The
Pirabhakaran Phenomenon
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Andrea: ‘Unhappy is the land that breeds no heroes.’ Galileo: ‘No Andrea. Unhappy is the land that needs a hero.’ - Bertolt Brecht, in his play Leben des Galilei [The
Life of Galileo], 1943. Apart from the word ‘love’, in my
opinion, the word ‘hero’ is another of those much abused four letter
words. When I was young, I learnt in my primary school English grammar
book that ‘hero’ is masculine and ‘heroine’ is feminine. Now,
primarily due to Hollywood hacks, the feminine version of the word had
been obliterated and the ‘hero’ had been turned into a gender-neuter
word. ‘Hero’ also has suffered from status deflation by constant
exposure and hype by the media hacks. In January 2000, I requested ,and
received, a reprint from Dr. Russell Travis of his 1999 presidential
address to the American Association of Neurological Surgeons. It was
entitled, ‘Is the age of heroes gone?’ [Journal of Neurosurgery,
Oct.1999; vol.91, pp.531-537]. In developing his address, Dr.Travis had
used timing to his advantage, following the year of the President
Clinton-Monica Lewinsky scandal. To quote, “After the past year’s worth of
political antics, I began to wonder ‘what is a hero?’ Who, other
than athletes, like John Elway or Michael Jordan, or country or rock
singers, are today’s candidates for the title ‘hero’? Who today
would be labeled as the ‘great man?’ Do we still have heroes?” Then, he presented six examples of
influential heroes: Galileo, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams,
Abraham Lincoln, Susan B. Anthony and John F. Kennedy. While many would
agree with the first five names, thousands of Americans would have
difficulty in identifying J.F.Kennedy as their hero. This address of Dr.
Travis' prompted me to turn my attention to the Eelam Tamil heroes. To place Pirabhakaran’s status as a
Tamil hero in context, first one has to define the word ‘hero’. The
well-thumped dictionary in my table – Funk & Wagnall’s
Standard Dictionary (1980) – provides the following descriptions
for the word ‘hero’. 1.
a
man distinguished for exceptional courage, fortitude or bold enterprise. 2.
one
idealized for superior qualities or deeds of any kind 3.
the
principal male character in a drama, fictional work, etc. 4.
in
classical mythology and legend, a man of great nobility or physical
prowess. Considering his track record for the
past two decades, it is not an exaggeration if one states that
Pirabhakaran’s deeds can fit into first three of the above
descriptions. On the remaining fourth description, while still living,
Pirabhakaran’s deeds also have been tagged with the ‘legendary’
appellation and his creation, viz. the LTTE, has demonstrated
‘physical prowess’ in a figurative sense. Orrin Klapp’s
classification of heroes It is not inappropriate to identify the
various types of legitimate heroes who were (and are) Pirabhakaran’s
contemporaries in Tamil society. Pirabhakaran cannot be studied in
isolation and, thus, the heroic deeds of his Eelam Tamil contemporaries
in various arenas are identified first. Orrin Klapp, the professor of
sociology at San Diego State University for two decades (1949-69), who
had researched on social types, developed a taxonomy of heroes in 1962.
Klapp’s classification of heroes consists of five types, and within
each type there are 3 or 4 sub-categories. Altogether, Klapp recognized
17 types of heroes, as follows: 1.
Winners:
Getting what you wanted, beating everyone and being a champion. (a)
Strong
man (b)
The
brain (c)
The
smart operator (d)
The
great lover 2.
Splendid
Performers: Shining before an audience. (a)
Showmen (b)
Heroes
of play (c)
Playboy 3.
Heroes
of Social Acceptability: Being liked, attractive and good. (a)
The
pin-up model (b)
The
charmer (c)
The
good fellow (d)
Conforming
heroes 4.
Independent
Spirits: Standing alone, making one’s way by oneself. (a)
Bohemian (b)
Jester (c)
Angry
commentator 5.
Group
Servants: Helping people, cooperation self-sacrifice, group service and
solidarity. (a)
Defender (b)
Martyr (c)
Benefactor
These types have been outlined by
Gordon Russell in his book, The Social Psychology of Sport
(Springer-Verlag, New York, 1993, pp.126-128). Tamil Heroes of Eelam In 20th century Eelam many
heroes emerged by popular recognition and public adoration. Among them
were artistes, educators, legislators, public defenders, and icons of
protest and valor. Some had academic exposure to cultures beyond Ceylon,
due to privilege of birth and affluence. Some did not even enter the
universities of the island. But, all were intelligent in their own
right. Thus, comparing each one with another is like comparing an apple
and orange. But, from my vintage perspective as a keen observer of Tamil
society for the past three decades, I provide below examples for each
of the above 17 categories of legitimate heroes, who experienced
‘one-of-a- kind’ life and contributed to the Eelam society in
unparalleled fashion. The majority of these heroes (those born
before 1950) have received recognition in the reference work, A
Dictionary of Biography of Ceylon Tamils (1996), compiled by
S.Arumugam, and are seniors to Pirabhakaran in age. The following list
may seem biased to some, but it is biased against some names (such as
phony Mother Teresa wannabes and sin eaters in the services of
borderline-demented politicians) who are pampered by the Colombo and
Chennai media hype. 1.
Winners (a)
Strong
man: S.Thondaman (in the local political
arena since 1947 until his death in 1999) (b)
The
brain: Swami Vipulananda, Fr. Xavier
Thaninayagam, Prof. Christie J. Eliezer, Prof. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (c)
The
smart operator: Prof. S. Vithiananthan, Col. Kiddu
(both as unconventional organizers of the Jaffna society in the 1970s
and 1980s respectively) (d)
The
great lover: James T.Rutnam (eminent bibliophile) 2.
Splendid
Performers (a)
Showmen:
G.G.Ponnambalam (both in legal and political arenas), musician Thavil
Thatchinamoorthy, endurance athlete V.S.Kumar Anandan (b)
Heroes
of play: cricketer Muttiah Muralitharan (c)
Playboy:
cricketer Mahadeva Sathasivam 3.
Heroes
of Social Acceptability (a)
The
pin-up model: poet Kasi Ananthan (in the first half
of 1970s) (b)
The
charmer: A.Amirthalingam, C.Rajadurai (from
1956 to 1980 as orators) (c)
The
good fellow: M.Sivasithamparam (d)
Conforming
hero: S.J.V.Chelvanayakam (for the Tamil
masses from 1956 until his death in 1977) 4.
Independent
Spirits (a)
Bohemian:
Prof.C.Suntheralingam (b)
Jester:
satirist Sivagnanasuntharam (editor of Sirithiran humor magazine
and creator of Jaffna’s cynical, wise old man character, Savari
Thambar) (c)
Angry
commentator: journalist S.Sivanayagam,
M.K.Eelaventhan (both heroes of non-violence against the high-handedness
of Indian Poo Bahs) 5.
Group
Servants (a)
Defender:
Senator S.Nadesan, Kumar Ponnambalam (both as legal defenders against
State oppression of human rights) (b)
Martyr:
Pon.Sivakumaran, physician ‘Gandhiyam’ S. Rajasundaram, Capt.
Wasanthan (Miller), Second Lieutenant Malathy, Lieutenant Col.Thileepan (c)
Benefactor:
Dr.Siva Chinnathamby (as pioneer campaigner of women’s health),
‘Milk White Industries' entrepreneur K.Kanagarajah Among the 31 individuals whom I have
identified above, with the exception of Swami Vipulananda, all others
are Pirabhakaran’s contemporaries. Many, though chronologically older,
were Pirabhakaran’s admirers; some, chronologically younger, were his
junior associates. Thus, Pirabhakaran’s stature as a Tamil hero is
hardly in doubt. In my view, despite the sneering of his
critics who suffer from ‘sour grape syndrome’, Pirabhakaran became a
hero to Tamils in the old fashioned way; he earned it for three of his
deeds. First, he established an authentic, vibrant and successful
(I use only these three appropriate adjectives to distinguish the LTTE
from other fakes) Tamil army – a deed which had not been performed for
his ethnic group in the past 400-500 years. In this deed, Pirabhakaran
is on par with George Washington who performed a similar feat for the
colonial settlers in America. Secondly, Pirabharan stood up against the
imperial intentions of Indian army and administrative Poo Bahs, while
his fellow Tamil rivals folded their tents in subservience. Thirdly, his
LTTE army stood up and scored against the aggression of the Sri Lankan
state’s armed forces and para-military elements for more than 15
years, despite heavy odds. Heroism
in the Battle of Poonagari (1993)
In 1993, writing under my pen-name
C.P.Goliard, I identified Pirabhakaran’s heroism in a commentary using
poet Kannadasan’s (1927-1981) lines, following the historic Battle of
Poonagari. Excerpts: ‘Uyir Mel Aasai (Love in Life)
is a mediocre Tamil movie which was released in the mid 1960s. It was
one of Jai Shankar’s early movies. The only redeeming feature of that
movie, as far as I can remember, was the Paapa [child] song of
poet Kannadasan, which was sung by Carnatic diva K.B.Sundarambal.
Kannadasan’s verse and Sundarambal’s voice! – splendid, is the
only adjective one can use for that super combination. Kannadasan wrote, Kelu Paapaa – Kelu Paapaa - Kelvigal
aayiram Kelu Paapaa Ketaal kidaipathu pothu arivu – intha
Kelviyil valarvathu pahutharivu. [Ask child – ask child – Ask
thousand questions child General knowledge you’ll gain – and
listening will make one rational.] In the subsequent lines, the poet
laureate wrote, Kadalukku payanthavan karaiyil ninran
– athai padahinil kadanthavan ulagai kandaan Payanthavan thanakke pahaiyaavan –
enrum thuninthavan ulagirku oliyaavan. [The one who feared the sea stood in
the shore – the one who rowed it in a boat discovered the world; The coward becomes an enemy to himself;
the ever courageous will become the beacon to the world.] The cowards and the courageous –
Tamils have played the political game in both these positions in recent
times. The recent Battle of Poonagari can be appreciated well when we
comprehend that not long ago, Tamils were a laughing stock among the
Sinhalese for their cowardice…. [Tamil Nation, London,
Dec.1993, p.4] I continued: “On the Battle of Poonagari, the Economist
magazine of November 13th [1993] had presented the verdict
succinctly to the world: ‘A Sri Lankan government official was honest
enough to describe the military setback on the Jaffna peninsula on
November 11th as a disaster. After an attack by 500-or-so
Tamil Tiger separatist guerrillas, the army seems to have withdrawn from
Poonareen [Pooneryn], its last base on the peninsula apart from the
airport. This defeat, the worst single
loss for years, is doubly worrying for the government that seemed
set on shooting its way to a solution to a decade of fighting against
Tamil guerrillas’. One should also note that the Economist is
no friend of the Eelam campaign. Kannadasan’s lines, Kadalukku
payanthavan karaiyil ninran – athai padahinil kadanthavan ulagai
kandaan, is meaningful in two planes. First, scientifically
speaking, they praise the determination and courage of explorers like
Colombus, Vasco da Gama and Magellan who ‘discovered the New World’
by their bold adventures. Secondly, in historical terms, these lines
also chronicle the fall of Tamils from their pedestal as explorers of
new land due to an inward-looking mentality, which became dominant five
centuries ago (at the same time when Europeans were beginning to explore
the sea). This bad trait, caused by caste consciousness, relegated the
fishermen to the secondary role in a society which came to be dominated
by the Brahmin doctrines. So, one can visualize that Kannadasan
challenged the Tamils with the words: Paynthavan thanakke pahaiyaavaan
– enrum thuninthavan ulagirku oliyaavaan. If he is alive, the poet
will be pleased that quite a number of lads and lasses of Eelam do take
his verses seriously and put them into action.” [ibid] Continuous
Successes in the Battlefield
That the Battle of Poonagari (1993) was
no flash in the pan was demonstrated by Pirabhakaran’s army which kept
mauling the Sri Lankan armed forces repeatedly at will. Excerpts from
four notable newsreports, between 1999 and 2002,
would suffice. (1) Arjuna Ranawana to
the Asiaweek magazine “ It didn’t take long. First a
100-man Tamil Tiger commando unit slipped through the thinly defended
government lines. Then three other groups attacked from different
directions, putting the defenders to flight. The government’s military
base at Oddusudan had fallen. Within a week of the Nov.2 [1999] assault,
up to 10 positions in the northeastern Wanni region had met a similar
fate. Thousands of government soldiers were falling back, and 18 months
of hard-fought advances were largely undone….. [President] Kumaratunga put a brave
face on the military setbacks. While conceding that considerable terrain
had been lost, she said media reports of government military losses had
been ‘grossly exaggerated’. Nevertheless, Unceasing Waves 3,
as Tamil Tiger supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran has dubbed the offensive,
has rattled the government and dented military morale. Kumaratunga
ordered a shakeup in the northern command and imposed censorship on
local news organizations. The army chief, Gen. Sri Lal Weerasooriya,
took personal command of the garrison town of Vavuniya, just south of
the government forces’ redrawn defensive line. He also ordered an
inquiry into the defeats. The Wanni region is the last
significant area of Sri Lanka still in Tamil Tiger hands. For about a
year and a half, government forces had been pushing the rebels back,
sometimes with unexpected ease. But in the end, say military analysts,
the advancing troops had become too thinly spread, even with the
injection of naval and air units into the infantry lines. When
Prabhakaran’s men punched through a gap between navy and army
positions, there was no organized resistance…” [In: ‘Attack and
Counter-Attack’, Asiaweek magazine, Nov.19, 1999, p.40] (2) Anthony Spaeth in the
Time magazine “…On April 22 [2000], the Tigers
managed to capture a military garrison at Elephant Pass, an isthmus that
connects the northern Jaffna peninsula to the rest of Sri
Lanka….Kumaratunga begged for weapons and ammunition from abroad, and
arms dealers from China, Israel, Iran, Russia and Ukraine flew into
Colombo, the country’s capital, to strike deals. At mid-week, Sri Lanka also begged
neighbor India to provide military aid, including ships to evacuate
troops from Jaffna and fighter planes to provide air cover. The last
time India got involved in the Sri Lanka war the results proved
catastrophic for both sides…Not surprisingly, India this time has
flatly refused to help evacuate the Sri Lankan soldiers…. The army seems inept and almost
certainly unable to win the war. The LTTE, having overrun so many
military bases, is now considered better armed than the government.
Thanks to Kumaratunga’s press censorship, the majority of Sri Lankans
didn’t even know of the three-week battle at Elephant Pass until the
rout was complete. Now they’re scared. ‘I am wondering whether we
can ever get over this.’, says a security guard working in Colombo.
Tiger supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran told his faithful last November
that 2000 would be the ‘Year of War’. He has kept his promise.”
[In: ‘Tigers Triumphant’, Time magazine, International
edition, May 15, 2000, p.25] (3) Anonymous reporter in
the Economist magazine “ ‘An attacking force always
sustains more casualties’, said a Sri Lankan army commander, seeking
to dismiss the army’s large losses in an attack on Tamil Tiger rebels.
The army said 157 of its soldiers and 190 rebels had been killed. The
Tigers said it had killed 300 soldiers for the loss of 48 of its own
fighters. Whatever the true figure, it was a ferocious battle. Worse,
the army appeared to have gained nothing from it. It had apparently aimed to capture the
town of Pallai as a prelude to retaking the more important Elephant
Pass, a causeway linking the Jaffna peninsula to the southern mainland.
Last year the army lost control of the pass in its worst defeat in the
18-year civil war. Without this land route, the government can supply
its troops in the Tamil-dominated peninsula only by sea or by air. An
offensive, named Rod of Fire, started on April 25th
immediately after the Tigers had ended a unilateral truce. The Tigers
put up strong resistance, forcing the troops, drawn mainly from the
majority Sinhalese population, to retreat to their original positions in
Nagar Kovil, Eluthumadduval and the Kilaly lagoon. On April 28th,
it was all over and both sides were disposing of their dead. The debacle has panicked the
government. The stalling of a major offensive led by the cream of its
recently modernised armed forces has exposed the precariousness of its
grip on the peninsula, which was wrested from the Tigers only in 1996.
The government’s earlier claim that the Tigers had called their
ceasefire out of military weakness is looking increasingly hollow…”
[In: ‘Tiger teeth’, Economist magazine, May 5, 2001,
pp.25-26] (4) Steve Percy in the Far
Eastern Economic Review magazine “…The [Jaffna] town’s most
noticeable residents are 30,000 troops, who man fortified camps and
bunkers at every intersection. At the 51st Battalion
headquarters, in one of the town’s two big 1960s-style hotels, a high
ranking officer concedes the Tigers ‘have won the war’. He cites
their unhindered passage to the town under the peace accord and how they
move among the people showing videos for political and recruitment
purposes, while extracting taxes from shopkeepers and traders. The army
won’t stand in their way, he says. They’ll be back in their barracks
by the end of the year, he adds. That’s the demand of the Tigers’
local political officer near Temple Road. Sympathizers come and go. On
the wall hangs a portrait of Prabhakaran in jungle fatigues with a
suicide capsule looped around his neck. A world map forms a backdrop
with a yellow Eelam – the promised Tiger homeland – jutting out of
the Indian Ocean like a crab with an enormous claw. It appears to be
unattached to Sri Lanka….” [In: ‘Highway of Hope’, Far
Eastern Economic Review magazine, Aug.22, 2002.] Russell Travis, in his above-cited
presidential address, drew attention to two components of heroism:
courage and fortitude. References to Pirabhakaran, appearing as sound
bites, by Ranawana, Spaeth, Percy and the anonymous Economist
correspondent in the above-cited passages tell without embellishment the
courage component of the LTTE leader as the Tamil hero. Travis also
stresses the fortitude component; i.e., the willingness of an individual
to suffer personal anguish for the sake of the moral good. A few authentic heroes living amongst
us now were blessed with both these components. I can state that Nelson
Mandela and champion Mohammad Ali (both bona-fide boxers) showed the
traits of courage and fortitude in their campaigns against political
arrogance and racism. Among the Tamils, Pirabhakaran’s deeds is on par
with that of boxers Ali and Mandela. An unorthodox Economist
Measure of Pirabhakaran’s fortitude I provide below an unusual measure of
Pirabhakaran’s fortitude. For almost two decades, political
decision-making in Sri Lanka and to an extent even in neighboring India
had been revolving around Pirabhakaran’s thoughts and deeds. No heads
of state have influenced the events in South Asia for such a lengthy
period in the post 1975 period like Pirabhakaran. As a review, I have assembled, from my
personal collection, over 100 news reports and commentaries on Sri Lanka
which appeared in London Economist magazine since July 1983 in
chronological order. To this, I have added the reports which are
currently available in the website of Economist magazine (details
of news reports since June 1997). I provide only the captions (sometimes
cynical, patronizing, and semi-incomprehensible, as is the style of Economist)
and the dates of issue of these news reports. When the caption is
too incomprehensible, I provide within parentheses the specific detail
relating to that caption. I have divided the reports according to the
time-span of four Sri Lankan heads of state who had to confront
Pirabhakaran. Why did I choose the Economist features for this
illustration? First, compared to Time and Newsweek
magazines, the Economist had provided constant coverage on the
South Asian scene, probably due to the colonial baggage and readership
captured in its homeland. Secondly, compared to Time and Newsweek,
the Economist is a great-grand daddy of journalism, having
entered the scene in September 1847, when the British were ascending as
the biggest and condescending bullies in the Asian, African and Oceanian
continents. Thirdly, in its succinct reports it provides a distinct
style of caricature in prose which is amusing, biting but less than real.
Two notes of caveat are in order. That
the journalists practising their trade for the Economist magazine
still hide behind a cloak of anonymity, bordering on the Victorian era
prudery on sex should be noted. Also, those hiding behind such a cloak
of anonymity have loose pens spitting venom and bile against named
individuals also reveals the spineless cowardice and contempt to
decency. Despite these deficiencies, I chose reports from the Economist
magazine since they cannot be tagged as pro-Pirabhakaran literature by
any stretch of imagination. Jayewardene
period
Week of the tiger. July 30, 1983,
pp.14-15 (editorial) Call in the professionals. Sept.15,
1984, p.41 Rajiv’s far horizons. Nov.10, 1984 Back-door and front-door. June 1, 1985.
[on refugee immigration] A small and solvable war. Aug.3, 1985,
pp.35-36 Tigers at bay. Feb.28, 1987, pp.28-29. The push on Jaffna. May 30, 1987, p.30 The Tiger hunt and the failed armada.
June 6, 1987, pp.27-28 & 31 When peace became possible. Aug.1,
1987, p.20 & 25-26 Tiger, Tiger, losing fight. Aug.1,
1987, p.13 (editorial) Still in the balance. Aug.8, 1987,
pp.18-19 Non-Tiger terror. Aug.22, 1987,
pp.44-45 Not all the guns were handed in.
Sept.19, 1987, pp.30-31 It’s war again. Oct.10, 1987, pp.29
& 32 The other side is just as bloody.
Nov.14, 1987, pp.24-25 [on JVP rioting] The other Tamils. Nov.14, 1987, p.25 Costly campaign. Nov.28, 1987, p.28 Bad day at Batticaloa. Jan.23, 1988,
pp.20 & 22 All over bar the shooting. Feb.6, 1988,
p.22 Tamil Nadu: Get a move on, soldier.
Apr.23, 1988, pp.35-36 The Tigers dig their claws in. July 30,
1988, pp.33-34 It still looks like no change. Aug.20,
1988, pp.23-24 Marching orders. Oct.8, 1988, p.32 Rajiv gets lost on a Tiger hunt.
Oct.22, 1988, pp.25-26 The Tamils defy the Tigers. Nov.26,
1988, pp.26 & 29 Enter Hydra. Dec.3, 1988, p.28 Democracy’s day of courage. Dec.24,
1988, p.33 Premadasa
period
Whose revolution will it be? Feb.11,
1989, pp.34 & 36 Mathematics for beginners. Feb.25,
1989, pp.32 & 34 Imperial India. Apr.15, 1989, pp.14
& 17 (editorial) If India leaves. Apr.22, 1989, p.36 Slip sliding away. May 27, 1989, pp.38
& 40 Blood, toil, tears and onions. June 10,
1989, p.32 Riding the Tiger. July 1, 1989, p.29 On with the hunt. July 8, 1989, p.31 Too bad to print. July 15, 1989, p.36 Towards midnight. July 22, 1989, p.31 Time for tea. Aug.5, 1989, p.33 Do or die. Aug.26, 1989, pp.25-26 Agreed on a phoney peace. Sept.16,
1989, p.32 Uncivil wars. Oct.7, 1989, p.38 A catastrophe in the making. Nov.11,
1989, pp.41-42 Shades of Che. Nov.18, 1989, p.40 [on
the death of Rohana Wijeweera] Tigers on the prowl again. Jan.20,
1990, p.38 Old Tigers in new skins. Mar.31, 1990,
p.35 Tigers again, fresh from their sleep.
June 16, 1990, pp.36-37 Back to the jungle. June 23, 1990, p.31 And don’t come back. July 7, 1990,
pp.37-38 Solid Dutch. Aug.11, 1990, pp.37-38 The relief of Jaffna. Sept.22, 1990,
pp.38-40 If they get bored with the war. Nov.3,
1990, p.42 Another round. Jan.19, 1991, p.34 Death of a hawk. Mar.9, 1991, p.28 [on
the death of Ranjan Wijeratne] It is not all war. May 18, 1991, p.40 Death among the blossoms. May 25, 1991,
pp.27-28 & 35 [on the death of Rajiv Gandhi] India’s trial. May 25, 1991, pp.15-16
(editorial) A warning? July 6, 1991, p.35 The battle for Elephant Pass. Aug.3,
1991, p.32 Elephantine mistake. Aug.17, 1991, p.24 The end of One-Eyed Jack. Aug.24, 1991,
pp.33-34 [on the death of Sivarasan] Himself surprised. Sept.7, 1991, p.28
[on Premadasa impeachment crisis] Under the stones of Sri Lanka. Sept.14,
1991, p.34 Our allies, the Tigers. Sept.28, 1991,
pp.36-37 If only. Nov.23, 1991, p.34 Sailing home. Jan.18, 1992, pp.24-25 Mars, not Venus. Apr.18, 1992, p.28 English lessons. Apr.25, 1992, pp.25-26 Taming the Tigers. June 6, 1992,
pp.28-29 Term of trial. Sept.5, 1992, p.33 Tea party. Nov.7, 1992, pp.27-28 Birthday present. Nov.21, 1992, pp.26
& 28 [on the death of Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando] Let’s federate. Dec.5, 1992, pp.28-29 Top Tiger talks about talks. Mar.6,
1993 [Pirabhakaran’s interview; an exclusive!] Who killed Lalith? May 1, 1993, p.27
[on the death of Athulathmudali] Wijetunga
period
The Tigers pounce. Nov.13, 1993, p.34 All in the family. Jan.8, 1994,
pp.26-27 [on the Bandaranaike clan] In the Tiger’s den. Mar.5, 1994,
pp.32-33 No kite flying in Jaffna. July 2, 1994,
p.31 Election leapfrog. July 2, 1994,
pp.31-32 Sri Lanka tilts to the left. Aug.20,
1994, pp.23-24 Missing money. Aug.27, 1994, pp.23-26 Murder and mystery in Sri Lanka.
Oct.29, 1994, pp.29-30 [on the death of Gamini Dissanayake] Women and children first. Oct.29, 1994,
p.30 [on the political nepotism in South Asia] Chandrika
Kumaratunga period
Some peace. Jan.21, 1995, pp.31-32 Out of the ashes. Apr.15, 1995,
pp.28-29 The victory still to come. Dec.9, 1995,
pp.27-28 [on the capture of Jaffna by the government forces] Terror in Sri Lanka. Feb.10, 1996, p.16
(editorial) After the bomb. Feb.10, 1996, pp.30-31 A fight over the ruins. July 13, 1996,
p.30 Back to the Tiger’s old lair. Aug.31,
1996, p.24 Junius Jayewardene. Nov.23, 1996, p.121
(obituary) Local difficulty. Mar.27, 1997, Another bomb. Oct.16, 1997, A tooth for a tooth. Jan.29, 1998, Sri Lanka’s unhappy birthday. Feb.7,
1998, pp.27-28 Blood and money. Oct.8, 1998, Civil war without end. Dec.5, 1998,
pp.32 & 37 So that’s democracy. Jan.28, 1999, Kalashnikov kids. July 10, 1999, Cries of battle. Sept.23, 1999, Four terrible days. Nov.11, 1999, Sri Lanka wants peace, perhaps. Dec.18,
1999, pp.23-24 Victory and war in Sri Lanka. Dec.23,
1999, Sri Lanka’s new killings. Jan.8,
2000, A prize from Norway. Feb.24, 2000, City slaughter. Mar.16, 2000, The worst defeat. Apr.29, 2000, pp.26
& 29 Sri Lanka’s Dunkirk. May 6, 2000,
p.33 The Tamil Tigers close in. May 13,
2000, pp.27-28 Another bomb in the war. June 10, 2000, p.27 [on the death of minister C.V.Goonaratne] The growing cost of war. July 13, 2000, Sri Lanka backs away from devolution.
Aug.12, 2000, p.24 Blood before the ballot. Sept.9, 2000,
pp.34-35 The war the world is missing. Oct.5,
2000, Sri Lanka votes and hopes. Oct.5, 2000, A double-barreled verdict. Oct.14,
2000, pp.38-39 Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Oct.21, 2000,
p.115 (obituary) Lynch law. Oct.26, 2000, Tiger tamed? Nov.30, 2000, Poker game. Jan.13, 2001, p.29 Hitting the Tigers in their pockets.
Mar.8, 2001, Tiger teeth. May 5, 2001, pp.25-26. The Tigers pounce. July 26, 2001, [on
the Katunayake Airport attack] No reconciliation. Sept.1, 2001, p.28 Start again. Oct.20, 2001, Voting in blood. Dec.1, 2001, A vote for peace? Dec.8, 2001, pp.31-32 The wounded Tigers. Jan.10, 2002, Viking rule. Feb.28, 2002, The peace of desperation. Mar.27, 2002, The Tiger comes out of his lair.
Apr.11, 2002, Meet the new democratic Tigers. Apr.11,
2002, Smiles that conceal the worries. July
18, 2002, To Thailand in hope. Sept.5, 2002, A world of exiles. Jan.4, 2003, As one could infer, the caption writers
to the Economist magazine are nothing but lobotomized transplants
from the tabloid journalism, whose paychecks seem scored solely on the
scale of offending good etiquette. Their irreverence is not limited to
the citizens of for former British colonies in Asia and Africa. Even the
aging Pope doesn’t get any respect from the Economist
magazine’s lobotomized slobs who once tagged him with a photo caption
- just stating ‘Don’t mention the pill’. If Pirabhakaran, by naming his
organization with reference to Tiger, had handed an easy whip to these
caption writers for splashing their feline metaphors, by his endurance
and fortitude he also made sure that the same caption writers eat crow
on some of their hasty captions such as ‘Tigers at bay (1987)’,
‘Tiger, Tiger, losing fight (1987)’, ‘Back to the jungle’ (1990)
and ‘Elephantine mistake (1991)’. The soppy eulogist of Sirimavo
Bandaranaike, writing for the Economist even hurled an insult on
Pirabhakaran, through the lips of Sirimavo’s daughter, as follows: “Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader
of the Tamil Tigers guerrilla group, who, says Mrs Kumaratunga, probably
correctly, is mentally ill. Why so many Tamils are willing to be led by
an apparent madman may perhaps be explained by their deep and unshifting
suspicion of the Sinhalese, even though Mrs. Kumaratunga has long
rejected Sinhala nationalism.” [Economist magazine, Oct.21,
2000, p.115] Within the subsequent two years,
majority of Sri Lankans have become convinced by the political and
theatrical antics of their Head of State that it is not Pirabhakaran,
but President Kumaratunga who suffers from arrogance, borderline mental
derangement and megalomania. A rare Pirabhakaran
interview to the Economist magazine What is currently unavailable in the
website of Economist magazine, I’m interested in placing in the
electronic database for researchers. This is a rare Pirabhakaran
interview to the Economist magazine, which was published almost
ten years ago. Even in the current context, it remains significantly
(and even eerily!) relevant – if one overlooks the inserted time
markers like the years of war, age of Pirabhakaran and the name of the
incumbent President of Sri Lanka. There is also a passing reference to
him as a ‘hero’, based on his then physical features – but not on
his deeds. So, I reproduce it in full without any deletions. Top Tiger talks about talks [Economist, March 6, 1993] from our Sri Lanka correspondent in Jaffna ‘The leader of the Tamil
Tigers, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, does not often give an interview to a
journalist. So why now? During about three hours of talk with Mr.
Prabhakaran, what emerged was a desire to negotiate once again with the
government. He rejected any suggestion that this arose out of weakness.
Victory, he insisted, was his for the taking. Yet all is not well within
the rebel group. The Tigers are finding it hard to recruit more
fighters. Teenagers quickly become veterans. In January ten tigers were
reported to have died when a ship said to be carrying arms was
interrupted by the Indian navy. Among the dead was Sathasivam
Krishnakumar, the Tigers’ number-two and a close friend of the leader.
Mr. Prabhakaran says he is too upset to talk about the loss. The Jaffna
peninsula, the Tamil area where the Tigers have their stronghold, is a
ruined place after ten years of fighting. There is no electricity and
not much food. Thousands of people have fled. Those too poor to leave
appear exhausted. But the Tigers have been up
against it before. The Indian peacekeepers invited to Sri Lanka in 1987
suppressed them for a time. A new president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, got
rid of the Indians in 1990 and, in return, the Tigers talked peace.
Nothing came of this talk, and many in the government believed that the
Tigers used the pause in the civil war to rearm. They will be suspicious
that this is what the Tigers have in mind now. Even his enemies concede
that Mr. Prabhakaran is a formidable leader. Despite the toll of the
civil war, he appears to retain the support of the majority of Tamils in
northern and eastern Sri Lanka, the area which the Tigers claim as the
Tamil homeland. He is 37, on the small side, and a bit overweight. With
his black hair and moustache and large eyes, he looks a little like the
hero that turns up regularly in Tamil films. He dresses in army
fatigues, and carries a gun. Around his neck is a black cord at the end
of which is a capsule, presumably containing the cyanide which Tigers
are supposed to swallow rather than be taken prisoner. His house – at least, the
house where he gave his interview – is small and modern, and a bit of
a drive from the town of Jaffna. There are maps on the walls, but no
radio or television or books, although Mr. Prabhakaran appears well
informed about affairs outside Sri Lanka, especially wars, in
Afghanistan, or in Indochina. Much of the talk was over dinner: noodles
and a soft drink. Mr. Prabhakaran’s portliness does not seem to arise
from over-eating. He appears to speak only Tamil. Interpreting was done
by Anton Balasingham, a much-traveled man – he lived for a time in
London – who has been the Tigers’ principal negotiator in the past. Is there anything the Tigers
might offer than would encourage the government to open negotiations?
The Tigers’ demand has been for an independent Tamil state covering a
third of the country and holding much of the coastline, a proposal that
the government rejects totally. Some politicians in Colombo believe the
way to peace is to turn Sri Lanka into a federal state. The government is
considering the idea, although the majority Sinhalese, who have
dominated the government and army since independence in 1948, are
believed to be against federalism. It would give the Tamils too much
power, some believe. The Tamils would want a high degree of autonomy,
particularly over law and order, land and education, all controversial
themes. The size of a possible Tamil state within a federation is matter
for endless argument. Although Tamils are in the majority in the north,
there are sizeable other groups, including Muslims, in the east. Mr. Prabhakaran talks of the
possibility of a ‘reasonable’ compromise, although it is unclear
what compromise he would make. He did say, though: ‘If a proposal which
gives autonomy and satisfies the expectations of the Tamil people is put
forward, we are prepared to consider it.’ However, he talks of
‘extremists’ in the government. President Premadasa, who has always
favoured negotiation, might be willing to try it again, but the army, a
growing force in Sri Lankan politics, would probably object. If its view
prevails, the Tigers will fight on. Mr. Prabhakaran said: ‘Victory in a war does
not depend on manpower or weapons. Firm determination, valour and love
of freedom are the factors that decide victory in a war. Our fighters
and our people are full of these.’ Sri Lanka’s civil war
could continue for a while yet.’ The first of the two above-mentioned
quotes from Pirabhakaran in his 1993 interview disproves unequivocally
the views expressed by Colombo, Chennai, London and New York
pundits that he had down-graded his demand for separate state as
a result of ‘post
September 11’ developments. The second of the two above-mentioned
quotes shows his courageous and uncompromising stand, which has not
wavered for the past ten years. This interview appeared in the Economist
when the current Sri Lankan president Kumaratunga and her ‘advisor’
Kadirgamar were non-entities in Sri Lankan politics, and the current Sri
Lankan prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe was an understudy to his
current post. One thing is still unclear for me. Who
was this anonymous interviewer, who talked with Pirabhakaran for nearly
three hours? The Economist, as is its wont, has not identified
the journalist. Pirabhakaran and Balasingham would definitely can
identify this journalist at an appropriate time. If this journalist is a
Sri Lankan, I have a hunch that it could have been Mervyn de Silva. I
may be right or inaccurate. But the fact that the Lanka Guardian
editor had served as Economist’s correspondent for Sri Lanka
and the circumstantial evidence presented in the previous chapters of
this series on Mervyn de Silva’s sympathetic observations on
Pirabhakaran lead me to infer that he could have been the interviewer.
But this inference needs verification from the interviewee. [To be
continued.] |