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RECENT EVENTS
AND DECEMBER 19 PROPOSALS

When Minister of State Shri Natwar Singh and Shri P. Chidambaram visited Colombo again in mid-December 1986, a new package of proposals was evolved (which has come to be known as the "December 19 Proposals").

The proposals essentially involve formation of a new Eastern Province by excising Sinhalese majority areas (Amparai Electoral District) from the existing Eastern Province, and the creation of two Tamil Provincial Councils in the Northern and the reconstituted Eastern Province. The two Councils would have institutional linkages for co-ordination between the two so as to make them acceptable to all concerned. The Sri Lankan government also agreed to consider a proposal for a Second Stage of constitutional development providing for the Northern Province and the new Eastern Province coming together; subject to the wishes of the people in the two Provinces being ascertained separately after a period of time. The proposals had the support of the Sri Lankan President.

However, soon after the return of the Ministers, the Sri Lankan Government expressed reservations and resiled from the December 19 position. The Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE also entered into direct negotiations without informing the Government of India. As a result, India could not discuss any proposals with the Tamil groups in the absence of a firm commitment by the Sri Lankan Government.

In January 1987, the situation in Sri Lanka took a turn for the worse after the Sri Lankan Government imposed an economic blockade on the Jaffna peninsula causing considerable hardship to the civilian population. The Sri Lankan authorities claimed that these measures followed a virtual setting up of a parallel administration in the Northern Province by the LTTE. The President also took the view that India could discuss the December 19 proposals with the Tamils, and if the latter accepted these proposals, he would try to persuade his party, the Muslims and Sinhala public opinion to accept them as the basis for resolving the ethnic problem. Dilatory tactics continued throughout January and early February while the Sri Lankan Government conducted large-scale military operations and made preparations for a possible assault on militant strongholds in Jaffna. On 10th February, a message from Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was conveyed to President Jayewardene that India was not in a position to resume discussions as long as the military operations against the Tamils continued, and the economic blockade was not lifted; the Sri Lankan Government was asked to clearly affirm its commitment to the December 19 proposals for any further negotiations.

Even after the suspension of its good offices role caused by Sri Lankan actions, India has remained in close contact with both sides. It has expressed its grave concern at the developments affecting civilians and has called for caution and restraint on the part of the Sri Lanka Government.

Starting from February, 1987 the position of Tamil militants has weakened greatly due to a number of factors. The Sri Lankan forces gained effective control over the Eastern provinces in February/March 1987 and in the first week of March 1987, a final offensive on Jaffna seemed imminent. On 4th March speaking in the Parliament, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi made an indirect reference to India's options. Contact was also maintained with the Sri Lanka Government. Since the situation in Jaffna continued to deteriorate with serious hardship being caused to the civilian population, and since there was imminent possibility of large-scale casualties, Shri Rajiv Gandhi sent Shri Dinesh Singh as his personal emissary on March 13, 1987 to meet President Jayewardene and express India's grave concern. These steps led to some de-escalation in mid-March, 1987. Sri Lanka did not embark on a military offensive on Jaffna. It reaffirmed its commitment to December 19th proposals. The fuel ban was also partially lifted. In this phase intense efforts were made to create conditions for resumption of negotiations on the basis of December 19th proposals. On 10th April, 1987 Sri Lanka announced a Unilateral Ceasefire for 10 days. The situation appeared hopeful. However, with the brutal massacre of over 200 people on 17th/18th April, r987, the Colombo Bomb Outrage on April 21, and the retaliatory and indiscriminate bombing and attacks by Sri Lanka's forces from 20th April, the fragile and temporary lull was shattered and full-scale hostilities resumed.

In an atmosphere of escalating violence, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mr. Premadasa announced on April 24 that in the light of provocative violence by the Tamil militants the Sri Lankan Government would be carrying out military attacks on militants' stronghold adding "Now on we will talk of a political solution only after we are able to protect and preserve the country. Whatever proposals (for resolving the problem) were discussed, I say emphatically we will consider them only after peace is restored." President Jayewardene, however, declared on April 26 that his Government was "pro-peace" and "pro-political settlement". He also said that the Government of Sri Lanka was extending a "Hand of peace and friendship" to the "terrorists" adding "it does not look as if our efforts and the efforts of India (to settle the ethnic problem) have been of any use to them (the militants). President Jayewardene's statement followed a strong condemnation by the Government of India of aerial attacks and other military operations by the Sri Lankan armed forces.

Nowhere is the two-track policy of Sri Lanka government towards a political solution of the ethnic problem more evident than in the public utterances of President Jayewardene and Prime Minister Premadasa. They seem to be talking double and at cross purposes. Within five days of Mr. Premadasa's announcement that "now on we will talk of a political solution", President Jayewardene told newsmen on April 28 in Colombo "I am always for a military solution. War has to end in a solution. There will be a ma . or military thrust".

This was not the first time in the past three years that President Jayewardene had spoken of a military solution. He has argued, and this is on record that his government had no choice but to pursue a military solution and hoped that the Sri Lankan army's attempts to recapture Jaffna would not result in too many civilian casualties.

The day President Jayewardene spoke of a military solution to the ethnic problem, Sri Lankan forces killed 400 Tamils in a five-day offensive in what was claimed to be a retaliation of the previous week's car bomb blast in central Colombo.

A government spokesman confirmed that about 150 militants had been killed in an air and ground assault on Tamil bases in Jaffna, while 250 more died in government sweeps through the Eastern Province.

There was no let up in military operations against the ethnic Tamil minority throughout the month of May. The Washington Times reported on May 19 "Three brawny British mercenaries mingle easily with tourists at the Tangerine Beach hotel (in Kalutara), playing tennis, swimming in the pool and dining at the posh supper club.

"A few miles away in Katukurunda, their colleagues are training Sri Lanka's deadly Special Task Force to kill Tamil rebels.

"They have some experience about fighting terrorism", said the National Security Minister, Mr. Lalith Athulathamudali, explaining that his government in 1984 hired a private security agency called Keeny Meeny Service (KMS).

After nearly a week of an on-again, off-again offensive, the Sri Lankan government launched on May 2 6 what appeared to be the final push to recapture the Jaffna Peninsula from the Tamil tigers, the main Tamil group fighting for the ethnic group's identity.

Nothing that is available in the armoury was spared. The Tamil cities with a large population were pounded with heavy shelling, bombing, strafing from land, sea and air. Shortly afterwards the army emerged in a brigade strength from most of its camps in the peninsula, the Times of London reported.

All this happened within five days of renewed assertions by Prime Minister Premadasa "anyone who advises us to find a political solution is regarded to be-our worst enemy". It is crystal clear that he was directing his wrath against India and other countries which have constantly advocated a political solution to the ethnic issue, allowing India's good offices to be used by both sides.

India was fully conscious of the suffering of people in the peninsula, reeling under the economic blockade imposed since the beginning of the year.

In his appeal to the Sri Lankan government on May 28, the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, warned against a military occupation of Jaffna since violence had already claimed thousands of lives in Sri Lanka.

"The military option is adding to the carnage. Hundreds have died in the last few days, Mr. Gandhi said. "The horrific loss of innocent life of this magnitude is totally dispropionate to the avowed aim of exterminating the Tamil militant groups."

Mr. Gandhi said "it is apparent now that the Sri Lankan government was buying time for pursuing the military option". How prophetic he was could be seen from the attempted takeover of Jaffna town in subsequent days.

A dispatch of June 9 in the Times of India reprinted by arrangement with Sunday Times, London, said "The streets lay silent and empty as the Sri Lankan soldiers last week filed into this Tamil town on the north coast of the Jaffna peninsula, after one of the bloodiest and most important battles in Sri Lanka's four-year ethnic conflict.

"There were two days of aerial bombardment. Helicopter gunships strafed the main street. The number of civilian casualties is disputed, but it was certainly higher than the 47 accounted by the government".

During the army operations not only was the unarmed civilian population massacred but also hospitals, school buildings and places of worship destroyed. It was in this context that India sent three messages in the first tow days of June to Sri Lanka's government, emphasizing the urgent need for relief supplies to Jaffna through the Indian Red Cross.

The message of June 1 said: "Although attempts have been made to keep this tragic story from the world by communication blockade and by sealing off Jaffna from the rest of the world, reports are already filtering out of large-scale civilian deaths, property damage, leaving thousands homeless and acute shortages of food, medicines and shelter. Even hospitals have become targets leaving the population without adequate medical facilities".

On June 3, essential relief materials were sent in unarmed and unescorted convoy of boats on a mission of mercy to Jaffna, which was forced to return under implied threat of force on the high seas. As always, Sri Lanka took a negative and obstructive attitude even on an issue which is entirely humanitarian. Keeping in mind the urgent and imperative need for rushing essential relief to the suffering people of the Jaffna Peninsula, relief materials were air dropped on the following day in-and-around Jaffna after being inspected by a large group of Indian and foreign journalists, some of whom flew in the transport aircraft. India's was thus a mission of mercy. "Lining up for ration, the people (of the Jaffna Peninsula) said they were not getting enough to cat and they hailed India's food airdrop", Steven Weisman said in his dispatch to New York Times of June 6. He further added "the main street of Velvedditturai is flanked by buildings with crumbled walls and roof, evidence of the government attack". He also noted that the biggest grievance of people of the area "was the arrest of perhaps 4000 young men last week as terrorist suspects". It is also reported by various sources that all young men between the ages of 15 and 45 have been rounded up and taken to unknown destinations. "The main street and coastal roads of Velveddittturai are testimony to the havoc that has been wrought.............. The battle smashed line after line of buildings beyond repair. Roofs are caved in and brick and concrete walls are a mass of rubble", John Elliot said in his report to the Financial Times of London on June 6.

A random survey of the world press would show that the print medium in general has welcomed the Indian stand on the issue.

"The military option, we hope Colombo understands, is not a solution .... The army has taken over the key points in Jaffna Peninsula and is now poised to take Jaffna city. We do not think that it will be difficult for the army to take over the city, but we shudder to think of the civilian casualties that have occurred and will occur", The Nation of Bangkok reported on June 3.

The Los Angeles Times said on May 3: "A review of the 1986 Amnesty International report on Sri Lanka soon puts matters into a more balanced perspective. Amnesty International records 'arbitrary killings of many noncombatant Tamils by government FE security forces in northern and-eastern Sri Lanka and of many disappearances".

"The heart of the problem", Christian Science Monitor of Boston said on May 20,"is that the Sinhalese outnumber the Tamils by more than 4 to 1, as a result the Sinhalese control Parliament, and therefore the Government".

The Boston newspaper went on to say "they (Sinhalese) have systematically discriminated against Tamils in economic development projects, higher education and public service.

The Toronto Star of April 16 noted that the "air force (of Sri Lanka) has bought 12 U.S. helicopters, commercial versions of the Huey that was used in Vietnam and converted them for military use. The air force has also acquired a number of fixed wing planes from China".

The Guardian of London said on April 2: "The army has denied that any shelling from nearby army camp in the old Dutch fort took place at the time of the incident, early on Monday morning. But a magistrate in Jaffna returned a verdict of homicide, which he said was planned and directed from the fort, after hearing evidence from the chief medical officer, Dr. Nachinarkinian."

U.S. congressman Mervyn Dymally, the second-ranking Democratic member of the Asian and Pacific Affairs subcommittee of the House of the Foreign Affairs Committee, said in a statement on June 3:

"While the government of President Jayewardene has been emphasizing a negotiated settlement in its public statement, it seems that all along the government has been intent on pursuing the military option. It will not lead to a settlement, rather it will only serve to undermine the moderates and polarize the Tamil minority, destroying any hope of a lasting settlement".

The International Commission of jurists and the world council of churches, among others, in an appeal to the U.N. Secretary General on June 4, urged the government of Sri Lanka to reconsider its decision and to permit the humanitarian aid offered by the Indian Red Cross to reach the civilian population.

The Daily Telegraph of London reported on May 22 : "Hundreds of Tamil civilians have disappeared in the eastern Sri Lanka region of Batticaloa after being arrested by British-trained security forces, local clergymen, a citizens' group and trade unionists claimed yesterday".

The Tamil daily "Virakesari" of Colombo on May 7: "Virtually all public associations in Jaffna have expressed their protests against the government's decision to close down Jaffna hospital".

Financial Times of London reported on May 20 that "young men are scared to walk on the streets of the eastern Sri Lankan coastal city of Batticaloa. No one goes out after 6 or 7 p.m. for fear of being shot".

The chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Asia-Pacific region, Congressman Stephen Solarz, said on June 11 that he wished that the Indian relief operation in Jaffna had been worked out in co-operation with the government of Sri Lanka but added that it was "better to drop supplies than bombs". He said he could conceive of an extraordinary situation where "humanitarian considerations are so great that, the principle of humanitarian rescue has to take precedence over the principle of non-interference."

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