| The
        Pirabhakaran Phenomenon | |||
|   Andrea: ‘Unhappy is the land that breeds no heroes.’ Galileo: ‘No Andrea. Unhappy is the land that needs a hero.’ - Bertolt Brecht, in his play Leben des Galilei [The
        Life of Galileo], 1943.   Apart from the word ‘love’, in my
        opinion, the word ‘hero’ is another of those much abused four letter
        words. When I was young, I learnt in my primary school English grammar
        book that ‘hero’ is masculine and ‘heroine’ is feminine. Now,
        primarily due to Hollywood hacks, the feminine version of the word had
        been obliterated and the ‘hero’ had been turned into a gender-neuter
        word. ‘Hero’ also has suffered from status deflation by constant
        exposure and hype by the media hacks.  In January 2000, I requested ,and
        received, a reprint from Dr. Russell Travis of his 1999 presidential
        address to the American Association of Neurological Surgeons. It was
        entitled, ‘Is the age of heroes gone?’ [Journal of Neurosurgery,
        Oct.1999; vol.91, pp.531-537]. In developing his address, Dr.Travis had
        used timing to his advantage, following the year of the President
        Clinton-Monica Lewinsky scandal. To quote,  “After the past year’s worth of
        political antics, I began to wonder ‘what is a hero?’ Who, other
        than athletes, like John Elway or Michael Jordan, or country or rock
        singers, are today’s candidates for the title ‘hero’? Who today
        would be labeled as the ‘great man?’ Do we still have heroes?”  Then, he presented six examples of
        influential heroes: Galileo, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams,
        Abraham Lincoln, Susan B. Anthony and John F. Kennedy. While many would
        agree with the first five names, thousands of Americans would have
        difficulty in identifying J.F.Kennedy as their hero. This address of Dr.
        Travis' prompted me to turn my attention to the Eelam Tamil heroes.   To place Pirabhakaran’s status as a
        Tamil hero in context, first one has to define the word ‘hero’. The
        well-thumped dictionary in my table – Funk & Wagnall’s
        Standard Dictionary (1980) – provides the following descriptions
        for the word ‘hero’.  1.    
        a
        man distinguished for exceptional courage, fortitude or bold enterprise. 2.    
        one
        idealized for superior qualities or deeds of any kind 3.    
        the
        principal male character in a drama, fictional work, etc. 4.    
        in
        classical mythology and legend, a man of great nobility or physical
        prowess.  Considering his track record for the
        past two decades, it is not an exaggeration if one states that
        Pirabhakaran’s deeds can fit into first three of the above
        descriptions. On the remaining fourth description, while still living,
        Pirabhakaran’s deeds also have been tagged with the ‘legendary’
        appellation and his creation, viz. the LTTE, has demonstrated
        ‘physical prowess’ in a figurative sense.  Orrin Klapp’s
        classification of heroes  It is not inappropriate to identify the
        various types of legitimate heroes who were (and are) Pirabhakaran’s
        contemporaries in Tamil society. Pirabhakaran cannot be studied in
        isolation and, thus, the heroic deeds of his Eelam Tamil contemporaries
        in various arenas are identified first. Orrin Klapp, the professor of
        sociology at San Diego State University for two decades (1949-69), who
        had researched on social types, developed a taxonomy of heroes in 1962.
        Klapp’s classification of heroes consists of five types, and within
        each type there are 3 or 4 sub-categories. Altogether, Klapp recognized
        17 types of heroes, as follows:  1.    
        Winners:
        Getting what you wanted, beating everyone and being a champion. (a) 
        Strong
        man (b)
        The
        brain (c) 
        The
        smart operator (d)
        The
        great lover  2.    
        Splendid
        Performers: Shining before an audience. (a) 
        Showmen (b)
        Heroes
        of play (c) 
        Playboy  3.    
        Heroes
        of Social Acceptability: Being liked, attractive and good. (a) 
        The
        pin-up model (b)
        The
        charmer (c) 
        The
        good fellow (d)
        Conforming
        heroes  4.    
        Independent
        Spirits: Standing alone, making one’s way by oneself. (a) 
        Bohemian (b)
        Jester (c) 
        Angry
        commentator  5.    
        Group
        Servants: Helping people, cooperation self-sacrifice, group service and
        solidarity. (a) 
        Defender (b)
        Martyr (c) 
        Benefactor
          These types have been outlined by
        Gordon Russell in his book, The Social Psychology of Sport
        (Springer-Verlag, New York, 1993, pp.126-128).  Tamil Heroes of Eelam  In 20th century Eelam many
        heroes emerged by popular recognition and public adoration. Among them
        were artistes, educators, legislators, public defenders, and icons of
        protest and valor. Some had academic exposure to cultures beyond Ceylon,
        due to privilege of birth and affluence. Some did not even enter the
        universities of the island. But, all were intelligent in their own
        right. Thus, comparing each one with another is like comparing an apple
        and orange. But, from my vintage perspective as a keen observer of Tamil
        society for the past three decades, I provide below examples for each
        of the above 17 categories of legitimate heroes, who experienced
        ‘one-of-a- kind’ life and contributed to the Eelam society in
        unparalleled fashion. The majority of these heroes (those born
        before 1950) have received recognition in the reference work, A
        Dictionary of Biography of Ceylon Tamils (1996), compiled by
        S.Arumugam, and are seniors to Pirabhakaran in age. The following list
        may seem biased to some, but it is biased against some names (such as
        phony Mother Teresa wannabes and sin eaters in the services of
        borderline-demented politicians) who are pampered by the Colombo and
        Chennai media hype.  1.    
        Winners  (a) 
        Strong
        man: S.Thondaman (in the local political
        arena since 1947 until his death in 1999)  (b)
        The
        brain: Swami Vipulananda, Fr. Xavier
        Thaninayagam, Prof. Christie J. Eliezer, Prof. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson  (c) 
        The
        smart operator: Prof. S. Vithiananthan, Col. Kiddu
        (both as unconventional organizers of the Jaffna society in the 1970s
        and 1980s respectively)  (d)
        The
        great lover: James T.Rutnam (eminent bibliophile)   2.    
        Splendid
        Performers  (a) 
        Showmen:
        G.G.Ponnambalam (both in legal and political arenas), musician Thavil
        Thatchinamoorthy, endurance athlete V.S.Kumar Anandan  (b)
        Heroes
        of play: cricketer Muttiah Muralitharan  (c) 
        Playboy:
        cricketer Mahadeva Sathasivam  3.    
        Heroes
        of Social Acceptability  (a) 
        The
        pin-up model: poet Kasi Ananthan (in the first half
        of 1970s)  (b)
        The
        charmer: A.Amirthalingam, C.Rajadurai (from
        1956 to 1980 as orators)  (c) 
        The
        good fellow: M.Sivasithamparam  (d)
        Conforming
        hero: S.J.V.Chelvanayakam (for the Tamil
        masses from 1956 until his death in 1977)  4.    
        Independent
        Spirits  (a) 
        Bohemian:
        Prof.C.Suntheralingam  (b)
        Jester:
        satirist Sivagnanasuntharam (editor of Sirithiran humor magazine
        and creator of Jaffna’s cynical, wise old man character, Savari
        Thambar)  (c) 
        Angry
        commentator: journalist S.Sivanayagam,
        M.K.Eelaventhan (both heroes of non-violence against the high-handedness
        of Indian Poo Bahs)  5.    
        Group
        Servants  (a) 
        Defender:
        Senator S.Nadesan, Kumar Ponnambalam (both as legal defenders against
        State oppression of human rights)  (b)
        Martyr:
        Pon.Sivakumaran, physician ‘Gandhiyam’ S. Rajasundaram, Capt.
        Wasanthan (Miller), Second Lieutenant Malathy, Lieutenant Col.Thileepan  (c) 
        Benefactor:
        Dr.Siva Chinnathamby (as pioneer campaigner of women’s health),
        ‘Milk White Industries' entrepreneur K.Kanagarajah  Among the 31 individuals whom I have
        identified above, with the exception of Swami Vipulananda, all others
        are Pirabhakaran’s contemporaries. Many, though chronologically older,
        were Pirabhakaran’s admirers; some, chronologically younger, were his
        junior associates. Thus, Pirabhakaran’s stature as a Tamil hero is
        hardly in doubt.   In my view, despite the sneering of his
        critics who suffer from ‘sour grape syndrome’, Pirabhakaran became a
        hero to Tamils in the old fashioned way; he earned it for three of his
        deeds. First, he established an authentic, vibrant and successful
        (I use only these three appropriate adjectives to distinguish the LTTE
        from other fakes) Tamil army – a deed which had not been performed for
        his ethnic group in the past 400-500 years. In this deed, Pirabhakaran
        is on par with George Washington who performed a similar feat for the
        colonial settlers in America. Secondly, Pirabharan stood up against the
        imperial intentions of Indian army and administrative Poo Bahs, while
        his fellow Tamil rivals folded their tents in subservience. Thirdly, his
        LTTE army stood up and scored against the aggression of the Sri Lankan
        state’s armed forces and para-military elements for more than 15
        years, despite heavy odds.  Heroism
        in the Battle of Poonagari (1993) In 1993, writing under my pen-name
        C.P.Goliard, I identified Pirabhakaran’s heroism in a commentary using
        poet Kannadasan’s (1927-1981) lines, following the historic Battle of
        Poonagari. Excerpts:  ‘Uyir Mel Aasai (Love in Life)
        is a mediocre Tamil movie which was released in the mid 1960s. It was
        one of Jai Shankar’s early movies. The only redeeming feature of that
        movie, as far as I can remember, was the Paapa [child] song of
        poet Kannadasan, which was sung by Carnatic diva K.B.Sundarambal.
        Kannadasan’s verse and Sundarambal’s voice! – splendid, is the
        only adjective one can use for that super combination. Kannadasan wrote,  Kelu Paapaa – Kelu Paapaa - Kelvigal
        aayiram Kelu Paapaa Ketaal kidaipathu pothu arivu – intha
        Kelviyil valarvathu pahutharivu. [Ask child – ask child – Ask
        thousand questions child General knowledge you’ll gain – and
        listening will make one rational.]  In the subsequent lines, the poet
        laureate wrote,  Kadalukku payanthavan karaiyil ninran
        – athai padahinil kadanthavan ulagai kandaan Payanthavan thanakke pahaiyaavan –
        enrum thuninthavan ulagirku oliyaavan. [The one who feared the sea stood in
        the shore – the one who rowed it in a boat discovered the world; The coward becomes an enemy to himself;
        the ever courageous will become the beacon to the world.]  The cowards and the courageous –
        Tamils have played the political game in both these positions in recent
        times. The recent Battle of Poonagari can be appreciated well when we
        comprehend that not long ago, Tamils were a laughing stock among the
        Sinhalese for their cowardice…. [Tamil Nation, London,
        Dec.1993, p.4]  I continued:  “On the Battle of Poonagari, the Economist
        magazine of November 13th [1993] had presented the verdict
        succinctly to the world: ‘A Sri Lankan government official was honest
        enough to describe the military setback on the Jaffna peninsula on
        November 11th as a disaster. After an attack by 500-or-so
        Tamil Tiger separatist guerrillas, the army seems to have withdrawn from
        Poonareen [Pooneryn], its last base on the peninsula apart from the
        airport. This defeat, the worst single 
        loss for years, is doubly worrying for the government that seemed
        set on shooting its way to a solution to a decade of fighting against
        Tamil guerrillas’. One should also note that the Economist is
        no friend of the Eelam campaign.  Kannadasan’s lines, Kadalukku
        payanthavan karaiyil ninran – athai padahinil kadanthavan ulagai
        kandaan, is meaningful in two planes. First, scientifically
        speaking, they praise the determination and courage of explorers like
        Colombus, Vasco da Gama and Magellan who ‘discovered the New World’
        by their bold adventures. Secondly, in historical terms, these lines
        also chronicle the fall of Tamils from their pedestal as explorers of
        new land due to an inward-looking mentality, which became dominant five
        centuries ago (at the same time when Europeans were beginning to explore
        the sea). This bad trait, caused by caste consciousness, relegated the
        fishermen to the secondary role in a society which came to be dominated
        by the Brahmin doctrines.  So, one can visualize that Kannadasan
        challenged the Tamils with the words: Paynthavan thanakke pahaiyaavaan
        – enrum thuninthavan ulagirku oliyaavaan. If he is alive, the poet
        will be pleased that quite a number of lads and lasses of Eelam do take
        his verses seriously and put them into action.” [ibid]  Continuous
        Successes in the Battlefield That the Battle of Poonagari (1993) was
        no flash in the pan was demonstrated by Pirabhakaran’s army which kept
        mauling the Sri Lankan armed forces repeatedly at will. Excerpts from
        four notable newsreports, between 1999 and 2002, 
        would suffice.  (1) Arjuna Ranawana to
        the Asiaweek magazine “ It didn’t take long. First a
        100-man Tamil Tiger commando unit slipped through the thinly defended
        government lines. Then three other groups attacked from different
        directions, putting the defenders to flight. The government’s military
        base at Oddusudan had fallen. Within a week of the Nov.2 [1999] assault,
        up to 10 positions in the northeastern Wanni region had met a similar
        fate. Thousands of government soldiers were falling back, and 18 months
        of hard-fought advances were largely undone…..  [President] Kumaratunga put a brave
        face on the military setbacks. While conceding that considerable terrain
        had been lost, she said media reports of government military losses had
        been ‘grossly exaggerated’. Nevertheless, Unceasing Waves 3,
        as Tamil Tiger supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran has dubbed the offensive,
        has rattled the government and dented military morale. Kumaratunga
        ordered a shakeup in the northern command and imposed censorship on
        local news organizations. The army chief, Gen. Sri Lal Weerasooriya,
        took personal command of the garrison town of Vavuniya, just south of
        the government forces’ redrawn defensive line. He also ordered an
        inquiry into the defeats.  The Wanni region is the last
        significant area of Sri Lanka still in Tamil Tiger hands. For about a
        year and a half, government forces had been pushing the rebels back,
        sometimes with unexpected ease. But in the end, say military analysts,
        the advancing troops had become too thinly spread, even with the
        injection of naval and air units into the infantry lines. When
        Prabhakaran’s men punched through a gap between navy and army
        positions, there was no organized resistance…” [In: ‘Attack and
        Counter-Attack’, Asiaweek magazine, Nov.19, 1999, p.40]  (2) Anthony Spaeth in the
        Time magazine  “…On April 22 [2000], the Tigers
        managed to capture a military garrison at Elephant Pass, an isthmus that
        connects the northern Jaffna peninsula to the rest of Sri
        Lanka….Kumaratunga begged for weapons and ammunition from abroad, and
        arms dealers from China, Israel, Iran, Russia and Ukraine flew into
        Colombo, the country’s capital, to strike deals.  At mid-week, Sri Lanka also begged
        neighbor India to provide military aid, including ships to evacuate
        troops from Jaffna and fighter planes to provide air cover. The last
        time India got involved in the Sri Lanka war the results proved
        catastrophic for both sides…Not surprisingly, India this time has
        flatly refused to help evacuate the Sri Lankan soldiers….  The army seems inept and almost
        certainly unable to win the war. The LTTE, having overrun so many
        military bases, is now considered better armed than the government.
        Thanks to Kumaratunga’s press censorship, the majority of Sri Lankans
        didn’t even know of the three-week battle at Elephant Pass until the
        rout was complete. Now they’re scared. ‘I am wondering whether we
        can ever get over this.’, says a security guard working in Colombo.
        Tiger supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran told his faithful last November
        that 2000 would be the ‘Year of War’. He has kept his promise.”
        [In: ‘Tigers Triumphant’, Time magazine, International
        edition, May 15, 2000, p.25]  (3) Anonymous reporter in
        the Economist magazine  “ ‘An attacking force always
        sustains more casualties’, said a Sri Lankan army commander, seeking
        to dismiss the army’s large losses in an attack on Tamil Tiger rebels.
        The army said 157 of its soldiers and 190 rebels had been killed. The
        Tigers said it had killed 300 soldiers for the loss of 48 of its own
        fighters. Whatever the true figure, it was a ferocious battle. Worse,
        the army appeared to have gained nothing from it.  It had apparently aimed to capture the
        town of Pallai as a prelude to retaking the more important Elephant
        Pass, a causeway linking the Jaffna peninsula to the southern mainland.
        Last year the army lost control of the pass in its worst defeat in the
        18-year civil war. Without this land route, the government can supply
        its troops in the Tamil-dominated peninsula only by sea or by air. An
        offensive, named Rod of Fire, started on April 25th
        immediately after the Tigers had ended a unilateral truce. The Tigers
        put up strong resistance, forcing the troops, drawn mainly from the
        majority Sinhalese population, to retreat to their original positions in
        Nagar Kovil, Eluthumadduval and the Kilaly lagoon. On April 28th,
        it was all over and both sides were disposing of their dead.  The debacle has panicked the
        government. The stalling of a major offensive led by the cream of its
        recently modernised armed forces has exposed the precariousness of its
        grip on the peninsula, which was wrested from the Tigers only in 1996.
        The government’s earlier claim that the Tigers had called their
        ceasefire out of military weakness is looking increasingly hollow…”
        [In: ‘Tiger teeth’, Economist magazine, May 5, 2001,
        pp.25-26]  (4) Steve Percy in the Far
        Eastern Economic Review magazine  “…The [Jaffna] town’s most
        noticeable residents are 30,000 troops, who man fortified camps and
        bunkers at every intersection. At the 51st Battalion
        headquarters, in one of the town’s two big 1960s-style hotels, a high
        ranking officer concedes the Tigers ‘have won the war’. He cites
        their unhindered passage to the town under the peace accord and how they
        move among the people showing videos for political and recruitment
        purposes, while extracting taxes from shopkeepers and traders. The army
        won’t stand in their way, he says. They’ll be back in their barracks
        by the end of the year, he adds.  That’s the demand of the Tigers’
        local political officer near Temple Road. Sympathizers come and go. On
        the wall hangs a portrait of Prabhakaran in jungle fatigues with a
        suicide capsule looped around his neck. A world map forms a backdrop
        with a yellow Eelam – the promised Tiger homeland – jutting out of
        the Indian Ocean like a crab with an enormous claw. It appears to be
        unattached to Sri Lanka….” [In: ‘Highway of Hope’, Far
        Eastern Economic Review magazine, Aug.22, 2002.]  Russell Travis, in his above-cited
        presidential address, drew attention to two components of heroism:
        courage and fortitude. References to Pirabhakaran, appearing as sound
        bites, by Ranawana, Spaeth, Percy and the anonymous Economist
        correspondent in the above-cited passages tell without embellishment the
        courage component of the LTTE leader as the Tamil hero. Travis also
        stresses the fortitude component; i.e., the willingness of an individual
        to suffer personal anguish for the sake of the moral good.   A few authentic heroes living amongst
        us now were blessed with both these components. I can state that Nelson
        Mandela and champion Mohammad Ali (both bona-fide boxers) showed the
        traits of courage and fortitude in their campaigns against political
        arrogance and racism. Among the Tamils, Pirabhakaran’s deeds is on par
        with that of boxers Ali and Mandela.  An unorthodox Economist
        Measure of Pirabhakaran’s fortitude  I provide below an unusual measure of
        Pirabhakaran’s fortitude. For almost two decades, political
        decision-making in Sri Lanka and to an extent even in neighboring India
        had been revolving around Pirabhakaran’s thoughts and deeds. No heads
        of state have influenced the events in South Asia for such a lengthy
        period in the post 1975 period like Pirabhakaran.   As a review, I have assembled, from my
        personal collection, over 100 news reports and commentaries on Sri Lanka
        which appeared in London Economist magazine since July 1983 in
        chronological order. To this, I have added the reports which are
        currently available in the website of Economist magazine (details
        of news reports since June 1997). I provide only the captions (sometimes
        cynical, patronizing, and semi-incomprehensible, as is the style of Economist) 
        and the dates of issue of these news reports. When the caption is
        too incomprehensible, I provide within parentheses the specific detail
        relating to that caption. I have divided the reports according to the
        time-span of four Sri Lankan heads of state who had to confront
        Pirabhakaran. Why did I choose the Economist features for this
        illustration? First, compared to Time and Newsweek
        magazines, the Economist had provided constant coverage on the
        South Asian scene, probably due to the colonial baggage and readership
        captured in its homeland. Secondly, compared to Time and Newsweek,
        the Economist is a great-grand daddy of journalism, having
        entered the scene in September 1847, when the British were ascending as
        the biggest and condescending bullies in the Asian, African and Oceanian
        continents. Thirdly, in its succinct reports it provides a distinct
        style of caricature in prose which is amusing, biting but less than real.
          Two notes of caveat are in order. That
        the journalists practising their trade for the Economist magazine
        still hide behind a cloak of anonymity, bordering on the Victorian era
        prudery on sex should be noted. Also, those hiding behind such a cloak
        of anonymity have loose pens spitting venom and bile against named
        individuals also reveals the spineless cowardice and contempt to
        decency. Despite these deficiencies, I chose reports from the Economist
        magazine since they cannot be tagged as pro-Pirabhakaran literature by
        any stretch of imagination.   Jayewardene
        period Week of the tiger. July 30, 1983,
        pp.14-15 (editorial) Call in the professionals. Sept.15,
        1984, p.41 Rajiv’s far horizons. Nov.10, 1984 Back-door and front-door. June 1, 1985.
        [on refugee immigration] A small and solvable war. Aug.3, 1985,
        pp.35-36 Tigers at bay. Feb.28, 1987, pp.28-29. The push on Jaffna. May 30, 1987, p.30 The Tiger hunt and the failed armada.
        June 6, 1987, pp.27-28 & 31 When peace became possible. Aug.1,
        1987, p.20 & 25-26 Tiger, Tiger, losing fight. Aug.1,
        1987, p.13 (editorial) Still in the balance. Aug.8, 1987,
        pp.18-19 Non-Tiger terror. Aug.22, 1987,
        pp.44-45 Not all the guns were handed in.
        Sept.19, 1987, pp.30-31 It’s war again. Oct.10, 1987, pp.29
        & 32 The other side is just as bloody.
        Nov.14, 1987, pp.24-25 [on JVP rioting] The other Tamils. Nov.14, 1987, p.25 Costly campaign. Nov.28, 1987, p.28 Bad day at Batticaloa. Jan.23, 1988,
        pp.20 & 22 All over bar the shooting. Feb.6, 1988,
        p.22 Tamil Nadu: Get a move on, soldier.
        Apr.23, 1988, pp.35-36 The Tigers dig their claws in. July 30,
        1988, pp.33-34 It still looks like no change. Aug.20,
        1988, pp.23-24 Marching orders. Oct.8, 1988, p.32 Rajiv gets lost on a Tiger hunt.
        Oct.22, 1988, pp.25-26 The Tamils defy the Tigers. Nov.26,
        1988, pp.26 & 29 Enter Hydra. Dec.3, 1988, p.28 Democracy’s day of courage. Dec.24,
        1988, p.33  Premadasa
        periodWhose revolution will it be? Feb.11,
        1989, pp.34 & 36 Mathematics for beginners. Feb.25,
        1989, pp.32 & 34 Imperial India. Apr.15, 1989, pp.14
        & 17 (editorial) If India leaves. Apr.22, 1989, p.36 Slip sliding away. May 27, 1989, pp.38
        & 40 Blood, toil, tears and onions. June 10,
        1989, p.32 Riding the Tiger. July 1, 1989, p.29 On with the hunt. July 8, 1989, p.31 Too bad to print. July 15, 1989, p.36 Towards midnight. July 22, 1989, p.31 Time for tea. Aug.5, 1989, p.33 Do or die. Aug.26, 1989, pp.25-26 Agreed on a phoney peace. Sept.16,
        1989, p.32 Uncivil wars. Oct.7, 1989, p.38 A catastrophe in the making. Nov.11,
        1989, pp.41-42 Shades of Che. Nov.18, 1989, p.40 [on
        the death of Rohana Wijeweera] Tigers on the prowl again. Jan.20,
        1990, p.38 Old Tigers in new skins. Mar.31, 1990,
        p.35 Tigers again, fresh from their sleep.
        June 16, 1990, pp.36-37 Back to the jungle. June 23, 1990, p.31 And don’t come back. July 7, 1990,
        pp.37-38 Solid Dutch. Aug.11, 1990, pp.37-38 The relief of Jaffna. Sept.22, 1990,
        pp.38-40 If they get bored with the war. Nov.3,
        1990, p.42 Another round. Jan.19, 1991, p.34 Death of a hawk. Mar.9, 1991, p.28 [on
        the death of Ranjan Wijeratne] It is not all war. May 18, 1991, p.40 Death among the blossoms. May 25, 1991,
        pp.27-28 & 35 [on the death of Rajiv Gandhi] India’s trial. May 25, 1991, pp.15-16
        (editorial) A warning? July 6, 1991, p.35 The battle for Elephant Pass. Aug.3,
        1991, p.32 Elephantine mistake. Aug.17, 1991, p.24 The end of One-Eyed Jack. Aug.24, 1991,
        pp.33-34 [on the death of Sivarasan] Himself surprised. Sept.7, 1991, p.28
        [on Premadasa impeachment crisis] Under the stones of Sri Lanka. Sept.14,
        1991, p.34 Our allies, the Tigers. Sept.28, 1991,
        pp.36-37 If only. Nov.23, 1991, p.34 Sailing home. Jan.18, 1992, pp.24-25 Mars, not Venus. Apr.18, 1992, p.28 English lessons. Apr.25, 1992, pp.25-26 Taming the Tigers. June 6, 1992,
        pp.28-29 Term of trial. Sept.5, 1992, p.33 Tea party. Nov.7, 1992, pp.27-28 Birthday present. Nov.21, 1992, pp.26
        & 28 [on the death of Vice Admiral Clancy Fernando] Let’s federate. Dec.5, 1992, pp.28-29 Top Tiger talks about talks. Mar.6,
        1993 [Pirabhakaran’s interview; an exclusive!] Who killed Lalith? May 1, 1993, p.27
        [on the death of Athulathmudali]  Wijetunga
        periodThe Tigers pounce. Nov.13, 1993, p.34 All in the family. Jan.8, 1994,
        pp.26-27 [on the Bandaranaike clan] In the Tiger’s den. Mar.5, 1994,
        pp.32-33 No kite flying in Jaffna. July 2, 1994,
        p.31 Election leapfrog. July 2, 1994,
        pp.31-32 Sri Lanka tilts to the left. Aug.20,
        1994, pp.23-24 Missing money. Aug.27, 1994, pp.23-26 Murder and mystery in Sri Lanka.
        Oct.29, 1994, pp.29-30 [on the death of Gamini Dissanayake] Women and children first. Oct.29, 1994,
        p.30 [on the political nepotism in South Asia]  Chandrika
        Kumaratunga periodSome peace. Jan.21, 1995, pp.31-32 Out of the ashes. Apr.15, 1995,
        pp.28-29 The victory still to come. Dec.9, 1995,
        pp.27-28 [on the capture of Jaffna by the government forces] Terror in Sri Lanka. Feb.10, 1996, p.16
        (editorial) After the bomb. Feb.10, 1996, pp.30-31 A fight over the ruins. July 13, 1996,
        p.30 Back to the Tiger’s old lair. Aug.31,
        1996, p.24 Junius Jayewardene. Nov.23, 1996, p.121
        (obituary) Local difficulty. Mar.27, 1997, Another bomb. Oct.16, 1997, A tooth for a tooth. Jan.29, 1998, Sri Lanka’s unhappy birthday. Feb.7,
        1998, pp.27-28 Blood and money. Oct.8, 1998, Civil war without end. Dec.5, 1998,
        pp.32 & 37 So that’s democracy. Jan.28, 1999, Kalashnikov kids. July 10, 1999, Cries of battle. Sept.23, 1999, Four terrible days. Nov.11, 1999, Sri Lanka wants peace, perhaps. Dec.18,
        1999, pp.23-24 Victory and war in Sri Lanka. Dec.23,
        1999, Sri Lanka’s new killings. Jan.8,
        2000, A prize from Norway. Feb.24, 2000, City slaughter. Mar.16, 2000, The worst defeat. Apr.29, 2000, pp.26
        & 29 Sri Lanka’s Dunkirk. May 6, 2000,
        p.33 The Tamil Tigers close in. May 13,
        2000, pp.27-28 Another bomb in the war. June 10, 2000, p.27 [on the death of minister C.V.Goonaratne] The growing cost of war. July 13, 2000, Sri Lanka backs away from devolution.
        Aug.12, 2000, p.24 Blood before the ballot. Sept.9, 2000,
        pp.34-35 The war the world is missing. Oct.5,
        2000, Sri Lanka votes and hopes. Oct.5, 2000, A double-barreled verdict. Oct.14,
        2000, pp.38-39 Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Oct.21, 2000,
        p.115 (obituary) Lynch law. Oct.26, 2000, Tiger tamed? Nov.30, 2000, Poker game. Jan.13, 2001, p.29 Hitting the Tigers in their pockets.
        Mar.8, 2001, Tiger teeth. May 5, 2001, pp.25-26. The Tigers pounce. July 26, 2001, [on
        the Katunayake Airport attack] No reconciliation. Sept.1, 2001, p.28 Start again. Oct.20, 2001, Voting in blood. Dec.1, 2001, A vote for peace? Dec.8, 2001, pp.31-32 The wounded Tigers. Jan.10, 2002, Viking rule. Feb.28, 2002, The peace of desperation. Mar.27, 2002, The Tiger comes out of his lair.
        Apr.11, 2002, Meet the new democratic Tigers. Apr.11,
        2002, Smiles that conceal the worries. July
        18, 2002, To Thailand in hope. Sept.5, 2002, A world of exiles. Jan.4, 2003,  As one could infer, the caption writers
        to the Economist magazine are nothing but lobotomized transplants
        from the tabloid journalism, whose paychecks seem scored solely on the
        scale of offending good etiquette. Their irreverence is not limited to
        the citizens of for former British colonies in Asia and Africa. Even the
        aging Pope doesn’t get any respect from the Economist
        magazine’s lobotomized slobs who once tagged him with a photo caption
        - just stating ‘Don’t mention the pill’.  If Pirabhakaran, by naming his
        organization with reference to Tiger, had handed an easy whip to these
        caption writers for splashing their feline metaphors, by his endurance
        and fortitude he also made sure that the same caption writers eat crow
        on some of their hasty captions such as ‘Tigers at bay (1987)’,
        ‘Tiger, Tiger, losing fight (1987)’, ‘Back to the jungle’ (1990)
        and ‘Elephantine mistake (1991)’. The soppy eulogist of Sirimavo
        Bandaranaike, writing for the Economist even hurled an insult on
        Pirabhakaran, through the lips of Sirimavo’s daughter, as follows:  “Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader
        of the Tamil Tigers guerrilla group, who, says Mrs Kumaratunga, probably
        correctly, is mentally ill. Why so many Tamils are willing to be led by
        an apparent madman may perhaps be explained by their deep and unshifting
        suspicion of the Sinhalese, even though Mrs. Kumaratunga has long
        rejected Sinhala nationalism.” [Economist magazine, Oct.21,
        2000, p.115]  Within the subsequent two years,
        majority of Sri Lankans have become convinced by the political and
        theatrical antics of their Head of State that it is not Pirabhakaran,
        but President Kumaratunga who suffers from arrogance, borderline mental
        derangement and megalomania.  A rare Pirabhakaran
        interview to the Economist magazine  What is currently unavailable in the
        website of Economist magazine, I’m interested in placing in the
        electronic database for researchers. This is a rare Pirabhakaran
        interview to the Economist magazine, which was published almost
        ten years ago. Even in the current context, it remains significantly
        (and even eerily!) relevant – if one overlooks the inserted time
        markers like the years of war, age of Pirabhakaran and the name of the
        incumbent President of Sri Lanka. There is also a passing reference to
        him as a ‘hero’, based on his then physical features – but not on
        his deeds. So, I reproduce it in full without any deletions.  Top Tiger talks about talks [Economist, March 6, 1993] from our Sri Lanka correspondent in Jaffna  ‘The leader of the Tamil
        Tigers, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, does not often give an interview to a
        journalist. So why now? During about three hours of talk with Mr.
        Prabhakaran, what emerged was a desire to negotiate once again with the
        government. He rejected any suggestion that this arose out of weakness.
        Victory, he insisted, was his for the taking.  Yet all is not well within
        the rebel group. The Tigers are finding it hard to recruit more
        fighters. Teenagers quickly become veterans. In January ten tigers were
        reported to have died when a ship said to be carrying arms was
        interrupted by the Indian navy. Among the dead was Sathasivam
        Krishnakumar, the Tigers’ number-two and a close friend of the leader.
        Mr. Prabhakaran says he is too upset to talk about the loss. The Jaffna
        peninsula, the Tamil area where the Tigers have their stronghold, is a
        ruined place after ten years of fighting. There is no electricity and
        not much food. Thousands of people have fled. Those too poor to leave
        appear exhausted.  But the Tigers have been up
        against it before. The Indian peacekeepers invited to Sri Lanka in 1987
        suppressed them for a time. A new president, Ranasinghe Premadasa, got
        rid of the Indians in 1990 and, in return, the Tigers talked peace.
        Nothing came of this talk, and many in the government believed that the
        Tigers used the pause in the civil war to rearm. They will be suspicious
        that this is what the Tigers have in mind now.  Even his enemies concede
        that Mr. Prabhakaran is a formidable leader. Despite the toll of the
        civil war, he appears to retain the support of the majority of Tamils in
        northern and eastern Sri Lanka, the area which the Tigers claim as the
        Tamil homeland. He is 37, on the small side, and a bit overweight. With
        his black hair and moustache and large eyes, he looks a little like the
        hero that turns up regularly in Tamil films. He dresses in army
        fatigues, and carries a gun. Around his neck is a black cord at the end
        of which is a capsule, presumably containing the cyanide which Tigers
        are supposed to swallow rather than be taken prisoner.  His house – at least, the
        house where he gave his interview – is small and modern, and a bit of
        a drive from the town of Jaffna. There are maps on the walls, but no
        radio or television or books, although Mr. Prabhakaran appears well
        informed about affairs outside Sri Lanka, especially wars, in
        Afghanistan, or in Indochina. Much of the talk was over dinner: noodles
        and a soft drink. Mr. Prabhakaran’s portliness does not seem to arise
        from over-eating. He appears to speak only Tamil. Interpreting was done
        by Anton Balasingham, a much-traveled man – he lived for a time in
        London – who has been the Tigers’ principal negotiator in the past.  Is there anything the Tigers
        might offer than would encourage the government to open negotiations?
        The Tigers’ demand has been for an independent Tamil state covering a
        third of the country and holding much of the coastline, a proposal that
        the government rejects totally. Some politicians in Colombo believe the
        way to peace is to turn Sri Lanka into a federal state.  The government is
        considering the idea, although the majority Sinhalese, who have
        dominated the government and army since independence in 1948, are
        believed to be against federalism. It would give the Tamils too much
        power, some believe. The Tamils would want a high degree of autonomy,
        particularly over law and order, land and education, all controversial
        themes. The size of a possible Tamil state within a federation is matter
        for endless argument. Although Tamils are in the majority in the north,
        there are sizeable other groups, including Muslims, in the east.  Mr. Prabhakaran talks of the
        possibility of a ‘reasonable’ compromise, although it is unclear
        what compromise he would make. He did say, though:  ‘If a proposal which
        gives autonomy and satisfies the expectations of the Tamil people is put
        forward, we are prepared to consider it.’  However, he talks of
        ‘extremists’ in the government. President Premadasa, who has always
        favoured negotiation, might be willing to try it again, but the army, a
        growing force in Sri Lankan politics, would probably object. If its view
        prevails, the Tigers will fight on. Mr. Prabhakaran said:  ‘Victory in a war does
        not depend on manpower or weapons. Firm determination, valour and love
        of freedom are the factors that decide victory in a war. Our fighters
        and our people are full of these.’  Sri Lanka’s civil war
        could continue for a while yet.’  The first of the two above-mentioned
        quotes from Pirabhakaran in his 1993 interview disproves unequivocally
        the views expressed by Colombo, Chennai, London and New York 
        pundits that he had down-graded his demand for separate state as
        a result of  ‘post
        September 11’ developments. The second of the two above-mentioned
        quotes shows his courageous and uncompromising stand, which has not
        wavered for the past ten years. This interview appeared in the Economist
        when the current Sri Lankan president Kumaratunga and her ‘advisor’
        Kadirgamar were non-entities in Sri Lankan politics, and the current Sri
        Lankan prime minister Ranil Wickremasinghe was an understudy to his
        current post.  One thing is still unclear for me. Who
        was this anonymous interviewer, who talked with Pirabhakaran for nearly
        three hours? The Economist, as is its wont, has not identified
        the journalist. Pirabhakaran and Balasingham would definitely can
        identify this journalist at an appropriate time. If this journalist is a
        Sri Lankan, I have a hunch that it could have been Mervyn de Silva. I
        may be right or inaccurate. But the fact that the Lanka Guardian
        editor had served as Economist’s correspondent for Sri Lanka
        and the circumstantial evidence presented in the previous chapters of
        this series on Mervyn de Silva’s sympathetic observations on
        Pirabhakaran lead me to infer that he could have been the interviewer.
        But this inference needs verification from the interviewee. [To be
        continued.]  | |||