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Pirapaharan
By: T. Sabaratnam 24. Tamils
still back Moderates DDC
Elections President
Jayewardene wanted to show the world, through the District Development
Council election of 4 June 1981 that the majority of the Tamils did not
approve the separate state which the TULF was demanding but succeeded in
showing just the reverse. The DDC
election was held countrywide but the main focus was in Jaffna because
the real drama was enacted there. In the Sinhala south it was lackluster
election since opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party boycotted it. That
made it plain sailing for the UNP which swept all the 18 Sinhala
majority districts. In the
north- eastern province it was a different tale. UNP snatched only
Ampara district, one of the seven districts in that province. In Ampara
Muslims constitute the majority with 41%, of the population and
Sinhalese come second with 37%. Tamils on whose vote bank the TULF
depend form only 20 percent f the population of Ampara. The TULF
naturally lost Ampara but won the other six districts. In the
Trincomalee district where Tamils comprise only 33.9% of the population,
Sinhalese 33% and Muslims, 29%, TULF polled 44,692 votes to Ump’s
42,388. In the other eastern district of Batticoloa where Tamils
constitute a clear majority with 70% of the population, Muslims 24% and
Sinhalese 3%, the TULF won the election and captured the council. The TULF
swept all the five districts in the Northern Province- Jaffna,
Kilinochchi, Mannar, Vavuniya and Mullaitivu. Overall,
Jayewardene helped the TULF to reaffirm the mandate it obtained in the
1977 parliamentary election; that Sri Lankan Tamils living in the
north-east supported a separate state, a fact which he wanted to
disprove. Jayewardene
also wanted to weaken the TULF politically and strengthen alternate
Tamil groups which could be managed to accept whatever he would give as
the solution to the Tamil problem. It has
become necessary for him to grant some sort of autonomy to the Tamil
regions to silence the international community, especially aid givers,
who had begun to make ‘noises’ in support of meeting the aspirations
of the Tamil people. Showing to
the world that he was prepared to meet the aspirations of the Tamil
people at least to some extent was the prime objective for which
Jayewardene “cooked” his District Development Scheme. The UNP in its election manifesto for the 1977 parliamentary election gave two promises to the Tamils to win over their votes in Southern Lanka. The UNP promised to take action to remove Tamil grievances which it identified as being in the fields of education, colonization, use of the Tamil language and employment in public and semi public corporations and undertook to call an All-Party Conference to work out a permanent solution to the ethnic dispute. Jayewardene did take some action to give relief to the Tamils but did not call the All-Party Conference. Keen on politically finishing off his main rival Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Jayewardene shirked holding the All-Party Conference that could have given her an opportunity to stage a come back into politics. Instead,
Jayewardene decided to negotiate with the TULF which emerged the
predominant voice of the Tamils in the 1977 election. He appointed two
influential Tamil intellectuals, Professor Jayaratnam Wilson of the
University of New Brunswick, the son-in-law of the founder of the Federal
Party, S.J.V, Chelvanayakam (Thanthai Chelva) and Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam,
a jurist, son Federal Party’s representative in a former UNP cabinet,
to handle the matter. Wilson told me that Jayewardene looked very
concerned when he talked to him about settling the ethnic conflict.
“We cannot allow it to fester. That will endanger the very existence
of the country. Now that Amirthalingam is the Leader of the Opposition
and the TULF had become part of the parliamentary game let’s get
together and lay the foundation for the solution,” Jayewardene told
him. Jayewardene
then spelt out the basic plan he had conceptualized. He told him that
they could start with the development of the district. “We’ll form
an elected council for each district and make the council responsible
for its development. We would give the DDC’s the needed powers and
finance,” Jayewardene added, “This is just what the Jaffna man
wants. DDC would afford an opportunity for the economic development of
the Tamil areas.” Wilson
and Neelan persuaded Amirthalingam and the TULF to accept the DDC scheme
and Jayewardene appointed the 10-member Victor Tennakoon Presidential
Commission on District Councils in 1979. Wilson and Neelan toiled hard
to make it the effective first step for regional autonomy. Tennakoon and
other Sinhala hardcore members of the commission frustrated their effort
by making DDCs dependent on the government and its ministers and
bureaucrats. The government
further diluted the DDC scheme when the bill was drafted. Wilson was
disappointed with the final outcome commented: Too little, too late. The
usual Sinhala politics was enacted when the bill went before the
parliament. The
opposition Sri Lanka Freedom Party opposed it. Opposition leaders and
members of the Buddhist clergy tore and burnt copies of the bill and
accused Jayewardene of selling the country to the Tamils. The Buddhist
clergy shouted that the DDC arrangement would lay the foundation for a
Tamil separate state. Jayewardene countered that propaganda by telling a
delegation of high ranking Buddhist priests that DDC was a general
arrangement that applied to the entire country. Then he told them the
real objective of his scheme. “Once
Amirthalingam and the TULF get involved in the DDC exercise they would
become part of the power game,” he said. Through
the DDC Jayewardene wanted to slay the Tamil demand for a separate
state. He wanted to draw the TULF and the Tamil people into the
administrative process. The TULF would run some sort of glorified
local administration in their areas and forget its cry for a separate
state. UNP’s Decision to Contest President
Jayewardene plans everything methodically, meticulously, craftily so
that he, his government and his party derive maximum benefit out of
them. The DDC scheme was no exception. He wanted to weaken
Amirthalingam, the TULF and the Tamil community so that he could
enhance his standing and strengthen his government’s popularity
among the Sinhala people and the international community. Weakening
of Amirthalingam, the TULF and the Tamils was planned in two fronts.
Firstly, the gulf between the TULF and the revolting Tamil youths
would widen once the TULF accepts the DDC scheme. It
happened. Secondly, TULF’s bargaining position and its standing
among the Tamil people and the international community would be
weakened if the UNP could win one or two seats in every district in
the north-east province. The
UNP could then claim its decisions were representative of the entire
people of the country, including Tamils. UNP working committee
discussed this matter extensively and decided to prepare the ground
through a series of ministerial visits to the north. Prime
Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa was sent first. I covered his 4-day
tour. All his public meetings were well attended and he was accorded
rousing welcome in Jaffna and Point Pedro.
Encouraged by Premadasa’s triumphant visit, Jayewardene sent
Lalith Athulathmudali, Gamini Dissanayake and Cyril Mathew to tour the
Jaffna peninsula. I covered those visits also. Those ministers
organized a network of UNP organizations in the Jaffna peninsula.
Jayewardene started talking about an electoral bridgehead between the
north and the south, Close
to the nomination day Jayewardene sent a group of top officials to
assess the situation in Jaffna. The group advised him against UNP
contesting in Jaffna. The officials told him that most of the UNP
organizers he had appointed were self seekers and lacked popular
backing. Similar advice was given by Wilson and Thondaman. But,
Jayewardene decided to hold the election under emergency and to
contest it, a disastrous miscalculation. The
UNP ran into difficulties from the start. With great difficulty it
managed to compile the list of candidates. It was headed by A.
Thiyagarajah, who in 1970 parliamentary election defeated
Amirthalingam in the Vaddukoddai seat. Then, as a popular former
principal of the prestigious Karainagar Hindu College and member of
the Karainagar trading community Thiyagarajah was popular. But his
term in parliament was disastrous. He deserted the Tamil Congress
Party in which he contested and joined Sirimavo Bandaranaike
government and supported the 1972 constitution which the Tamils
declared “the Charter of Slavery.” PLOTE,
the new militant group Uma Maheswaran has formed after he was expelled
from the LTTE, requested the UNP candidates to withdraw from the
contest. Thiyagarajah declined. On 24 May two boys, members of the
PLOTE, cycled to his jeep as he was getting into it and shot him. He
died in the Jaffna Hospital. Then they killed Nadarajah, a UNP
organizer. Rigging the Election Jayewardene
decided to go ahead with his plan to capture one or two seats in the
Jaffna District Council. He sent a high
powered government delegation headed by powerful ministers Gamini
Dissanayake and Cyril Mathew, defence secretary Col. C. A. Dharmapala,
additional defence secretary General Sepala Attygala, cabinet
secretary G. V. P. Samarasinghe and Army Chief-of-Staff Brigadier
Tissa Weeratunga to Jaffna, to take any "on the spot
decisions" to subdue the TULF and manage Tamil militants. The UNP
launched a campaign of terror and intimidation. Police
was ordered to keep the peninsula clear of the militants. They
launched a massive operation and detained about 30 Tamil youths. They
were held incommunicado. Amnesty International expressed its concern
about them to Jayewardene and urged him to allow all detainees
immediate access to lawyers and relatives. It also alleged that all
the detainees had been tortured. Four of those detainees filed, for
the first time, Habeas Corpus applications and the Appeal Court ruled
that torture and ill treatment had occurred in two cases. Brigadier
Tissa Weeratunga was shifted to Jaffna to take control of army
operations. He took almost the same group that worked with him in
1979. He converted Subash Hotel into army headquarters. Nachchimar
Kovilady incident of 31 May, police retaliatory attacks of that night,
burning of the Jaffna Public Library on 1 June, and attack on
Chunnakam on 2 June generated a very tense situation in Jaffna. Night
curfew, from 6p.m. to 5a.m., was declared on 3 June. Around
noon on 3 June an additional group of over 250 Sinhala civilian
officers were taken to Jaffna in CTB buses. They were kept in Jaffna
Central College. Two
strange events occurred on the night of 3 June. Mathew and Gamini
visited the Elections Office in Jaffna Secretariat where Elections
Commissioner M. A. Piyasekera and Returning Officer Yogendra Duraisamy
were giving final instructions to the 150 presiding officers of the
polling stations. They took with them the Sinhala civilian officials.
Mathew told Duraisamy that they had no confidence in the Tamil
presiding officers and wanted them replaced with Sinhala officers. When
Duraisamy refused he was given a written order by Defence Secretary
Col. C. A. Dharmapala which directed him to remove the officers
already appointed and replace them with Sinhala officers. Dharmapala
told Duraisamy that he was giving that direction on a directive from
the President. Former
Senator S. Nadesan revealed this a year after the DDC election.
Speaking at the Central YMCA in Colombo at the seminar on “Free and
Fair Election” organized by the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) Nadesan
said, “On the day before the election , the secretary to the
ministry of Defence, on the order of the president, had given certain
directives to the returning officer. One hundred and fifty presiding
officers at the polling booths had been removed and others were
substituted. Some of the substitutes were peons in government offices
who knew nothing of election procedure. At the end of the poll six
ballot boxes were missing.” Senior
elections officers present when this incident took place confirmed
this. The
second strange event was the arrest of Amirthalingam early morning of
4 June. Around 2.45 a.m. on 4 June, the polling day, about 100
policemen surrounded Amirthalingam’s home at Pannakam and the
Inspector who led the party handed to Amirthalingam the arrest warrant
Brigadier Weeratunga, the Competent Authority, had issued. The warrant
stated that he is being taken into custody on the charge of disrupting
the democratic process. Amirthalingam
quipped: On the contrary I am trying to help the democratic process.
The Police Inspector was apologetic. He said he was only carrying out
an order. Amirthalingam
was ordered to sit on a chair in the sitting room while policemen
examined the entire house. He told Parliament on 9 June that even his
wastepaper basket was emptied and every piece of paper in it was
scrutinized. He added the whole operation resembled a major operation
to catch a key militant or a major militant base. Amirthalingam
was then taken to the Gurunagar army camp in Jaffna city and kept in a
room incommunicado. After day-break Jayewardene spoke to him on the
telephone and told him that his arrest had been a mistake and he had
ordered his release. Amirthalingam
told me that he was mystified by his arrest. “Might be, the
President wanted to help me,” Amirthalingam joked. His arrest had in
fact electrified the Tamils. That was one of the reasons for the huge
voter turn out that day. Doubts
still persist about the origin of the arrest order. The common belief
was that Mathew forced Weeratunga to issue the order. Military sources
told me that the decision was taken jointly by Mathew and Gamini. Security
was tightened that day. Police guarded all polling stations and put up
check points. Police and Military strengthened the mobile patrol.
Military escorted the ballot boxes and the civilian officials to the
polling station and stayed there till the polling concluded and
escorted the ballot boxes to the counting centres. Elections law
prescribes polling hours as 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. Counting commences after
all the ballot boxes are received at the Counting Centre. Sarath
Munasinghe who was in charge of the Jaffna city says: “We were ready
at the first light. But it was around 10 a.m. buses carrying the
ballot boxes started moving to the polling stations. By 6 p.m. we
escorted the buses to the Counting Centre.?” On election day, police detained three more leaders: VN Navaratnam,
MP for Chavakachcheri; V Dharmalingham, MP for Manipay; and M
Sivasithambaram, president of the TULF and MP for Nallur. Officials
said there was lot of confusion, arguments and shouting. Sinhala
civilian officials were sent back to the South as soon as the election
was over. At
the Counting Centre there was mayhem. Some ballot boxes had not been
returned which created confusion. Duraiswamy refused to start the
count. Mathew got angry and shouted at him. Piyasekera consulted the
Attorney General who told him that he had no power to invalidate an
election and he should direct the Returning Officer to count the
available votes in the presence of the representatives of the
political parties and independent groups. Duraiswamy,
in his report to the Elections Commissioner, about the election
states: Certain
ballot boxes had arrived late. Certain ballot boxes had not arrived at
all. A substantial number of counting officers had not
confirmed with the requirement that they should submit a written
statement about the number of votes cast at each polling station for
each political party or independent group that contested the
election… The poll had not been conducted in the proper manner. TULF
did not make a fuss about all that because UNP’s violence and antics
had helped it. TULF polled a massive 263,369 votes against UNP’s
paltry 23,302 which failed to get Jayewardene even a single seat.
Tamil Congress fared worse collecting only 21,369 votes. UNP collected
its 23,302 votes by massive impersonation and stuffing of votes. In
one ballot box there were 59 ballot papers, all marked for the UNP and
stuffed in one bundle. Election
Commissioner Piyasekera was unhappy about the government’s attempt
to rig the election and sent in his retirement papers to the President
as a show of protest. Jayewardene accepted the retirement papers and
kept him out of any controversy by appointing him as Sri Lanka’s
ambassador in Rome. DDC
election showed clearly that the Tamils were still with the
democratic, non-violent, moderate TULF. They admired the militants and
adored their attacks on the police but were not prepared to place
their political future on the hands of the handful of brave and daring
youths. Jayewardene failed to learn this simple lesson from the DDC
election. Amirthalingam
and the TULF were prepared to cooperate with Jayewardene and work the
DDCs. The TULF picked efficient men with proven administrative skills
to head the councils under their control. Former Senator Subramanian
Nadarajah was elected the chairman of the Jaffna District Development
Council. Pirapa Leaves Jaffna Neerveli
Bank Robbery, arrests of Thangathurai and Kuttimani and incidents of
state violence during DDC elections resulted in the launching of police
and military crackdown on Tamil militants. Pirapaharan
found it difficult to stay in his normal hideouts in the Jaffna
peninsula. Tired, weak and weary Pirapaharan sought refuge in
Tamil Nadu leaving behind Mahataya to run the LTTE outfit. He
and his ten trusted men traveled to Vetharaniyam by boat on 6 June 1981.
The journey was not smooth. Pirapaharan asked his trusted colleague
M. K. Sivajilingam, of TELO, to arrange a boat for his journey. On the
night of 5 June, when the TULF supporters were celebrating their
election victory lighting fire crackers Pirapaharan and ten of his
confidantes slipped into a house close to the Valvettithurai police
station. The group was armed with a G3 rifle, an AK 47, a sub machine
gun, a shot gun and a few revolvers. Accidentally, a rifle went off.
But fortunately for them the bullet got embedded in a mattress. The
sound was not heard outside. Pirapaharan and his
men stayed indoors the entire day on 6 June. After nightfall they
stealthily moved to the shore when they saw the headlights of an army
jeep. They fell flat on the sand and lay motionless as the jeep
streaked past them. “Inside the boat Pirapaharan fell thoughtful. He looked towards
the receding beach and vowed to himself to avenge the insult
Jayewardene’s armed gang had heaped on the Tamils,” Kittu who
travelled wrote later. The three days- 31May to 2 June- had intensified Pirapaharan’s
resolve to redeem the rights, dignity and honour of the Tamil people.
“The Sinhalese, who with impunity torched Jaffna, the cultural
capital of the Sri Lankan Tamils, who burnt down the Jaffna Library,
should be taught that Tamils would never be their subject race,”
Pirapaharan has told several of his interviewers. The burning of the Hindu
priest in 1958 under S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike rule, The disruption and killing of
nine civilians on the final day of the Fourth International Tamil
Research Conference in 1974 under Sirimavo Bandaranaike rule, and The burning of Jaffna and the
Jaffna Library in 1981 under J. R. Jayewardene regime, Were the three atrocious
events that created and moulded Pirapaharan and fashioned Tamil armed
freedom Struggle. Once in the safety of Tamil Nadu, Pirapaharan made the necessary
preparations to wage the freedom struggle. Since then he had not
wavered, Since then he had not shirked his commitment. He opened safe houses in Sirumalai, Pollachi and Mettur, where
Tiger recruits were taught how to use walkie-talkies and other
wireless communication instruments, and also how to handle arms. Next: Chapter 25. Parliament
Discuss Ways to Kill Amir
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