I empathise with Jeyaraj especially because I, too, have similarly been a victim. My publications in Colombo and the work I do as the Secretary of the Action Group of Tamils in Colombo (AGOTIC) have invited the attention of the Sri Lankan Government's security forces. My residence was raided by a team of Police officers and Army Intelligence officers one night, at 2.00 am, in November 1995, ostensibly because I may be "habouring terrorists". The raid lasted about one and half hours. The second raid took place over a period of two consecutive days in early May, 1996. It was carried out by a team Police officers from the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) and the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). They claimed to have information that I was "storing ammunition and explosives" in my residence. In both instances, the search neither discovered "terrorists" nor unearthed "ammunition and explosives".

Significantly, the officers were more interested in the books and documents in my study. And they took away many documents which deal with the Tamil national struggle, particularly those which related to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). My explanation that I am a researcher by profession and that I carry as part of my work, on the study of nationalism, documents relating not only to the LTTE but also to numerous other nationalist organizations in Sri Lanka and around the world made little difference. In my mind the purpose behind the two raids is clear: they were designed to discourage me from writing critically and freely expressing my thoughts regarding the Tamil Question in Sri Lanka - and the "investigations" are not yet over. So I share Jeyaraj's anguish over the suspension of publication of Muncharie.

However it was only a few weeks ago that I came across his open letter and that too only excerpts of it published in a Sunday newspaper in Colombo in April, 1996. Somehow I missed reading it then which is a most unfortunate oversight. While I unreservedly support and defend Jeyaraj's right to free expression I must at the same time, and in the exercise of the right of free expression, record my observations on his interpretation of the so-called "peace process" initiated by President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga.

"The advent of Chandrika Kumaratunga on the Sri Lankan political horizon", wrote Jeyaraj in his open letter, "brought about a positive change. Many Tamils including myself felt that a negotiated settlement to the ethnic question was on the cards." I readily agree with Jeyaraj that many Tamils in Sri Lanka and outside did feel that way. But what more than surprised me is that Jeyaraj entertained the same hope. For I remember Jeyaraj as a politically most astute journalist. He and I spent countless evenings discussing the intricacies of the Sri Lankan Tamil Question during the many years I knew him before he left the shores of Sri Lanka. He possessed the ability, rare among journalists, to intuitively distinguish between form and content; and we avidly read his incisive insights into political events. These recollections of Jeyaraj's journalistic prowess contrast sharply with his naive expectation that the involvement of Mrs.Kumaratunga in Sri Lankan politics signalled a "positive change".

Let me explain why. In mid-1994 the Peoples Alliance (PA), led by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), launched the campaign for the August parliamentary and November presidential elections in that year. SLFP's Mrs.Kumaratunga held out to the Tamils, and to the country, the vague prospect of a nebulous "peace". The PA won the parliamentary election and as the new Prime Minister and presidential candidate, Mrs.Kumaratunga employed the equally nebulous slogan "peace at any cost" in the run up to the presidential election. A majority of Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka interpreted her slogan to mean a negotiated settlement for three important reasons. Firstly, Mrs.Kumaratunga had no political track record since she did not hold any public office before she became the Chief Minister of the Western Province Provincial Council (PC) in March 1994; and so some Tamils and Sinhalese generously gave her the benefit of the doubt, believed her self-proclaimed good intentions and took her at her word. Secondly, members of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) opportunistically supported Mrs.Kumaratunga, holding her aloft as the "symbol of peace"; which did convince many other Tamils that she could be a breath of political fresh air. Lastly, Mrs.Kumaratunga's election promises were virulently attacked by the Sinhalese Right Wing and some sections of the Buddhist clergy, who are blinded by their pathological hatred of anything even remotely Tamil, as a "sell out of the birth right of the Sinhalese"; which made her election rhetoric of "peace" seem credible.

But the more critical Tamil observers and analysts in Sri Lanka probed deeper. Because good intentions can be proved only by corresponding actions, we did not merely listen to what Mrs.Kumaratunga said; we also watched what she did. And we discerned a qualitatively different political reality.

We saw no concrete evidence whatsoever which could confirm her alleged good intentions during the campaigns for the parliamentary and presidential elections. To start with, Mrs.Kumaratunga's election rhetoric meant different things to different people. The TULF interpreted Mrs.Kumaratunga's "peace at any cost" to the Tamil electorate as her firm commitment to a negotiated settlement to the Tamil Question. On the other hand, the PA explained "peace at any cost" to the Sinhalese electorate as an unqualified guarantee to end the war one way or another in the North-East Province (NEP). And some of SLFP's electoral-level Sinhalese campaigners were reported to have translated "peace at any cost" to mean an all out military campaign in the NEP to crush the LTTE once and for all.

More concretely, Mrs.Kumaratunga did not construct the political foundation of "peace" - she did NOT attempt perception building among the Sinhalese people to make a federal system of government acceptable to them. Two consequences flowed from her omission. Firstly, her slogan of "peace at any cost" was open to numerous and conflicting interpretations which alarmed large sections among the Sinhalese and thereby strengthened the chauvinist anti-Tamil propaganda of the Sinhalese right wing. Secondly, Mrs.Kumaratunga effectively excluded the federal alternative which, in the view of Tamils, is the minimum requirement for a viable conflict resolution framework; and so she must surely have made the LTTE suspect her intentions.

I analysed precisely these labyrinthine manoeuvres of Tamil collaborators and Sinhalese nationalists in my article titled "Broker Politics: a betrayal of Tamil Struggle", which was published about two months BEFORE the parliamentary election in the Lanka Guardian of 15 June 1994, I reproduce below a section from that article which disputed TULF's claim about Mrs.Kumaratunga's intentions.

SLFP: a "new dispensation"?
The Virakesari (29/5/94) reported that two prominent Sinhalese intellectuals are engaged in brokering an alliance between the SLFP and the TULF and Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). According to Taraki, a political columnist, the TULF and EPRLF believe (a) that Mrs.Kumaratunga "will stand firm" in resolving the Tamil problem and (b) that she is "unlike any other Sinhalese leader in the past or present". And Dr Neelan Tiruchelvam, a Member of Parliament (MP) of TULF, reportedly asserted that she is "the best bet for Tamils" (Island, 29/5/94).

Informal sounding revealed that some in the TULF are virtually gushing over an alleged "understanding" reached between the TULF and Mrs.Kumaratunga.

What is the basis of optimism? In her May interview published in the Virakesari (1/5/94), Mrs.Kumaratunga offered nothing new. She merely repeated the following platitudes:

1. A political solution to the Tamil problem could be achieved based on a form of decentralization of authority which includes an institutional mechanism for centre-region interaction. Translated into simple language, she prefers to reduce the political autonomy of regional administration in Tamil areas and increase the powers of the centre in order to minimise center-region friction.

2. Such a political solution must apply equally to all parts of the country. In other words, she intends to ignore the Tamil National Question in the tradition of Sinhalese politics.

3. The intransigence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is the only obstacle to a negotiated peace. That is, under her leadership a future SLFP Government will pursue a military solution against Tamils in the NEP. Moreover, she has implicitly set up the LTTE as a convenient scapegoat for her future inability or unwillingness to achieve a political solution to the Tamil Question.

4. Tamils in the NEP are virtually exhausted and wish an end to conflict. In other words, she draws comfort from the mistaken belief that counter-insurgency techniques of collective punishment have weakened the resolve of Tamils.

These banal observations were widely quoted by many Tamil parties in Colombo as indicative of a new vision of ethnic reconciliation emerging within the SLFP; and as justification for Tamil support for the SLFP.

It is important to note the point omitted by Mrs.Kumaratunga in her interview. She spoke mysteriously of a proposal that is being evolved within the SLFP to solve the Tamil Question, This proposal is to be "placed before the people" (in the election manifesto). She failed to say that SLFP party policy will be changed to reflect the so-called new proposals. So the SLFP will not be bound by them. For those who are naive enough to have faith in election manifestos, they surely must remember the number of times past manifestos of Sinhalese parties have promised an end to the Tamil Question. More to the point, election manifestos cease to have meaning after voting is over and the regularity with which promises offered to Tamils in past manifestos were betrayed simply boggles the mind. It should be obvious that the new proposals will similarly be consigned to the dust bin after elections.

If the assertions of Mrs.Kumaratunga are to be taken seriously by Tamils, she firstly must begin a nation-wide campaign of perception building among Sinhalese to make a federal system of government acceptable to them. Secondly, she must lobby within the SLFP to incorporate the fundamental concepts and principles of the new proposals into the official party policy. She has done neither, although similar inclusion was effected, for example, with respect to economic issues. Until she engages in concrete actions along these lines, any positive comment on the Tamil problem must be taken merely as political posturing in an election year which carries no meaning beyond the day on which elections are held...Mrs.Kumaratunga has begun playing peace-maker. She is actively wooing Tamils WITHOUT compromising the SLFP. But after the elections SLFP policies on the Tamil Question will remain the same and the Tamil Question will continue to fester. The present as well as a future Government will avoid negotiations with the LTTE and continue to seek a military solution in the NEP.'

Sinhalese rights, Tamil dignity
When I published the above comments in June 1994, the so-called "peace lobby" in Colombo viewed them as bordering on political heresy simply because I disputed Mrs.Kumaratunga's alleged good intentions. However the post-election methodological shift in Mrs.Kumaratunga's position after she was elected President amply substantiated my argument.

Her actions were documented in the press statements released by AGOTIC, which became active in mid-1994. The statements closely examined the so-called "peace process" at each important step. Jeyaraj would have found AGOTIC's December 1994 statement instructive. In that statement (Sunday Observer, 1 January 1995), we recorded the following observations:

'AGOTIC notes with regret that there is no change in Mrs.Kumaratunga's approach to the Tamil problem. At the May Day meeting this year (1994), Mrs.Kumaratunga "solemnly pledged to foster Buddhist rights in the event of her coming to power" through the August parliamentary elections. She added that the rights of other religions will be "guaranteed".

After that May Day statement, Mrs.Kumaratunga projected a less partisan image of herself in the run up to the parliamentary elections. Her new government announced in September that their aim is "peace at any cost". As Prime Minister she sent a peace delegation in October to meet the LTTE in Jaffna and appeared to make conciliatory gestures. As presidential candidate her call for peace was unqualified. This was the official position up to the presidential election on the 9th.

The day after the presidential election Mrs.Kumaratunga began the slide back to her May Day political position. As president-elect she moved away from "peace at any cost" to announce to the country on the 10th that her government "will seek peace but not at any cost". In this context she offered "justice" to the minorities whilst safeguarding the "rights" of the Sinhalese Buddhists.

By the time the new President delivered her address to the nation two days later on the 12th, she had completed the political back-sliding. Reading from a prepared text, President Kumaratunga said: "We will ensure that our approach to peace will fully address the necessity to safeguard and strengthen the rights of the Sinhala people, while recognising dignity, self-respect and equality of treatment of all communities. This will form the essential basis of a negotiated solution to the ethnic problem".

From whom are the rights of Sinhalese to be safeguarded and strengthened? Does the President believe that the rights of Sinhalese are being threatened by Tamils and Muslims?

To make matters worse the President MADE NO REFERENCE whatsoever to the RIGHTS of other communities. Does the President believe that Tamils and Muslims have no rights in this country? Does she believe that only the Sinhalese have rights in Sri Lanka?...The former President D B Wijetunge expressed the same chauvinist opinion but in a less sophisticated way: he claimed superiority of the Sinhalese "tree" on which the subordinate Tamil and Muslim "vines" spread.'

From conflict resolution to counter insurgency
The above observations were included in AGOTIC's December 1994 statement, published more than one and half months after President Kumaratunga's 12 November declaration. During that time, and up to now, she has neither retracted nor qualified the declared approach of her PA Government to the Tamil Question.

It is here important to note the following. When campaigning for the presidential election, Prime Minister Kumaratunga did not reveal her hand evidently because she sought a majority vote from a multi-ethnic electorate (of Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims). But after being elected President, and free from electoral compulsions, Mrs.Kumaratunga lost no time in placing her cards on the table. She took the first opportunity, on the day of her inauguration as President of Sri Lanka, to publicly and officially declare that her Government does not recognise the political rights of Tamil and Muslim communities.

The PA Government's approach may be culturally myopic. But President Kumaratunga was honest.

Because her Government refused to recognise Tamil rights, President Kumaratunga evidently concluded that she cannot negotiate a political solution with the LTTE. And she began logically to prepare to apply a military solution.

The first step toward a military solution was the attempt to politically isolate the LTTE from the Tamil people. Thus in the same AGOTIC statement, released more than two weeks BEFORE the Government announced the cessation of hostilities on 8 January 1995, we identified the tactical shift in the PA Government's approach: the shift from negotiating with the LTTE to politically isolating the LTTE. I reproduce below AGOTIC's preliminary observation contained in the December 1994 statement:

'The most disturbing change in the government's approach is the apparent debasing of the peace process. Before the presidential election the peace process was projected as the way to a negotiated solution which would end the civil war in the north-east. But after the election, the peace process has become a tactic to isolate and defeat the LTTE by pitting the Tamil people against the LTTE. The peace process which began as a strategy for conflict resolution has been corrupted into a counter insurgency political tactic...The "peace lobby" in Colombo is a major contributor to this unprincipled and opportunistic tactic.

We caution the government that dishonest intentions cannot produce honest results. Nothing will be settled until it is settled right. So-called peace initiatives aimed at politically isolating and defeating the LTTE are nothing more than counter-insurgency measures. They will fail to drive a wedge between the LTTE and the Tamil People. They will not solve the Tamil problem.'

From negotiation to re-construction
I reproduce the above excerpt from the AGOTIC statement to make an important point: President Kumaratunga fully disclosed her hand by early December 1994. Moreover it is within this context that the four pre-conditions for negotiations set, and insisted upon, by the LTTE should be viewed.

Those, like Jeyaraj, who believed in a mythical "hand of friendship" and continued to ignore President Kumaratunga's forthrightness have only themselves to blame for failing to perceive the unfolding military solution to the Tamil Question. In contrast critical Tamil opinion in Sri Lanka noted this ominous development; and AGOTIC further analysed the situation in its March 1995 statement (Sunday Observer, 19 March 1995) as follows:

'Before the presidential election the "peace process" was projected as the way to a negotiated solution which would end the civil war in the north-east. Members of the so-called "peace lobby" in Colombo campaigned for a PA election victory. In fact they almost guaranteed that a future PA government will on being elected immediately put forward a peace package and begin negotiations with the LTTE.

But after the election, the "peace mood" changed. The first indication that conflict resolution is becoming counter insurgency came immediately after the presidential election. The President shifted emphasis from putting forward a peace package to reconstruction of roads, public library etc in the Jaffna District. A Rs 39 Billion carrot was dangled before the Tamils, if only the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would allow the reconstruction to start. The evident intention is to demonstrate that the LTTE are opposed to a return to normalcy. The vain hope is that in this way Tamil people could be pitted against the LTTE and thereby isolate and defeat the LTTE BEFORE a peace package, if it does really exist, is placed before the country. Thus the "peace process" which began as a strategy for conflict resolution has been corrupted into a counter insurgency political tactic.

The "peace lobby" and especially its Tamil members colluded in this unprincipled and opportunistic tactic. They implicitly supported the shift in emphasis from negotiations with the LTTE to infrastructure development in the north. They stopped demanding that the Government must first put forward a peace package. In contrast the LTTE has consistently invited the Government to put forward its proposals.

Today sending bull-dozers and heavy machinery for construction purposes has become more important than formulating a viable peace package. Opening of the Elephant Pass road is more important than working out the modalities of negotiations.

Today the "peace lobby" is less interested in inducing the government to honour its election pledge to submit a peace package to the nation. They are more interested in showing that the LTTE is not cooperating by opening the Elephant Pass road; that LTTE is perpetuating the misery of Tamils in the north.'

Termination of cessation of hostilities (COH)
By the time AGOTIC's observations reproduced above appeared in its March 1995 statement, the President lost credibility among most Tamils in Sri Lanka (with the exception of servile Tamil politicians in Colombo) who had placed their trust in her before the elections. And the LTTE responded to the Government's counter insurgency tactic by announcing in late March a three-week notice of termination of the COH.

When the LTTE accordingly ended the COH on 19 April 1995, Colombo's "peace lobby" feigned surprise and indulged in much breast-beating. Just as Jeyaraj admonished the President "for her inefficient handling of matters", Kumaratunga apologists too sought to absolve the President of seeking a military solution against the Tamils and LTTE. The sycophants in the "peace lobby" in particular made the outlandish assertion that President Kumaratunga "trusted the LTTE. The LTTE in turn took advantage of the situation".

Simultaneously the "peace lobby" also alleged that the LTTE "feared peace" and was therefore the principal obstacle to politically resolving the Tamil Question. But AGOTIC saw the situation in an entirely different light. And I reproduce below the relevant excerpt from AGOTIC's April 1995 statement (Sunday Observer, 30/4/95):

'Those who view LTTE as an obstacle to peace argue that Velupillai Prabhakaran personally has little to gain from the peace process. If there is a negotiated settlement Prabhakaran, they claim, stands to lose much of his present power and influence. However, this argument was just as applicable before the parliamentary and presidential elections. But it was never raised then since President Kumaratunga's election campaign commitment to a negotiated settlement would have sounded hollow. Because if Prabhakaran has apparently nothing to gain from a negotiated settlement, what is the relevance of President Kumaratunga's "peace process"? So the doubts were NOT raised before the elections about Prabhakaran's willingness or the LTTE's ability to negotiate a political solution; and it was vigorously promised that Mrs.Kumaratunga will put forward a peace package immediately after taking over as President.

Doubts were raised deliberately after the elections, about Prabhakaran's willingness to accept a negotiated solution. These opportunistic arguments could undermine the peace climate in the South and justify the continuation of the military option against the LTTE. They are also flat-footed attempts to mislead Tamils into believing that Prabhakaran is the major, if not the sole, obstacle to peace. The evident and naive intention is to isolate the LTTE from the Tamils, pit the Tamils against the LTTE and weaken LTTE's military capacity to resist...After 19 April, the LTTE has been criticised specifically for not giving more time for the "peace process" to take effect. But give more time for what? Should more time be given to the farcical Presidential delegation composed of private secretaries and personal friends? Should more time be given for further betrayals of promises to relax the economic embargo? Should more time be given to postpone the publication of the Government's peace package? In the Tamil perception, the integrity of the "peace process" has now been seriously eroded. It would be ludicrous to expect the LTTE to continue the peace talks without a fresh and genuine initiative from the PA Government.'

Who are the peacemakers?
It will be evident from the foregoing that Jeyaraj's conclusion that "the LTTE broke the ceasefire" and "the manner in which the ceasefire was broken and the reasons given for it left much to be desired" is empiricist of the worst kind. He displayed a staggering inability to contextualise the actions of the LTTE. Because it matters less that the LTTE acted first to terminate the COH; for it is more to the point that the President and her Government are in fact responsible for making the COH irrelevant by shifting from conflict resolution to counter insurgency, which included the refusal to publish a proposal for conflict resolution during the COH.

Moreover when he asserted that "Mr. Prabhakaran should have resorted to war only after exhausting all avenues of a peaceful settlement", he committed two errors which are out of character with his journalistic record. Firstly he uncritically accepted President Kumaratunga's "Basic Ideas" as a window of opportunity to reach a negotiated solution. But critical Tamil opinion in Sri Lanka viewed the timing and manner of the release of the "Basic Ideas" with considerable alarm. They were announced on 3 August 1995, approximately three weeks AFTER the military campaign to invade Jaffna was unleashed with Operation Leap Forward on 9 July. We had little doubt that the "Basic Ideas" were timed to politically legitimate the ongoing military campaign. And it was announced officially that the August Proposals will NOT be communicated to the LTTE. The obvious reason is to avoid halting the military advance; because if the LTTE did agree to re-start negotiations on the basis of the "Basic Ideas", then the President would have no option but to suspend the military operations.

Secondly, Jeyaraj ignored precisely the initiatives taken by the LTTE. But in AGOTIC's August 1995 statement (Sunday Observer, 27/8/95), we enumerated LTTE's initiatives thus:

'It must be remembered that, immediately after Mrs. Kumaratunga became Prime Minister, Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran initiated "peace talks" by writing to invite the PA Government for talks in September last year (The Island, 8/9/94). About two weeks later he made the unprecedented announcement that the LTTE is willing to drop the Eelam demand: that it is "prepared to accept a `substantial [devolution] package' as an alternative to its demand for a separate State" (The Island, 22/9/94). Prime Minister Kumaratunga responded positively by sending her delegation to Jaffna for the first round of talks on 13 October. It must also be remembered that the day after Mrs. Kumaratunga took oaths as President on 12 November, the LTTE offered a unilateral COH effective for seven days (Daily News, 15/11/94). After the second round of talks on 3 January 1995, the Government announced a temporary COH on 8 January. The LTTE in turn proposed that the COH should be turned into a permanent ceasefire. The Government did not agree to do so. Nevertheless the LTTE reiterated its readiness to abandon the demand for a separate State; and listed four issues which must be covered by any proposal made by the Government (The Island, 6/3/95). They are:

- The problem of the Tamils should be accepted as a national issue.

- The Tamil people should be accepted as a national entity.

- The traditional homelands of the Tamils should be accepted.

- The rights and sovereignty of the Tamils should be accepted.

The President's Proposals ignored these issues. Nevertheless the LTTE, whilst dismissive of the Proposals, has again reiterated its willingness to restart talks with the Government (Sunday Observer, 20/8/95).

Here let me summarise the arguments presented above. In her May 1994 interview to the Virakesari, President Kumaratunga was completely honest in stating unambiguously that her (future) government

will not recognise the Tamil Question and

expects to apply the military solution to Tamil nationalism.

She has stood by her word. In her November 12 inaugural policy statement the President explicitly stated that her Government recognises "rights" only of the Sinhalese and that Tamils and Muslims are entitled only to "respect" and "dignity". In other words, President Kumaratunga made it amply clear that she will continue the discriminatory distinction first made in the "Sinhala Only" and "Reasonable Use of Tamil" legislation of the late 1950s. And she has maintained this distinction in the "Basic Ideas".

As I said, the President cannot be accused of deception; she has been entirely honest with the people of Sri Lanka and the world.

Viewed in this light, I would argue that it is hardly surprising that the President avoided putting forward a conflict resolution proposal during the COH, preferred the counter insurgency approach and implemented a military solution.

Equally I would also argue that the LTTE's termination of COH and its military response are the logical reactions.

Toward a Dharma Yuddha
But Jeyaraj believed President Kumaratunga is "the best bet for the Tamils among the present crop of Sinhala political leaders". In contrast, and even BEFORE Mrs.Kumaratunga was elected President, AGOTIC in its November 1994 statement (Virakesari, 7 November 1994) had cautioned her Government:

'In the event that Mrs.Kumaratunga's Government decides to seek a military solution, the effect will be profound. The Sri Lankan armed forces lack the capacity to achieve a military solution. Then what is the way out for the Government? It must not be forgotten that even a foreign military intervention in the North-East could not bring the desired results.' In a later statement published in May 1995 (Sunday Observer, 14/5/95) AGOTIC again cautioned the President: 'Today the prospects for a foreign military intervention appear very real. If it does materialise it will be an unmitigated political disaster for Sri Lanka'.

The accuracy of AGOTIC's predictions needs hardly to be underlined. The PA Government began receiving military assistance from the United States in early 1996.

Then how did Jeyaraj misrepresent the political developments in Sri Lanka? How is it that Jeyaraj "genuinely felt that Chandrika Kumaratunga offered a way out of the military quagmire" even while she and her military commanders were making preparations for the assault on Jaffna, on the spurious claim that the LTTE needs to be militarily weakened as a minimum precondition for conflict resolution? Indeed how did he convince himself that "a negotiated settlement...was on the cards" when we had argued, as for example in my July 1995 article titled "The Peace Hoax" (Lanka Guardian, 15 July 1995), and confirmed by subsequent events, that the PA Government will not seek a political settlement and instead will apply a military solution to the Tamil Question?

Jeyaraj's child-like trust in President Kumaratunga's intentions was not disturbed by even the grotesquely chauvinistic Sudu Nelum Movement. Perhaps he missed AGOTIC's October 1995 statement (Sunday Leader, 8/10/95). In it we deplored the Government's shift from "negotiation for peace" to "battle for peace" and made the following observations:

'The Sudu Nelum ("White Lotus") Movement, initiated by the Government in August, is attempting to mobilise Sinhalese people to "battle for peace". It marks the beginning of a Sinhala-Buddhist Dharma Yuddha (Holy War). The white lotus flower is a potent symbol of Buddhist worship in Sri Lanka. The PA Government has invoked this religious symbol to legitimise the military campaign being conducted by the Armed forces in the NEP. Never during its 17 years of misrule did the previous UNP Government sink to such abysmal depths of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism. It is no accident that the Operation Thunder Strike now in progress was launched during Navarathiri, a deeply religious festival of Tamil Hindus.

It requires a galactic leap of faith to believe that the present Government would willingly implement a genuine devolution of power which will adequately address the Tamil Question.'

Jeyaraj made precisely this unwarranted "galactic leap of faith". He is of course free to do so. Equally he must accept that he departed from long-established journalistic norms and is grossly mistaken when he "felt that the Chandrika Government unlike its predecessors was justified in pursuing the war". In effect he has become a propagandist for the PA Government. Indeed his baseless assertion that "the Sri Lankan soldier would be fighting a just war as opposed to the Tiger counterpart" is a terrible betrayal of the Tamil national struggle.