Tigers to Part Ways for Want of Southern Consensus?


by Taraki

A military solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict remains a very real option today although we are almost into three years of a fairly stable no-war atmosphere.

In large measure this is due to persistent beliefs and perceptions in the Sinhala polity about the LTTE. And these are having the cumulative effect of draining the south of whatever frail will it had been left with after the elections of April 2004 to resume negotiations with the Tigers.

The dominant of these is the conviction that the Liberation Tigers are imploding and that this is an irreversible process, which needs only time to bring about the fragmentation of the LTTE into politically negligible factions. The belief is shared by almost everyone in the Sinhala polity - from the customer friendly trishaw driver in Pettah to President Chandrika Kumaratunga.

In the South, one has been hearing about this in one form or another from politicians, journalists, academics, military officers business persons etc., since Karuna ran away from the LTTE.

Now it is clear that the President herself shares the conviction that the LTTE is falling apart. In her latest interview to the Hindu, the President says: "For the first time (the LTTE) has split into three. Prabhaharan has lost his army commander. Now he is having serious problems with his navy commander".

We also see persistent reports in the mainstream Sinhala and English press in Colombo that give further credence and flesh to this 'LTTE break up' theme.

Then there are reports that Karuna's men are giving the LTTE a real hard time in the east; that the appointment of Bhanu as Batticaloa commander has annoyed eastern Tamils; that supporters, relatives and followers of former Batticaloa commander Ramesh are disgruntled and are waiting for an opportune moment to vent their anger on the Tigers.

At this juncture, lest it be misconstrued, I should emphasise that it is not my intention here to dispute stories about the LTTE's implosion. Their truth or falsity has absolutely no relevance to my argument.

The point is that this belief, stated or implied, promotes an attitude in the Sinhala polity which inevitably dampens its collective will to restart talks (on any basis) with the LTTE in a hurry.

A Sinhala nationalist acquaintance put in a nutshell at a watering hole discussion the other day.

"If the no war, no talks atmosphere in the northeast is triggering such spectacular cracks in the LTTE such as Karuna's revolt, why should any smart Sinhala leader throw a life line to the Tigers by restarting talks with them now?" asked he.

Internationally facilitated negotiations with the Government of Sri Lanka could take the wind off the sails of Karuna and his allies by enhancing the LTTE's political standing among the Tamils in good measure, according to the prevailing attitude.

Logically and strategically this line of thinking is perfect and hence very convincing. It is reasonable to assume that the LTTE can remain on top in the Tamil polity only as long as it is winning a war or is delivering a tangibly significant peace dividend to the people of the northeast. Either is necessary to maintain the LTTE's internal cohesion. It is also reasonable to assume that sans a clear purpose, either of fighting the Sri Lankan state or of delivering the peace dividend, the rank and file of the LTTE will start losing motivation or become disgruntled with the leadership.

Therefore, it logically follows that if the LTTE is prevented from going back to war for a sufficiently long period during which it is unable to negotiate a mechanism for giving Tamils their long-awaited peace dividend then it would start fragmenting inexorably.

And some articulate Sinhala nationalists argue that promoting a broad front of all the anti LTTE groups and strengthening their hand at this time could help shrink the political space which the Tigers occupy today.

This frame of mind in the south is not only based on the belief that the LTTE is breaking up but also on long standing assumptions such as that the Tamil people do not like to live under the LTTE's jackboot; Tamils support the Tigers out of fear and because they have no other option; journalists from the northeast write in favour of the Tamil cause because they are scared of the Tigers; ordinary Tamils would resist the LTTE if they have the democratic space to voice their protest.

For more than 13 years the University Teachers For Human Rights (J) have produced voluminous material which further convinced the Sinhala polity that the Tamils inveterately despise the LTTE.

   

From this it follows that if the Tamils in the northeast were adequately

empowered they would openly shun the Tigers.

In this context one now hears the theory that prolonging the no war, no talks stalemate is salutary in that it is empowering ordinary Tamil people and hence helping them resist the Tigers.

Dr. Sumansiri Liyanage illustrated this argument in a recent article with the example of Tamil parents in Akkaraipattu who opposed the LTTE when it had demanded back their children who had deserted its ranks during Karuna's revolt.

So there are ample grounds for the Sinhala polity to believe that the international and local conditions for the continuing implosion of the LTTE are perfect today.

If, according to this belief, ordinary Tamils are not happy with the LTTE and if there are major splits in the organisation then why should the Sinhala polity give it legitimacy by resuming talks or, for that matter, grant a mechanism for delivering the peace dividend in the northeast? Also, it is believed the LTTE is not in a position to put all this right by going back to war because the US, EU and India won't allow it.

The cumulative effect of all these beliefs and perceptions in the South, regardless of their truth or falsity, will further negate the conditions within the Sinhala polity for resuming talks with the Tigers.

And at this juncture Pirapaharan, in the message he sent through the Norwegians last Thursday, has asked President Kumaratunga to publicly state the consensus in her government to restart the talks - a consensus on what the UPFA government can offer the Tamils.

But the beliefs and perceptions about the LTTE that have gained wide currency in the South from the President downwards will totally impede a Sinhala consensus on settling the Tamil question.

How long can the President prevaricate on the Sinhala consensus that Pirapaharan has asked for?

The Tamil reaction to this was anticipated by Senathirajah Jeyanandamoorthy, TNA MP for Batticaloa who was a close friend of Karuna, on Monday.

"Sinhala parties will never come to a consensus on a political settlement to the ethnic conflict. It won't happen if we Tamils wait for another fifty years in deference to the wishes of the international community. The so-called Sinhala consensus is a perfidious mirage. It is now time for the Tamils to call the bluff and prepare to forge ahead on their own".
Daily Mirror