Tamils should recall old lessons: only inflicting pain pays
by J. S. Tissainayagam - Comment, Northeastern Monthly, October 8, 2004

Tamils have forgotten a golden rule that has come down during the 20-year armed struggle, between the Tamil guerrilla groups and the Sri Lankan state. In the 1980s, before signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987, every initiative taken by President J. R. Jayewardene’s government to engage the Tamil groups in discussions was based on it. So it was after the Accord, culminating in the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA).

The golden rule was that only when the multiplicity of Tamil armed groups before 1987, and the LTTE after it, were able to inflict hurt on the Sri Lankan government would the latter agree to talks for a political settlement. It was the violence and losses, in lives, property and prestige, which forced the government to agree to discussions such as the all parties’ conference (APC), Thimphu talks, Political Parties Conference etc. In 2000 it was the devastating attack on the Katunayake international airport coming on top of the military debacle at Elephant Pass that compelled the UNF government to negotiate the ceasefire with the Tigers.

What is the situation today? With the signing of the CFA the only effective weapon the Tamils knew, or had sufficiently explored, to force the Sri Lankan government to come to the negotiating table had become unusable. The signing of the CFA neutralised the one means the Tigers possessed for taking the initiative and compelling the government to fall in line. After the CFA, the LTTE could only use threats such as establishing a camp at Kurangupaanjaan, or taking into custody military personnel straying into areas of its jurisdiction, or holding military exercises within areas of its control. But that sort of bluffing hardly sufficed. The Tamil rebels lost the initiative they had once enjoyed, which had gone entirely to the Sri Lankan state supported by is international backers.

With the ceasefire in place, and reluctant to resume violence to wrest the initiative back in its favour, the weapons available now to the LTTE are politics and diplomacy to apply pressure on the government to consider favourably demands for an interim self-governing authority (ISGA) and of course for the fulfilment of the residue of the state’s obligations under the CFA.

In certain liberation struggles conditions favour the using of political tactics to grab the initiative from the enemy without having to resort to intense and sustained military effort. An example of this is the ‘rolling demonstrations’ is South Africa. The violence unleashed by sections of the ANC was supported and enhanced by the civil disobedience and non-cooperation campaigns carried out by the blacks against their white masters. Strikes, pickets, go-slows and other actions crippled industry, agriculture, administration and normal, day-to-day life. Though the South African state responded to the campaign conventionally at first by using the law, police, prisons and the armed forces to overcome the resistance, it was no avail.

This was because the South African economy and political institutions could not function due to the widespread civil disobedience and selective violence. The ruling classes were further retarded by the economic sanctions. Collectively these measures took a terrible toll on the stability of the state. The pressure, assisted no doubt by the presence of Nelson Mandela, led to President F. W. de Klerk to agree to begin negotiations.

The LTTE however does not have such advantages. The Tamils are not numerically the majority community in Sri Lanka nor do they control the commanding heights of the economy, the sabotaging of which could bring a country to its knees. However, this does not mean there is initiative entirely impossible because means indeed are available, but there should be the will to exploit it successfully.

It was believed that the LTTE’s non-participation in the Tokyo summit in April 2003, where donor nations pledged US$ 4.5 billion, would force funds to be withheld from Sri Lanka till progress was made in resurrecting the peace talks. The LTTE hoped this would exert enough pressure on the then UNF government, which had economic growth as its primary goal. However, the UNF was out-manoeuvred by President Chandrika Kumaratunga and in the elections that followed, the UPFA government that came into office emphasised Sinhala nationalism and security, rather than economic growth as being on the top of its hierarchy of objectives.

Kumaratunga’s inflexibility on conceding anything tangible to the Tamils regarding the interim administration, and the skilful diplomacy undertaken by her envoys led the international community to believe that if the US$ 4.5 billion was unavailable, a substitute had to be found to prop up this redoubtable nemesis of the LTTE. Therefore, it was decided by individual countries to extend funding such as the Indian line of credit. Negotiations are also on to find out as to whether monies from the U.S government’s Millennium Exchange Fund could be released. Similarly, some of the multilateral and bilateral donors are making smaller amounts of funding available. These put together appears sufficient for the government to survive.

Under these circumstances it will be very important for the LTTE to lobby donors about the political situation in Sri Lanka and explore ways to see whether part of the money at least could be withheld. This pressure need not necessarily be applied by the LTTE on multilateral institutions directly but through institutions and organisations specialised in that job.

Second, unlike in the early 1980s when there was formidable support for the Tamils in United Nations forums, such is not the case now. Though introducing motions to embarrass the Sri Lanka government might be more difficult today than it was 20 years ago, effective work is possible in the various committees in the UN system dealing with human rights, humanitarian work and a host of others, most of which hardly sees a sustained input by Tamils. Such work should be systematically and effectively undertaken by influential members of the diaspora, which should be supported by appropriate information network that is not in existence now.

There is also no effective attempt to embarrass Sri Lankan leaders when they go overseas. President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s visit to New York should have been greeted by a militant Tamil diaspora, but there was nothing. The tempo should be upped to the point that Sri Lankan leaders feel reluctant to go overseas because of the reception they receive from Tamil expatriates. The Ponguthamil in Toronto was an exception, but such campaigns should be sustained.

Lobbying has to be undertaken in western and other capitals on a systematic basis. Is there a permanent system of lobbying available on Capitol Hill and Westminster for the LTTE? What about the Tiger campaigns in countries of the EU, Japan and India? The only lobby that appears to be on is that undertaken by the more articulate MPs of the TNA who go overseas to appraise foreign offices of different countries about what is happening in Sri Lanka. But that is inadequate. Permanent lobby groups do not operate that way. They know politics in their countries well and strike at the most opportune time that makes the effort productive.

Only a sophisticated political engagement could successfully exploit the contradictions arising from the national interests of foreign countries – economic, geo-strategic or diplomatic. It is only a creative and nimble lobbyist who uses these contradictions with telling effect, not one who limits his or her campaign to despatching delegations to foreign capitals to do damage control.

Though the Tamils are not a majority community as the blacks in South Africa, sustained non-cooperation, such as the hartals in the northeast have rendered dividends in the past. They could be tried out, especially if it affects communities other than the Tamils, though its success cannot be predicted.

There is a school of thought that the LTTE should put forward the plight of the Tamil people to gain the sympathy of other countries. The argument is that displacement, human rights violations etc that the Tamils have been experiencing after the CFA should be put forward to force leaderships in other countries to pressurise the Sri Lanka government to commence negotiations on ISGA. This school of thought also believes that for this moral argument to be sustained, the LTTE should stop its alleged human rights abuses.

This course of action however is unlikely to work. It does not hurt the government sufficiently and bring pressure upon it. The CFA ensures that human rights violations that occurred during the fighting – killing, disappearances, torture and draconian legislation – are no longer on the cards. Therefore, moving the international community because of human rights abuse is much more difficult now than in the past. Successive Sri Lanka governments’ lobbying and the international community’s safety nets have seen to it that the suffering of the Tamils will not receive world headlines. And even if they do, they could be neutralised by allegations of the LTTE recruiting children, killing political enemies and abduction.

The Tamils have to realise there is a dangerous situation brewing in southern Sri Lanka. With the failure of the national advisory body on peace and reconciliation (NACPR) the president has reached an impasse on restarting negotiations. Under these circumstances she might have no other option but to drag things on indefinitely. The prospects for this are enhanced with 2005 expected to be an election year. The ball now is in the LTTE’s court to restart negotiations by applying pressure on the government.