Will Sri Lanka Face Its Truth?
by Wimal Navaratnam, Canada, June 30, 2025
Next Steps and Future Outlook
With Volker Türk’s mission now completed, attention shifts to what comes next. All parties – the
UN, the Sri Lankan government, Tamil representatives, and international actors – are looking ahead
to ensure that the visit’s momentum translates into sustained progress rather than fading away. The
coming weeks and months are critical. Here are the key anticipated steps and developments to
watch:
1. Implementation of Government Pledges:
Sri Lanka’s government will be expected to start implementing the promises reiterated during Türk’s
visit. Repealing the PTA will be a litmus test – drafting of a new security law (or amendments)
should ideally be underway by July, with the aim to present it to Parliament soon. Similarly,
movement to amend or repeal the Online Safety Act could happen quickly given the ruling
coalition’s supermajority. If August arrives with no action on these fronts, it will signal backtracking.
Additionally, watch for releases or sentencing reviews of PTA detainees; human rights lawyers
anticipate that a handful of long-term prisoners might be freed as a goodwill gesture. The
government may also unveil some new reconciliation initiatives – for instance, a plan to expedite
pending cases of wartime abuses through a special inquiry or to beef up the Office on Missing
Persons with fresh resources. President Dissanayake is under pressure to demonstrate tangible
changes before the UNHRC meets, to bolster his credibility.
2. UN Human Rights Council Session (Sept 2025):
The 51st regular session of the UNHRC (expected in September 2025) will be the centerpiece.
High Commissioner Türk will deliver an update on Sri Lanka’s situation to the Council. His update
(and any report released before it) will incorporate observations from the June visit. Diplomatically,
negotiations will occur on a new resolution on Sri Lanka. The current UNHRC resolution (which
authorized the evidence collection by OHCHR) is up for renewal. We should expect a draft
resolution to be tabled by the Core Group on Sri Lanka (likely led by the UK, Canada, Germany,
etc.) in early September. The tone of that resolution will be telling: Will it continue the current
monitoring for another year or two? Will it strengthen language on exploring international avenues
for justice? Or conversely, will it tone things down, citing improvements under the new government?
Civil society is lobbying hard for a strong resolution – including an extension (or even expansion) of
the accountability project mandate. One suggested idea is for the High Commissioner, at the
completion of the evidence-collection project, to share its findings with UN bodies like the
Security Council or Secretary-General for possible action (similar to how UN investigations on
Myanmar or North Korea have been escalated). The upcoming resolution might encourage such
steps. On the other hand, if Sri Lanka can show it is moving on some domestic reforms, some
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states may opt for a softer approach, giving Colombo more time. September’s UNHRC outcome
will be a direct consequence of how convincing or not the follow-up to Türk’s visit has been.
3. OHCHR Follow-up and Engagement:
The Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR) will keep a close eye on Sri Lanka. Türk indicated
that his team stands ready to assist Sri Lanka in technical areas. In practice, this could mean
deploying experts to advise on legal reforms (for example, helping draft a PTA replacement that
meets international standards) or providing forensic support for investigating mass graves (he
specifically encouraged seeking international forensic expertise for sites like Chemmani). If the Sri
Lankan government is serious, we may see formal requests for such assistance. Additionally,
OHCHR’s Sri Lanka Accountability Project (OSLAP) will continue its work of collecting evidence.
A milestone to watch is April 2026 (if two years from 2024 report) or as mandated by UNHRC –
that might be when OHCHR has to report on what it has compiled. But even before that, OSLAP
might quietly begin sharing information with jurisdictions pursuing cases. The UN Special
Procedures (special rapporteurs) might also increase visits – for instance, the Special
Rapporteur on Truth, Justice, and Reparation could be invited to Sri Lanka as a next step, to
build on Türk’s visit.
4. Domestic Justice Initiatives:
Locally, it will be important to see if Sri Lanka launches any new domestic accountability
mechanism in response to the calls. There have been mentions that the government might
propose a fresh Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), or reform the OMP to give it more
teeth. If such a mechanism is announced, its credibility will be scrutinized – victim’s groups have
already warned they will reject any “whitewashed commission” without real powers. Engaging
victims in the design will be crucial. Another area is prosecutions of a few emblematic cases: for
example, advancing the long-stalled case of the Trinco 5 students or the Navy’s “disappeared
11” case. Any concrete justice delivered in even one case would be heralded as a breakthrough.
Türk explicitly said achieving results in some longstanding cases would build confidence. Thus,
keep watch if the Attorney General suddenly files indictments or if any military officers are charged
in the coming months. Conversely, lack of any legal action will reinforce the impunity narrative.
5. Continuation of Tamil Advocacy:
Tamil civil society and political actors will not remain idle. They have already signaled plans to take
their campaign to the international stage. In July and August, expect Tamil diaspora groups to
engage the Core Group countries, possibly by visits or lobbying in Geneva. The messaging will likely
be: “Don’t be swayed by cosmetic changes; insist on justice.” If the Sri Lankan government
drags its feet, Tamil politicians at home might resume protests – for instance, we could see renewed
demonstrations in the North/East or even a coordinated hartal (shutdown) to remind the world of
Tamil demands around the time of the UNHRC session. Also, any attempt by the government to
curtail remembrance (like the yearly Mullivaikkal memorial in May) or to intimidate activists could
provoke a backlash that influences next steps. On the flip side, if the government makes some
goodwill moves (like returning a chunk of land or engaging sincerely with Tamil leaders on
devolution of power), that might ease tensions and open dialogues internally. The role of India
might also come into play here – India has a stake in Tamil issues and could encourage Sri Lanka to
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deliver on things like the 13th Amendment devolution as part of reconciliation, which would be a
significant step if it happened.
6. Monitoring and Mid-Term Checkpoints:
Beyond September, other checkpoints will include Sri Lanka’s Universal Periodic Review
(UPR) at the UN (next cycle likely 2027, but recommendations from the last UPR in 2022 will
be on record) and any visits by other UN officials. Also, domestic events such as the next budget
or local elections might influence human rights progress – for example, if the government feels
stable enough, it might be bolder on reforms after securing political wins. Internationally, watch if
any country uses universal jurisdiction to charge Sri Lankan officials – for instance, if a lawsuit is
filed in a European country by diaspora activists against a visiting general. Such legal actions, while
independent, can impact the larger conversation and spur others to act (or push Sri Lanka to
undertake its own prosecutions to avoid foreigners doing it).
7. Global Context Considerations:
As Türk himself acknowledged, global crises (Middle East wars, etc.) form the backdrop. If those
escalate, Sri Lanka could get less attention, which is why the next couple of months are so crucial.
Conversely, any major geopolitical shift (e.g., a change in the UN Security Council dynamics) is
unlikely to put Sri Lanka on that body’s agenda unless things dramatically deteriorate. So, the focus
remains at the Human Rights Council and bilateral engagements.
In conclusion, the trajectory after Volker Türk’s visit will depend on accountability vs. impunity –
which of these forces gains the upper hand. The optimistic scenario is that Sri Lanka seizes this
chance: enacting promised reforms swiftly, genuinely engaging victims in truth-seeking, and
partnering with the UN to address past crimes. That could gradually transform Sri Lanka into the
“story of hope” that Türk envisioned, with improving human rights and reconciliation. The
pessimistic scenario is that after the initial fanfare, political will fizzles reforms stall, old patterns
re-emerge (surveillance, denial), and the international community loses focus. In that case, we’d
likely see continued stalemate, with Tamils and human rights groups growing even more
disillusioned and possibly radicalizing their calls (renewing demands for international tribunals,
sanctions, etc.).
What’s certain is that all eyes will be on the promises made during this visit. Each promise
now serves as a benchmark:
• Will the PTA be gone by the end of 2025?
• Will any soldiers or officials face trial for past atrocities?
• Will families of the disappeared receive answers or at least acknowledgment and
support?
• Will occupied land in Valikamam North, Mullaitivu, and elsewhere be returned to its rightful
owners?
The answers to these questions will determine if Sri Lanka is indeed breaking from what Türk called
“entrenched identity politics” and impunity, or if it remains stuck in the past. Volker Türk’s
parting words were filled with hope and the promise of “constructive engagement”. The baton
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is now in Sri Lanka’s hands – and the world, especially the UN, will be closely monitoring how the
next chapters unfold, ready to engage further or apply pressure as needed to ensure that the tragic
lessons of Sri Lanka’s past lead to a better future for all its people.