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Pirapaharan By: T. Sabaratnam 16.
Wresting Weapons from the
Enemy Two
Golden Rules In
the second half of 1978, an intense intellectual debate raged among
Tamil militant groups in Jaffna. The issues were individual terrorism
and robbing banks. Marxist oriented militant groups were condemning them
as “immoral and anti-social.” Killing individuals does not make a
revolution, they argued. Robbing banks was stealing people’s money.
People must be mobilized for a revolution to take root and society made
to sustain the uprising. Supporters
of the militant group EROS initiated the debate. Its founder-leader
Ratnasabapathy (Ratna to friends and colleagues) was in Jaffna during
that period. He had already undergone weapon training in Lebanon. His
dream was more theoretical and extensive. It has to be a proletariat
uprising which included the Indian Tamil workers of the central hills.
He had brought with him a map of Tamil Eelam, which included
northern, eastern and the central provinces. Pirapaharan,
a down-to-earth pragmatist, differed. He differed not only about the
extent of Tamil Eelam territory but also about the theoretical base of
the revolution. Tamil Eelam should comprise the north and east of Sri
Lanka, the historical area in which the Tamils lived.
Central hills formed the historical homeland of the Kandyan
Sinhalese. His world-view was not Marxist. He never spoke about the
workers or the working class or class less society. His concern since
childhood was the Tamil race. Tamils should not be a subject race. They
should live in dignity, safety and security. They should not be
terrorized by the Sinhalese mobs or by the armed forces. His
concern for socialism was limited to the creation of a casteless society
among the Tamils and nothing more. He viewed the caste system as a
factor that impedes Tamil struggle. It harmed Tamil unity and hindered
the building of a strong-armed group. A
Jaffna University professor once told Pirapaharan that the people should
be politicized before taking to the gun. Pirapaharan dismissed him with
a wave of his hand: “What politicization? What the people need is
action. We have to do some action first. People will follow us,” he
said. That was what he did. That was his mode of struggle. Hit back. Hit
back hard. Hit back repeatedly, ceaselessly. The people will be with
you. He
drew two golden rules from this position: Wrest the weapons from your
enemy and rob the money needed to finance your struggle from the enemy.
LTTE wrested most of its weapons from the police and the army. He
teaches his cadres that getting the weapons was the major target of any
operation. In the initial stage of the struggle, LTTE took the major
portion of its funds from the two state banks: Bank of Ceylon and the
People’s Bank. Tinnaveli Bank Robbery Tinnaveli
Bank robbery was planned that way. Pirapaharan wanted a major bank
robbery to follow the spectacular 7 September plane blast that attracted
international attention. It took him over a month to get ready.
Snatching the sub-machine gun from the police officer on guard was to be
the first act. He selected Sellakili for the task. He was appointed the
leader of a six-member group which included Pirapaharan himself.
Sellakili befriended cashier Sabaratnam who worked in the Tinnaveli
branch of the People’s Bank. Sabaratnam told Sellakili that People’s
Bank branches usually deposit their collections on Fridays with their
head office in Jaffna. The money would be neatly packed in suitcases and
kept in the chief cashier’s room to be transported to Jaffna around
noon. He provided the sketch of the bank including the passages. The
manager and his eight assistants would be present. Sellakili went to the
bank and observed the set up. The
group raided the bank, which was outside Jaffna city limits, on 5
December 1978, an hour after it opened. Sellakili went to Police
Constable Kingsly Perera who was sitting on a chair near the gate
holding his sub- machine gun. Sellakili pounced on him, wrested the gun
and shot him with it. Reserve Police Constable Satchithananthan who was
standing on the other end of the gate started running.
Sellakili shot and killed him too and kept guard at the gate. Pirapaharan
and the other four herded the nine employees into the manager’s room
and dumped the suitcases into gunny bags. They warned the employees to
stay where they were till they make their get away. While they were
getting out with their loot, a jeep from the Kopay police came. It came
there accidentally. Kopay police inspector had sent Reserve Police
Constable Jayaratnam to cash a cheque for him. Sellakili
opened fire on Jayaratnam as he got down and others dumped the driver
and they escaped in the police vehicle. Jayaratnam escaped with
injuries. LTTE
had pulled out a major bank robbery and had escaped with a sub-machine
gun, their second, and Rs. 1,180, 000/-, a big amount those days. Cashier
Sabaratnam who helped the Tigers is now the finance chief of the Vanni
administration. He was known as Ranjith Appa but now he calls himself
Thamilenthi. Talented Youths join Thamilenthi joined the LTTE after the daring Tinnaveli Bank
robbery proving Pirapaharan’s position that action, mind-capturing
action, would bring in cadres and supporters. Talented youths were drawn
to the LTTE soon after its formation. As pointed out earlier Baby
Subramaniam Ilankumaran) joined soon after the LTTE was formed. He was
involved in the Air Lanka plane blast. Kumrappa
and Pandithar in 1977. Kittu, Mahattaya and Raghu joined in 1978. All of
them were able and very successful commanders. Except for Baby
Subramaniam, who is now in charge of education in the Vanni
Administration and Mahattaya who was executed for betrayal others were
martyred and are remembered fondly. Kittu,
Mahattaya and Ragu joined the LTTE soon after the AVRO blast and rose to
responsible positions rapidly. They were from Valvettithurai. Kittu was
a relative of Pirapaharan and was inducted by him. Kittu, whose real
name was Sathasivampillai Krishnakumar, studied at Chithampara College.
His father owned a printing press in Nelliyadi and was a strong
supporter of the Federal Party and an ardent follower of Thanthai Chelva.
So was Kittu’s mother Rajaledsumi. Kittu’s parents took part in 1961
satyagraha before Jaffna Secretariat and they carried the one-year-old
toddler with them. Kittu, the youngest, was born on 2 January 1960.
Parents, wedded to Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence, had
named their eldest son Gandhithasan, who is living now in India. Kittu, the fourth and the two girls
in between, died under tragic circumstances. Rajaledsumi,
in her old age, is still working to uplift downtrodden women. Ragu wanted to join the police service but was rejected
because he was from Valvettithurai. Then he joined the LTTE. Pirapaharan spent most of his time training his cadres and
collecting money and weapons. He concentrated in raising a group of
dedicated, highly motivated cadres of unimpeachable character and
discipline and unquestionable loyalty. Discipline and loyalty, he
argued, were the foundation of a
successful guerilla outfit. Tamil Solidarity Jayewardene
was incensed by the Tinnavely Bank robbery. He called an urgent meeting
of the Inspector General of Police Stanley Senanayake and Army Commander
Lt. Gen. Denis Perera. The army commander took with him Brigadier Cyril
Ranatunga, Commander, Western Command headquartered at Panagoda.
Jayewardene told them: This simply cannot go on. This has to be stopped.
I don’t know what you are going to do but you must stop it.” Police
and army chiefs suggested the strengthening of the law. They said the
special law enacted to ban the LTTE was not sufficient. Jayewardene
readily agreed to do it and ordered his secretary Manikdiwela to get the
Attorney General and the Legal Draftsman to prepare an appropriate law.
Army Commander said he wants to place Brig. Ranatunga in charge of the
operation. Brig.
Ranatunga was given in January 1979 the task of apprehending the
militants. His first act was to ask Captain Sarath Munasinghe of the
Army Intelligence Unit to set up within two weeks an Intelligence Unit
in Jaffna to help in his operations. He set up an office at Palaly Army
Camp which drew maps of all the vulnerable places in the Jaffna
peninsula including Valvettithurai. Brig. Ranatunga was appointed Jaffna
Commander in February. While
preparing militarily to deal with Tamil militancy Jayewardene continued
his political game of weakening the Tamil community and promoting a
cleavage between the TULF and the militants. His move to draw the TULF
into the government structure through the district minister scheme
failed to yield quick results. Conscious of the growing youth pressure
against it the TULF was reluctant to give a positive response. So,
Jayewardene told Thondaman on 2 August, during a chat, about his scheme
and his readiness to offer three of the 25 district ministerships to the
TULF. “I
have told Amirthalingam about my scheme. Did he tell you anything about
it?” Jayewardene asked Thondaman innocuously.
Thondaman
asked Amirthalingam about it when he met the next day. Amirthalingam
said they were considering Jayewardene’s offer but had not come to any
conclusion. Thondaman told Amirthalingam if they decide to accept the
offer one of the three posts should be given to him. Next
day, 4 August, Jayewardene asked Thondaman whether he spoke to
Amirthalingam about the district minister scheme. Thondaman replied that
he had told Amirthalingam that if they decide to accept one of them
should be given to him. Jayewardene
seized the opening. “Will you join if I give you one?” “What
is the use of district ministership?” “Will
you join the cabinet?” “If
you invite.” “I
am inviting you. Will you join?’ Thondaman
accepted the invitation but asked for time carry his trade union, Ceylon
Worker’s Congress (CWC), with him. Jayewardene
had scored a major triumph. He had got a section of the Tamil community
to his side. He had weakened the Tamil struggle to that extent. He
was keen to get the TULF also into his fold. That would help him to show
to the world, especially the donor community, that he was a just and
fair ruler who looked after the minority communities well. TULF
was in a fix. Many members in the TULF parliamentary group favoured
accepting the posts. Youths were revolting. TULF politbureau decided to
accept the district ministries if five were given. Amirthalingam asked
Jayewardene for the district ministries of Jaffna, Kilinochchi.
Mullaitivu. Vavuniya and Mannar, the five districts in the northern
province. Jayewardene was prepared to give only three posts. And the
TULF dragged its feet. Jayewardene
announced the names of 24 district ministers on 5 October. He kept
the post of the district minister for Jaffna vacant and announced that
that had been reserved for the TULF. Since the TULF refused to accept
it, the president appointed Ukku Banda Wijekoon, a UNP member of
parliament from the Kurunegala district, for that post. The government
appointed Vaithilingham Duraisamy, an opponent of the TULF, as secretary
to the district minister. Jayewardene, meanwhile permitted, Cyril Mathew, to continue with his anti- TULF, anti- Tamil campaign. From
anti-Tamil speeches, he progressed into publishing anti- Tamil pamphlets
and booklets. They were targeted, in a systematic way, to instigate the
Sinhala people against the Tamils. They were ghost written by a group of
officials he had gathered around him in his Industries Ministry. They
were published and distributed by the Ministry of Industries as
government publications. The
first booklet of that series was titled "Sinhalese! Rise to Protect
Buddhism." It was a collection of speeches he delivered in 1979
which contained the photograph of a map EROS had prepared. It showed
north-western coast up to Chilaw and the Tamil majority areas in the
hill country as part of Tamil Eelam. As the reporter covering the
Industries Ministry for the Daily News, I was with Mathew at the
Puttalam Rest House when the first copies of the booklet were delivered
to him by his ministry officials. He was on an inspection of the
Puttalam Cement Factory. He gave me a copy of the booklet and showed me
the map and said: “See what your people are claiming. Is it fair?’ In
that booklet, he argued that the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka
were ancient Sinhala territory. They were originally ruled by Sinhala
kings and Sinhalese had lived there. Tamils had invaded those areas
during the beginning of the second millennium and had pushed the
Sinhalese to the south. Tamils who are now trying to claim the north and
the east as their traditional homeland were now trying to destroy all
historical evidence, he charged. He organized the distribution of that
pamphlet through Buddhist temples. The
second booklet instigated the Sinhala people to boycott Tamil shops. It
accused the Tamils of holding the Sri Lankan economy by the neck. It
said, "the wholesale and retail trade” was completely in the
hands of the Tamils. It urged the Sinhalese to destroy the dominance the
Tamils had in the wholesale trade in the Pettah market in Colombo. It
also called upon the Sinhalese to patronize the Sinhala shops. That
pamphlet was distributed by the Sinhala traders.
Another
pamphlet targeted Tamil plantation workers. It warned that the Indian
Tamil workers had grown into a threat to "Buddhism and Sinhala
culture” and pointed out the building of Hindu kovils as an immediate
threat. It warned, “Buddhism and the up-country villages will all
vanish" from the historical lands of the Kandyan territory. It was
distributed through the Buddhist temples in the hill country. The
fourth pamphlet, "Who is the Tiger", tried to show that all
Tamils who spoke of their rights as Tigers. It propagated the Mahawansa
theory that Sri Lanka is a Sinhala- Buddhist country and the Tamils were
invaders who belonged to Tamil Nadu in India. Tamils should either go
back to Tamil Nadu or live at the mercy of the Sinhala- Buddhists. This
booklet was distributed by the traders, Sinhala organizations and
Buddhist temples. While
creating the ground for Sinhala onslaught on the Tamils Cyril Mathew
also took upon himself the cause of the Sinhalese who resented the
reversal of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s university admission policy by
the new government. Sinhala extremists, especially academics and school
teachers, opposed the new government decision announced in its Statement
of Government policy of 4 August 1977. They did not want to forgo the
advantage Sinhala students derived since 1972. Sinhala nationalist
groups declared their opposition to reverting to the merit system. A
return to the merit system, they argued, would result in Tamils
outnumbering the Sinhalese in the much sought-after professional studies
of medicine and engineering. The one- day token strike the secondary
school children called for February 1978 was averted by the government
by the closure of the schools on that day and by the arrest of the
organizers. Mathew
who was building himself as the leader of the Sinhala nationalists Mathew
held the media briefing the following day, 12 December, at the
Industries Ministry. I covered it for the Daily News.
Prof. P. P. G. L. Siriwardene, Professor of Chemistry, Colombo
Campus of the University of Sri Lanka, was present as a special invitee.
Mathew produced two biology answer scripts of two Tamil students who sat
for the GCE Advanced Level examination held in 1977 and alleged two
marks had been given in excess over the allotted marks for a question on
the life-cycle of a mosquito. He
said, "Marks had been awarded to Tamil students in a manner that
was unworthy of civilized people. Tamil examiners had been dishonest and
as a result a large number of Sinhalese students had been deprived of
the opportunity of getting into university. It is a conspiracy practiced
since 1968." Mathew
followed the press conference with another of his vicious pamphlet
titled "The Diabolical Conspiracy", which accused Tamil
examiners of awarding high marks to Tamil students to make them enter
the university in higher numbers. He tried to make out that was a Tamil
national conspiracy. He
tried to show that as "a burning question ... exploding within the
hearts of Sinhala students, parents and teachers." Then
the government announced the district quota scheme. District quota
system allotted 30 percent of the university seats on merit, 55 percent
on the basis of population of each district, and the balance of 15
percent to backward districts. It
looked that the Jayewardene government had made use of Mathew’s charge
of cheating as a smokescreen to introduce the district quota system for
university admission. It could have done that without hurting the Tamils
but Sinhala politicians and the media were insensitive to the feelings
of the Tamils. That was one of the major incidents that alienated the
Tamils, planted in their hearts Tamil national consciousness and built
in them the feeling of solidarity. Three
weeks before this calculated Mathew insult a natural disaster that
struck the eastern coastal belt in Batticoloa and Mullaitivu districts
roused and kindled the Tamil National consciousness. The cyclone
accompanied by a massive tidal wave flattened the coastal areas and
dissipated over Polannaruwa. Sinhala officers manning the government
departments and agencies diverted local and international aid to less
affected Sinhala areas in Polannaruwa thus depriving the needy Tamil
areas of assistance. Groups of Sinhala thugs blocked the roads and
diverted the lorries carrying foreign assistance to the Sinhala areas. Tamils
of the north boiled with anger when they learnt about the government
indifference and Sinhala thuggery and organized their own disaster
relief. Jaffna University students, social and religious organizations
and militant groups played lead
role in this movement to help Tamil brethren. Among the Tamil militant
groups, LTTE and EROS played significant role. They went in sizable
groups, lived in the damaged eastern villages and helped the villagers
to rebuild their houses and their lives. One of them was a youth named
Inbam. His real name was Viswajothi Erattinam. He was arrested,
tortured, killed and his body was thrown on the Pannai Bridge when he
returned to Jaffna after Jayewardene turned the northern peninsula into
a killing field in the latter half of 1979. That story will be told
later. Tamil
distrust in Sinhala officers hardened when their conduct was exposed in
parliament and the Tamil press. Quality sarees India gifted to be sent
to the Tamils of the east were sold to Colombo public at cut-rate
prices! When queried they answered that the money so raised was spent on
disaster relief. Tent material was left to rot in government buildings.
Tamils have to look after themselves was the feeling that grew among the
Tamils, even among those living in Colombo. This made them join the
relief effort. Jayewardene
government through its commission and omission created during 1978-78 an
environment conducive for the growth of Tamil militancy. Jayewardene, in
particular, was keen in weakening the TULF, which even at that time
enjoyed considerable influence among militant groups especially the LTTE
and the TELO. Pirapaharan, Uma Maheswaran, Thangathurai, Kuttimani,
Jegan and others listened and obeyed
Amirthalingam- Sivasithamparam group’s advice. Jayewardene’s
strategy was not to make use of the TULF influence to control and
contain Tamil militancy politically but to drive a wedge between them. Jayewardene
believed in violence. He decided to give Tamil militants also the same
medicine he administered to Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s supporters- state
violence. Next: Chapter
17: Sinhala- Tamil Tension
Mounts
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