Citizens, Civilians, Casualties

by Chandi Sinnathurai

The Rajapaksha Brothers – both President Mahinda and Defense secretary Gotabaya are cautiously spinning yarns to boost the morale of the Sinhala nation after the so-called capture of Mavil Aaru and Sampur.

The fundamental question still remains unanswered, however. Did Sampur fall or was it indeed a tactical retreat on the part of the Tamil Tigers? 

Colombo media reports have, of course, suggested that ‘Sampur fell to the Government forces on the night of September 4th after a heavy Eight-day battle.’  Someone who has ears to the ground has conveyed to this writer that the “capture” of Sampur is indeed a hyperbolical statement. It is only half-a-truth. Serious doubts have now been raised as to the claim of Colombo.

The Sri Lankan armed forces have NOT captured, at any rate, the whole of Sampur, nor have they neutralised the Tigers in the East.  The hype is only to psyche-up the masses in the South.  It is said that in this “Eight-day Battle,” the LTTE lost only one gun in the entire series of operations!

Sampur, no doubt, is a strategic asset to the Tamil Tigers in the overall plan of reclaiming the Eelam capital of Trincomalee. But the current ‘takeover’ of only part of Sampur has not thwarted one iota the overall design of the Tigers. But, for Colombo, it is indeed an obscene breach of the Cease-Fire Agreement.

For instance, the sea-Tiger base in Illakkantai is still intact.  The US has for some years advised Colombo that Illakkantai could be a launching pad on Trinco.  The Illakkantai camp is situated within about 4 miles of Trinco Bay, close to Foul Point.

Hence, the Sampur retreat might be a minor detraction. In all likelihood, in no way, has it altered the overall strategy of the battle for Trinco.  As we have always maintained, in spite of the indiscriminate aerial onslaught of the Kfir jets, Col. Soosai’s “Kadal Puligal” will play a decisive role in the liberation of Trinco.

In the meantime, one has to question the silence of the international community.  Sri Lanka has failed to treat Tamils as its own citizens.  Hundreds of Tamil civilians, including a host of children, are being bombed and killed.  None (including the international community) are doing anything about it.  Hundreds of thousands of Tamils are being internally displaced.  In fact, many agencies are warning that there is going to be a human catastrophe in the North: innocent civilians will literally starve to death.  Such story is just a footnote in the West, if at all reported.

In this context, there are media reports of October Peace Talks. Colombo has flatly refused to engage in substantive conversation with the Tamils.  How can Colombo expect the Tamils to arrive at the table after such indiscriminate and ongoing attacks on innocent civilians?

Could these peace talks be a respite from intense conflict?  Would the breathing-space help the Tamil refugees within their homeland to settle back in their homes? Will their bombed houses be rebuilt?  Will compensation be paid by the Government?

Such humanitarian matters call for urgent action.

There are yet some dry-docked ‘think tanks’ splitting hairs in Sri Lankan newspapers and websites pointing out that President Rajapaksha should not be talking to the LTTE because they are not the elected representatives of the Tamils.

Such so-called intellectuals, both Sinhalas and Tamils, are still living in a fool’s paradise.

In the Lanka-Eelam conflict, the people who are directly affected by the suffering turmoil are crying out loud for peace and justice.  If there were to be yet another set of Oslo Talks, it should not be a cosmetic exercise as it was sadly in the past – a tragic comedy of errors.

The Tamils will have to be open and frank in telling the Sinhala Government in what sort of framework peace will be possible.  Sri Lanka will have to have the stomach for accommodation.

It is too late in the struggle for Tamils to even dream about a sentimental state of unification. That’s being brutally honest.  It pains one, however, to say it!

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