Peace Process: Picking up the pieces

By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

 “If the Sri Lankan government reciprocates positively to our goodwill gesture and ceases armed hostilities against our forces and takes immediate steps to remove the economic embargo and other restrictions, the LTTE will favourably consider extending the period of ceasefire to create cordial conditions for a stable peace and de-escalation.”

- LTTE statement of Dec 19th 2001

‘Glad tidings of great joy’ are beginning to be heard in Sri Lanka again as Christmas, that universal season of peace and goodwill approaches. There is a sense of Deja vu too as far as prospects of peace are concerned. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have predictably forced the pace of peace in the island by opting for a unilateral cessation of hostilities effective from December 24 midnight this year. A press release issued on December 19 from the LTTE international secretariat in the northern mainland of the Wanni outlined details of this peace offer. Relevant paragraphs from the press release are excerpted below.

“Velupillai Prabakharan, the leader and military commander of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, has issued orders to all units and combat formations of the Tamil Liberation army to cease all hostile military actions against the Sri Lankan armed forces from midnight 24 December 2001 till midnight 24 January 2002,” the LTTE’s statement declared.

New hope

“Encouraged by the collective mandate for peace and ethnic harmony given by the Sinhala and Tamil masses at the general election, the LTTE leadership has decided to declare unilaterally, a month long cessation of armed hostilities during the festive season of Christmas, New Year and Thai Pongal (Tamil harvest festival) as a gesture of goodwill to facilitate the promotion of peace initiatives.

“We fervently hope that the new government of Sri Lanka will reciprocate positively to our goodwill gesture and instruct its armed forces to observe peace during this period. Our decision to cease armed hostilities and observe peace during the festive season should be viewed as a genuine expression of goodwill, demonstrating our sincere desire for peace and negotiated political settlement. We are confident that the new government will utilise this space of peace to implement goodwill measures to create congenial conditions of normalcy in the Tamil homeland by withdrawing the economic embargo and other restrictions and prohibitions imposed on our people,” the statement said.

“If the Sri Lankan government reciprocates positively to our goodwill gesture and ceases armed hostilities against our forces and takes immediate steps to remove the economic embargo and other restrictions, the LTTE will favourably consider extending the period of cease-fire to create cordial conditions for a stable peace and de-escalation,” the statement further said.

The LTTE statement’s date of release may stir memories of an important event that occurred 15 years ago on December 19. In 1986, two Indian Ministers K. Natwar Singh and P. Chidambaram were in Colombo to promote peace actively and constructively on behalf of India. The set of proposals emerging during that visit were simply described as the ‘December 19th proposals.’ Initially the proposals evoked much euphoria and positive hope but within days then President Junius Richard Jayewardene backtracked on assurances, and the December 19 proposals never reached light of day by way of implementation.

Likewise, the LTTE’s cease-fire offer also revives recent memories. It was only last year that the Tigers made a similar offer and continued to maintain the unilateral cease-fire for 132 days in the face of grave and calculated provocation by the Sinhala dominated state. The Tigers also refrained from any operations in the seven Sinhala majority provinces during this time.

No co-operation

The Kumaratunga regime refused to reciprocate positively and engaged in hostilities against the LTTE. The government also in puerile fashion tried to derive political mileage out of the Blair governmental decision to ban the LTTE on British soil. It was this approach by the Kumaratunga government that hardened the LTTE to resolve considerably and rendered it seemingly inflexible on the question of de-proscription. The previous government gravely misunderstood LTTE overtures for peace talks and also underestimated its military capabilities.

There was an erroneous perception that the LTTE needed a cease-fire to regroup itself. The government undermined the peace process that it helped create partially and prepared for major war. The LTTE inflicted a telling blow on the ‘Agni Kheela’ operation and proved to the world that its pursuit of peace was not necessitated by military weakness.

The Kumaratunga regime however did not learn its lessons and in a controversial move downgraded Norwegian facilitation and sidelined the chief peace envoy Erik Solheim. It also began massive aerial bombardment of Tamil civilian areas. This resulted in the successful LTTE operation against the Katunayake Air Force base and destruction of several aircraft. The Katunayake attack triggered off a massive economic backslide for the country that is yet to be rectified. Also, the Kumaratunga regime was internationally isolated with many countries blaming in diplomatic jargon the Sri Lankan government for this sorry state of affairs rather than the LTTE.

The Kumaratunga-Wickremanayake-Kadirgamar troika did not re-orient its approach even after that. Instead, the last parliamentary election and preceding events saw the People’s Alliance led by Kumaratunga adopt a disgusting pro-war anti-peace political platform. Wild allegations of LTTE links were heaped against United National Party leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and Gampaha district Parliamentarian Jayalath Jayewardene. The PA campaign had no major issue other than protesting peace talks with the LTTE. The mandate received by the UNP led front and the impressive victories of Wickremesinghe and Jayewardene have demonstrated that substantial portions of the southern voters have dismissed Kumaratunga’s accusations with the contempt it deserved.

The 2000-2001 period was particularly horrendous as she was actively involved in undermining and negating the Oslo facilitated peace process that she jointly created along with Velupillai Prabhakaran. Although the country and people suffered immensely as a result the LTTE came off credibly by demonstrating to some extent that they unlike the Kumaratunga government were not averse to a negotiated settlement.

A new beginning

Now the stage seems set for resumption of talks between the new government and the LTTE. Wickremesinghe has to pick up the pieces of the peace process and begin afresh. 

Given past history, the situation does not augur much. What is fundamentally wrong in the island from a Tamil perspective is the Sinhala dominated structure of the Sri Lankan state and the Sinhala-Buddhist hegemonistic ideology that continues to sustain it.

The past decade or two has also seen massive militarisation of Sinhala society and its tremendous effect on the conflict. There is also the profitable ‘arms dealer lobby’ that has within its folds ex-ministers, permanent secretaries, members of the defence hierarchy and their kinsfolk. Another impediment is the mainstream media. It continues to be negative and instead of reflecting the ordinary citizen’s yearning for peace whips up war frenzy.

Unless and until these problems are addressed and a radical re-structuring of the state and re-orientation of dominant ideology is effected, the situation is unlikely to improve. Mere change of government without these fundamental changes would only prove the earthy Tamil proverbial wisdom about how headaches cannot be cured through change of pillows. It is unrealistic to expect such transformation quickly or immediately.

Ranil Wickremesinghe’s election manifesto promise of breaking with the past and ushering in a new beginning and new political culture shows some promise. He has also stated that his priorities are resolving the conflict, establishing law and order and uplifting the economy. All issues are inter-related and the abolition of war is the key to resolving the others. Wickremesinghe also wants a government of national reconciliation that would not exclude any race, religion, caste or creed. What is to be hoped for here is the beginning of a genuine attempt that would resolve some problems in the short term and lay the foundation for long-term solutions that could establish durable peace.

The biggest obstacle facing Wickremesinghe is the bifurcation of authority and responsibility. Notwithstanding his electoral victory executive power is still in President Kumaratunga’s hands.

The question of negotiating with the LTTE involves many decisions concerning the role of the armed forces. Wickremesinghe has to retain full authority and confidence of the armed forces. This is not possible with Kumaratunga as President for practical, political and personal reasons. It is necessary therefore for Wickremesinghe to force Kumaratunga out through democratic will. Until this is done, every move on the peace front can only be cautious and slow. This may cause problems vis-à-vis the LTTE.

On the other hand, there is also the worry from a Sinhala perspective about the LTTE’s bona fides regarding peace. Assuming that Wickremesinghe is able to settle his problems and proceed on the peace front, the question arises about the extent of cooperation available from the LTTE. The nagging doubt fuelled by Sinhala hardliners is that the LTTE will not quit its separatist agenda and opt for a settlement within a united Sri Lanka. In the absence of a national media campaign to combat, contain or clarify this skepticism there is no doubt that this trend of thought will gather momentum in the coming months. Kumaratunga the fallen peace angel is likely to spearhead this anti-Tiger and by extension anti-UNP campaign.

It is in this respect that Kumaratunga erred grievously in the past. When the LTTE extended its hand for peace and tried to force the pro-peace pace by declaring a unilateral cease-fire, her government did not comprehend ramifications fully. It failed to distinguish between the LTTE’s genuine commitment to the search for peace and its dedication to the ideals that led to the birth and growth of the movement. It was possible for the LTTE to cooperate and participate wholeheartedly in a peace process that aimed at resolving the issue within the parameters of a united Sri Lanka without abandoning its thirst for Tamil Eelam. In the words of a Western diplomat stationed in Colombo, “The Tiger commitment to the peace process was really genuine. Chandrika failed to recognise that.”

It is important to recognise that Velupillai Prabakharan and his companions are firmly convinced that the Tamil national question cannot be resolved within a united Sri Lanka. There is no reason to doubt that the Tigers are of this mindset even now. The difference was that unlike in the past where the LTTE felt negotiations were useless because of its conviction that the Sri Lankan state could resolve the problem and therefore shunned talks, the Tigers reoriented their approach and opted to talk. This change of heart was not because the Tigers had abandoned Tamil Eelam or felt that Colombo could award them a satisfactory solution. It was only a tactical shift. Instead of staying away from negotiations and being blamed as intransigent, the LTTE participated in the peace process to show that it was not averse to a negotiated peace and also expose the Kumaratunga government’s insincerity. In this it succeeded greatly.

That state of mind prevails even now. However, much of the LTTE desired a change of regime in Colombo that does not necessarily mean that it has changed its sustaining ideological beliefs. But just as with Kumaratunga, the Tigers are willing to cooperate and participate fully with Wickremesinghe in the peace process. The approach would be de-escalating the conflict. Creating a conducive climate for peace and then talking peace. The outcome would depend on progress achieved in the talks. What is necessary now in the country’s best interests is to usher in a no war situation regardless of the final conclusion of the peace process. It is important to sustain the peace process on an ongoing basis and not let any setbacks turn the clock back to outbreak of war again.

Another positive indicator about LTTE commitment to the peace process is the manner in which it encouraged a UNP victory in the south and a TNA win in the northeast. There were no clandestine agreements or pacts. But the LTTE felt that genuine progress on the peace process could be achieved only through a regime change. When the Kumaratunga government tried to wriggle out of its political difficulties by trying to project a dishonest image that it was actively involved in the peace process, LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham went the extra mile by informing the media that it was not so. The LTTE also stated clearly that meaningful talks could commence only after new elections ushered in a stable government.

LTTE supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran went on record publicly through his ‘Maa Veerar Naal’ address and appealed in uncharacteristic fashion to the Sinhala masses to “reject racist forces committed to militarism and war” and to offer “justice to the Tamil people to bring about peace, ethnic reconciliation and economic prosperity to the island.”

Furthermore the LTTE’s press release highlighted this appeal as the main thrust of the speech in case people failed to note that salient factor. Moreover, during elections, the LTTE did not obstruct people living in Tiger controlled areas attempting to vote. The Tigers scored another political point by showing that the state was not willing to allow free and fair political participation for the Tamil people.

The need of the hour

Under these circumstances there is an imperative need to perceive the LTTE approach in a rational balanced fashion. Extreme perceptions should be avoided. The LTTE has not abandoned its liberationist ideology of setting up Tamil Eelam through armed struggle. This does not mean that no talks should take place because of this. At the same time the LTTE is genuinely committed to the peace process and would cooperate fully in that.

The fact that is willing to do so within the parameters of Sri Lanka’s unity does not mean that it is prepared to accept any inadequate settlement.

The challenge therefore is to commence negotiations as soon as possible and seek avenues of a negotiated settlement. Even though the LTTE cannot openly state so, it is not entirely impossible that it may opt for a settlement within a united but not necessarily unitary Sri Lanka. If the essence of Tamil grievances can be redressed and aspirations accommodated within a re-structured state, then the Tamil Eelam demand may not be stressed upon.

The state should be re-invented. In the words of Professor A. J. Wilson a settlement ensuring ‘separation without secession’ should be achieved. Such a solution is highly imaginative and bold. What is envisaged here is an ‘associative structure’ between the two ‘solitudes.’

Hope!

Hoping for such a solution within the next few years seems unrealistic. But temporary arrangements could be made while negotiations go on. Provisions like an interim administration for the northeast where pride of place is given to the LTTE or parties favoured by it should be established. The important thing is to prevent the peace process from collapsing into a state of war.