settlement - it is outright surrender. And it is
irreversible. The momentum of this successful insurrection will carry
the well-honed war machine of the Tigers to areas in the deep Sinhala
South in a scenario reminiscent of the Kalinga devastation some eight
centuries ago” (The Island, 23/Nov/99).
Neither
will the armed forces “surrender” to the Tamil national movement.
Reading between lines, it is clear that their priority is to re-arm and
re-enter the battle. The United National Party (UNP) candidate Ranil
Wickremasinghe has repeatedly criticised the President for hobbling the
armed forces by imposing political objectives and failing to give a
“free hand” to the generals to fight the war successfully on
military criteria. “The army leadership warned”, he confirmed,
“that they could not hold large areas but they were pushed for her
(President Kumaratunga) to make capital at the presidential election”
(The Island, 28/Nov/99). He had levelled the criticisms when
Operation Jayasikurui was mired in the Vanni in 1998 and repeated them
more stridently after the military debacle in the Vanni in the wake of
Operation Oyatha Alaigal 3. The implication is obvious. Wickremasinghe
is assuring the armed forces, which play a pivotal role in Sri Lankan
politics today, that he would be more responsive to their military
perspectives.
While
assuring the armed forces that he is their “friend”, Wickremasinghe
stoked Sinhalese chauvinism. He warned the Sinhalese electorate that
Kumaratunga’s alleged political solution, the 1997 Parliamentary
Select Committee (PSC) Report, is an insidious scheme to divide the
country permanently. For good measure he raked up Kumaratunga’s
confession in an interview to the Time magazine (9/Feb/98) that
she had offered to let the LTTE administer the Tamil-majority North-East
Province (NEP) for a ten-year period. Sinhalese should vote for him
because, he claims, his political solution would retain the unitary
State and protect the birthright of the Sinhalese people. The political
message that he implicitly conveys to the Sinhalese electorate is that
Kumaratunga intends to barter the rights of the Sinhalese people in
return for Tamil votes.
Not
to be outdone, Kumaratunga too stooped to the habitual Tamil baiting to
win Sinhalese votes. She has accused Wickremasinghe of hatching a
heinous “secret plot”, together with the LTTE, to cause chaos in the
Sinhalese-majority south and west of the country; and alleged that he
offered the NEP to the LTTE for a two-year period. She implied that
Wickremasinghe has capitulated to Tamil demands and would, if elected
President, betray the Sinhalese race and Buddhist religion. In a
desperate bid to improve her election prospects that were mauled by the
success of Operation Oyatha Alaigal 3, Kumaratunga cast about for
scapegoats in the army for the military debacle. She invented the
“Vanni Conspiracy” (The Island, 23/Nov/99), in which
anti-Government factions within the armed forces together with the UNP
have, she alleged, conspired in the military debacle in order to
undermine her administration and torpedo her re-election prospects.
The
Sinhalese “liberals” had gloated over her victory in November 1994.
Their copious publications, primarily in the journal “Pravada”, held
up the vote for President Kumaratunga as a “mandate for peace”. They
pointed to the defeat of the UNP presidential candidate as
incontrovertible proof that anti-Tamil Sinhalese chauvinism is virtually
dead. They had condescendingly viewed Tamil chauvinism, epitomised in
their view by the LTTE, as the main barrier on the road to peace. Today
they are walking around with egg on their faces. As demonstrated at a
seminar held in November at the International Centre for Ethnic Studies
(ICES) in Colombo, the “liberals” are reduced to bleating for a
“moratorium” on Sinhalese chauvinist politics!
Comic
relief in this pathetic drama is provided by pro-Government Tamils. The
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and other collaborationist Tamil
parties are busy running-with-the-hare-and-hunting-with-the-hound. To
reward their fawning Tamil minions, both candidates are offering them
the crumbs of provincial office. Wickremasinghe proposes to set an
interim administration in the NEP. Kumaratunga has already set in motion
the procedure to appoint an interim administration by Gazetting the
announcement on 2 November and inviting Tamil parties representing the
NEP to nominate their candidates.
Some
pro-Government Tamils, aghast at the idiocy of Sinhalese chauvinists,
are desperate to stay their hand. For instance, DBS Jeyaraj strained
every nerve to salvage the crumbling Sinhalese morale. He advised the
Sinhalese Government in Colombo on how to grab the initiative back from
the LTTE. In his report, “Birthday profile of Prabhakaran”, Jeyaraj
sensitively invited Sinhalese politicians to think anew. “The credit
for creating a Prabhakaran”, he assuaged them, “does not go to the
Tamils. It goes to those shortsighted Sinhala political leaders who by
their chauvinist oppressive policies have led the country to ruin.” He
denigrated the LTTE as “an extremely virulent and violent
leadership” and fervently urged the Sinhalese supremacists to think
politically. “The harsh truth today”, Jeyaraj implored, “is the
fact that unless some ‘military miracle’ occurs, there is no wishing
Velupillai Prabhakaran away. Ground realities however bitter have to be
acknowledged, albeit grudgingly. Attempts to marginalise him militarily
without political engagement is an exercise in futility. It can only
prolong the agony of war that is bleeding the country. What is needed
now is a full-fledged political offensive with the aid of a
‘facilitator cum mediator’ that could de-escalate the armed conflict
and transform it into constructive dialogue” (Sunday Leader,
28/Nov/99).
Where
does all this leave the Tamil voters? Put simply, votes carry political
representatives to power; classes keep them in power. Irrespective of
how Tamils vote, Sinhalese leaders will remain an integral part of their
ruling classes, which include the upper echelons of the armed forces and
Buddhist clergy, and must rely on them to stay in power. In short, Tamil
votes for Sinhalese politicians will have no effect whatsoever in
inducing the recognition and acceptance of Tamil national rights and
aspirations by the pathologically anti-Tamil Sinhalese ruling classes
that call the shots. Indeed, a Sinhalese commentator, Vimikthi Yapa,
succinctly described the Sinhalese consensus, after Operation Oyatha
Alaigal 3, as one in which the Sinhalese must “present a common front
to the minorities and force them to ‘accept a solution on our
terms’” (Sunday Leader, 7/Nov/99).
The
war, therefore, will go to its logical conclusion, to the creation of an
independent State of Tamil Eelam. The LTTE is practising an axiom of
political economy: a State is politically conceived and militarily
constructed.
MEDIATION
What,
then, does mediation mean?
The
LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabhakaran specified “mediation” by a third
party – a foreign government or an inter-governmental
regional/international organisation – as a necessary precondition for
commencing and conducting negotiations with the Sri Lankan Government,
in his Heroes Day address in November 1998. He reiterated the condition
an year later, in November 1999.
The
Sri Lankan Government has steadfastly rejected mediation and prefers
instead “facilitation” by a third party to initiate negotiations
with the LTTE.
Some
North European governments have shown interest in serving as mediators.
The British Government brokered a meeting in November between LTTE’s
political advisor Anton Balasingam and General Secretary R Sampanthan of
the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), evidently hoping to induce the
LTTE to commence “talks” with the PA Government under British
mediation.
When
foreign governments endorse mediation, what do they have in mind?
Fundamentally, foreign intervention pursues its own national interests;
and mediators come with their own agenda. Its basic interest is to
defend the status quo. It is imperative here not to be misled by the
apparently benign intervention of the international community in East
Timor and Kosovo. The point demonstrated by the two cases is that the
principal objective of foreign intervention by States or inter-State
regional/international organisations is to ARREST the TREND toward the
independence of nations from existing States, which trend is
accelerating in the post-Cold War era.
Foreign
intervention could be either indirect or direct. The former approach
sometimes includes an apparently contradictory move to carve out a new
State in the short-term, which, in fact, is quite compatible with the
long-term objective to “stop the rot from spreading”, to prevent the
emergence or intensification of other national liberation movements. The
intervention in East Timor is a fairly good example. An intention behind
the “Popular Consultation” in East Timor was to settle once and for
all the issue of national liberation movements within Indonesia as a
whole. This was attempted using a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand,
because the
Indonesian
Government could not legalise the occupation of East Timor under
international law, the international community re-discovered the
illegality of the occupation and coerced the Indonesian Government to
concede the referendum to separate it from Indonesia. On the other hand,
the international community claims the rule of the Indonesian Government
over the other provinces, which were part of the country at the time of
independence from the Dutch colonialism, to be quite legal. So it has
excluded the national liberation movement in Aceh from the purview of UN
conventions on de-colonisation, defined it as "secession" and
decreed it to be illegal under international law. The use of
revolutionary violence by the Aceh national liberation movement is then
de-legitimised as "terrorism". So far this has been the
position adopted by the international community in the other instances -
Chechnya, Kurdistan, Kashmir, Tamil Eelam, etc.
The
foreign intervention in Kosovo is an example of the second, direct
approach. The primary objective in Kosovo is quite straightforward: it
is to neutralise the Kosovo Liberation Army and destroy the Kosovo
Liberation Movement. Rather than East Timor, the cases of Aceh Province
and Kosovo are instead closer and more similar to the case of Tamil
Eelam.
In
Palestine, too, the aim of foreign intervention and mediation was NOT to
create an independent Palestinian State. The 1993 Oslo Accords sought
instead to demilitarise of the PLO and then place it in a position where
it had no choice but to accept the best offer made by Israel, which has
beaten the PLO down in virtually every bargain. Yassar Arafat has had to
give away at almost every confrontation, so much so that he is being
contemptuously dismissed in most of the Arab World as the strip-tease
dancer of Tel Aviv.
Almost
all foreign governments wish to see that the Sri Lanka Government
maintains the status quo, preserves its territorial border, by
militarily defeating the Tamil national movement in the short term and
politically emasculating it in the long term. The approach adopted by
the Indian Government, together with the UNP Government, is a textbook
example. The “stick” was the Indian armed force, sanitised as the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and deployed in August 1987, while the
“carrot” was the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord to supposedly “devolve
power”.
The
international community encouraged the PA too to employ the two-pronged
strategy to
(a)
militarily contain the LTTE as far as possible in the jungles, and
simultaneously
(b)
politically neutralise the LTTE by introducing constitutional reforms.
In
fact, Minister for Justice, Constitutional Affairs, Ethnic Affairs and
National Integration Prof GL Peiris explicitly admitted the strategy
after President Kumaratunga launched Operation Leap Forward on 9 July
1995 and released her alleged constitutional reform proposal on 3
August. Two days later, Minister Peiris had ventured to outline the
utility of the proposal for driving a wedge between the Tamil people and
LTTE thus: “we do expect that the military effort will have the effect
of diminishing the strength of the LTTE. But the political proposals
will also have a role in that regard because they will go a long way
towards convincing the Tamil people that the Government should be
supported and that will alienate the Tamil people from the LTTE. So
there is a connection between the two things” (Island,
6/Aug/95). About a week later, at the inaugural meeting of the Sudu
Nelum (White Lotus) programme, Minister Peiris explained why the
proposals are necessary to satisfy the international community. “Some
want to know”, he acknowledged, “the necessity for a political
solution when a war is raging. True, what we need to win the war is
armaments not a political solution. But we have been able to procure
military hardware because we have presented a political solution…The
President’s leadership has gained international acceptance today.
Therefore, we experience no difficulty to get our arms
requirements…The President and the Government have succeeded in
convincing the world community that restoration of peace is possible
through the political package. We cannot”, he emphasised, “expect
the co-operation of the international community [to execute the military
campaign] without seeking a political solution” (Daily News,
15/Aug/95).
But,
the UNP's 14-year war (1979-1987 and 1990-1994) and PA’s 5-year war
(1995-1999) against the Tamil national movement, and especially the
spectacular success of Operation Oyatha Alaigal 3, have conclusively
proved that the LTTE’s military capacity cannot be sapped by the
Sinhalese armed forces. The UNP's 1984 All Party Conference and 1987
13th Amendment to the Constitution and the PA’s 1997 PSC Report
revealed that Sinhalese chauvinism has obstinately refused to go beyond
proposals for decentralisation through Local Government institutions.
Sinhalese politicians and administrators resisted implementing fully
even the limited changes proposed under the 13th Amendment.
The Sinhalese leadership, therefore, woefully lacks the foresight to
politically neutralise the LTTE.
The
past five years in particular have demonstrated that as the war
progresses, the Tamil national movement would increase in strength both
relatively and absolutely. The relative increase is due to the
government’s war effort becoming more and more unpopular among the
Sinhalese people whilst the support for LTTE’s armed struggle grows
exponentially among Tamils. The absolute increase in strength of the
Tamil national movement is a result primarily of rising recruitment and
acquisition of more sophisticated arms and equipment, largely from the
Sri Lankan armed forces, by the LTTE. The longer the war goes on, the
stronger the LTTE would become and Tamil Eelam will be all that more
feasible.
The
rising interest in the west for catalytic intervention, including
third-party mediation, especially after Operation Oyatha Alaigal 3 must
be seen in the above context. The international community views
mediation in Sri Lanka as one way to bring the armed struggle of the
Tamil national movement to an end and pre-empt the emergence of an
independent State of Tamil Eelam. To “de-escalate” the armed
conflict therefore means the cessation of hostilities and incorporation
of LTTE’s armed cadres into the armed forces of the Sinhalese State.
In
contrast, for the Tamil national movement, foreign intervention by way
of mediation should introduce an independent party who would at the very
minimum stand witness to the process of negotiations and vouch for the
actions of the LTTE. The primary intention is to expose the duplicity
and obstinacy of the Sri Lankan Government and to further strengthen the
Tamils’ case for independence. To “de-escalate” means the
cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Sinhalese armed forces
and their replacement by LTTE’s armed cadres, thereby entrenching a
parallel State structure in the NEP.
In
short, from the standpoint of the Tamil national movement, the principal
function of the mediator must be to guide the negotiations toward the
peaceful demarcation of the international border between Sri Lanka and
Tamil Eelam. Any takers?
4
November 1999