by Tamil Guardian editorial, July 27, 2005
The
Liberation
Tigers’
decision
to
withdraw
their
political
cadres
from
Sri
Lankan
government-controlled
parts
of
the
eastern
province
has,
at
least
in
the
short
term,
reduced
violence
there
by
denying
the
Army-backed
Tamil
paramilitaries
their
easy
targets.
But
the
withdrawal
is
itself
a
serious
setback
for
the
ceasefire
and
the
peace
process.
As
the
head
of
the
international
monitors
in
Sri
Lanka,
Hagrup
Haukland,
aptly
put
it:
"the
cornerstone
in
the
ceasefire
agreement
is
the
ability
of
the
LTTE
to
conduct
their
political
work
in
the
north
and
east.
And
if
they
can't
do
that
then,
for
sure,
the
ceasefire
is
void."
This
abysmal
situation
has
not
developed
overnight.
Indeed,
this
problem
has
been
simmering
since
the
ceasefire
was
signed
in
February
2002
(and
only
escalated
in
the
past
year).
Colombo
not
only
ignored
its
obligations
under
the
truce
to
disband
the
paramilitaries,
but
bolstered
these
forces
and
resumed
targeted
killings.
And,
for
far
too
long,
this
issue
has
been
ignored
by
all
concerned.
Indeed,
the
dangerous
low-intensity
conflict
has
been
caricatured
as
the
LTTE
attacking
‘political
rivals.’
Sri
Lankan
military
intelligence’s
determination
to
press
home
a
murderous
campaign
against
LTTE
members
and
supporters
(and
the
wider
insistence
of
Colombo’s
armed
forces
–
particularly
the
Navy
-
on
testing
the
LTTE’s
tolerance)
has
thus
seriously
weakened
the
truce.
The
unequivocal
demand
last
week
by
the
Co-Chairs
of
the
Peace
Process
that
Sri
Lanka
disarm
its
paramilitary
outfits
and
ensure
the
safety
of
unarmed
LTTE
cadres
in
areas
controlled
by
the
government
is
thus
both
timely
and
welcome.
But
the
nub
of
the
problem
was
revealed
almost
immediately;
President
Chandrika
Kumaratunga’s
predictable
response
to
the
joint
statement
by
the
United
States,
European
Union,
Japan
and
Norway
was
to
vehemently
deny
her
military’s
central
role
in
fostering
the
paramilitaries
and
to
harangue
the
LTTE
instead.
Moreover,
her
next
impulse
was
to
seek
the
redrafting
–
i.e.
dismantling
-
of
the
February
2002
truce.
Quite
properly,
the
LTTE
has
bluntly
rejected
the
notion.
As
the
movement’s
Chief
Negotiator
and
Political
Strategist,
Mr.
Anton
Balasingham,
told
this
newspaper
this
week,
"there
is
nothing
wrong
with
the
truce
agreement.
The
current
escalation
of
violence
could
only
be
attributed
to
the
failure
on
the
part
of
the
Sri
Lankan
government
to
fulfil
its
obligation
under
it."
But
in
seeking
to
redraft
the
ceasefire
agreement,
President
Kumaratunga
is
merely
continuing
the
Sinhala
leaders’
tradition
of
tearing
up
deals
they
sign
with
the
Tamils.
In
sixty
years,
not
a
single
agreement
signed
by
a
Tamil
leadership
with
a
Sinhala
one
has
survived
-
the
fiasco
of
the
Post
Tsunami
Operations
Management
Structure
(P-TOMS)
is
but
the
latest.
All
have
either
failed
to
be
implemented
or
simply
been
abrogated
-
and
the
ethnic
conflict
has
continued,
escalating
on
the
way.
Let us be clear. The Tamils do not trust Sri Lanka’s Sinhala leaders. Even the conditional goodwill extended to (then) Premier Ranil Wickremsinghe in 2002 is based on his lack of a violent history with us. The limited benefits accruing to some sections of our community from the peace process stem from Colombo’s failure and inability to destroy the LTTE.
In other words, there is no reason for us to assume a continuation of the present peace is a natural order of things. On the contrary, we believe it is only a matter of time before Colombo resumes its efforts to crush our liberation struggle. Kumaratunga’s determined continuation of the paramilitary campaign against the LTTE is the surest indicator of this. The Co-Chairs have expressed their concern and displeasure, but it very much remains to be seen what Sri Lanka does.
As ever, the ceasefire and peace process depend not on Colombo’s assurances – indeed, words have rarely been cheaper – but on concrete facts on the ground.
###
Posted August 3, 2005