by Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, October 24, 2014
Executive Summary________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Introduction: Context
The Northern Provincial Council election, the first provincial election in the province for 25 years was held on the 21st of September 2013. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) won a resounding victory, securing 30 out of the 38 seats in the Council – a four – fifths majority. The United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won 07 seats and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress(SLMC) won 01. Voter turnout was recorded at 67.52% with 7.5% of the ballots cast being rejected.Given its potential for a full- fledged return to civilian administration in the Northern Province and accordingly, its significant bearing on democracy, reconciliation and unity in post-war Sri Lanka four years after the military defeat of the LTTE, the election was welcomed nationally and internationally. First referred to by the president in an interview with the Hindu newspaper in July 2012, in which he said that the electionwould be held by September 2013, the holding of the election by that date was by no means assured. Groups within the ruling UPFA government such as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the National Freedom Front (NFF) were at the forefront of attempts, eventually,unsuccessful, to suspend the holding of the election as well as to remove the land and police powers granted to provincial councils under the constitution.The holding of the election, which was also welcomed in the March 2013 resolution on Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR), is widely believed to be attributable to international pressure from India in particular and a pledge made to the government of Japan that the election would be held by September 2013. Indian involvement to this effect was acknowledged by the newly elected TNA Chief Minister, C.V.Wigneshwaran following a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Salman Kurshid in Colombo, soon after he was elected. It is believed that Indian support for the holding of the November 2013 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Colombo, was employed as a keysource of leverage in this respect.
Monitoring
CMEV commenced its monitoring of the election on 1st September 2013 through the deployment of field monitors in each of the province’s polling divisions. Field monitors were trained and asked to swear a pledge of independence and impartiality before being deployed to the field. Once deployed, they were supported by staff based at the headquarters of CMEV in Colombo. The latter further corroborated incidents reported from the field before releasing communiqués to themedia.
On election day CMEV had, in addition to its field monitors a total of 283 monitors of which 27 were in 12 mobile teams and 240 were stationed in polling centres throughout the period of polling. CMEV is one of twonational election monitoring organizations permitted by the Elections Commissioner to station observers in polling centres throughout the period of polling. CMEV recorded 27 Major Incidents of election-related violence during the
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campaign and 57 Minor Incidents. In most cases (20), the alleged perpetrator identified by party affiliation was the UPFA. On Election Day, CMEV covered 616 polling stations or 71.68% out of atotal of 851 polling stations – 830 in the north and 21 for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Puttalam. Of the 34 Major Incidents recorded on Polling Day, the UPFA was identified as the alleged perpetrator in 13 incidents. In the majority of such incidents- 18- the party affiliation of the perpetrators was not identified.
Observations
As elaborated in the attached situation and incidents reports,militarization was and continues to be the major impediment to the enjoyment of civil, political and socio-economic rights in the province.The exercise of the franchise is no exception to this. CMEV as well asother monitors recorded a number of complaints of threat and intimidation allegedly by members of the security forces including the Civil Defence Force, Their involvement in the campaigns of ruling party candidates – four in particular were mentioned in this regard- and even intimidating presence on election day. Militarization was underscored in the remarks made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the end of her visit to Sri Lanka just under a month before the election – 25-31 August 2013- and as required by the March 2013 resolution on Sri Lanka in the Council, in her oral remarks to the Council just after the election. The High Commissioner expressed her grave concern that civilians who had met with her had been questioned by the military before and after their meeting with her.The extent of militarization in the daily lives of the civilian population and the political objectives it serves, attests to its embedding and institutionalization in the context in which the election campaign andpolling was held. In this respect militarization clearly undermined the integrity of the electoral process, with the overall voter turnout figure and result representing a popular backlash in defiance against it.
De- militarization of the north has been called for in the Final Report of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). CMEV unequivocally endorses this recommendation and calls upon the government to implement it as a key element of the post-war reconciliation process and an unquestionably necessary one in a post – conflict situation defined in terms of the sources of conflict being neither sustained, nor re-produced.Another egregious violation of the law and challenge to the integrity of the electoral process was the flagrant abuse of state resources by the ruling party throughout the campaign and on polling day. This is by no means peculiar to the Northern Province and has plagued elections of every type throughout Sri Lanka with the exception of elections conducted after the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution was promulgated in 2001 and the independent oversight commissions for the police and public service it provided for, established.The jettisoning of the Seventeenth Amendment and its replacement by the Eighteenth Amendment provides an enabling environment for this abuse, which in turn saps at public confidence and trust in the electoral process, the basic mechanism of choice and change in a functioning democracy. The Eighteenth Amendment effectively gives the president free rein over key agencies of the state responsible for governance including the police and public service as well as removes terms limits on the office of the president. Constituent organizations of CMEV such as the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) took the lead on behalf of civil society in defending the Seventeenth Amendment and in opposing the Eighteenth. Electoral violence and malpractice was a catalyst for the Seventeenth Amendment and we call upon the government to reinstitute the Seventeenth Amendment, the independent oversight commissions which serve as checks and balances on the exercise of executive power and authority in particular. We note that this is underscored in the LLRC report as well.Concern, which CMEV also shares, was raised during the campaign period over the involvement of the Governor of the Province in the election
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campaign of the UPFA. This compounded the controversy over the role and powers of the Governor and the impact of this on meaningful devolution in practice in the wider context of devolution in the Northern Province. It raises serious issues with regard to the conduct of state officials in elections, especially of key officials who have to work with elected representatives from a variety of political parties and most importantly in a situation in which the relationship with elected officials is of fundamental importance to the workings of the constitutionally ordained scheme of devolution. CMEV hopes that state officials will at all times demonstrate in word and deed a commitment to uphold the constitution of the country with independence and impartiality and without fear or favour. Moreover, their failure to do so must result in disciplinary measures and when warranted, after due process, removal from office. CMEV is also concerned about restrictions placed on the media, the blocking of certain websites and the publication of misinformation. CMEV notes that before the election was announced and the campaign commenced, the distribution centre of the regional newspaper Uthayan was destroyed in Killinochchi and later in Jaffna, its printing press. The free flow of information and exchange of ideas is integral to the process of choice and change an election constitutes in a functioning democracy and must be upheld. Once again this underscores the importance of the Seventeenth Amendment and the empowered Election Commission itallows for in protecting and strengthening the fundamental rights of the electorate. CMEV recognizes the work done by the Department of Elections and other monitoring organizations on voter education and the system of voting. We note however that the 7.5% figure for rejected ballots is high and urge that in future elections a concerted effort is made by the authorities as well as political parties to address this well in advance of the commencement of the election campaign.
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