The Psychology of Nationalism

By Joshua Searle-White

(Palgrave, New York, 2001)
ISBN 0-312-23369-8

Prof. Searle’s book is especially relevant for the Sri Lankan situation at this moment because one of his stated goals is to show how lessons learned from his study of the psychology of nationalism can be used to make negotiations between warring groups in nationalist conflicts more effective.

“I have argued so far that all the primary features of nationalist conflict - a strong identification with a national group, assertions that the group has rights to a particular place, a perception of threat from others, and a reluctance to give up the nationalist struggle - can be intensified, if not created outright, by concerns about identity.(p.101)...because of the nature of identity, we, as human beings are always constantly on the lookout for any sign of disrespect or threat. We are also always seeking ways to be right.(p.102)....the self-images and self-esteem of groups can become an issue in negotiations that are ostensibly directed toward an entirely different issue.(p.105)....If both parties do not feel that their honor and dignity is being attacked, they are more likely to engage in discussions about the substantive issues at the table....First and foremost is the according of full recognition to each partner or participant. Because in many situations one party (such as a secessionist group) may be seen as illegitimate by the other party (such as the government), this can be a very difficult issue. (p.106)....The problem, of course, is that acknowledging the legitimacy of the other is often very closely linked, in nationalist conflicts, with the issue of self-determination - the right for a group to decide how to govern itself....These difficulties arise because of the association of self-determination with secession. (p.109)...That does not necessarily mean that each of those groups should have a state devoted to protecting their identity. But it does mean that if those involved want negotiations to be successful, then supporting the integrity of those national identities is one way to help such success happen.(p.111)

Here we have a crux of the current situation in Sri Lanka clearly stated. Will the Sri Lankan government have the courage or the ability to lift the ban on the LTTE to remove one primary aspect of their illegitimacy and will they then be able to accept the LTTE as worthy partners in negotiations? Without this acceptance, the war is most likely to continue.

As illegitimacy and exclusion are such basic and widely employed instruments in the use of power in today’s world, it is hard to believe that Dr. Searle’s suggestions will find favor except in selected cases.

Prof. Searle’s book is noteworthy in another respect. The Armenian-Azerbaijani and Sinhalese-Tamil conflicts and experiments with his students are the main sources for his study of the dynamics of nationalism and identity. It is one of the few analyses that uses no moral weighting for the contestants. Tamils are so used to having their struggle demonized by outsiders that this evenhandedness may be a shock. In fact, after talking to the Sri Lankan embassy and Rohan Gunaratne, Prof. Searle searched out Tamil opinion in the US and elsewhere because he intuitively knew that there is another side of the story. And he has treated this other side with respect (as he should, given his subject!!). Notably, he gives a small scolding to those who claim that the issue in Sri Lanka is terrorism rather than arising from questions of identity and nationalism of both communities. (p.49)

The book is of particular interest to the wider Tamil community because it deals with a subject that each person can test against his or her own experience. We have all had to deal with the issue of nationalism in our own lives at an individual level. We have watched our own reactions and those of our friends, relatives and neighbors in response to the events of the past few decades. We thus all can have an opinion based on intimate experience about the psychological theories that are described in this book to explain the nationalist phenomenon. The book is written in simple language with easy-to-follow logic, which should appeal to the general reader. It is also interesting to have contemporary events, such as the Bindunuwewa killings and the Talawakele riots, presented immediately in a scholarly work.

The underpinning of the theory that bothers me the most is the assumption that nationalist feelings are latched onto because of some inherent weakness in every human’s personality that means that we require a ‘sense of purpose and meaning’ (p.87), the more transcendent the better, to get through life. “The first is that we fear we are fragile. The second is that we are unwilling to accept aspects of ourselves because we are ashamed of them. Nationalism is one way we can attempt to deal with these fundamental challenges to our identity.(p.67)” There is also an assertion that we try to push, or ‘project,’ the aspects of ourselves that we are most ashamed of off onto our conception of our opponent, the ‘other.’ It makes me uneasy to use explanations of how fragile, anxious and weak all people are to say why we chose which identity to emphasize. It seems to me that this is a bias due to psychologists’ contact with those who are weak, who are having trouble.

I have heard this explanation of the fragility of the individual used in other contexts, for instance someone claiming that the biggest flags put up in the recent patriotic fervor in the US are on the houses of their neighbors who have the biggest personal problems. Note how when we call the feeling ‘patriotism,’ rather than ‘nationalism,’ our reaction changes. I would be interested to see explanations of this nature directed toward those involved in the US Revolutionary War. Did George Washington have existential dilemmas? When we watch Mel Gibson in the recent movie ‘The Patriot,’ do we see any evidence of an ambiguity of identity due to a fear of ‘non-being?’ We see a conflict between his identity as a father and his identity as a warrior, but external, concrete events decide which identity he will chose to emphasize. These two identities do not seem mutually exclusive given these events. In fact, both identities seem quite ‘selfless,’ rather than self-absorbed, although Prof. Searle, might say, “Aha, there’s our need for transcendence.”

The idea that identity is fungible - and that we most strongly hold onto the one of our many identities that is most under threat - is useful in examining the dynamics of individual reaction to the war in Sri Lanka. Prof. Searle explains that we have a choice of which of our numerous identities based on sex, age, geography, religion, race, etc. to emphasize, and that we put different identities forward in different contexts. This is an interesting idea in thinking about the reactions of ourselves and those we know to the events of recent years and about the growing distinctiveness between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Why have all other groups accommodated themselves to Sinhalese-Buddhist dominance and given up their right to be included in the Sri Lankan nationalist mythology?

Prof. Searle’s prescription for how to end this war, or any conflict, beyond the dynamics of negotiation mentioned above and the need for more inclusiveness in social discourse, involves a dimension that all of us can learn from. He urges us to attain enough self-love that we can show compassion to those who have been our adversaries. This seems like a very wise course for all of those attached to the island to pursue.

The grasp of the issues in the Sri Lankan national conflict here is impressive. One would take issue with only 2 matters. The devolution offered by Pres. Kumaratunge’s government was not ‘substantial,’ except in the minds of her supporters.(p.5) It did not provide as much devolution as is enjoyed in either the US or India, for instance, much less Switzerland or Brazil. The bombing of the Temple of the Tooth was not ‘an explicit attempt to attack Sinhalese identity.’(p.73) Rather, it was an attack on the conflation of national identity with Sinhalese identity. The attack was not on the Temple of the Tooth itself, although some exterior parts of the Temple were damaged, but on the site where the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Sri Lanka’s independence were to take place - directly in front of that symbol of Sinhalese identity. The ceremony was moved to an area in front of the Parliament Building, a neutral, inclusive symbolic space, and proceeded without hitch.

The real question is why majority groups in new nations such as Sri Lanka and Turkey need to be so vociferous in proclaiming the dominance of their own culture, language, and history within the national discourse that no room is left for other groups to express themselves. Objectively it seems a self-destructive course to follow for a new nation. Is the need for a coherent story so imperative and is pluralism so difficult, especially in countries in which pluralism has been a way of life before independence?

Can a country, once it has gone down the road of a nationalism based on one ethnic, language or religious group, widen the definition of national identity to include others on an equal basis?