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Pirapaharan By: T. Sabaratnam 4.
Tamil Mood Toughens The
Federal
Party Working Committee met on 11 July, 1970 at Vavuniya to consider Dr.
de Silva’s message. Thanthai Chelva told the meeting the government
had indicated many positive features in the new constitution and Tamil
representatives should make use of that opportunity. C. Rajadurai, V. N.
Navaratnam and other youths voiced their doubt. “Would it serve any
purpose?” was the question they posed. The
Working Committee decided to organize a consultation with prominent
Tamil persons to determine the question of participation and to identify
the issues to be raised in the Constituent Assembly if they decided to
participate. The
consultation with prominent Tamil lawyers and elders held a week later
at Saiva Mangayar Hall in Colombo decided that all Tamil
parliamentarians should attend the meetings of the Constituent Assembly,
participate in its deliberations, and try to obtain the Tamil demands.
Summing up the conclusions of the 3-hour consultation Thanthai Chelva
said: The
meeting decided to ask the Tamil MPs to attend the Constituent
Assembly and place before it the basic Tamil demands for a
federal state structure, for adequate sharing of power between the
Centre and the Regions, for parity of status for the Tamil language,
that education be imparted in the mother tongue and for strong guarantee
of fundamental rights together with legal remedies against infringement.
An expert committee will be asked to draft and present to the
Constituent Assembly a model constitution. Members
of Parliament met on the invitation of Prime Minister Sirimavo
Bandaranaike at Navarangahala, the Royal College auditorium, on 19 July,
1970 and decided after three days of discussion to convert themselves into a
Constituent Assembly to draft, enact and operate a new constitution.
Opposition Leader J R Jayewardene, Federal Party member S
Kathiravetpillai and Tamil Congress member V. Anandasangaree assured the
cooperation of their parties. The Steering and Subject Committee,
comprising representatives of all parties was set up at the next meeting
to consider the basic resolutions that would form the core structure of
the constitution. Section
1 of the model constitution provided for the federal structure of the
state. It proposed a system comprising a central government and five
regional states. The states were formed on the basis of the economy of
the regions. The economically advanced western and southern provinces were
grouped into one state. Coconut-growing areas of the north-western and
north-central provinces were brought into another state. The tea and
rubber-growing Uva, Sabaragamuva and Central Provinces were grouped into
the third. The northern province and Trincomalee and Batticoloa
districts of the eastern province were grouped into a North-eastern state
and the Muslim majority district of Amparai was to form the South-eastern
state. Section
1 also gave a detailed power-sharing scheme for the Central Government
and the states. The Central government would be run by Parliament and
States by State Assemblies. Members of the State Assemblies would be
directly elected by the people. They would be divided into committees,
each headed by a chairman elected by the members. The chairmen of the
committees would constitute the Board of Ministers and the Board of
Ministers would elect the Chief Minister. The
model constitution allocated to the Central Government the following
subjects: international relations, defence, law and order, police,
citizenship, immigration and emigration, customs, postal and
telecommunication services, ports, sea, air and rail transport,
inter-state roads, electricity, irrigation, weights and measures,
determination of the national policy in health and education, Central
Bank and monetary policy. The rest of the powers were left to the
states. Section
4 proposed that Sinhala and Tamil would be the national languages and
courts in the north and east would function in Tamil and those in the
rest of the country would work in Sinhala and every citizen would have
the right to communicate with the government in his mother tongue.
Section 5 stated that the medium of instruction would be the mother
tongue. Section 3 provided for the fundamental rights with the right to
legal remedy against infringement. The Steering and Subjects Committee, which met regularly from 4 January 1971, did not consider Federal Party’s model constitution. Instead, it considered the Basic Resolutions prepared by the government. It took up Basic Resolution No 1, which read that ‘Sri Lanka would be a free, independent, socialist republic’ on that first day. It was approved unanimously.
Basic
Resolution No 2 which read; ‘The Republic of Sri Lanka shall be a
unitary state’ brought the Federal Party into conflict with the
government. The
Federal
Party’s S. Dharmalingam moved an amendment on 16 March which said Sri
Lanka should be a ‘non-sectarian federal republic’. In an
impassioned plea to the Sinhala leaders, he said communal harmony was a
prerequisite to national harmony and development and argued that only a
federal structure that ensured the self-respect and security of the
Tamil people would provide the environment for concord. Dharmalingam
pleaded; If
you have no mandate to establish a federal constitution, please at least
consider the decentralization of the administration. He
also told the Steering and Subjects Committee; I
wish to make our position very clear. Tamil people have rejected the
unitary constitution from the first parliamentary election held in 1947.
In addition, from 1956 they have voted for a federal constitution. Our
mandate from the Tamil people is for a federal constitution. The
Basic Resolution calling for the establishment of the unitary state was
passed on 27 March 1971. Dharmalingam,
an ardent socialist, was dejected. He told the Tamil press; Today
is an ominous day for Sri Lanka. The trouble with my Sinhala friends is
that that they are concerned only about the Sinhala people and their
interests. They fail to see the Tamil side and refuse to accommodate
their interests. Sinhala
leaders declined to accommodate Tamil interests in the question of
language also. The Basic Resolution about the language stated, "The
official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala as provided by the
Official Language Act No 33 of 1956." By this the government
enshrined in the constitution the Sinhala Only law enacted by S. W. R.
D. Bandaranaike on 5 June 1956. The Federal Party’s request that the laws
concerning the reasonable use of the Tamil language also be enshrined in
the constitution was rejected. Similarly,
superior status was accorded to the Sinhala language regarding enactment
of laws and in the case of the language of courts. The Basic Resolution on
the language of legislation stated that all laws should be enacted in
Sinhala and their Tamil translations be provided. The Federal Party’s
request that that all laws be enacted in Sinhala and Tamil was rejected.
The Basic Resolution concerning the language of courts made Sinhala
the language of courts countrywide. The Federal Party’s plea that courts
in the northern and eastern provinces be allowed to conduct their
affairs in Tamil was turned down. Federal
Party’s Udupiddy MP, K. Jayakody's, plea; “At least permit the courts in
the north and east to conduct their proceedings in Sinhala and Tamil,”
was not entertained. To
cap all this, Buddhism was provided a superior position, doing away
with the secular aspects of the earlier constitution. The Basic Resolution
on Buddhism read; "The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism
the foremost place and, accordingly, it shall be the duty of the state to
protect and foster Buddhism, while assuring to all religions the rights
granted by section 18[1] [d]." The
constitution
makers did not stop at that. They dropped the safeguards Section 29 of
the Soulbury Constitution provided to the minority communities against
discrimination. Section 29 (2c) prohibited Parliament from enacting laws
that “confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or
advantage which is not conferred on persons of other communities or
religions.” Though the courts failed to act on this safeguard when
Indian Tamils were disfranchised and when Sinhala was made the official
language, the Sirimao Bandaranaike government felt that its retention in the
constitution would harm the Sinhala interest in the future. They also
made the Parliament supreme, thus consolidating Sinhala power. Tamils Lose Faith The
hard line taken by the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government produced a
strong reaction among the Tamil people, especially the youth. Tamils
lost faith in the Sinhalese. Their mood hardened. The youths resumed
their campaign demanding that the Federal Party quit the Constituent
Assembly. “Why are you still attending the Constituent Assembly when
your requests are turned down?” they asked. The irrepressible
Suntharalingam issued a statement; We
asked you not to go. We told you that you would be outvoted. You went.
See what had happened? You have been outvoted. Your voice had not been
heard. As we warned, you have only weakened the Tamil cause. Amirthalingam
who had been assigned by the Federal Party the task of answering
Suntharalingam’s criticisms was at a loss when pressmen contacted him
to get a reply. He confided on an off the record basis; What
is the answer I can give? We have been let down even by the leftists in
the government. We look a set of fools in the eyes of the youths. The
Federal Party had no way out. On 21 June Thanthai Chelva announced the Federal Party’s decision to quit the Constituent Assembly. Thanthai
Chelva issued the following statement; We
moved several amendments regarding the nature of the constitution,
citizenship rights and other fundamental rights. All these amendments
were rejected. I sought an interview with the Prime Minister with a view
to arriving at a compromise to the problems which had to be settled not
by a majority of votes but by mutual adjustment and agreement. Our
interviews with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Constitutional
Affairs and others do not appear to have produced the desired results.
We are always willing to compromise for the sake of agreed settlement of
the vexed question. We indicated to the Prime Minister and Minister of
Constitutional Affairs the minimum rights we want embodied in the
constitution. Although our discussions were cordial and our views
apparently received serious consideration, yet they were not prepared to
make any alteration to the Basic Resolutions as they stand. Youths
treated the Federal Party’s decision to pull out of the Constituent
Assembly as their victory. They started talking openly that the path of
cooperation with the Sinhala community had ended and a new
confrontational approach had to be adopted. But, except for a handful,
others were talking about non-violent struggle. Lessons from Revolts Two
events that profoundly affected the Tamil youths occurred during 1971
when the Constituent Assembly was busy drawing up the constitution. The
first, the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) insurrection happened during
March – April and the second, the Bangladesh War, in December. Tamils
in general, and Tamil leaders in particular, were not concerned when the
JVP insurrection broke out. They considered it a wholly Sinhala affair,
a conflict involving two Sinhala factions, the Sirimavo Bandaranaike
government and neglected Sinhala youths. Tamils were not directly
involved. They
showed keen interest in the Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) freedom
movement from the inception. They were interested in it because India
got involved and fought the third Indo–Pakistan war. It resulted in the
creation of a new state, Bangladesh. Preparations
for the JVP insurrection and the Bangladesh freedom struggle commenced
in 1970. The basic causes for both revolutions were similar, the
relative backwardness and the resulting discontent among the people In
southern Sri Lanka, the rallying slogan was: To us they give coconut
milk; to Colombo people cow milk. In Bangladesh, the rallying cry was the
exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan. The
JVP attack commenced on 5 April morning in Monaragala and Wellawaya. It
was planned for the evening but the misinterpretation of a message
caused confusion. The JVP leadership, which met at the Vidyodaya
Sangaharamaya on 2 April decided to launch their attacks on police
stations and army camps island-wide at 5 pm on the evening of 5 April. A
coded telegram was sent on 4 April saying "JVP Appuhamy expired,
funeral 5". The signal for the attack was the pop song "Neela
Kobeyya", played over the state-owned radio, Sri Lanka Broadcasting
Corporation. Leaders from Wellawaya and Moneragala started the attack on
the police stations in the early morning and the government alerted the police
countrywide. The police readied themselves to meet the offence. They set
up defensive positions. Realizing their mistake, the JVP then advanced its
attack.
Groups
of 25 to 30 youths, armed with home-made petrol bombs and grenades,
surrounded the police stations on all sides and attacked them. About 93
of the island’s 273 police stations in the country fell. The
government evacuated many more police stations located in the most
vulnerable areas.
The
rebels were poorly armed, untrained and often badly led. Their major
weapon was the surprise element and, once the initial attack was repulsed,
the government forces regrouped and launched devastating counter
attacks. The government also called out the army and appealed for
international help. Many countries responded and India sent helicopters
and crack paratroopers. The
armed forces struck back and within three weeks they had broken the back of
the insurgents, and by the end of the year some 18,000 insurgents and
their sympathizers were in prison camps.
Official figures put the total killed at 5,000, while the accepted
unofficial figure is around 25,000. Atrocities and summary executions
were alleged, but the government denied them. Eastern
Pakistan was more populous than the Western wing, but political power
since independence had rested with the western elite. Significant national revenues
were spent to develop the West at the expense of the
East. The people of the Eastern wing felt increasingly dominated and
exploited by the West. Friction between the two wings surfaced. Pakistan
had undergone marked political instability and economic difficulties since
its birth. Civilian political rule failed and the government was
dominated by its military, which was rooted in the West. This caused considerable resentment in East Pakistan
and a charismatic Bengali leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, most forcefully
articulated that resentment. He formed a political party called the Awami
League and demanded more autonomy for East Pakistan within the Pakistan
Federation. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League won 167 seats out of
313 National Assembly seats at the general elections held in 1970. This
entitled Rehman to form the Pakistan government, but the ruling elite in
West Pakistan arrested him and banned his party. All
of East Pakistan rose in revolt. President Yahya Khan sent his junior
General Tikka Khan to handle the situation. He ordered a crackdown on 25
March 1971 Many
of Rehman’s aides and more than 10 million Bengali refugees fled to
India, where they established a provisional government. Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi decided in April to help the Bengali freedom
fighters, especially the Mukti Bahini, to liberate Eastern Pakistan.
Mukti Bahini set up a chain of camps along Eastern Pakistan’s border,
well inside the Indian territory. The Pakistani army shelled these
camps, which
resulted in clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces. Pakistan
threatened to open a front on the west and on 3 December Indira Gandhi
declared war on Pakistan. The
combined Indian-Bengali forces soon overwhelmed Pakistan's army
contingent in the East. Pakistan's forces surrendered on 16 December 1971
and a new nation, Bangladesh, was born. The
fledgling Tamil militants looked at the JVP misadventure and the birth
of Bangladesh for lessons. A former Tamil militant now living in Canada
said they analysed both events in depth. They were encouraged by both.
“They were vitamin tonic for all of us,” he said. The
JVP revolt, he said, boosted their confidence that they could take on the
Sri Lankan government: The
JVP revolt was a moral booster. We learnt from it that the state could
be taken on. Given motivation, grit, weapons and leadership the state
could be effectively challenged. He
said they concluded that the JVP revolt was amateurish, their weaponry
poor, their training minimal, their leadership weak, and their strategy faulty. He said: The
second lesson we learnt was that one should not take territory if it
cannot be held. What JVP committed was suicide. They “liberated”
large extent of territory and when the police and the army regrouped and
counter attacked,
they bolted. We adopted the well-tested urban guerilla
warfare of hit and run based on this lesson. Drawing
lessons from the Bangladeshi
war was more tricky. It was not as simple as the Federal Party leaders and
their youth agitators like Mavai Senathirajah, Kasi Ananthan, Vannai
Anandan and Kovai Mahesan preached. The
Federal
Party congratulated Indira Gandhi on the Bangladesh victory and held a
seven-party rally in Kankesanthurai on 12 January 1972 to celebrate the
victory. Youth leaders told the gathering that India would do a
Bangladesh operation in Sri Lanka to help the Tamils establish a
separate state. But they failed to comprehend the fact that Indian
troops were able to infiltrate into East Pakistan along with the
different armed Bangladeshi groups, Mukti Bahini being the biggest and
most organized. In addition, the Federal Party still held that their mode of struggle was
the 1961-type satyagraha. Amirthalingam
was the only one who went closer to armed struggle. He was careful. He
talked only in general terms. He said; Time
has come for the Tamils of this country to wage a clear-cut struggle for
a totally separate state and for which they should not hesitate to gain
foreign assistance. Independence cannot be bought from a shop. It has to
be won through a hard struggle, if necessary a bloody struggle. Amirthlingam
also called upon the Tamil people to unite and said they should follow
the example set by the people of Bangladesh. Militants
analyzed the Bangladesh war much deeper. They concluded: India
will never help Sri Lankan Tamils to attain their goal of a
separate
state. They
reasoned that India helped the Bangladeshi people to break away from
Pakistan because that weakened their enemy. Since partition, India had
to deal with an enemy on its western and eastern borders. After its
clash with China it had an enemy on its north. It helped the break up of
Bangladesh so that it would not have an enemy in the east. In
Sri Lanka the situation is different. If India helped the break-up of Sri
Lanka it may have a friendly neighbour, Tamil Eelam, but would be left
with an unfriendly Sri Lanka which could join India’s enemies. India
would not help the birth of Tamil Eelam, the militants concluded. That was
India’s position then and that is India’s position now. Next: 5.
Tamil Youths Turn Assertive
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