by Dayan Jayatilleka, October 17, 2004
The
Sangam
makes
no
endorsement
in
the
American
election
campaign.
This
is
an
interesting
article
speculating
on
the
implications
of
one
outcome
of
the
election.
Jayatilleka
is
a
voice
crying
in
the
wilderness
for
a
a
non-sectarian,
pluralistic,
federal
state
on
the
island.
If
that
were
possible
in
a
real
sense
there
would
be
no
need
for
war.
Why
did
the
current
president's
father
not
stick
to
his
Pact
with
Chelvanayagam
in
the
1950s
creating
such
a
state?
Because
to
win
elections
in
Sri
Lanka
one
must
be
a
Sinhala
Buddhist
chauvinist.
--
Editor
"
Friends,
the
high
road
may
be
harder
but
it
leads
to
a
better
place."
-
John
Kerry
(Acceptance
speech,
Democratic
Convention
2004)
While
every
rational,
moderate
and
progressive
minded
person
the
world
over
hopes
John
Kerry
will
beat
George
Bush,
invader
of
independent
Iraq,
Sinhala
hardliners
already
denounced
him
some
months
ago
for
allegedly
supporting
the
LTTE
(Sunday
Island,
Aug
1).
This
man
is
possibly
the
next
leader
of
the
most
powerful
nation
in
history,
and
if
indeed
he
has
been
soft
on
the
Tigers
it
is
prudent
to
meditate
on
the
reality
of
the
emerging
situation:
(1) Under a Kerry administration, the post Cold War global leadership of the US will be reasserted and will reach its zenith, through the rebuilding of alliances, the practice of multilateralism, the refocusing of 'hard power' and the revitalizing of 'soft power'.
(2) A Democratic administration is far likelier than a Republican one, to be permeable to liberal, humanitarian, civil society, Asian American and minority rights lobbies.
(3)
Historic,
ideological
and
personal
ties
make
for
closer
convergence
between
Washington
and
Delhi
under
Democratic
and
Congress
administrations.
(4)
The
Sinhala
paradigm
of
a
non-secular
unitary
state,
as
distinct
from
a
united
Sri
Lanka,
will
have
no
takers,
and
will
be
unsustainable.
If
the
Lankan
crisis
has
a
Yugoslav
outcome,
it
is
likelier
under
a
liberal
Democratic
US
administration.
(5)
Kerry
is
set
to
shift
back
to
an
anti-terrorist
line,
post
9/11,
pre-Iraq,
which
can
be
made
to
work
for
the
Sri
Lankan
state
rather
than
the
LTTE,
if
we
use
the
security
argument,
delete
'unitary',
and
reform
the
state.
The
Tigers'
South
African
connection
gives
the
LTTE
a
bridge
to
Black
Congressmen
in
the
US,
who
will
have
an
enhanced
say
in
a
Kerry
Administration.
There
is
no
way
the
Sinhalese
can
maintain
a
non-secular
unitary
state
in
a
conflicted,
multiethnic
and
multi
religious
society,
on
a
small,
economically
dependent
island,
in
the
21st
century
and
the
moment
of
liberal-democratic
American
hegemony.
A
Democratic
victory
will
make
the
world
a
safer
place
while
enabling
the
USA
to
get
back
on
the
track
of
a
focussed
war
on
terror,
with
a
multilateral
approach.
Historically
India's
Congress
party
has
been
more
comfortable
with
the
Democrats,
and
Washington
and
Delhi
will
draw
still
closer
than
they
are
today.
Lakshman
Kadirgamar
and
Jayantha
Dhanapala
have
good
relations
with
the
US
Democrats
and
their
supportive
liberal
intelligentsia,
though
one
trusts
that
these
will
be
used
in
a
manner
quite
distinct
from
that
in
which
Ranil
used
his
contacts
with
the
Republicans
-
for
special
pleading
for
the
Tigers
and
an
appeasement
approach!
Thus
as
this
year
closes,
Colombo
could
insert
itself
into
a
closely
congruent
equation
between
Washington
and
New
Delhi.
The
biggest
losers
would
be
the
'local
Republicans'
Ranil
&
Co,
and
potentially
the
Tigers,
but
the
Sinhalese
must
know
that
there
is
a
price
to
be
paid.
The US Democrats are infinitely more concerned with minority rights, multiculturalism, secularism and federalism than the Republicans, and will push for liberal reforms along those lines in a way that the Bush administration did not. Democrats are into 'humanitarian intervention': the break-up of Yugoslavia took place under a Democratic administration. The Sinhalese have some soul searching to do and hard choices to make. Who is the main enemy: Prabhakaran or Tamil nationalism? What is the main danger and which the lesser evil: Tamil autonomy or the ISGA; federalism or Tamil Eelam?
Under
JR
Jayewardene
we
could
not
benefit
from
a
closer
relationship
with
Washington
because
we
had
antagonized
Delhi,
and
Washington
would
never
help
us
against
India.
We
swung
around
under
pressure
and
signed
the
Accord,
but
India
alone
could
not
help
us
against
the
LTTE
and
JVP,
because
the
Cold
War
wasn't
over
and
the
US,
which
was
about
to
win,
merely
watched
from
the
sidelines
as
the
Accord
unraveled.
Today
Sri
Lanka
can
manage
her
crisis
by
using
the
US-India
relationship.
Unilateralism
did
not
help
India
in
Sri
Lanka
any
more
than
it
has
done
the
US
in
Iraq.
Only
an
Indo-US
condominium
on
Sri
Lanka
can
generate
enough
leverage
to
crack
our
crisis.
However,
if
the
Sinhalese
display
a
Serbian
profile
and
discourse,
the
emerging
constellation
of
a
Democrat
victory,
the
Congress
government
and
a
strengthened
US-India
axis
can
help
Prabhakaran
more
than
it
does
us!
Sri
Lanka's
great
disadvantage
is
that
though
a
legitimate
state,
the
formation
that
poses
a
threat
to
it
-
the
LTTE
-
has
a
far
more
extensive
global
network.
Even
the
best
researchers
and
analysts
focus
on
the
Tamil
Diaspora,
oblivious
to
the
fact
that
this
Diaspora
is
compatible
and
interface
with
two
far
larger
cultural
hinterlands
or
zones
of
potential
support.
The
first
is
linguistic:
that
of
Tamil
speakers
the
world
over,
from
Singapore
to
South
Africa
(the
LTTE's
breakthrough
to
the
ANC
is
worth
a
dissertation),
the
second,
religious:
Hindu
co-religionists.
(Since
there
are
more
Sinhala
Christians
than
Tamil,
and
no
Sinhala
Hindus,
the
Hindu
factor
bulks
larger
than
does
the
Christian).
This
is
evident
in
the
social
behavior
of
expatriate
Sri
Lankan
(Eelam?)
Tamils
who
interact
most
consistently
and
overlap
readily
with
Tamilian
(South
Indian)
and
Hindu
expatriate
communities.
The
LTTE's
international
support
must
be
seen
in
the
form
of
these
concentric
circles.
It
is
by
no
means
true
that
all
or
most
Tamil
speakers
and/or
Hindus
worldwide
are
in
sympathy
with
the
Tigers:
the
truth
is
probably
the
contrary.
But
the
compatibility
and
connections
with
these
communities
give
the
LTTE
a
cocoon
within
global
society,
a
bridge
to
important
segments
of
the
international
community,
and
vital
contacts
for
its
global
logistics
network.
By
contrast
the
majority
of
Sri
Lankans
cannot
count
on
any
axiomatic
or
ready
relationships.
It
is
not
a
matter
of
being
a
small
island
in
the
Third
World.
Cuba
is
one,
but
the
Spanish
language
gives
her
a
bridge
to
Latin
America,
African
blood
links
her
with
Black
Africa,
and
even
the
Catholic
background
enables
her
(the
Papal
visit
of
1998)
puncture
the
US
blockade.
The
majority
of
Sri
Lankans
do
not
have
linguistic
links
with
the
world
outside
(except
of
course
with
other
Sinhalese
overseas)
or
readily
accessible
communities
of
co-religionists.
This
would
not
have
been
an
insuperable
obstacle
if
our
country
had
wisely
invested
its
social
capital
i.e.
if
the
question
of
the
minorities,
ethnic,
linguistic,
religious,
had
been
properly
handled.
The
Tamils
(both
Northeastern
and
Hill
country),
Muslims,
Burghers
and
Christians
could
have
been
the
bridges
and
beachheads
of
Sri
Lanka's
interaction
with
the
world.
But
it
is
precisely
those
cultural
"externalities"
that
made
the
majoritarians
regard
the
minorities
as
alien.
How
then
did
the
Bandaranaike
administrations,
which
enacted
discriminatory
domestic
policies,
also
have
so
successful
a
foreign
policy?
The
answer
is
twofold:
the
existence
of
world
socialism,
the
US-Sino-Soviet
competition
for
Asia,
the
Non-aligned
Movement,
all
formed
the
tides
we
surfed.
They
are
gone,
never
to
return.
Secondly
the
state,
the
system,
still
had
the
personalities
and
profile,
the
standards
and
quality
human
resources
that
permitted
successful
external
presence
and
projection.
The
policies
of
the
Bandaranaike
administrations
would
produce
their
consequences
decades
later.
We
live
downstream
from
those
socially
toxic
policies
that
were
released
into
the
Sri
Lankan
body
politic.
Today
we
are
almost
at
the
terminus
of
that
"ecological"
process.
As
the
base,
the
substructure,
of
Sinhala-Buddhist
rural
society
erupts
and
incrementally
captures
the
Sri
Lankan
State
through
its
organic
vanguard
the
JVP
(its
advance
registered
in
absolute
and
relative
electoral
terms),
the
greater
the
lack
of
commonality,
the
greater
the
gap,
between
the
world
and
us.
There
are
two
'geological'
almost
'tectonic'
shifts
underway:
from
bottom
up,
as
manifested
in
the
JVP's
surge;
and
the
resultant,
the
drift
which
distances
Sri
Lanka
from
the
rest
of
the
world.
As
Sri
Lanka
reconfigures
to
look
more
and
more
like
its
base
rather
than
its
totality,
as
the
organic
vanguard
of
its
utterly
unique
(and
therefore
isolated)
inner
cultural
core
dictates
overall
strategic
direction,
as
its
values
become
increasingly
hegemonic
in
society
and
State,
the
less
there
is
in
common
(in
ideology,
culture
and
values)
between
us
and
the
world;
the
less
the
world
recognizes
when
it
looks
at
us.
This
mutual
alienation
is
vastly
accelerated
and
enhanced
because
we
live
in
what
President
Clinton
defines
as
"the
global
information
age",
and
whatever
the
spin
put
on
it
in
translation,
the
JVP's
hardline
on
Tamil
autonomy,
communicated
globally,
is
dangerous
fanaticism
(if
not
gibberish)
to
anyone
who
isn't
a
like-minded
Sinhalese!
In
the
information
age,
the
international
mass
media
are
the
medium
we
exist
in,
the
mirror
that
reflects
us,
the
mould
of
our
destinies.
Fatally,
this
trend
of
ideological,
paradigmatic
and
philosophical
isolationism
takes
place
just
as
the
LTTE
is
widening
its
reach
and
embedding
itself
in
electoral
democracies
from
Canada
to
South
Africa,
from
Britain
to
Australia,
socially
enabled
by
its
Tamil
language,
Hindu
and
Christian
components.
Sri
Lanka
is
a
former
British
colony,
outside
the
Indo-Pak
nuclear
equation
and
Afghan-Pakistani
'Jihadi'
turf,
so
the
US
is
far
likelier
to
take
on
board
her
staunchest
ally
Britain's
inputs
concerning
our
island,
come
crunch
time.
Since
'56,
Britain
has
felt
guilty
about
the
unitary
settlement
it
was
persuaded
by
DS
Senanayake
to
install
in
'47
ignoring
Tamil
warnings
and
entreaties.
As
the
processes
unleashed
by
'56
come
to
fruition
with
the
Second
'56
that
is
unfolding,
and
collides
with
its
Tamil
'Other',
Britain
could
be
moved
to
compensate
with
accumulated
interest
for
that
'47
settlement
by
helping
undo
it,
and
could
tilt
the
views
of
Washington.
That
is
the
real
challenge
for
our
foreign
policy.
Coping
with
(a)
a
structural
problem:
a
demography
that
provides
little
axiomatic
purchase
on
the
world
and
(b)
a
process,
a
political,
ideological
and
socio-cultural
'power
shift'
that
can
culminate
in
the
world
system
drifting
away
from
us,
or
worse,
being
alienated
and
repelled,
effecting
triage
on
the
Southern
two
thirds
of
the
island,
the
Sinhala
nation.
Those
who
fantasise
that
India
or
China
will
afford
us
alternative
patronage
must
be
reminded
that
its
fellow
Slavic
identity
notwithstanding
(the
kind
of
affinity
we
have
with
none)
Moscow
pulled
the
plug
on
Milosevic's
Serbia.
In
the
1980s
our
ethnic
problem
not
only
became
externalised,
it
became
internalized
within
other
countries,
most
notably
India,
with
the
exodus
into
Tamil
Nadu,
but
also
the
West,
with
the
flow
of
refugees.
The
outside
world
had
-
and
continues
to
have
-
a
legitimate
reason
to
concern
itself
with
how
we
manage
our
affairs.
In
a
new
turn
of
the
spiral,
the
international
community,
with
its
diplomatic,
donor/developmental
and
conflict
resolution/humanitarian
arms,
has
now
become
internalised
within
Sri
Lanka,
and
constitutes
a
powerful
pressure
group.
This
is
an
irreversible
reality,
or
reversible
only
by
a
JVP
or
JHU
type
regime
at
horrendous
economic
cost.
The
challenge
is
to
manage
the
new
dynamics,
not
entertain
xenophobic
fantasies
of
reversing
them.
The
problem
is
that
today
there
is
more
international
pressure
on
us
-
more
nudging
of
us
-
than
there
is
of
the
LTTE!
This
is
a
cruel
irony
because
given
their
record
at
least
since
1987,
and
the
world
system's
allergy
to
tyrants
and
suicide
bombing
terrorists
since
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
and
9/11,
the
Tigers
should
be
occupying
the
moral
low
ground
and
the
Lankan
state
-
democratic
and
accountable
-
should
be
in
possession
of
the
moral
high
ground.
The
Tigers
have
made
their
case
globally,
making
significant
new
politico-diplomatic
breakthroughs
as
in
South
Africa
with
the
ANC.
For
them
the
struggle
is
global,
from
weapons
procurement
to
fundraising
to
propaganda.
For
us
it
is
neither
a
struggle
nor
is
it
truly
global
in
scale
and
scope,
mobility
and
outreach.
If
the
problem
is
international
("jathyaanthara"),
the
solution
cannot
be
national
("jathika")
-
however
many
times
one
uses
the
latter
as
adjective
or
incantation
in
policy
prescriptions!
If
the
problem
is
international
so
too
must
be
response
and
solution.
It
is
a
global
contestation.
It
requires
the
construction
of
a
global
united
front.
This
means
a
settlement
of
the
ethnic
issue
that
is
a
compromise
between
Sri
Lankan
needs
and
international
compulsions,
and
can
be
communicated
internationally,
not
only
to
audiences
of
monolingual
Sinhalese.
It
means
combating
the
Tigers
in
a
language
that
the
world
can
comprehend.
It
means
exposing,
explaining,
convincing
and
persuading
world
opinion.
It
means
regarding
the
world,
especially
the
global
media
which
creates
the
public
opinion
that
governments
are
sensitive
to,
as
a
single
arena
and
fighting
that
war
with
ideas,
arguments
-
in
sum,
a
discourse
-
that
the
world
can
identify
and
empathize
with
more
closely
than
it
can
those
of
the
Tigers.
"Think
globally,
act
locally",
goes
the
slogan.
We
Sri
Lankans
tend
to
"think
locally,
act
locally",
or
"think
locally,
act
globally".
But
we
must
convert
(ethically,
of
course)
to
globalize
in
our
outlook;
globalize
our
thinking.
We
must
think
globally,
act
globally.
We
are
in
a
historical
period
that
is
simultaneously
post
Cold
War
and
post
9/11,
interweaving
the
dynamics
of
both
periods.
In
the
post
Cold
War
reality
with
only
one
superpower,
the
US,
one
system,
the
world
capitalist
system,
and
one
economy,
the
world
capitalist
economy
(Cuba
is
sui
generic),
we
can
only
make
marginal
gains,
reap
marginal
benefits.
We
must
however,
strive
for
the
accumulation
of
marginal
gains.
Many
marginal
gains
on
the
widest
canvas
(reaching
out
for
instance
to
Latin
America
and
Africa)
can
yield
a
significant
cumulative
advantage.
"The
age
of
ideology"
has
been
replaced
by
"the
age
of
identity"
(as
Mervyn
de
Silva
put
it).
Sri
Lanka's
majority,
its
political
leadership
(elite
and
counter-elite)
and
intelligentsia,
have
not
understood
the
implications:
the
enhanced
intellectual
legitimacy
and
power
of
Tamil
claims
for
federalism,
regional
autonomy,
and
internal
self-determination.
The
boundaries
of
the
nation
state
are
no
longer
sacrosanct
(eg
Yugoslavia).
But
the
God
of
History
(Stalin's
phrase)
is
merciful,
and
this
is
also
the
post-9/11
conjuncture.
So
while
the
nation-state
is
not
sacrosanct,
there
is
a
recrudescence
of
the
State,
as
machine,
as
apparatus
-
against
terrorism.
We
must
ride
the
new
winds
and
waves
of
history,
which
bear
two
big
ideas:
"the
war
on
terrorism",
and
"a
secular,
federal
democracy".
It
is
almost
too
late
for
us
to
realize
that
internationalism
is
not
a
luxury
but
an
imperative,
which
cannot
be
an
intermittent
gesture,
but
a
permanent
posture
and
relentless
practice.
"Internationalism
isn't
just
a
necessity.
It's
a
condition
for
survival."
(Fidel
Castro:
1977)