Buddhists Take Off Lotus Gloves

by The Action Group of Tamils (TAGOT); Kotte, Sri Lanka, April 20, 2004

 

THE ACTION GROUP OF TAMILS (TAGOT)
Kotte, Sri Lanka
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PRESS RELEASE

20 April 2004

2004 ELECTIONS: SINHALA BUDDHISTS TAKE OFF THEIR LOTUS GLOVES

Two aspects of the 2004 parliamentary elections are important. First, within two years the Sinhala voters increased the parliamentary seats of the extreme Sinhala Jathika Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) from 16 (2002) to 39 (2004). The JVP is implacably opposed to Tamils’ internal self-determination. The Sinhala Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) had mouthed the empty rhetoric of “devolution,” but toned it down after teaming up with the JVP to form the United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition. And the anti-Tamil Sinhala-chauvinist UPFA won two-thirds of the Sinhala electorates, secured 105 parliamentary seats (out of 225) and received about 45 per cent of total votes.

Second, in a historic departure, primarily urban and relatively more educated Sinhala constituencies elected 9 Buddhist monks to parliament. They, together with 271 other monks, had contested the elections under the ultra Sinhala Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) or National Heritage Party that is committed to the creation of Dharmarajya (Ideal Buddhist State).

One need only reflect on the grotesque history of former President JR Jayawardene’s Dharmishta rule to guess where Dharmarajya would take the country.

Sinhala electorates lurched toward the extreme Buddhist right wing. From the Tamil perspective, it means most Sinhala people feel there is less need now to politically engage the LTTE in “talks.” Evidently Sinhala voters allowed the Karuna Factor to delude them into the mistaken belief that the LTTE is militarily weakened and therefore could be crushed fairly easily. Also neither the UNP, nor the SLFP, nor any other Sinhala political party asked for a mandate to negotiate a sharing of power between Sinhala and Tamil peoples based on internal self-determination by Tamils. Instead, Sinhala politicians sought support for a nebulous “peace,” which for most Sinhala people specifically means eliminating the LTTE’s military capability and putting an end to the armed struggle of the LTTE-led Tamil National Movement.

Throughout the election campaign and before, peace was never linked to the recognition of the national rights of Tamils. Consequently no Sinhala party or politician made any attempt whatsoever to re-educate the Sinhala people on the need to accept internal self-determination by Tamils as the minimum basis to begin negotiations with the LTTE. We, The Action Group of Tamils (TAGOT), highlighted this fact in our Press Release of 29 March 2004.

The unprecedented Sinhala electoral swing in favour of the UPFA and JHU in the April 2004 parliamentary elections clearly demonstrate that powerful and decisive sections within the Sinhala polity fully endorse the existing unitary State. In short, they reject power sharing with Tamils within a new confederal or even federal structure.

The fact of the matter is this: The Sinhala electorates have in effect voted for a military solution if Tamils do not accept a political settlement on Sinhala terms, based on administrative decentralisation within a unitary State.

Therefore, under the new UPFA government – just as during the previous UNF government – there is an utter absence of Sinhala political space to negotiate a viable power-sharing arrangement with the LTTE. The Sinhala President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s and her Sinhala Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse’s assurances to continue “talks” and negotiate “peace” with the LTTE are dishonest bilge dished out for the gullible.

We must, however, not lose sight of the unfolding power struggle within government. TAGOT emphasised this point before and we repeat it now. The current Constitution prohibits a person from holding the office of President for more than two terms. President Kumaratunga’s second term ends in 2005. She is manoeuvring to either amend the Constitution to allow her to return as President for the third time or to enact a Westminster constitution under which she could hold office as Prime Minister.

To amend or change the Constitution President Kumaratunga needs a parliamentary majority for her SLFP, which was in the Opposition in the last parliament. So she engineered the confrontation with the previous United National Front (UNF) government to justify calling the parliamentary elections. Her sole intention was to put her SLFP in power with a majority sufficient to ram through constitutional changes.

But her plan went badly wrong. The 105 seats won by the UPFA falls well below the simple majority of 113 in the 225 member Parliament.

The JVP’s stunning electoral success shifted the balance of power against the SLFP inside the UPFA coalition.

Within the SLFP President Kumaratunga schemed to appoint Mr Lakshman Kadirgamar, her Tamil Advisor on Foreign Policy, as Prime Minister. Her intention was to prevent a competing centre of power coalescing around a Sinhala Prime Minister within the party. She calculated correctly that Mr Kadirgamar is not backed by any faction in the party and does not have a political base in the country at large. He would be under her complete control and cannot pose a challenge to her political ambitions.

The JVP supported President Kumaratunga’s ploy because if Mr Kadirgamar were to be made Prime Minister that would further divide and weaken the SLFP. The balance of power inside the UPFA would then shift more in favour of the JVP.

Again, Pres. Kumaratunga’s ploy failed. A section of the SLFP – generally known as the “Rajapakse faction” – backed by the powerful Buddhist Sangha unceremoniously leaned on her to give the position to the veteran SLFP member Mr Rajapakse. President Kumaratunga’s “Chandrika faction” caved in; and she conceded Mr Rajapakse the post of Prime Minister.

President Kumaratunga faces two formidable opponents in the UNF leader and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickrematunga on the one hand and the present Prime Minister Rajapakse on the other. A lesser challenge comes from the senior leaders of the JVP. All have presidential ambitions. None of them is at all willing to help her return to power next time round. In fact it is in their immediate interest to prevent any constitutional change that would favour President Kumaratunga.

To add insult to injury, as President Kumaratunga’s political fortunes plummet, New Delhi may start looking to Prime Minister Rajapakse as the next India-friendly Sinhala leader to replace her.

President Kumaratunga’s last hope is the US government, which is plotting to push the alleged “Marxist” JVP out of the UPFA and engineer a so-called national government between the SLFP and UNP.

In her desperation to hold on to power, President Kumaratunga has approached the JHU for support in Parliament. She seems to have concluded that, since none in the JHU could realistically hold presidential ambitions, the party may agree to a horse deal. At the meeting between President Kumaratunga and the Supreme Sangha Council of the JHU on 8 April, she offered to govern the country as a Dharmarajya and in return invited JHU’s 9 Members of Parliament (MPs) to throw their lot in with the UPFA.

The JHU sensed her political vulnerability and set out to extract their pound of flesh. They refused to join the UPFA, but set out stiff conditions for issue-based support. They made five demands: the unitary State must be retained; the LTTE cannot be the sole representatives of Tamils; the NorthEast Province (NEP) must be de-merged into the original Northern and Eastern provinces; laws must be enacted against unethical religious conversions; and a demand regarding independent commissions.

What lies behind this political dance is the JHU’s intention to coerce President Kumaratunga to enact a constitution that would explicitly turn the country into a Buddhist State, euphemistically called Dharmarajya. By offering to create a Dharmarajya President Kumaratunga wants the JHU to support a constitutional change that would allow her to return to power after 2005.

Will this horse deal work?

President Kumaratunga’s willingness to capitulate to religious forces has profound implication for the country. One needs go no further than Pakistan to see the hideous consequences. The then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto attempted in 1974 to consolidate his power base by aligning with Islamists. To buy the support of Muslim clerics he banned the consumption of alcohol and horse racing, closed down bars and night clubs, declared Friday as the weekly holiday (instead of Sunday) and effectively launched Islamisation toward Nizam-i-Mustafa (Ideal Islamic Society).

Gen Zia ul Haq later dragged Islamisation to abysmal depths and in the process spawned the Taliban.

The President’s mother, then Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike, made the first constitutional compromise with Buddhist religious forces when Buddhism was accorded “the foremost place” in her 1971 Constitution. By promoting Dharmarajya President Kumaratunga is plotting – with crass opportunism – to deliver the next and perhaps fatal blow to secular governance and undermine hopes of a negotiated settlement between the Sinhala government and the Tamil National Movement.

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Dr S Sathananthan Ph D, Secretary

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