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Ilankai Tamil Sangam

Association of Tamils of Sri Lanka in the USA

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Rajapakse Heading to Deeper Waters

by V Gunaratnam

That would be pure wishful thinking. India, the US and others, without being explicit, have said what would work in Sri Lanka, given the history of the conflict, and democracy in the civilized world. Ironically, any concrete proposals formulated by the Rajapakse government could serve to expose the hollowness of their terms for an accord with the Tamils, and become “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” the breaking point for the Tamils and the Co-chairs.

If it does not immediately lead to war, paradoxically such a concrete proposal could turn out to be the catalyst that gets India and the Co-chairs started on something more tangible and purposeful.

The never ending nightmare for the Tamils has been the mindless violence that continues to destroy their lives and property, as it has for over twenty years, the legacy of successive Sri Lanka governments since independence in 1948, making them a people under siege, constantly subjected to vicious, life-threatening violence.

When a state can sanction such violence against its own citizens, then it is certain there is something radically wrong with the way they are being governed. It all began with the Sinhalese systematically violating the constitution they had freely accepted from the British in 1948, and had sworn to uphold, reducing the Tamils to second-class citizens, and changing their relationship from one of equality among those of different ethnicities to one of Sinhala domination.

Spiralling violence was the devastating result, and violence continues to take the lives of innocent Tamils to this day, in ever-increasing numbers. But, in truth, it matters little whether the victims are Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims, civilians, LTTE fighters, or Sri Lankan soldiers, because there is nothing to distinguish one from the other when blood is spilled.

It is the easiest thing in the world to blame the victims, the Tamils, for the violence, and everything else that has failed in Sri Lanka in its aftermath, but no one would deny that it is the Tamils who have suffered the most. The Sinhalese must wake up and see the world as it is; they cannot continue to bury their heads in the sand, ignore what the Tamils have endured for so long, or condone the destruction of human lives on all sides.

The Sinhalese have no one else to blame but themselves. After having ruled the country for all of nearly sixty years since independence, they can take full ‘credit’ for the chaos, and the wreck that is Sri Lanka today. Failure to deal fairly with the Tamils any longer could mean a war more terrible than anything seen before, with no winners at the end, and the loss of many precious lives.

President Mahinda Rajapakse, a chameleon-like figure, who wields powers akin to a dictator like Pakistan's Musharaff, is the one who has the power and the stature to help his people overcome the deeply entrenched feelings of distrust and hostility to make the leap of faith with him to a new era of live and let live, something that has eluded all the Sri Lankan leaders before him.

Up to now, it has been just words and shadows from him. He has not been able to quell the violence or chart a course towards an accord with the Tamils. It is an uphill task, and by emphasizing peace at every turn, even at the worst of times, he may have kindled some hope that behind it all there is an elevated purpose, but nothing tangible has emerged up to now!

Rajapakse has tried everything short of war as a way of buying time. He tried to avoid political chaos by prematurely seeking a hasty accommodation with the LTTE, while he sought legitimacy through political consensus to lead the nation out of the impasse, as he must, if it was not to descend into social, political and economic disintegration.

But Rajapakse's efforts have been chaotic: a failed attempt at tinkering with the CFA; another fiasco when a plan to have Norway thrown out of the peace process flopped; and finally, reneging on the Geneva undertakings to get the SLA and the paramilitaries under control, sparking the violence that has edged the country closer to an open war.

As always in such situations, there have been unintended consequences. The violence took on a life of its own. Putting the brakes on the paramilitaries was delayed, possibly, because there were new political concerns or military implications that have not been fully resolved, along with the tricky problem of how exactly to disarm them. But by shutting his eyes to the atrocities against the Tamils, he has tarnished the image of his high office, and given the appearance that he is just the president of the Sinhalese.

Rajapakse took an extreme position at election time to win the presidency, with no hint of compromise compatible with the Oslo terms or the most basic aspirations of the Tamils. With the shadow of war looming large over the country now, he is being forced to retreat from his inflexible policy stance by trying to build a political consensus that would allow him to engage the LTTE in talks aimed at a negotiated solution. But that is still work in progress with no substantive forward movement yet.

Nothing could be more devastating for Rajapakse than a war, with its horrendous humanitarian consequences, inviting swift international intervention, like debilitating sanctions for a start. India, especially, would not tolerate such a crisis, which could send tens of thousands of refugees pouring into South India, causing serious political fallout in Tamil Nadu.

The unthinkable could also happen, with separation becoming inevitable in the face of a human catastrophe and international concerns for the Tamils. And with an economy in steep decline, racked by high inflation, starved of foreign aid and investment, and heading to deeper waters, he would have no option left but to negotiate with the LTTE, if only to avoid having a solution thrust on him.

The president also finds himself under intense pressure from India and the Co-chairs to get on with it, forcing him to again resort to a stop-gap measure, setting up a 'high-powered' committee to find a way out of the power-devolution dilemma, while he continues his search for the elusive political consensus he needs to go forward and continue to govern. And with many UNP members at his doorstep seeking high positions in government, it gives the impression he is picking up momentum, but that is to ignore the 'joker in the pack,' the JVP that panders to the basest kind passions of the Sinhalese.

The JVP continues to paint a doomsday scenario for Sri Lanka: their racial politics knows no bounds; everything that hints at a solution based on the Oslo terms, the ISGA, or the devolution of power favoured by India, the US, Britain, and the others, has been shot down, and so, too, the concept of a Tamil homeland and autonomy; while Norway is vilified as a ‘persona non grata.’

Seen against this background, the All-Party Conference with the 'high-powered' committee set up to draft an outline solution to the Tamil problem is really an exercise in futility. There is an element of self-deception in it, because no one expects an offering couched in unitary state terms to catch fire and lead to anything but more frustration. There is no question that anything with ‘unitary’ in it would be clearly rejected by the Tamils, or would fool the world into rushing to stand with Sri Lanka.

That would be pure wishful thinking. India, the US and others, without being explicit, have said what would work in Sri Lanka, given the history of the conflict, and democracy in the civilized world. Ironically, any concrete proposals formulated by the Rajapakse government could serve to expose the hollowness of their terms for an accord with the Tamils, and become “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” the breaking point for the Tamils and the Co-chairs.

If it does not immediately lead to war, paradoxically such a concrete proposal could turn out to be the catalyst that gets India and the Co-chairs started on something more tangible and purposeful. Failure by Sri Lanka to respond in any positive way thereafter could be devastating for them in social, political, and economic terms. But since a political consensus within Sri Lanka seems as far away today as ever before, it seems the nation is in for a very rough time before it sees good things happening.

The Sri Lanka scene looks so nebulous at this point, as it has for some considerable time, with war always so near and threatening, that there are no other strategic options left for the government of Sri Lanka except peace and negotiations, unless it wants to fall victim to its own designs!