The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
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Is Pirabhakaran a deviant and a merchant of death? Based
on these uninterpreted (as of now!) historical data, I assert that the karmic
theory of death for power holders should gain credence. To put it
simply, my take on the karmic theory of death for power holders is as
follows: Excessive abuse of power by power holders leads to homicide
attempts on them which largely succeed, irrespective of higher level of
surrounding security. It is based on the degree of abuse of power.
I’m sure that millions of pious Hindus and Buddhists subscribe to this
karmic theory. But for reasons of political correctness and expediency
not many are willing to articulate it publicly and thus it is not given
adequate academic scrutiny. For
this analysis, I should record that I benefited from the lecture notes
of a valuable summer course taught by Prof. Barbara Sirvis (currently,
President of the Southern Vermont College) two decades ago at the
University of Illinois. The title of that course was ‘Death
Education’. God
bless the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
Suppose a zoologist walks along a
jungle tract, and comes across two toe nails of a tiger. She then tries
to present her finding and its implications to biology to her colleagues
in a professional meeting. She provides her analysis relating to the age
of the tiger (based on the size of two toe nails found), and the prey of
the tiger (based on the remnants of flesh entangled in the toe nails).
To this extent, her interpretations would be gladly accepted by her
colleagues. Suppose, based from her finding of two toe nails, if
this zoologist exaggerates her inferences beyond reasonable limits, to
quantify the heart beat of the tiger or the blood proteins of the tiger
or the number of progeny of the tiger which lost its two toe nails, then
she would be laughed off the podium. This is how new findings are
scrutinized in my professional parish. But, in the world of Tamil Tiger
observers, scrutiny of facts in context has been a missing
element relating to the political assassinations. Thus, much muck is
mixed with kernels of truth. In this chapter, I present an analysis of
LTTE’s political assassinations as viewed in a world-wide frame. In the above-cited example, I chose the
gender of the zoologist with a reason, since two of the ranking culprits
of such exaggeration on LTTE activities were women, namely Rajani
Thiranagama (a medical doctor by training) and Radhika Coomarasamy (a
legal scholar by training). Both were human rights activists of a
certain caliber, but it is evident from their published pronouncements
that their blanket denunciation on LTTE activism is flawed with
gullibility in topics which were beyond their understanding. Their
flawed literature had served as easy copies for ‘foreign’ area
specialists (who do not bother to check the original sources in Tamil
language) from USA and elsewhere. Here is an example. While web-surfing for research
materials on Pirabhakaran a few months ago, I came across a document
entitled, ‘The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a
Terrorist and Why?’, prepared by the Federal Research Division,
Library of Congress, Washington DC, with a date-line September 1999.
Author of this document is identified as Rex A.Hudson, and editor as
Marilyn Majeska. Even the first paragraph under the sub-head
‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), is riddled with errors in
facts and prejudiced opinions, as indicated below by me within
parentheses in italics: “The LTTE is widely regarded as the
world’s deadliest and fiercest guerrilla/terrorist group and the most
ferocious guerrilla organization in South Asia. It is the only terrorist
group to have assassinated three (sic) heads of government –
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, Sri Lankan President
Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, and former Prime Minister Dissanayake (sic)
in 1994. It has also assassinated several prominent political and
military figures. The LTTE’s ill-conceived Gandhi assassination,
however, resulted in the LTTE’s loss of a substantial logistical
infrastructure, and also the loss of popular support for the LTTE among
mainstream Indian Tamils. In 1999 the LTTE made two threats on the life
of Sonia Gandhi (Any convincing evidence in support of
this blatant lie is not divulged. But the author had the temerity
to mention not one but two threats!), who has nevertheless
continued to campaign for a seat in parliament.” If the readers (which may include
American Poo Bahs and politicians) of this report prepared by the
‘Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC’ show
ignorance on recent South Asian affairs, it is not easy to blame them
since blind regurgitators of mangled facts such as Rex A.Hudson behave
like the zoologist I referred to at the beginning of this chapter. Assassination
is an Act with Two Lead Players and Two Frames
An assassination is a violent act with
two lead players (the assassin and the victim) and two frames.
Immediately after the assassination act, in the shorter frame, it
appears to the onlookers and listeners of the news that the assassin was
the powerful among the two, while the victim was the powerless
individual - to either suffer and succumb or miraculously escape. This
is the scenario which is presented to the society by the media. However,
the hidden longer frame which incorporates vital facts (which in turn
led to the assassination event) where the victim is the powerful bully
while the assassin and his or her cohorts were the powerless sufferers
is conveniently obscured and neglected in non-critical appraisals of the
assassination event. This scenario remains true since the most famous
political assassination of Julius Caesar on March 15, 44 B.C. at the
hands of Brutus and Cassius. Presenting LTTE assassinations,
beginning from Pirabhakaran’s confessional on the killing of Jaffna
Mayor Alfred Duraiappah in 1975, as acts of societal deviants gained
currency from the much-hyped book The Broken Palmyra (1990).
Though this book has gained an iconic status, none so far has bothered
to scrutinize the professional credentials of the four authors – Hoole,
Sritharan, Somasundaram and Thiranagama – to pose as anthropologists
of Tamil culture. In the preface to their book, the four authors
modestly claimed ignorance of history. Simple ignorance is excusable.
But ignorance garbed with academic arrogance is inexcusable. In this respect, I wish to bring to
light an interesting research paper published by Joseph Westermeyer of
University of Minnesota in 1973. It was entitled, ‘Assassination and
Conflict Resolution in Laos’. The ideas presented by Westermeyer in
this paper are vital to the understanding of the fact how, flawed
analyses by human rights activists (a la Rajani Thiranagama and
Radhika Coomarasamy) can distort the established societal norms.
Westermeyer’s anthropological study is pertinent to the Sri Lankan
scene in more than one context. His study was conducted in Laos (an
Asian country, not different from Sri Lanka in cultural norms, with a
majority practising Buddhism.). Also, Pirabhakaran’s acknowledged
first assassination (that of Jaffna Mayor Alfred Duraiappah) occurred in
July 1975. The abstract of Westermeyer’s study is as follows: “Ten cases of political homicide in
Laos were intensively studied, with particular attention to the
assassin, the victim, the homicidal event, the provocation, and the
social context. Each assassination provided a resolution for a social
dilemma which had proven refractory to other means of social problem
solving. Certain demographic characteristics and psycho-social
correlates of political homicide in Laos resemble those of other
cultures.” [American Anthropologist, 1973, vol.75; pp. 123-131]
For thoughtful digestion, I provide
excerpts from Westermeyer’s nine-page anthropological research paper
– under the subheadings he had identified in his abstract. The
Assassin
“These men were viewed as responsible
citizens in their various communities. None was known to be particularly
troublesome to his village, nor had they shown the erratic behavior or
bizarre mentation of phi baa (insane) people. In no case were any
of the men incarcerated for their deed, nor was any indemnity paid to
the family of the victim… The
Victim
“None of these people had ever been
psychotic; however, the primary victims in cases one through six all had
demonstrated deviant social behavior. Victim one had robbed and murdered
on multiple occasions to obtain material goods; social sanctions in his
village had failed to rehabilitate him… In their role as leaders, however, each
had exercised poor judgment in discharging his responsibilities to his
followership…. The
Provocation
“Assassination was preceded by months
or years of dyssocial behavior by the victim. In the three cases
involving criminal recidivism, the threat to the group consisted of
direct violation against person or property. Social pressure and
traditional village law (a private law) had not ameliorated their
antisocial habits…. The
Social Context
…Victims in each case held authority
over the group to which the assassin belonged. Furthermore, the
positions occupied by all four victims were appointed rather than
elected ones. Thus, popular vote was not an available means for exerting
pressure against the victim, and political means have not evolved for
the removal of appointed officials who prove to be incompetent.” Now, I present the interesting section
of Westermeyer’s analysis which negates the psychological and
psychiatric projections on LTTE, made by the authors of The Broken
Palmyra. It should be reiterated that of the four who authored the Broken
Palmyra book, two (Thiranagama and Somasunderam) were nominally
medical scientists and the other two (Hoole and Sritharan) had degrees
in mathematics. Among the two with medical qualifications, Somasunderam
identifies himself as a psychiatrist. Excerpts of Westermeyer’s
analysis under three sub-categories [Assassin as Deviant, Political
homicide as societal deviance, and Victim as Deviant] are given below. I
have only omitted the reference sources for reasons of brevity. Assassin
as Deviant
Westermeyer had observed: “Much has been made of assassins as
deviants in the historical and psychiatric literature, where they are
variously described as nefarious, fanatic, lunatic, retarded,
sociopathic, unstable, and/or mentally ill. Less of the deviant
interpretation appears in the anthropological literature however….
Differences between the historical-psychiatric and anthropological
viewpoints may in part be accounted for by the reliance of the former
studies on incarcerated assassins; the stress of incarceration might
accentuate the observed psychopathology. Or assassins in the complex
societies studied by historians and psychiatrists may perforce be more
deviant with reference to their fellow citizens than in societies
studied by anthropologists.” The subsequent paragraph is vital to
Pirabhakaran’s much projected role as an assassin. To quote
Westermeyer again, “On the other hand, informants in
societies where assassins remain at large may gloss over their
assassins’ deviant behavior, since in most cases they do not view the
assassination itself as a criminal or deviant act. Quite the contrary,
it is often viewed as a responsible or courageous action. Since the
assassins continue their lives as before (perhaps with enhanced
prestige), psychopathology may not be so likely to emerge or be
noted.” Westermeyer ends his section on
‘Assassin as Deviant’ with a quote from Hyams, who had authored a
book Killing No Murder; A Study of Assassination as a Political Means
[1969, London: Nelson and Sons]. “From a social perspective, Hyams
assumes neither the condemning nor absolving stance in describing the
assassin. Instead, he emphasizes the social function served by the
assassin: ‘So the assassin – the genuine assassin, not the
murderous lunatic – is, as it were, that particularly sensitive cell
of the social body which reacts first and most quickly to preserve the
social body.’ The authors of Broken Palmyra
presented the image of Eelam Tamil society as having become pathological
and undergoing stress due to the emergence of LTTE as a lead player in
the 1980s. Westermeyer again negates such a view. Political
Homicide as Societal Deviance
To quote Westermeyer again, “Some investigators implicate
assassination as a sign of a pathological society, a society in
transition, or a society undergoing stress…Work by Dole and Friedrich,
as well as these Laotian data, suggest that this need not be so:
political homicide can be a functional part of a stable society….In
sum, the assassination/social disorganization relationship does not
appear to be a simplistic one based on the cross-cultural data presently
available.” I consider the third sub-category in the analysis of Westermeyer entitled ‘[Assassination] Victim as Deviant’ is the most revealing to understand Pirabhakaran’s projected role as an assassin of Duraiappah. And it is this sub-category which has been completely ignored or hidden for reasons of convenience in the publications of individuals belonging to the Sri Lanka’s human rights industry, who proliferated in the 1990s. Thus, what Westermeyer found in his 1973 study on Laotian assassinations is highly pertinent to the assassinations in Eelam and Sri Lanka of 1980s and 1990s as well. Victim
as Deviant
“The evidence here is perhaps not so
ambiguous as it is for assassins and for political homicide…Friedrich
(1962) posits tyrannical use of power, struggle for power, or kinship
revenge as motivating most assassinations among the Tarascans of Acan… Among the Laotian cases, half of these instances of social peer assassination involved criminal recidivism. Where the usual methods for modifying antisocial behavior fail, however, there has traditionally been no recourse to state imposed sanctions. Since traditional law has been exclusively a private law, the community would tolerate destructive or dangerous behavior ad nauseum, i.e., until some person or persons became motivated enough to do away with the recidivist. For this category of social problem, then, political homicide has served as a final solution to the problem of social deviants whose dangerous behavior has proven refractory to ordinary means of rectification. ….The victims served in a particular
kind of leadership role; they were appointed from further up the
governmental hierarchy, rather than popularly chosen by a constituency.
These four leaders, ordinary men in other respects, had erred in the
same way: they had inordinately abused their power vis-à-vis their
subordinate group. By excessive corruption, seduction, disrespect, or
indolence, they failed in their responsibilities toward their followers.
Since these men wielded considerable power and occupied authoritative
positions important to the welfare of their subordinates, their behavior
gradually became intolerable to the subordinate group. Eventually, one
of their subordinates executed them, and received the approval (and
protection) of the subordinate group in doing so.” Westermeyer’s conclusion (as well as
caveat) of his findings is worth recording, to highlight the context of
assassinations of political leaders such as
Alfred Duraiappah, Sam Tambimuttu, Neelan Tirchelvam and rival
militant leaders belonging to TELO and EPRLF by LTTE. He wrote, “Regarding assassination of political
leaders, this small Laotian sample does not lend itself to expansive
theorizing. Nonetheless, a common theme prevails: the victim leaders
have taken inordinate liberties with the power available to them, or
have failed to discharge their leadership obligations. Such leaders
appear not to comprehend the traditional responsibilities of their
positions: while the elite have always exercised considerable dominion
over peasants, such authority is not unlimited…the leader must also
commit himself to the well-being and the dignity of the governed. Should
the leader ignore these responsibilities, the situation is fraught with
danger…Slow, indirect politicking may prove effective given sufficient
time. If too slow or inept, politicking may give way to assassination as
a means for social problem solving. In sum, problems which may lead to
assassination are of such magnitude that they threaten the existence of
the community. Other means of social problem solving either have been
exhausted without effect or are not available. Under such circumstances
political homicide serves as a ‘court of last resort’ in social
conflict resolution.” Since Westermeyer’s study sample was
restricted to ‘ten cases of political homicide in Laos’, to analyze
in depth the anthropological context of political assassinations by the
LTTE, I refer to two additional studies with extensive world-wide
samples. But, prior to that, I provide some general facts on
assassinations. General
Facts on Assassinations
Four modes of death exist for humans.
These are, natural death, accident, suicide and homicide. For
convenience of remembering, they are identified in abbreviation as NASH.
One of the subcategories of homicide is assassination. The English word
‘assassin’ (defined as, one who kills, especially one who murders a
political figure) is derived from the Arabic word hashshashin,
relating to users of hashish. Political assassination is a
sub-subcategory of homicide. If one checks the relative percentages
of the modes of death in a nation’s population per annum, natural
deaths exceeds 90 percent. Other three modes of death contribute at the
maximum 8 or 9 percent of total deaths. For illustration, I will provide
recent figures for USA and Japan, where statistics on the four modes of
death are available. 2 million and 322,421 individuals died in USA for
the year 1996. Among these, 2 million and 177,447 individuals (93.76
percent) died a natural death; 93,874 individuals (4.04 percent) died in
accidents; 30,862 individuals (1.33 percent) died by suicide; and,
20,738 individuals (0.89 percent) were victims of homicide. The pattern
is similar in Japan as well. Among the 896,211 individuals died in 1996,
824,192 individuals (91.96 percent) died a natural death. Accidental
deaths amounted to another 4.3 percent. Suicide victims constituted
around 3.5 percent and about 0.15 percent of the total deaths were
homicide victims. The notable difference between the suicide and
homicide percentages between the American and Japanese populations can
be chiefly attributed to cultural tolerance of suicide in Japan and
societal acceptance of non-restricted use of hand guns in USA. These
figures taken together reveal that deaths due to homicide in an year
among the larger public in a population with relative social stability
comprises less than one percent of total deaths. Surprisingly, this pattern does not
hold for nominal political power holders, power sharers and power
peddlers (among which are to be included informants, spies,
collaborators). However, vilifying Pirabhakaran is a cottage industry
of the Colombo press since 1985. Here is a short passage of vitriol
penned by one W.T.Singha in mid 2002, under the title, ‘Prabhakaran
– Is he Goethe’s daemon?’ “… Is this that person who was
responsible for savagely murdering of a democratically elected President
of Sri Lanka, for the suicide bombing of the much loved Prime Minister
of India – the grandson of Nehru, and the crème de la crème of
Singhalese – Presidential candidates and eminent politicians – for
butchering leading Tamil politicians who did not tow the line of
Prabhakaran’s racism and for the bomb attacks on internationally
recognised Tamil intellects who opposed his sanguinary mania? Did
Premadasa, Rajiv, Ranjan, Gamini, Amirthalingam, Lalith, Tiruchelvam,
Doraiswami and others deserved such brutal extermination? A single
assassination of a high ranking politician is in itself vicious but to
arrogate to himself the right to kill leading politicians and eminent
people in such great number, mostly for flimsy disagreement or political
dissension, could be the perpetration of an evil incarnate or
megalomania…” [The Island newspaper, Colombo, July 10, 2002.] While (1) paying due allowance the fact
that W.T.Singha appears completely ignorant of the classic analytical
study of Westermeyer in Laos (60 percent Buddhist) relating to political
assassinations in an Asian society not different from Sri Lanka, (2)
asserting that as of now, Pirabhakaran had not been convicted in
a court of law for the assassinations of all the individuals mentioned in the above passage, (3) strongly doubting that all
these named individuals in their ranks as politicians did not abuse
power, and also (4) recognizing the unmentionable facts that four of
the named individuals had been previously targets of assassins
(Premadasa - JVP in 1987, Rajiv Gandhi – JVP in 1987 and Sikh
militants in 1991, Amirthalingam – Sinhalese mob in 1956, Lalith
Athulathmudali – JVP in 1987) other than LTTE, I now refer to the two published studies to
refute the views held by correspondents and journalists (not necessarily
Sri Lankan) like W.T.Singha and Gamini Weerakoon, the editor of
Colombo’s Island newspaper. The
assassinations of politically powerful persons
Both studies which deserve attention
(but have been conveniently ignored by LTTE’s critics) originate from
USA, and are from two institutions with rather impeccable credentials-
namely, the New York Times and the CIA. These are as follows: 1.
James
F.Kirkham, Sheldon G.Levy and William J.Crotty: Assassination and
Political Violence: A Report to the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, New York Times - Bantam Books, New York,
1970, 752 pages. Especially of value for the current discussion is the
Appendix A of this report (pp.301-325), which provides data on
assassination events from November 1918 to October 1968. This
extensive data was collected by Carl Leiden, Murray Havens, Karl Schmitt
and James Soukup belonging to the Department of Government, University
of Texas, Austin, in 1968. 2.
Leslie
R.Pyenson, Laurence A.Cove and Francic X.Brickfield: Patterns of death
in world leaders. Military Medicine, Dec.1998, vol.163, no.12,
pp.797-800. Especially of interest is the professional affiliation of
the authors, namely CIA, Washington DC. In this interesting analysis,
Pyenson and his colleagues have reviewed the deaths of all political
leaders, who died between January 1, 1965 and December 31, 1996. Leiden and colleagues (1968) had
identified the assassination victims into six ranks. To the rank no.1
was assigned, ‘Head of State, head of government, or dictator; former
head of state or head of state-elect, e.g: presidents, kings,
premiers.’ Pyenson and colleagues (1998) defined their assassination
victims (world leaders) as ‘those who at any time during their careers
were a country’s principal decision-maker, exercising final authority
for formulation and execution of national government policies. The
positions they held included monarch, president, prime minister, party
secretary or chairman, supreme religious authority or head of junta.’
Thus the data assembled by Leiden’s group and Pyenson’s group are
more or less compatible but not identical. Subtle differences
need notice. First, while Leiden’s group had pooled the heads of state
and former heads of state into a single list, Pyenson’s group had
separated the heads of state and former heads of state into two separate
lists. Secondly, while Leiden’s group had identified each of the
assassination victim by name, country, date of assassination and also
included unsuccessful assassination attempts, Pyenson’s group
belonging to CIA have not provided such complete details. Thus, the
summarised information in the paper of Pyenson’s group has to be
believed in good faith. Thirdly, Pyenson’s group had indicated that
their study population was ‘non-U.S. world leaders’ since ‘CIA
regulations prohibit the study of U.S. citizens.’ This partly explains
why their study period begins from January 1, 1965 because by this
choice they could conveniently exclude the assassination of President
John F.Kennedy from the study population. Since the time frame studied by both
groups overlap between January 1965 and October 1968, six heads of state
and former heads of state who died during this overlapping period would
have been counted in both studies. Taking this into consideration, from
the extensive tabulated listing of Leiden’s group,
I counted 63 heads of state and former heads of state as
assassination victims between November 1918 and December 1964. [Leiden
group’s data on heads of state and ex head of state is presented below
as Appendix 1.] The study presented by Pyenson’s group, informs that
between January 1965 and December 1996, 52 heads of state and 16 former
heads of state died by violent means. Thus, between November 1918 and
December 1996 (a turbulent 78 year period of the 20th century
which saw the ascension and decline of communism, vanishing of
overt colonialism, world war and regional wars, genocides,
dominance of weapon industry and proliferation of nations), based on the
assembled statistics of Leiden’s group and Pyenson’s group, a total
of 131 (63 + 52 + 16) heads of state and former heads of state had died
violently. This is certainly an under-count, since Pyenson’s group
also excluded “countries – essentially a score of island states –
with populations less than 250,000”. Furthermore, some reported
‘accidents’ to leaders which resulted in mortality could have really
been homicides. I wish to further identify the
significance of the findings Pyenson’s group which focused on the
violent deaths of political leaders who died between 1965 and 1996,
since two of the attributed victims of Pirabhakaran’s deeds – namely
Rajiv Gandhi (in 1991) and R.Premadasa (in 1993) – would have been
counted in this study. The findings of Pyenson’s group are as follows: (1)
261
world leaders died between 1965 and 1996. (2)
Of
these 261 world leaders, 118 died while in office; only 66 (56 percent)
died by natural causes. Remaining 52 died by violent (unnatural) causes,
of which 35 died by assassination. To reiterate, 30 percent of titular
heads of state died by assassination during their terms of office.
R.Premadasa was one of the 35 heads of state to die during this study
period. (3)
Among
the 143 world leaders who died after leaving office, 16 died by violent
(unnatural) causes, of which 10 were by assassination. Rajiv Gandhi was
one of the 10 ex heads-of state to die during this study period. What is revealing from this statistic
provided by the CIA researchers is that, percentage wise, there is a
marked difference between the assassination deaths among larger public
and the assassination deaths of heads of state and ex heads of state. In
the discussion section of their paper, the CIA researchers inferred as
follows: “Our first impressions, nevertheless,
do call into question some prevalent beliefs or intuitive assumptions,
which, in turn, may have practical planning implications. (1)
World
leaders are not superhuman. By all accounts, they receive the best
medicines, technology and professional services their country can offer
or import, and generally they can travel to the best institutions in the
world when required… (2)
It
is not at all unusual for leaders to die violently, especially while in
office. Death from assassination or other external means occurs commonly
among world leaders, often wile they are in office. Almost half of those
leaders who died were still in office, and almost half of that group
died violently. Overall, violent deaths accounted for a surprisingly
large proportion of the totals in both the mortality analysis group
(26%) and the 1980 cohort (40% through 1996). By comparison, although it
represented only a single year’s experience, in 1993, violent death
constituted less than 7% of deaths among the U.S. population.” Unfortunately, unlike Leiden’s group,
CIA’s Pyenson’s group has not provided the individual details
of the deaths of 261 world leaders between 1965 and 1996. A letter sent
to Dr.Pyenson’s address in Washington DC. by me, dated Dec.12, 2002,
requesting such individual details for research has gone unanswered as
of now. Thus, I cannot further comment on the significance of the
reported findings. But in their study, Pyenson’s group had stated that
their data was gathered “using unclassified information from readily
available English-language or translated newspapers, books,
periodicals”. Also to be noted is that, in their
first finding reproduced above, Pyenson’s group use an
all-encompassing clause “technology and professional services their
country can offer or import” which include medical service as well as
security service. Despite all the top-level security they are
surrounded with, if such a high number of heads of state or ex heads of
state succumb to assassination, I would consider that here is a
circumstantial proof for the karma theory in action. As a nominal
believer in the karma theory, I have never come across a study like that
of Pyenson’s group to provide some statistical support for the karma
theory of death for power holders. In sum, it is my contention that the
statistical data on the assassinations of politicians at international
level between 1918 and 1996 convincingly demonstrate that the
assassination events of heads of state such as Rajiv Gandhi and
Premadasa lie within the probability range of the observed pattern of
assassination deaths of power-holding politicians, irrespective of
whether LTTE and Pirabhakaran had a direct or indirect hand in them or
not. The assassination issue is further muddled with the facts that both
Rajiv Gandhi (at the hands of Sinhalese in 1987 and Sikhs in 1991) and
Premadasa (at the hand of JVP radicals in 1987) were assassination
targets prior to their eventual deaths. The oft-repeated claim by LTTE
watchers like Rohan Gunaratna that “LTTE is the only terrorist group
to have assassinated two heads of government” is also tenuous by
omission and deception. It is an open secret that Intelligence agencies
like CIA, Mossad and RAW which for all practical purposes technically
operate as ‘under-cover terrorist groups’ in the soils of
adversarial nations and territories have successfully planned and
executed the assassinations of numerous heads of state who were counted
in the studies of Leyden’s group and Pyenson’s group. Regicides
in pre-colonial Buddhist Ceylon
“The more powerful and prestigious
the office, the greater likelihood of assassination.”
was the first conclusion derived by Kirkham, Levy and Crotty
(1970), based on the analysis of 81 of the recorded political
assassinations or attempted assassinations between 1835 (beginning from
President Andrew Jackson) and 1968 (ending with Presidential aspirant
Robert Kennedy) in USA. As I know of, such a statistical analysis
covering a span of over 100 years on assassinations and attempted
assassinations on politicians is hardly available in either Sri Lanka or
India, for the equivalent period of 19th and 20th
centuries. In the absence of such an exhaustive study, the projection of
LTTE’s and Pirabhakaran’s role as assassins or social deviants has a
profound bias. However, it should also be exposed that the much-vaunted,
pre-colonial Sinhala monarchic traditions of Ceylon accomodated
assassinations as a practical tool in the change of regimes. British colonial authority Sir James
Emerson Tennent’s 1859 work on Ceylon still stands as an exhaustive
source book on the despotic and wild form of Buddhist monarchic
tradition which prevailed in the pre-colonial Lanka for 2,000 years. I
reproduce two paragraphs (with two extensive foot-notes providing
statistics on regicides and successions) from Tennent’s observations,
which appears under the chapter 6 entitled, ‘The Influence of Buddhism
on Civilisation’. To quote Tennent, “The long line of sovereigns is
divided into two distinct classes; the kings of Maha-wanse or
‘superior dynasty’ of the uncontaminated blood of Wijayo, who
occupied the throne from his death, B.C. 505, to that of Maha Sen,
A.D.302; and the Sulu-wanse or ‘inferior race’, whose descent
was less pure, but who, amidst invasions, revolutions, and decline,
continued, with unsteady hand, to hold the government down to the
occupation of the island by Europeans in the beginning of the sixteenth
century. “….Neither the piety of the kings
nor their munificence sufficed to conciliate the personal attachment of
their subjects, or to strengthen their throne by national attachment
such as would have fortified its occupant against the fatalities
incident to despotism. Of fifty one sovereigns who formed the pure Wijayan
dynasty, two were disposed by their subjects, and nineteen put to death
by their successors. [Foot-note by Tennent: There is something
very striking in the facility with which aspirants to the throne
obtained the instant acquiescense of the people, as soon as assassination
had put them in possession of power. And this is the more remarkable,
where the usurpers were of the lower grade, as in the instance of Subho,
a gate porter, who murdered King Yasa Silo, A.D. 60, and reigned for six
years (Mahawamsa, ch.xxxv.p.218). A carpenter, and a carrier of
fire-wood, were each accepted in succession of sovereigns, A.D. 47;
whilst the great dynasty was still in the plenitude of its
popularity. The mystery is perhaps referable to the dominant necessity
of securing tranquility at any cost, in the state of society where the
means of cultivation were directly dependent on the village organisation….]” Tennent continues further and provides
an interesting statistic of Sinhalese regicides as follows: “Excepting the rare instances in
which a reign was marked by some occurrence, such as an invasion and
repulse of the Malabars, there is hardly a sovereign of the ‘Solar
race’ whose name is associated with a higher achievement than erection
of a dagoba or the formation of a tank, nor one whose story is enlivened
by an event more exciting than the murder through which he mounted the
throne or the conspiracy by which he was driven from it. [Foot-note
by Tennent: In theory the Singhalese monarchy was elective in the
descendants of the Solar race; in practice, primogeniture had a
preference and the crown was either hereditary or became the prize of
those who claimed to be of royal lineage. On viewing the succession of
kings from B.C. 307 to A.D. 1815, thirty nine eldest sons (or nearly one
fourth), succeeded to their fathers; and twenty nine kings (or more than
one fifth) were succeeded by brothers. Fifteen reigned for a period less
than one year, and thirty for more than one year and less than four. Of
the Singhalese kings who died by violence, twenty two were murdered by
their successors; six were killed by other individuals; thirteen fell in
feuds and war, and four committed suicide; eleven were dethroned, and
their subsequent fate is unknown. Not more than two-thirds of the
Singhalese kings retained sovereign authority to their decease, or
reached the funeral pile without a violent death. See also, Mahawanso,
ch.xxiii, p.201.” [Book: Ceylon, vol.1, 1859 facsimile print in
1999, pp.360-361.] The statistics presented by Tennent on
the Sinhalese monarchs who were homicide victims [a total of 22
sovereigns among 153 - in a period of 2,000 years - murdered by their
immediate successors] is astounding and parallels the finding of
CIA’s Pyenson’s group on the fate of non-USA heads of state between
1965 and 1996. In a subsequent page, Tennent had provided the following
statistic: “Of the sixty two sovereigns who
reigned from the death of Maha Sen, A.D. 301, to the accession of
Parakrama Bahu, A.D. 1153, nine met a violent death at the hands of
their relatives or subjects, two ended their days in exile, one was
slain by the Malabars and four committed suicide.” [ibid,
p.385] This means, during a period spanning
852 years, ten of the 62 sovereigns – nearly one in every six – were
eliminated by violent deaths. In
the post-Parakrama Bahu period, between A.D. 1153 and A.D. 1527,
according to Tennent, fates of seven sovereigns were decided by
homicides. [see, Appendix 2 below for a complete listing of sovereigns
who were victims of homicide.] In sum, a total of 32 of the 153
sovereigns – one in five who ascended to the throne – were homicide
victims, during the 2,000 years of recorded despotic monarchic
tradition of the island. A
Synopsis on the fates of post-colonial Sri Lankan heads of state
The pattern of death seen for the
pre-colonial Buddhist monarchs of the island seems to prevail even in
the post-colonial Sri Lanka, lasting only 55 years. The labeling of
post-colonial Sri Lanka as a democracy by the international press is a
misrepresentation of serious proportions committed by reporters and
analysts who do not bother to do their home work. The pre-colonial
monarchic tradition continues to hold, so that the Sri Lankan version of
democracy is in reality a despotic nepocracy (feudal nepotism
laced with bells and whistles of democracy) , with seven of the heads of
state emerging from only two families : Senanayakes (father and son) and
Bandaranaikes (husband, wife and daughter). Two other heads of state,
namely Kotelawala and Jayewardene, were related to these two families by
lineage and marriage. Of the ten heads of state, two died by
assassinations and one died by accident. In addition, there were
assassination and devious dethroning attempts on another three heads of
state. The data is as follows: 1.
Don
Stephen Senanayake – died by horse-riding accident in March 1952. 2.
Dudley
Senanayake [son of #1] – natural death in 1973. 3.
John
Kotelawala [nephew of #1] – natural death in 1980. 4.
Solomon
W.R.D.Bandaranaike – died by assassination in Sept. 1959 by a cabal of
disgruntled Buddhist monks. 5.
W.Dahanayake
– natural death in 1996. 6.
Sirimavo
Bandaranaike [wife of #4; escaped coup d’e-tat in 1962 by state’s
armed forces and unconstitutional dethroning in 1971 by Sinhalese JVP]
– natural death in 2000. 7.
J.R.Jayewardene
[escaped assassination on Aug.18, 1987 by JVP] – natural death in
1996. 8.
R.Premadasa
[escaped assassination on Aug.18, 1987 by JVP
while serving as prime minister and before his own ascension as
head of state] - died by assassination in May 1993 attributed to LTTE,
when the country was under a state of war. Belonging to an inferior
caste group, Premadasa also escaped a devious dethroning attempt in 1991
by competitors within his own party who belonged to the higher Govigama
caste. 9.
D.B.Wijetunge
– still living. 10.
Chandrika
Kumartunga [daughter of #4 and #6] - escaped assassination on Dec.20,
1999 by LTTE, when the country was under a state of war. Still living. Among the ten post-colonial Sri Lankan
heads of state, two outsiders [Dahanayake and Wijetunge] were stop-gap
ascensions, following successful assassinations. LTTE is implicated with
the dethroning attempts of Premadasa (#8) and Chandrika Kumaratunga
(#10), of which that of Premadasa was successful. Technically, when
LTTE’s dethroning attempts occurred in 1993 and 1999 respectively,
LTTE was in war with its adversary - the Sri Lankan government, and the
Sri Lankan head-of-state was the nominal Commander in Chief. The despotic nepocracy of post-colonial
Sri Lanka reached its zenith, between 1994 and 1999, when the quartet
who made vital decisions on behalf of the state consisted of President
Chandrika Kumaratunga (a professional neophyte), President’s mother
and prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike (then a senile professional
invalid), President’s uncle and Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Anuruddha
Ratwatte (a professional imbecile) and the Foreign Minister Lakshman
Kadirgamar (a professional sin-eater). That the seeds for despotic
nepocracy were sown with the two dethroning attempts on Sirimavo
Bandaranaike made by the state’s armed forces in 1962 and the
Sinhalese youth insurrection of 1971 should not be overlooked. That the
despotic nepocracy had reached a level of troubling concern by the end
of 1975 (when the general elections due in 1975 were postponed for the
first time by two years) was evident by the famous expose by the Time
magazine in its graphic feature, ‘All in the Family’, which showed
eleven members of the then ruling clan who were kin of the then prime
minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Even the current President Chandrika was
featured in this ‘Ruling clan’ family tree as the ‘Director, Land
Reform Commission’. The first paragraph of Time’s brief
commentary said it all: “ ‘The last word in family
planning’ is how Britain’s Guardian described it. The paper
was referring to the Bandaranaike clan of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon),
who have managed to turn government into something of a family affair.
At the head of the Indian Ocean republic is Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike,
the Prime Minister and widow of S.W.R.D.Bandaranaike, who held this post
from 1956 until he was assassinated by a Buddhist monk in 1959. Since
Mrs. Bandaranaike was last elected in 1970, an imposing number of her
relatives – both from her own family, the feudal Ratwatte clan, and
her in-laws, the equally aristocratic Bandaranaikes – have assumed
high office.” [Time magazine, Asian edition, Dec.15, 1975,
p.36] Thus, even the assassination of the
then Jaffna mayor Alfred Duraiappah in July 1975, a loyal retainer of
the despotic Bandaranaike clan, by Pirabhakaran has to be viewed from
such an anthropological context presented by Joseph Westermeyer. To comprehend LTTE’s viewpoint on its
unsuccessful dethroning attempt made on President Chandrika Kumaratunga,
I present the currently prevailing view of American executive
(Presidential) wing of power, as it appeared in a news report
originating from Washington DC, relating to Afghanistan campaign. “…A presidential order from 1976
bars political assassinations. The president can waive the order, as has
been done for Osama bin Laden. But for Mullah Omar [the supreme leader
of Taliban] the Bush administration has invoked a old principle of
warfare to overcome that restriction. The commander of an enemy army is
fair game, and strikes against him are not an assassination but an
attack on the adversary’s command and control. Even before the United
States unleashed its air strikes, President George W. Bush had made it
clear that the mullah was a potential target…” [news report: ‘U.S.
admits it’s trying to kill Taliban Leader’, by Michael Gordon and
Tim Weiner, International Herald Tribune, Oct.17, 2001, p.2] If Bush administration can adhere to
the old principle of warfare that ‘The commander of an enemy army
is fair game’, there is nothing illogical to advance a claim that
the LTTE’s past attempts on two Sri Lankan heads of state also fall
within the boundaries of the old principle of warfare. What’s good for
the goose is good for the gander as well, isn’t it? I should add that
I’m not validating LTTE’s assassination attempts on the two Sri
Lankan heads of state. Rather, I have presented an answer to the
‘why’ on the assassination attempts of 1993 and 1999 from LTTE’s
point of view. It should not be forgotten that in the context of war-time strategy, attacks on the adversary’s command and
control is not a deviant measure, especially if one like
Pirabhakaran was facing such a measure from his adversary. Only an
ignoramus and one who is inadept in military tactics could label it as
‘terrorism’. Thus, based on the available
anthropological, historical and criminological evidences relating to
assassinations - assembled in this chapter, I would infer that
Pirabhakaran is not a deviant or a merchant of death, as viewed by his
adversaries. The contrary point of view will be proved true, only
when sufficient data on political assassinations from Sri Lanka and
elsewhere can be presented to dismantle the established facts assembled
in this chapter. [To be Continued.] Appendix 1 Successful Assassinations of Heads of State between Nov.1918 and Oct.1968 [source: James F.Kirkham, Sheldon G.Levy and William J.Crotty, 1970, pp.301-325] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Name of Head of State Country
Date of Assassination ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Paes Sidonia
Portugal
Dec.16, 1918 2. 2.Habibullah Khan Afghanistan
May 17, 1919 3. Carranza, V. Mexico May 21, 1920 4. Droubi Pasha Syria Aug.23, 1920 5. Dato Eduardo
Spain
Mar.9, 1921 6. Dos Santos Machado Portugal
Oct.21, 1921 7. Granjo Antonio
Portugal
Oct.21, 1921 8. Hara Takashi
Japan
Nov.5, 1921 9. Narutowicz Gabriel
Poland
Dec.16, 1922 10. Stambuliski Alexander Bulgaria
1923 11. Petlura Simon Poland May 25,1926 12. Obregon Alvaro Mexico Jul.17, 1928 13. Hamaguchi Yuko
Japan
Nov.14, 1930 14. Doumer Paul
France
May
7, 1932 15. Tsuyoshi Inukai Japan May 16, 1932 16. Sanchez Cerro, L.M. Peru
Apr.30, 1933 17. Nadir Shah Afghanistan Nov.8, 1933 18. Duca Ion G.
Rumania
Dec.30, 1933 19. Sandino, A.C.
Nicaragua
Feb.23, 1934 20. von Schleicher, K.
Germany
Jun. 1934 21. Dollfus Engelbert
Austria
Jul.25,
1934 22. Okada, Admiral
Japan
Feb.26, 1936 23. Saito, Viscount
Japan
Feb.26, 1936 24. Sidki Bakr Iraq Aug.12, 1937 25. Calinescu Armad Rumania Sep.21, 1939 26. Iorga, Nicolas
Rumania
Nov.29, 1940 27. Enriquez, General A. Ecuador May 31, 1942 28. Boris Bulgaria Aug.24, 1943 29. Maher Pasha Ahmed Egypt Feb. 24, 1945 30. Mahidol Ananda
Siam (Thailand) Jun.11, 1946 31. Villaroel Gualberto Bolivia Jul.21, 1946 32. San U Aung Burma Jul.19, 1947 33. Yahya ibn Mohammed Yemen Feb.17, 1948 34. Gaitan Jorge E. Columbia Apr. 9, 1948 35. Nukrashy Pasha Mahmoud/Egypt Dec. 28, 1948 36. Arana Francisco Javier Guatemala Jul.19, 1948 37. Al-Barazi Muhsin Syria Aug.14, 1949 38. Zaim Husni Syria Aug.14, 1949 39. Hazhir Abdul-Hysayn Iran 1950 40. Al Hinnawi, Col. Sami Lebanon Oct.31, 1950 41. Delgado Chalbaud Carlos Venezuela Nov.13, 1950 42.
Razmara
Ali
Iran
Mar.8, 1951 43. Al Sulh Riad Jordan Jul.16, 1951 44. Abdullah
Jordan
Jul.20, 1951 45. Liaquat Ali Khan Pakistan Oct.16, 1951 46. Remon Jose Antonio Panama
Jan.2, 1955 47. Al Malki, Lt.Col. Adnan Syria Apr.22, 1955 48. Somoza Anastasio Nicaragua Sep.21,1956 49. Castillo Armas Carlos Guatemala Jul.26,1957 50. Adul Ilah Iraq Jul.14,1958 51. Faisal II Iraq Jul. 14,1958 52. Nuri Al-Said Iraq Jul.16,1958 53. Bandaranaike Solomon Ceylon Sep. 25,1959 54. Majali Hazza
Jordan
Aug.29, 1960 57. Rivagasore Louis Burundi Oct. 1961 58. Olympio Sylvanus Togo Jan. 13, 1963 59. Kassem Abdul Karim Iraq Feb. 9, 1963 60. Ngo Dinh Diem
South Vietnam
Nov.2, 1963 61. Kennedy, John F. U.S.A. Nov. 22, 1963 62. Dorji Jigme P. Bhutan Apr.27, 1964 63. Al-Shishakli, Gen. Adib
Brazil
Sep.27, 1964 66. Mendez Montenegro Mario Guatemala
Oct.31, 1965 67. Balewa Sir Abubakar Nigeria
Jan.15, 1966 68. Ironsi Aguiyi, J.T.V. Nigeria
Jul.30, 1966 69. Verwoerd Hendrik F. South Africa
Sep.6, 1966 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Appendix 2 Unnatural Deaths of pre-colonial Ceylonese Buddhist Sovereigns [source: James Emerson Tennent, 1859, pp.320-324] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chronological
Name of Sovereign
Date of
Ascension order as sovereign and mode of
death ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10
Suratissa – put to death
247 BC 13
Elala – killed in battle
205 BC 72
Datthapa Bhodi (Dapalu 1st) – committed suicide
547 82
Kaluna Detu Tissa – committed suicide
648 89
Hatthadatha (Hununaru Riandalu) – decapitated
720 123
Wikramabahu 2nd – put to death
1196 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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