By
Professor
Alvappillai
Veluppillai,
2003
Introduction
In
my
view
a
common
thread
running
through
the
history
of
the
Sri
Lankan
ethnic
conflict
in
the
post-independence
period
is
the
Buddhist
fear
of
the
Tamil
demand
for
sharing
as
one
nation,
two
states,
and
with
equal
individual
opportunity.
There
is
fear
on
both
sides
now
and
there
was
probably
some
fear
even
at
the
time
of
independence.
In
the
Tamil
perspective,
the
majority
Buddhists
and
the
Sinhalese
could
have
been
magnanimous,
accommodative,
and
reassuring.
There
can
be
a
peaceful
solution
to
the
conflict
only
if
this
angle
is
understood.
The
ethnic
problem
in
Sri
Lanka
is
curious
in
that
it
can
be
described
as
a
conflict
of
the
Buddhists
versus
the
Tamils.
Some
foreigners,
even
some
foreign
scholars
and
journalists
find
it
difficult
to
understand
this
equation
and
substitute
the
Buddhists
versus
the
Hindus.
The
Sri
Lanka
Buddhist
clergy
and
laymen
target
the
Tamils
and
almost
never
the
Hindus
as
such.
The
Buddhist
monks
also
spearhead
the
Sinhala
nationalist
movements.
There
is
no
Hindu
clergy
counterpart
in
the
Tamil
national
movement.
The
Pali
chronicles
also
speak
about
the
Tamil
invaders
of
the
Buddhist
kingdom,
and
they
refer
to
the
Buddhist
kings
(even
though
they
could
be
wicked),
who
defeated
the
Tamil
kings
(even
though
they
might
have
been
righteous),
as
heroes.
Probably
self-government
is
always
preferable
to
good
government.
What
the
Buddhists
find
difficult
to
digest
is
that
even
the
Tamils
could
hold
on
to
this
maxim.
Immediately
before
and
after
independence,
the
Buddhists
appear
to
have
talked
about
an
inclusive
nationalism,
as
it
was
directed
mainly
against
foreign
rule
and
the
English.
By
1956
it
became
exclusive
as
it
was
directed
against
a
perceived
domination
by
the
Tamils
and
possible
future
domination
by
Tamils
also.
The
1972
Constitution
went
further
and
focused
on
Buddhism,
obviously
to
please
the
Buddhist
clergy.
The
Republic
of
Sri
Lanka
were
to
give
Buddhism
the
foremost
place
and
it
became
the
duty
of
the
State
to
protect
and
foster
the
Buddha
Sasana.
The
1978
Constitution
tried
to
accommodate
the
claims
of
Tamil
and
English
as
official
languages
to
some
extent
but
the
clause
regarding
Buddhism
was
retained
in
toto.
The
proposed
Constitution
of
the
P.A.
government
of
2000
tried
to
make
the
clause
regarding
Buddhism,
an
entrenched
clause
in
the
Constitution,
requiring
a
2/3
majority
in
parliament
and
the
approval
of
the
country
at
a
referendum
for
amendment.
This
also
spoke
about
the
setting
up
of
a
Supreme
Council
in
consultation
with
the
Maha
Sangha
and
consulting
it
in
all
matters
pertaining
to
the
protection
and
fostering
of
the
Buddha
Sasana.
If
this
clause
were
to
become
an
entrenched
clause,
this
could
be
interpreted
in
different
ways
to
harm
non-Buddhists,
especially
the
Tamils.
The
government
probably
calculated
that
its
proposals
regarding
devolution
would
not
face
opposition
from
the
Buddhist
clergy,
if
they
found
that
the
clause
regarding
Buddhism
was
entrenched
in
the
Constitution.
If
this
clause
were
to
continue,
then
the
provisions,
elsewhere
in
the
proposed
constitution,
that
assure
equality
of
all
religions
would
be
incompatible
with
this,
and
would
therefore
become
meaningless.
Conferring
a
superior
status
to
the
religion
of
one
group
of
citizens
over
that
of
others
is
of
much
greater
consequence
than
even
the
question
of
what
powers
would
be
delegated
to
the
regional
councils.
Here
again,
there
seems
to
be
a
fear
to
accept
the
situation
that
the
state
should
treat
all
citizens
alike.
The
P.A.
government
brought
forward
an
Equal
Opportunities
Bill
a
couple
of
years
ago
in
the
parliament
and
then
withdrew
it
because
there
was
much
opposition
to
accepting
equal
opportunity
for
all
citizens.
The
clause
giving
Buddhism
the
foremost
place
among
religions
in
the
country
and
stipulating
a
duty
of
the
State
to
foster
and
protect
the
Sasana
will
make
the
Buddhists
who
form
about
2/3
of
the
population
of
the
country,
practically
a
high
caste
ruling
elite.
The
attempt
to
make
it
an
entrenched
clause
signifies
that
a
substantial
section
of
the
population
are
very
unhappy
about
this
position
and
they
might
try
to
overturn
this
position
and
this
overturning
has
to
be
made
very
difficult.
It
is
divisive
clauses
like
this
that
lead
to
perpetual
conflict
in
a
multilingual
and
multireligious
society.
The
Buddhists
can
have
their
organizations
to
protect
and
foster
the
Sasana
and
contribute
to
them.
It
is
unfair
to
force
non-Buddhists
who
form
about
1/3
of
the
population
of
the
country
to
pay
for
the
pleasure
of
the
other
2/3
of
the
population.
The
Buddhist
clergy
should
agree
to
let
the
State
treat
all
its
citizens
and
ethnic
groups
alike.
The
difference
between
the
Buddhist
and
the
Tamil
perspective
The
difference
in
perspective
between
the
Buddhists
and
the
Tamils
about
how
far
back
we
have
to
go
to
bring
back
peace
is
very
significant.
The
Buddhists
will
be
suggesting
1976
if
not
1983,
when
the
TULF
opted
for
an
independent
state
for
the
Tamils
and
when
militant
movements
originated
among
the
Tamils.
The
Tamils
will
be
suggesting
1948
if
not
1956
when
tentative
steps
were
taken
for
the
restoration
of
a
Sinhalese
Buddhist
state.
In
the
Tamil
perspective,
the
Tamils
were
pushed
to
the
limits
of
desperation
to
demand
separation
and
to
take
up
arms
in
the
1970s.
The
Sinhalese
started
to
fight
against
imaginary
Tamil
separatism
in
1957
when
the
Provincial
Council,
which
Bandaranayake
agreed
to
set
up
in
the
North-East
(which
was
much
less
than
Federalism),
was
blown
up
as
a
separate
Tamil
State
by
its
Sinhalese
opponents
of
the
UNP
and
others.
The
Sinhalese
opponents
of
the
SLFP
and
others
campaigned
against
imaginary
Tamil
separatism
again
in
1968
when
Dudley
Senanayake
agreed
to
set
up
District
Councils
in
the
North-East.
During
the
late
fifties
and
the
late
sixties,
some
Tamil
politicians
put
forward
the
claim
for
a
separate
state
for
the
Tamils.
C.
Suntharalingam,
the
then
popular
MP
for
Vavuniya,
was
the
first
to
campaign
for
a
separate
country
in
the
late
fifties.
The
Tamil
FP
campaigned
against
his
demand,
characterising
it
as
extremism,
and
soon
he
lost
even
his
seat.
When
the
District
Council
bill
was
abandoned,
V.
Navaratnam,
MP
for
Kayts,
defected
from
the
FP
and
started
the
Self-Rule
Movement,
to
establish
a
separate
country
for
the
Tamils.
In
the
1970
elections,
the
FP
put
forward
a
loyal
candidate
against
him
and
got
him
defeated
in
his
electorate.
These
are
instances
to
show
that
Tamil
nationalism
continued
to
be
inclusive.
The
Tamils
continued
to
have
hopes
of
a
fair
settlement
within
a
united
country.
In
the
ethnic
conflict
of
Sri
Lanka,
the
issue
of
majority
versus
minority
is
very
important.
About
a
fourth
of
the
people
speak
Tamil.
Only
about
half
of
them
are
Tamils
of
indigenous
origin.
Regionally
the
Tamils
are
the
majority
in
the
North-East
while
the
Sinhalese
are
the
majority
in
the
South-West.
It
is
the
North-East
Tamil
majority
who
have
been
fighting,
trying
to
remain
afloat,
without
getting
lost
and
losing
their
identity.
They
have
been
putting
forward
various
demands
to
be
able
to
share
power
and
to
have
equal
opportunity.
The
history
of
the
ethnic
problem
during
the
last
six
decades
could
be
described
as
the
Tamils
trying
to
share
power.
Even
the
demand
for
separation
is
an
attempt
to
share
the
island,
if
the
Buddhists
could
not
agree
to
share
power
and
wanted
to
hold
on
to
a
virtual
Sinhala
Buddhist
state.
In
the
Tamil
perspective,
which
has
become
hardened
after
half
a
century
of
oppression
and
two
decades
of
civil
war,
the
Tamils,
who
could
have
settled
down
for
compromise
solutions
in
the
fifties
and
the
sixties,
have
begun
to
feel
that
they
are
a
people
or
a
nation.
They
have
their
own
language,
culture
and
historical
habitat
within
the
island.
They
are
loyal
to
their
motherland
and
that
is
why
they
have
been
fighting
for
the
last
two
decades.
If
Sinhalese
nationalism
continues
to
be
exclusive,
it
is
doubtful
whether
unity
will
ever
return
to
the
island.
If
Sinhalese
nationalism
can
be
inclusive,
a
genuine
attempt
must
be
made
to
make
possible
real
power-sharing.
As
a
people,
the
Tamils
want
to
be
treated
as
equals
of
the
Sinhalese,
another
people.
Independence
implies
equality
before
the
law
and
equal
opportunity
in
the
country.
The
Tamils
believe
in
the
sovereignty
of
the
people.
State
comes
into
being
by
the
free
will
of
the
people.
If
the
present
state
caters
to
one
people
exclusively,
the
other
people
should
have
a
right
to
establish
a
state
of
their
own
and
share
the
island.
The
unity
of
the
country
and
the
territorial
integrity
of
the
country
can
be
preserved
if
constitutional
arrangements
are
so
made
and
governments
are
so
carried
on
as
to
enable
the
Tamils
to
have
equality
and
equal
opportunity.
In
the
Tamil
perspective,
the
Buddhist
talk
about
the
unity
and
territorial
integrity
of
the
country
appears
hypocritical
because
the
proper
course
for
establishing
the
unity
of
the
country
is
to
win
over
all
sections
of
the
people
of
the
country.
If
all
sections
of
the
people
of
the
country
can
be
made
to
feel
they
have
a
stake
in
the
unity
of
the
country,
then
there
will
be
unity
and
territorial
integrity.
The
Buddhists
want
to
have
the
land
of
the
North-East,
but
not
its
people.
They
dont
care
for
the
misery
of
the
people
there
under
the
long
civil
war
and
the
prolonged
military
occupation,
if
land
can
be
brought
under
the
control
of
the
State
and
ultimately
under
their
control.
Some
Buddhist
monks
perform
bodhi
pujas
and
bless
the
armed
forces
to
bring
unity
by
conquest
and
military
occupation.
The
Tamils
have
been
at
the
receiving
end
of
all
this;
they
have
been
treated
as
foreign
enemies.
Military
atrocities
against
the
Tamil
civilians
very
rarely
received
any
attention
from
the
State
or
from
the
media
controlled
by
the
Sinhalese
because
it
was
considered
unpatriotic
to
condemn
them
or
to
take
action
against
them.
Political
demands
and
pragmatism
The
Tamils
have
put
forward
various
demands
during
the
last
60
years:-
fifty-
fifty,
parity
of
status,
federalism,
separation
and
self-determination.
It
is
too
simplistic
to
say
that
the
Sinhalese
are
always
for
unity
and
the
Tamils
are
always
for
separation.
The
Tamils
began
to
demand
even
federalism
rather
gradually.
What
they
want
is
power-sharing
and
equal
opportunity.
At
the
time
of
the
Soulbury
Commission
in
the
1940s,
the
Tamils
demanded
fifty-fifty,
-
50%
representatives
for
the
Sinhalese
and
50%
representatives
for
the
non-Sinhalese,
-a
form
of
balanced
representation
in
a
unitary
constitution
so
that
the
Sinhalese
cannot
dominate
all
the
others
combined.
The
Buddhist
revival
under
Anagarika
Dharmapala
has
given
the
Sinhalese
the
ideology
of
a
Sinhala
Buddhist
state.
The
Tamils
feared
that
the
Sinhalese
would
use
their
political
power
to
oppress
other
sections
of
the
people
of
the
country.
They
had
a
bad
experience
in
1936
when
the
Executive
Committee
system
was
manipulated
to
establish
a
Pan-Sinhalese
Ministry.
To
form
a
government,
the
Sinhalese
should
be
able
to
get
the
cooperation
of
at
least
one
or
two
members
from
the
other
communities
so
that
the
government
will
not
ride
rough-sod
over
the
other
communities.
The
Tamils
were
thinking
primarily
of
equal
opportunity
for
all
individuals
and
trying
to
secure
that
position
within
the
unitary
constitution.
After
independence,
the
Tamil
demand
became
parity
of
status
for
Sinhala
and
Tamil
languages
under
a
unitary
constitution.
The
Tamils
felt
that
parity
of
status
would
ensure
equality
of
the
speakers
of
the
two
main
languages
of
the
country
as
well
as
equal
opportunity
for
individuals.
The
Buddhists
argued
that
parity
of
status
would
lead
to
the
disappearance
of
Sinhalese
language
and
as
a
consequence,
of
Buddhism
itself
from
the
island.
This
irrational
argument
swept
through
the
Sinhalese
electorate.
The
major
parties
opted
for
Sinhalese
only
and
then
the
Marxist
parties
also
followed
suit
later.The
Tamils
began
to
vote
for
the
FP
in
large
numbers
from
1956
and
continued
to
do
so
till
1970.
Federalism
can
provide
for
"one
country,
two
states,
and
equal
opportunity".
In
the
Tamil
perspective,
the
demand
for
federalism
was
a
Tamil
realization
that
the
Sinhalese
wanted
a
restoration
of
the
Sinhalese
state
and
in
that
set-up
there
could
not
be
equality
of
different
nationalities
and
equality
of
opportunity
for
all
individuals.
The
demand
for
a
Tamil
state
was
to
provide
for
equality
as
a
nationality.
The
word
state
can
mean
either
a
country
or
a
unit
in
a
federation.
To
avoid
confusion,
country
is
used
for
an
independent
country
and
state
is
used
for
a
unit
in
a
federation
in
this
paper.
Even
after
the
establishment
of
a
federation,
where
states
will
provide
for
some
form
of
power-sharing,
equality
of
opportunity
for
individuals
in
the
central
or
federal
government
have
to
be
worked
out.
The
unity
of
a
country
can
be
preserved
even
under
a
federal
constitution.
Even
though
there
are
many
countries
with
federal
constitutions
and
they
remain
united,
this
demand
was
portrayed
to
the
Sinhalese
electorate
as
a
demand
for
dismemberment
of
their
country.
The
question
of
unitary
constitution
versus
federal
constitution
is
really
a
question
of
monopoly
of
power
for
the
Buddhists
or
the
Buddhists
sharing
power
with
the
other
groups.
The
Sinhalese
leaders
and
the
Buddhist
clergy
vehemently
opposed
the
federal
demand,
equating
it
to
separation.
Any
gain
to
the
Tamils
is
portrayed
as
a
loss
to
the
Sinhalese.
As
the
Tamils
were
demanding
federalism,
it
was
perceived
as
an
evil
to
which
the
Sinhalese
should
never
agree.
The
Buddhists
have
never
made
an
attempt
to
understand
federalism
or
to
explain
the
concept
of
federalism
to
the
Sinhalese
electorate.
But
the
Tamil
leaders
were
not
at
all
intransigent.
They
were
ready
to
settle
for
much
less,
when
the
relationship
between
the
two
peoples
had
not
yet
been
embittered
by
a
long
drawn
out
conflict.
The
Federal
Party
tried
to
be
pragmatic
and
tried
to
make
compromises.
In
1957,
it
came
to
an
agreement
with
Bandaranayake
known
as
the
Bandaranayake
-
Chelvanayagam
Pact.
A
form
of
provincial
autonomy
for
the
North-East
with
Tamil
as
the
administrative
language
was
found
to
be
agreeable
for
both
leaders.
Though
it
was
far
short
of
federalism,
the
Federal
Party
was
willing
to
compromise
in
the
interests
of
peace
and
asked
the
Tamil
people
to
accept
it
as
an
interim
measure.
This
provincial
autonomy
could
have
been
established
under
a
unitary
constitution.
The
compromise
solution
was
portrayed
by
the
U.N.P.
as
a
betrayal
of
the
Sinhalese
to
the
Tamils
and
as
giving
away
of
1/3
of
the
country
to
the
Tamils.
The
Buddhist
monks
marched
to
Bandaranayakes
residence
and
demanded
that
Bandaranayake
abrogate
the
Pact.
Bandaranayake
obliged
them
and
an
opportunity
for
peace
was
lost.
The
Tamil
leadership
climbed
down
to
be
pragmatic.
But
the
result
was
nothing.
The
Federal
Party
tried
to
be
kingmaker
twice
in
the
1960s
to
find
justice
for
the
Tamils.
In
the1960
March
elections,
neither
of
the
two
main
parties
obtained
an
absolute
majority.
The
UNP,
with
the
largest
number
of
seats,
formed
the
government.
The
SLFP
obtained
the
support
of
the
Federal
Party
to
defeat
the
government,
promising
to
redress
the
Tamil
grievances.
In
the
1960
July
elections,
the
SLFP
came
to
power
with
an
absolute
majority
and
formed
the
government.
There
were
talks
between
the
government
and
the
FP
but
the
government
was
not
prepared
for
any
compromise
solution.
This
effort
of
the
Tamil
leadership
resulted
in
nothing
again.
In
the
1965
elections
there
was
a
stalemate
in
the
parliament
again
and
this
time
the
UNP
with
the
largest
number
of
seats
came
to
an
agreement
with
the
FP,
known
as
the
Dudley
Senanayake
Chelvanayagam
Pact.
In
return
for
giving
full
support
to
the
government,
Dudley
Senanayake
agreed
to
District
level
autonomy
with
Tamil
as
the
administrative
language
in
the
North-East.
The
FP
agreed
to
have
much
less
than
even
what
Bandaranayake
offered
in
1957.
Instead
of
a
big
provincial
council
in
the
North-East
with
administration
in
Tamil,
the
new
scheme
envisaged
the
already
existing
districts
in
the
North-East
to
have
local
assemblies,
with
elected
representatives,
conducting
their
affairs
in
Tamil.
This
arrangement
could
have
worked
under
a
unitary
set-up.
Though
there
were
serious
misgivings
among
a
section
of
the
Federal
Party
that
it
was
too
little,
the
party
leaders
argued
that
the
Tamils
should
accept
it,
and
then
try
to
build
on
it
in
the
future.
When
the
District
Councils
bill
came
up
for
debate
in
1969,
the
then
opposition
and
a
section
of
the
government
opposed
it
strongly,
using
the
arguments
which
the
UNP
used
in
1957.
The
Buddhist
clergy
was
at
the
fore-front,
demanding
the
rejection
of
the
bill.
They
were
not
willing
to
betray
the
Sinhalese
to
the
Tamils
and
they
should
not
hand
over
1/3
of
the
country
to
the
Tamils.
Dudley
Senanayake
could
not
stand
up
to
the
pressure
from
the
extremists
and
withdrew
the
bill.
Again,
the
Tamils
gained
nothing.
Another
important
opportunity
to
redress
the
Tamil
grievances
had
been
missed.
Disillusionment
with
the
parliamentary
method
of
redressing
Tamil
grievances
grew
among
the
Tamils.
Ethnic
majoritarianism
and
corrupt
rule
Sri
Lanka
is
sometimes
described
as
a
democracy,
and
the
Tamils
have
been
advised
to
choose
the
democratic
way
to
solve
their
problems.
It
is
true
that
Sri
Lanka
has
periodic
elections
and
frequent
changes
of
government
between
the
two
major
parties.
There
is
very
little
democracy,
however,
except
for
periodic
elections.
Election
campaigns
and
elections
are
generally
violent
and
corrupt,
especially
since
the
infamous
referendum
of
1982.
Except
for
short
periods,
the
country
has
been
under
emergency
rule
for
the
past
three
decades
when
all
normal
individual
human
rights
are
suspended.
The
draconian
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Act
of
1979
which
targets
the
Tamils
in
practice,
overrides
all
individual
freedoms.
The
principle
of
majority
rule
in
a
democratic
society
has
been
abused
to
justify
ethnic
majority
rule.
Ethnic
majoritarianism
has
been
so
well
entrenched
among
the
major
parties
from
1956
that
there
is
no
scope
for
minorities
to
get
justice
through
parliamentary
methods.
More
than
half
a
century
of
so-called
democracy
in
Sri
Lanka
give
the
Tamils
no
hope.
The
Sri
Lanka
Muslim
Muslim
Congress
has
emerged
recently
as
a
very
important
political
party.
It
is
almost
the
king-maker
in
Sri
Lanka
politics
during
the
last
decade.
There
is
some
resentment
about
their
influence
and
power,
especially
among
some
Buddhist
nationalist
elements
of
the
affected
parties.
The
solution
they
suggest
is
that
the
two
major
parties
should
form
a
coalition
government
to
thwart
the
minorities
wielding
power.
What
they
dont
seem
to
visualize
is
that
it
will
lead
to
perpetual
conflict
and
may
open
a
third
front
of
war,
in
addition
to
the
present
Tamil
front.
There
is
a
point
in
the
argument
that
a
minority
party
should
not
be
allowed
to
dictate
terms
and
unfair
demands
when
it
becomes
the
king-maker.
The
problem
arises
from
the
fact
that
the
major
parties
become
in
effect
Sinhala
Buddhist
parties,
looking
after
the
interests
of
the
majority
community
only.
There
are
many
countries
with
multi-party
democracy.
But
there
are
very
few
multi-lingual
multi-religious
countries
where
compartmentalization
of
political
forces
on
ethnic
lines
is
so
deep
as
in
Sri
Lanka.
This
situation
indicates
a
serious
malady
in
the
political
structure.
The
major
political
parties
should
so
formulate
their
policies
and
programs
that
at
least
large
sections
of
the
other
ethnic
groups
can
feel
satisfied.
The
Demand
for
a
federal
constitution
When
the
country
became
independent,
the
UNP
government
took
certain
steps
which
made
a
section
of
the
Tamils
suspicious.
D.S.
started
many
colonization
schemes
in
the
Eastern
Province,
starting
the
process
of
settling
a
large
number
of
Sinhalese,
changing
the
demographic
nature
of
the
province.
He
also
disenfrancised
the
entire
Tamil
community
of
Indian
origin,
who
had
voting
rights
before
Sri
Lanka
became
independent.
It
appeared
a
betrayal
in
a
sense
as
the
representatives
of
that
community
stood
with
D.
S.
Senanayake
in
voting
in
the
State
Council.
But
in
the
1947
elections,
they
had
Ceylon
Indian
Congress,
a
party
of
their
own,
and
they
also
helped
in
the
election
of
left-wing
politicians.
There
was
controversy
over
the
question
of
the
national
flag
for
Sri
Lanka.
The
minorities
feared
that
the
restoration
of
a
flag
with
lion
having
a
sword
in
its
paw
symbolised
the
restoration
of
the
Sinhalese
kingdom,
ready
to
use
force
to
subjugate
the
Tamils.
A
Parliamentary
Committee
went
into
this
question
and
the
present
national
flag
was
adopted
by
a
majority
vote,
with
one
of
the
two
Tamil
representatives
refusing
to
accept
the
flag.
Why
I
mention
this
is
to
show
that
on
matters
like
this,
something
could
have
been
done
to
adopt
a
flag,
other
than
a
terrorizing
lion
with
a
raised
sword,
ready
to
attack.
Some
members
of
the
Tamil
Congress
defected
from
their
party
which
was
then
supporting
the
government,
saw
dangerous
signals
in
these
trends
and
formed
the
Federal
Party
in
1949
to
press
for
a
Tamil
State
in
the
Tamil
dominated
North-East
within
a
Federal
set-up
and
to
press
for
citizenship
for
the
Indian
origin
Tamil
community.
It
is
interesting
to
see
how
the
Tamil
community
voted
in
the
1952
elections.
Even
though
sections
of
the
Tamil
community
had
misgivings,
the
Federal
Party
had
only
two
members
elected
and
the
vast
majority
of
the
voters
in
the
North-East
voted
for
Tamil
Congress,
U.N.P.,
and
independents.
The
election
result
was
an
indication
that
the
Tamil
people
were
willing
to
settle
for
"one
country
and
equal
opportunity"
in
a
unitary
constitution.
The
Tamil
voters
were
willing
to
sacrifice
on
some
important
issues
and
hoped
that
they
might
be
able
to
benefit
in
some
other
issues.
Mr.
S.
W.
R.
D.
Bandaranayake,
who
was
formerly
the
leader
of
the
Sinhala
Mahasabha,
broke
away
from
the
U.N.P.
in
1951
and
formed
the
Sri
Lanka
Freedom
Party.
The
party
had
a
nationalist
agenda,
but
at
the
beginning
his
nationalism
was
inclusive.
His
declared
aim
was
to
replace
English
with
Sinhalese
and
Tamil
as
official
languages
of
the
country.
The
title
of
his
party
is
intriguing.
The
frequently
used
name
of
the
country
was
Lanka
or
Lankava.
Even
though
the
name
Sri
Lanka
was
recorded
in
Medieval
times,
it
was
not
a
popular
name.
The
epithet
sri
has
many
meanings;
it
could
mean
holy
or
sacred
Lanka
as
well.
The
question
arises
as
to
whom
it
is
sacred
or
holy.
It
is
quite
possible
that
he
wanted
to
make
the
country
holy
or
sacred
to
the
Buddhists.
New
converts
are
always
over-enthusiastic
to
establish
their
credentials.
Bandaranayake,
who
was
a
convert
from
Anglican
Christianity
(his
family
enjoying
all
privileges
by
being
close
to
the
British
rulers)to
Buddhism,
probably
wanted
to
make
this
country
sacred
to
the
Buddhists.
Even
the
significance
of
the
word
Freedom
in
the
title
of
his
party
is
not
clear
because
Sri
Lanka
was
already
an
independent
country
when
he
formed
his
party.
The
nationalist
rhetoric
of
the
party
soon
lapsed
into
exclusivism,
excluding
not
only
English
but
also
Tamil.
Sinhala
as
the
only
official
language,
with
reasonable
use
of
Tamil
became
the
policy
of
his
party.
There
was
a
popular
wave
of
support
for
this
party
among
the
Sinhalese.
The
UNP
which
had
already
promised
parity
of
status
for
Sinhalese
and
Tamil,
was
in
jitters.
It
thought
that
it
could
come
to
power
only
by
taking
a
stand
even
more
extreme
than
the
SLFP.
The
U.N.P.
adopted
the
Sinhalese
only
slogan,
omitting
mention
of
any
place
for
Tamil.
Tamil
ministers
and
members
of
parliament
resigned
en
bloc
from
the
U.N.P.
From
this
time
onward
both
major
parties
ceased
to
accommodate
Tamil
interests.
In
the1956
elections,
the
U.N.P.
was
routed
because
the
Sinhalese
electorate
distrusted
its
last
minute
change
of
policy.
D.
S.
Senanayakes
disenfranchisement
of
Indian
Tamil
voters
helped
Bandaranayake
in
a
big
way
because
electorates
with
a
majority
or
a
substantial
Indian
Tamil
stateless
disenfranchised
population,
elected
Bandaranayakes
Sinhala
only
nationalists.
In
order
to
defeat
the
U.N.P.,
the
Sinhalese
electorate
elected
some
L.S.S.P.
and
C.P.
members
who
had
some
electoral
understanding
with
Bandaranayake,
even
though
these
parties
continued
to
stand
for
parity
of
status
for
both
languages.
All
the
16
representatives
from
the
North-East,
who
were
either
Tamil
or
Muslim,
plus
the
representatives
of
the
two
left
parties,
making
up
32,
opposed
the
Sinhala
only
Bill.
The
U.N.P.
was
with
the
government
and
the
Bill
got
66
votes.
Dr.
N.
M.
Perera
and
Dr.
Colvin
R.
De.
Silva,
the
leftist
leaders,
made
eloquent
speeches
that
the
adoption
of
this
language
policy
would
destroy
national
unity.
The
Sinhala-only
Act
divided
the
country
into
two
distinct
regions,
the
North-East
and
the
South-West.
This
division
of
the
country
manifested
itself
dramatically
in
1958
when
there
were
massive
anti-Tamil
riots
in
the
South-West.
The
Tamils
in
the
North-East,
except
in
the
recent
colonization
scheme
areas,
were
safe.
Tamils
from
the
South-West
had
to
be
transported
to
the
North-East
for
their
safety
till
the
return
of
normalcy.
The
concept
of
the
need
for
a
Tamil
state
received
much
boost
from
this
experience.
B.
H.
Farmer,
who
was
studying
the
developments
in
the
island,
wrote
a
book
under
the
title,
Ceylon-
A
Divided
Nation.
The
de
facto
division
of
the
country
had
taken
place
in
1956.
A
refusal
to
face
realities
has
been
going
on
for
nearly
half
a
century.
The
Federal
Party
emerged
as
the
Tamil
nationalist
party,
winning
ten
seats
out
of
sixteen
from
the
North-East.
Since
they
felt
they
were
not
strong
enough
to
block
the
Sinhala
only
Bill
in
the
parliament,
they
opted
for
some
extra-parliamentary
forms
of
passive
resistance.
They
wanted
to
use
Gandhis
satyagraha
method,
a
kind
of
sit-in
and
fasting
in
front
of
the
parliament
building.
The
peaceful
protesting
Tamil
leaders
were
manhandled
by
thugs.
The
thugs
were
not
identified,
but
they
must
have
been
Sinhala
nationalists,
and
possibly
Buddhists.
Having
realized
that
passive
resistance
was
not
understood
in
the
South-West,
the
Federal
Party
and
some
other
Tamil
leaders
adopted
passive
resistance
in
1961
in
the
North-East.
Satyagraha
was
organized
in
front
of
government
offices.
They
declared
that
these
offices
could
work
only
if
Tamil
grievances
were
attended
to.
As
thugs
could
not
go
all
the
way
to
disrupt
the
satyagraha,
the
Srimavo
Bandaranayake
government
sent
the
armed
forces
to
disperse
the
movement
and
to
arrest
the
Tamil
leaders.
The
government
thus
succeeded
in
crushing
the
passive
resistance.
What
happened
in
1956
and
in
1961
indicated
that
passive
resistance
on
the
model
of
Gandhi
could
not
work
when
Sri
Lanka
Buddhists
were
the
opponents.
The
1970
elections
brought
the
United
Front
government,
led
by
SLFP
to
power
with
a
two-third
majority.
The
government
took
two
big
steps
which
led
to
a
crisis
situation.
The
government
introduced
media
wise
standardization
of
marks
for
the
university
entrance
examination,
with
the
clear
aim
of
disadvantaging
the
Tamils.
The
government
also
convened
a
constituent
assembly
to
draw
up
a
suitable
constitution.
The
FP
was
invited
to
participate
and
to
present
proposals
for
the
new
constitution.
The
FP
proposed
various
measures
to
redress
the
Tamil
grievances.
Their
proposals
were
rejected
in
toto
and
a
constitution,
acceptable
only
to
the
UF
government,
was
promulgated
in
1972.
The
Tamils
felt
that
they
were
pushed
beyond
the
margin.
This
constitution
was
short-lived
because
it
was
overhauled
by
the
UNP
government
in
1978
when
it
had
5/6
majority
in
the
parliament.
The
UNP,
which
promised
to
redress
the
Tamil
grievances
in
its
election
manifesto
of
1977,
made
no
effort
at
all
to
accommodate
the
Tamil
demands
in
the
new
constitution.
The
TULF
proposed
various
amendments
to
accommodate
Tamil
grievances
but
they
were
summarily
rejected,
as
in
1972.
The
government
started
talks
with
the
TULF,
which
received
a
mandate
for
a
separate
state
from
the
Tamil
electorates,
and
introduced
District
Development
Councils.
This
appeared
too
little
to
many
Tamils
and
the
LTTE.
Even
then
the
SLFP
opposed
it
as
giving
too
much
to
the
Tamils.
Elections
were
held
in
1981
and
in
the
North-East,
the
TULF
won
all
the
districts
except
Amparai.
High
expectations
of
the
Tamils
turned
into
huge
disappointments
as
the
government
neither
voted
sufficient
money
for
them
nor
allowed
them
the
power
to
tax
on
their
own.
So
the
District
Development
Council
as
a
solution
to
the
ethnic
problem
turned
out
to
be
a
practical
joke.
The
Demand
for
a
seperate
country
As
there
seems
to
be
no
way
out
for
the
Tamils
to
have
power-sharing
and
equal
opportunity
in
a
united
country,
the
Tamil
demand
has
become
leave
us
alone
in
our
land.
If
the
Tamils
could
not
share
power
and
if
they
could
not
have
equality,
they
wanted
to
establish
a
country
in
the
land
where
they
were
in
a
majority
so
that
they
could
enjoy
freedom.
The
Tamils
have
been
influenced
by
modern
political
ideas.
This
is
a
step
in
desperation,
from
a
people
who
felt
profound
alienation.
The
situation
of
the
Tamils
then
and
the
demand
for
a
separate
country,
can
be
understood
in
the
following
preamble
of
the
American
Declaration
of
Independence
of
July
4,
1776:
We
hold
these
truths
to
be
self
evident,
that
all
men
are
endowed
with
certain
inalienable
Rights,
that
among
these
are
Life,
Liberty
and
the
pursuit
of
Happiness.
That
to
secure
these
rights,
Governments
are
instituted
among
Men,
deriving
their
just
powers
from
the
consent
of
the
governed,
-
That
whenever
any
Form
of
Government
becomes
destructive
of
these
ends,
it
is
the
Right
of
the
People
to
alter
or
abolish
it,
and
to
institute
a
new
Government,
laying
its
foundation
on
such
principles
and
organizing
its
powers
in
such
form,
as
to
them
shall
seem
most
likely
to
effect
their
Safety
and
Happiness.
The
French
Revolution
of
1789
has
emphasized
the
importance
of
Liberty,
Equality,
and
Fraternity.
The
Marxist
thinkers
also
argue
that
nationalities
cannot
be
subjugated
permanently
by
force.
The
demand
was
a
way
of
giving
notice
that
if
the
centralised
unitary
Sinhala
Buddhist
framework
could
not
be
dismantled,
the
Tamil
people
should
use
their
sovereignty
to
establish
a
separate
country.
The
Buddhists
do
not
want
to
share
the
island
with
the
Tamils
in
two
independent
countries
also.
In
fact
they
started
fighting
against
an
imaginary
Tamil
country
in
1957
even
before
any
Tamil
thought
of
demanding
a
separate
country.
They
say
that
peace
in
the
island
is
possible
only
if
the
Tamils
give
up
the
demand
for
a
separate
country.
The
Tamils,
including
the
LTTE,
have
been
proclaiming
again
and
again
that
the
demand
for
a
separate
country
is
negotiable
if
a
proper
alternative
constitutional
arrangement
were
proposed.
The
Buddhist
groups
which
demand
the
Tamils
to
give
up
separation,
are
not
at
all
willing
to
go
half
the
way.
No
Buddhist
leader
of
consequence
has
said
till
now
that
he
is
prepared
to
accept
federalism,
even
though
it
is
well-known
that
federalism
preserves
unity,
integrity
and
sovereignty
of
many
countries.
There
is
a
clear
attempt
among
Sinhalese
politicians
to
confuse
and
mislead
what
political
structure
they
could
accept.
They
tell
the
international
community
and
the
Tamils
that
anything
short
of
a
separate
country
could
be
discussed
during
negotiations.
They
tell
the
Sinhalese
electorate
that
they
would
settle
for
any
solution
within
a
unitary
constitution.
It
is
a
calculated
attempt
at
deception
which
could
lead
to
trouble
soon.
Devolution
within
a
unitary
constitution
cannot
provide
real
power-sharing.
The
equal
opportunity
for
individuals
is
possible
in
a
unitary
set
up
but
such
a
set
up
has
been
so
abused
for
more
than
half
a
century
that
Tamils
will
not
trust
it
again.
When
India
intervened
in
the
ethnic
conflict
in
1987,
Indian
lawyers
came
to
Colombo
and
helped
the
Sri
Lanka
government
to
draft
devolution
proposals.
When
these
proposals
were
submitted
to
parliament,
the
Supreme
Court
deleted
some
provisions
because
they
were
inconsistent
with
the
unitary
nature
and
the
entrenched
clauses
of
the
constitution.
The
parliament
passed
the
other
provisions
as
the
thirteenth
amendment
to
the
constitution.
Sri
Lanka
now
has
many
elected
provincial
councils
and
administrations,
but
they
have
very
little
power
and
authority,
except
concurrent
powers
with
the
central
government.
Some
of
the
Buddhist
liberals
who
stand
for
the
solution
of
more
devolution
under
a
unitary
constitution,
want
to
continue
a
set
up
similar
to
this.
It
is
an
extended
version
of
the
1981
District
Development
Council
scheme.
It
is
an
irony
that
the
provincial
council
scheme,
which
came
into
being
to
give
some
autonomy
to
the
North-East,
functions
everywhere
in
the
island
except
in
the
North-East.
In
1995,
the
PA
government
introduced
devolution
proposals
which
tried
to
bypass
this
shortcoming.
The
government
omitted
provisions
referring
to
unitary
nature;
Prof.
G.
L.
Pieris
explained
that
it
was
done
purposely
so
as
to
enable
devolution
to
work.
The
LTTE
rejected
it
as
too
little,
while
the
TULF
welcomed
it
and
suggested
that
some
improvements
be
made
to
meet
Tamil
aspirations.
There
was
a
hue
and
cry
among
the
Buddhists
and
the
Sinhalese,
and
the
government
started
the
process
of
strengthening
the
unitary
character
of
the
constitutional
arrangements
and
continued
to
do
so
in
its
subsequent
reformulations.
The
PA
government
introduced
its
latest
proposals
in
parliament
in
2000.
The
TULF
and
other
Tamil
political
parties
were
thoroughly
disillusioned
with
the
new
proposals
while
there
was
opposition
from
some
Buddhists
even
a
Buddhist
monk
threatening
to
fast
and
die
that
so
much
of
devolution
should
not
be
given
to
the
Tamils.
The
divide
between
what
the
governments
have
been
offering
till
now
and
what
the
Tamils
demand
seems
to
be
so
big
that
it
is
necessary
to
agree
on
some
basics
before
any
meaningful
negotiations
can
take
place.
In
the
India
sponsored
peace
talks
in
Thimpu
in
1986,
the
Tamil
party
including
all
important
militant
groups
like
the
LTTE,
came
out
with
the
Thimpu
principles,
specifying
the
acceptance
of
the
concepts
of
Tamil
homeland,
Tamil
nationality,
and
self-determination
for
the
Tamils
as
basics
on
which
a
political
solution
acceptable
to
the
Tamils
could
be
worked
out.
In
the
Tamil
perception,
these
are
all
essentials
if
the
Tamils
were
to
feel
free
and
secure
in
Sri
Lanka.
Why
do
the
Tamils
ask
for
self-determination
when
the
government
is
prepared
to
give
devolution
is
a
question
frequently
asked.
One
of
the
arguments
advanced
against
self-determination
is
that
it
could
lead
to
separation
or
something
unacceptable
to
the
other
peoples
of
the
island.
It
is
correct
that
the
ethnic
problem
could
be
solved
only
if
there
is
consensus
among
major
sections
of
the
other
peoples.
There
is
no
point
in
going
for
a
solution
if
that
solution
could
be
overturned
in
the
foreseeable
future.
Many
attempts
have
already
been
made
to
evolve
a
solution
acceptable
to
all
the
parties.
To
forestall
Indian
attempts
to
impose
a
settlement,
J.
R.
Jayawardane
convened
an
all-party
conference
in
1985.
In
addition
to
political
parties,
the
Buddhist
clergy
was
also
invited.
The
Buddhist
clergy
adopted
a
totally
uncooperative
attitude
about
devolving
power
to
the
Tamils,
and
nothing
came
out
of
this
effort.
R.
Premadasa
appointed
a
Select
Committee
of
Parliament.
This
committee
made
some
proposals
but
they
were
not
at
all
satisfying
to
the
Tamils.
Again,
nothing
came
out
of
this
effort
also.
As
already
noted,
the
PA
governments
proposals
for
reform
of
the
constitution
to
accommodate
Tamil
aspirations
floundered
between
1995
and
2000
in
the
same
way.
It
should
be
now
clear
that
no
solution
acceptable
to
the
Tamils
could
be
found
in
this
way.
The
only
sensible
approach
seems
to
be
for
the
Tamils
to
decide
what
they
want
and
then
for
the
other
parties
to
put
in
place
some
safeguards
to
preserve
the
unity
of
the
country.
Another
reason
why
the
Tamils
ask
for
self-determination
is
what
one
Sri
Lanka
government
offers
could
be
taken
away
by
another
Sri
Lanka
government.
The
Tamils
want
to
feel
that
they
are
equal
partners
to
the
constitution
and
that
they
form
part
of
the
country
on
their
free
will
and
not
because
they
could
not
throw
off
the
military
occupation.
The
Tamils
look
forward
for
the
recognition
of
their
rights;
they
dont
beg
for
gifts
or
grants.
What
worries
the
Tamils
most
is
that
up
till
now
no
Buddhist
leader
of
consequence
has
come
out
with
the
statement
that
Tamil
aspirations
are
just.
Some
Buddhists
appear
to
be
believing
that
modern
independent
Sri
Lanka
is
the
restoration
of
medieval
Sinhalese
kingdom
which
should
be
governed
as
it
was
then.
At
the
time
of
independence
in
1948,
about
90%
of
the
people
of
the
North-East
were
Tamil
speakers.
At
every
election
from
1956,
it
is
clear
that
Sri
Lanka
is
divided,
Tamils
in
the
North-East
expressing
aspirations
different
from
the
rest
of
the
island.
As
the
number
of
Tamil
representatives
is
small,
their
aspirations
are
ignored
consistently.
The
Sinhalese
are
settled
in
large
numbers
to
change
the
demographic
pattern
and
to
elect
representatives
who
will
help
to
keep
the
Tamils
in
check.
The
Tamils
are
not
simply
a
minority
but
a
people
or
a
nationality
having
a
historical
habitat.
The
Tamils,
having
a
territory
of
their
own,
make
a
big
difference.
There
are
many
independent
countries
in
the
world
today,
with
a
territory
smaller
than
the
North-East
and
with
a
population
smaller
than
the
North-East.
The
Tamils
have
been
able
to
carry
on
the
war
so
long
because
they
have
a
territory
and
the
militants
have
mass
support
in
that
territory.
The
Buddhist
leaders
do
not
care
for
the
misery
of
the
Tamil
people
when
their
territory
became
the
war
zone.
They
wax
eloquently
on
the
unity
of
the
country
but
not
on
the
unity
of
the
peoples
of
the
country.
The
Tamil
representatives,
through
their
long
experience
in
parliament,
realize
that
they
cannot
deliver
anything
to
the
Tamils.
Extra-parliamentary
passive
resistance
can
be
crushed
by
brute
force,
as
seen
in
1956
and
1961.
The
peace
process
The
peace
process
is
on
and
the
government
is
trying
to
negotiate
a
peaceful
settlement.
There
is
some
sort
of
military
stalemate
in
the
war
front
and
the
country
is
in
serious
financial
difficulties.
The
international
community
appears
to
be
pushing
both
sides
to
negotiate
a
peaceful
solution.
Some
Buddhist
leaders
want
the
government
to
use
proscription
of
the
LTTE
and
normalization
of
life
in
the
North-East
as
bargaining
points
so
that
Tamil
aspirations
will
not
become
the
focus
of
negotiations.
The
question
is
frequently
asked
how
could
you
trust
the
LTTE.
Those
who
question
dont
care
that
for
the
Tamils,
it
is
a
question
of
how
could
any
Sinhalese
leader
of
consequence
be
trusted.
Speaking
on
the
Sinhala
Only
Bill
in
parliament
in
1956,
Dr.
N.
M.
Perera
asked
how
the
Tamils
could
trust
any
Sinhalese
leader
as
they
had
betrayed
their
trust
many
times.
Even
he
betrayed
the
trust
of
the
Tamils
after
a
decade.
Periodically,
many
Buddhist
leaders
have
raised
the
hopes
of
the
Tamils;
everybody
has
backed
out
in
the
face
of
extremist
threats
or
the
lure
of
cabinet
portfolios.
Perceptive
Tamils
are
still
skeptical
of
the
future
because
so
many
hindrances
are
still
possible
in
the
three
stages
of
the
process.
The
2001
elections
as
well
as
what
is
happening
among
the
Tamils
recently
clearly
indicate
that
a
vast
majority
of
Tamils
pin
their
hopes
on
the
LTTE
to
negotiate
on
their
behalf.
Normalcy
to
the
North-East
must
return,
and
the
LTTE
must
be
deproscribed
if
some
trust
were
to
be
built
up
between
the
two
sides.
A
radical
political
solution
has
to
be
worked
out.
It
has
to
be
incorporated
into
the
constitution.
The
constitution
has
to
be
implemented.
The
second
and
the
third
stages
of
the
process
cannot
be
accomplished
if
the
two
major
parties
do
not
adopt
a
bipartisan
attitude.
There
could
be
a
big
gap
between
incorporation
in
the
constitution
and
implementation
at
the
ground
level.
Though
the
present
constitution
provides
for
the
use
of
Tamil
language,
complaints
continue
that
the
provision
relating
to
Tamil
is
not
properly
implemented.
Tamils
who
dont
know
Sinhalese
are
forced
to
transact
business
in
Sinhalese
and
even
forced
to
sign
Sinhalese
legal
documents.
What
has
been
accomplished
so
far
in
the
peace
process
is
the
preliminary
step
of
signing
a
memorandum
of
understanding
for
a
permanent
ceasefire.
So
much
noise
is
made
against
it
by
the
JVP
and
a
section
of
the
Buddhist
clergy
that
it
is
clear
that
extraordinary
statesmanship
and
courage
among
political
leaders
will
be
needed
at
every
stage
of
the
long
peace
process.
The
Tamils
remain
skeptical
even
now
because
of
the
retention
of
the
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Act
of
1979.
This
draconian
act
which
suspends
all
individual
rights
for
anybody
suspected
of
being
a
terrorist
or
aiding
a
terrorist
has
been
used
by
the
government
for
indefinite
detention
of
suspects
in
prisons,
where
some
of
them
are
beaten
up,
tortured
and
killed.
Cases
have
not
been
instituted
against
many
of
them
because
there
are
no
cases,
but
only
suspicions.
After
suffering
so
long,
they
sometimes
start
hunger
strikes,
demanding
that
they
should
either
be
released
or
tried
in
courts.
This
Act
brings
untold
sufferings
to
the
Tamil
civilians
but
very
ineffective
in
preventing
Tamil
militancy
which
it
characterises
as
terrorism.
When
this
Act
was
passed,
there
were
only
two
militant
movements-
the
LTTE
and
the
PLOTE-
with
their
membership,
not
even
reaching
a
hundred.
Militant
movements
mushroomed
after
1983.
The
LTTE
continues
to
prosper
till
today.
So
it
is
clear
that
it
is
worthless
in
controlling
militancy.
It
has
only
served
to
inflict
inhuman
and
degrading
punishments
on
Tamil
civilians
who
are
suspects.
The
Tamils
find
it
difficult
to
understand
the
merits
in
having
an
excellent
constitution
with
a
wonderful
chapter
on
fundamental
rights,
if
the
PTA
can
override
all
the
rights.
The
LTTE
has
released
many
times,
its
prisoners
who
had
been
fighting
against
it.
The
government
still
cannot
make
up
its
mind
on
releasing
long
suffering
prisoner
suspects,
against
whom
it
has
no
cases,
because
they
are
detained
under
the
PTA.
It
is
amazing
that
the
Buddhists,
who
claim
that
ahimsa/
non-violence
is
the
prime
virtue
of
their
religion,
do
not
care
for
the
misery
of
Tamil
civilians.
One
of
the
arguments
used
by
some
persons
from
the
ethnic
majority
for
opposing
regional
autonomy
for
the
Tamils
is
that
in
that
case
the
Muslims
and
the
Upcountry
Tamils
could
also
ask
for
it
and
the
majority
Sinhalese
could
not
give
away
so
much
of
the
country
to
the
minorities.
In
addition
to
many
other
factors,
in
the
Tamil
perception,
some
persons
from
the
ethnic
majority
have
encouraged
the
other
two
communities
to
raise
their
demands
so
that
they
could
be
used
as
a
counter-weight
to
weaken
the
demands
of
the
Tamils.
The
Tamil
speaking
Muslims
of
the
East,
who
form
about
a
third
of
the
population
there,
want
to
secure
their
position.
The
Muslims
in
the
East
are
not
concentrated
in
a
contiguous
territory;
their
villages
and
towns
intermingle
with
Tamil
villages
and
towns.
So
it
will
not
be
possible
to
have
separate
territorial
units
for
the
Tamils
and
the
Tamil
speaking
Muslims.
Some
safeguards
for
them
should
be
worked
out
during
negotiations
on
substantive
issues
when
their
representatives
should
also
take
part.
Conclusion
The
principle
guiding
the
future
constitution
of
the
country
should
be
equality
for
all
groups
and
individuals.
This
should
try
to
establish
equal
opportunity
for
all
individuals.
This
aim
could
have
been
achieved
easily
under
a
unitary
constitution.
But
the
opportunity
was
sadly
missed.
The
distrust
that
has
grown
among
the
Tamils
for
almost
half
a
century
by
the
oppressive
use
of
the
unitary
constitution
will
not
allow
them
to
accept
empty
verbose
promises
and
platitudes.
There
should
be
checks
and
balances
to
see
that
an
ethnic
majority
does
not
take
over
everything
into
its
hands
once
more
and
try
to
consolidate
its
power
by
military
conquest
and
occupation
in
the
name
of
unity,
sovereignty,
and
territorial
integrity
of
the
country.
The
process
of
negotiation
with
the
LTTE
could
be
difficult.
The
sweeping
victory
of
the
TNA
in
the
2001
elections
in
the
Tamil
electorates
of
the
North-East
is
an
endorsement
of
their
election
manifesto
that
the
LTTE
should
be
the
sole
representative
of
the
Tamils
during
the
peace
process.
Half
a
century
of
political
experience
has
convinced
many
Tamil
political
parties
-
most
of
whom
suffered
at
the
hands
of
the
LTTE
at
one
time
or
another-
that
there
was
no
other
way
to
come
to
a
just
settlement
of
the
ethnic
problem.
The
LTTE
reason
for
the
failure
of
previous
negotiations
is
that
the
previous
governments
treated
them
as
just
another
group
or
party
and
evaded
discussion
of
important
issues
as
equals.
But
the
government,
the
Buddhists,
and
the
Sinhalese
have
one
big
advantage
in
negotiating
with
the
LTTE.
If
an
agreeable
political
solution
could
be
worked
out
and
implemented
and
the
LTTE
made
to
have
a
stake
in
the
administration
of
the
country,
one
can
be
sure
that
the
settlement
will
hold,
at
least
as
far
as
the
Tamils
are
concerned.
The
Journal
of
Buddhist
Ethics
ISSN
1076-9005
Volume
10
2003
http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/10/veluppillai-sri-lanka-conf.html