Notes on Political Instability in Divided Societies

Some Notes on Political Instability in Divided Societies with Reference to the Sri Lankan State and Conflict

by A.R.M. Imtiyaz, Ph.D. (Visiting scholar, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, USA), December 21, 2004

Form of governments

Recent political disturbances in ethnically, religiously and linguistically divided societies including Sri Lanka reminds one of Max Weber, the German Sociologist’s, explanation of the form of government or, in pure political science language, legitimacy.

Mex Weber explicitly catagorized three types of legitimacy: traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal. The first is the legitimacy of a king or similar ruler which is embedded in tradition and custom. The second is the legitimacy of a ruler who takes power through force of will, and whose government has the support of the people as long as he does. Robert Mugabe had this for a while, as did Adolf Hitler, Alexander the Great, and Mao Zedong. The final example of legitimacy exists thanks to having rules people accept, and it is this type which requires the rule of good law to survive.

This last type of legitimacy I find in question in divided societies and with the destruction of traditional legitimacy in the post-colonial world. I largely agree with Weber’s political understanding. However, I believe that bureaucratic legitimacy in divided societies (such as Sri Lanka, India, Iraq, Kenya, etc.) fails to deliver as it has done in the western societies.

The concept of the rule of law is really fascinating as it represents decent political decisions. However, in divided societies, domestic elites’ colorful ‘talk’ on the impartial delivery to the people fails simply due to institutional partiality to their particular ethnic or religious group.  This encourages marginalized people or groups to lose their trust in the political institutions, which trust is a part of political democracy.  In Sri Lanka, the British left their political and administrative institutions as they did in India, but the post-independence state and successive governments did not let those institutions act impartially, instead they used these institutions to serve for the interests of the majority Sinhala-Buddhists.  As a result, minorities, particularly the Tamils became frustrated and lost trust in the state and its institutions.  The result was protracted civil war.

India proves the same reality, though it enjoyed a British civil service culture.  The state and its institutions favor the majority Hindus.  US ruling elites have been trying to impose this form of government (bureaucratic legitimacy or rule of law) in Iraq, but I reasonably expect this would not  produce positive outcomes.  Iraq is as divided as Sri Lanka.  It is my political understanding that democracy will not produce the desired outcome unless political institutions are rooted properly in the societies.  I think democracy in Iraq will breed instability as domestic elites and leaders try to satisfy the majority (Shia) community.  The reason is simple; ethno-minorities – the Sunni and Kurds in Iraq would not be treated as fairly as they want to be.  As a result, they, particularly the Sunnis would lose their trust in the state and its institutions.  One of the possible dangerous outcomes would be an outbreak of civil war as the last resort.

American policymakers and academics do not have a clear understanding about the problems and nature of divided societies, in which a majority religious or ethnic group plays a predominant role in shaping state structure, policies, and institutions.  Iraq’s current reality is really frustrating.  I do not think its problems will end after the elections in January 2004.  To a large extent, cracks would start to appear ONLY after the elections.  The worst scenario is civil war, which was impossible during Saddam;s regime.

What I want to point is that attempts to establish democracy in divided societies should be carefully considered along with all possible negative outcomes.  The British believed that democracy in Sri Lanka would allow it to prosper, but Sri Lanka now has became the homeland of people so desperate that they are willing to be suicide bombers.

Students of philosophy might argue that a ‘Philosopher king,’ who has a political commitment to the society, could bring about positive changes to divided societies.  In practical political science language, this would lead to the construction of a ‘strong state’ in divided societies.  China makes a real example of this nature.  It is true that the Chinese political system is not perfect.  But the point is that it is still working, because it is still delivering to the people it represents.  China proves that its system can bring more political and social stability for economic development than democracies in the Third World and, particularly, in divided societies.  International donors just recently decided to rank China as a member of that elite club, along with so-called advanced western countries and Japan.  This is tactical move but it proves China’s ability to help other poor countries, that have been experiencing democracy since their independence.

I feel the emphasis needs to be on the rule of law, and ‘just’ laws, rather than on democracy.  This is something researchers are just beginning to understand.  I think democracy by itself is inadequate, and dangerous.  Democracy in the context of a “democratic bargain” (see articles in The Journal of Democracy and especially by Larry Diamond for an expansion) is what seems to work.

Broad political and social culture

There must be a strong groundwork to discourage the majority ethno-religious group’s fundamentalism, which resolutely encourages minority fundamentalists themselves to develop roots in the social system.  The NGOs have big roles to play in this process.  I always think that NGOs in Sri Lanka are not doing a good enough job in eliminating Sinhla-Buddhist fundamentalism.  Some of them receive very attractive funds from the western organizations to improve democratic structure and perk up civil society.  But some NGOs just are terminating their roles with organizing some residential seminars.  They submit a ‘full report’ at the end of the day.  This trend should be changed.  Besides, the state has to play bigger role in this process.

The peace process will not produce good results as long as Sinhala-Buddhists still oppose the peace – fearing it would lead to the break-up of the island.  The majority Sinhala-Buddhists’ ‘fear complex’ mainly helps nationalist political organizations (the PA) and chauvinists (the JVP and JHU) forces.  Civil society forces must work to defuse the situation.  However, this trend has much to do with the economic condition of the people.

Generally speaking, the theory goes, economically rich people think more liberally than those who are poor.  People who live in the big cities think more liberally than people who live in a village (the SLFP and JVP vote base).   The former is in the minority, the latter is the majority.  This is modernization’s political formula.  In this logic, the more you economically better off, the more you think rationally or liberally.  This political understanding had met a severe setback recently as Americans voted a conservative back into the office with religious rhetoric.  The bottom line is that the economy plays an important part in influencing people’s ideas.  Generally, economic growth encourages people to broaden their knowledge, which plays a significant role in ‘modernizing’ people’s ideas.

International Donor’s Warning

The recent strongly worded warning of some important international actors to Sri Lanka about the dangers to the peace proces, I think was a bit late but still timely.  I am of the opinion that rational international actors should exert pressure on the Sri Lankan domestic elite.  However, I believe that in Sri Lanka, though the government appears to be weakening, it still attempts to  use all its political capital to hold on the power.  The government thinks (it is a fact) that majority Sinhala-Buddhists backing is very crucial to hold on power since it largely won the elections on an anti-LTTE or anti-peace platform, which attracted Southern Sinhala-Buddhists who think that they were the only victim of UNP-implemented neo-liberal economic policies.

More, I suspect this warning will work less effectively than international actors expect.  The simple reason is that the Sinhala ruling class desperately needs the JVP’s support to hold onto power.  Sri Lanka may face two elections in two years.  So, the JVP’s vote bank (Southern Sinhalese villagers and urban dwellers) will play a significant role for the UPFA’s future election success.  I do not think CBK will go beyond the JVP’s intimidation, which keeps CBK a pro-Sinhala leader.  As I said,  the government in Sri Lanka is weak, but it is still trying to sell all its political profits to satisfy the Sinhala-Buddhists.

The result has been that minorities have lost their trust in the state and its institutions (my main theoretical approach).

So, as far as international actors are concerned, the best way forward would be keeping the pressure on the Sri Lankan state continuously to find a meaningful negotiated political settlement (tactical political science language – consociational democracy) that aims to break the ice of Sri Lanka’s unitary structure, the Sinhala-Buddhists; dream, while they also extend pressure on the LTTE to find a negotiated settlement based on a meaningful federal formula.  Pressure on the LTTE, however, will not work as long as the Sri Lankan state fails to deliveranything to the Tamils.

The JVP’s recent positions

The  JVP’s statement condemning the violence that occurred at the Indian pop star program in Colombo last week proves the JVP’s ability to be an effective political party in divided societies.  The JVP, in its violent campaign to capture state power (1987-89), rejected Indian imports including pop culture and movies justifying its stand by declaring the need to consume local products and explained that India is a socially imperialist power in the region.  However, much of its political strategy has changed since it decided to transform itself into a mainstream democratic political party, which encourages political outbidding on the anti-minority programs.  The JVP’s condemnation of the violence at the pop star program allows us to identify  the nature it has been establishing to woo Sinhala-Buddhist votes:

1. The JVP says the recent violent attack on the Indian pop singers programs provide ugly images of the Sinhalese.  That is to say, the JVP considers this violent act gives an image of Sinhalese as religious fundamentalists. T his is a clear attempt to win the Sinhala-Buddhists sympathy to the party.  The JVP’s ‘love’ of the Sinhala-Buddhists would help to totally alienate it from the oppressed minorities who consider Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony of state as the main political organ that pushed them to mobilize violently against the state and its institutions.

2. The JVP also stated that actions should be taken to bring back those Indian pop stars for new music programs to prove Sinhalese innocence.  This gives two messages: First, the JVP no longer is a party of anti-‘third class’ commercial culture and is ready to make a pact with any devil for power. Second, it becomes an ever more ardent political group that actively voices the Sinhala-Buddhists’ interests, in order to win their hearts for political power.

3. The JVP, an important ally of the current coalition by its policies and actions, encourages minorities, particularity the Tamils, to believe that minorities will have no genuine power-sharing at the executive level of Sri Lanka state.

All these moves finally help the LTTE to mobilize the Tamils violently against the state and will persuade Tamils and the international community to establish an independent state and institutions in the NorthEast of the island.  Also, it would lead Muslims, a politico-religious minority in Sri Lanka, to suspect the Sri Lankan Sinhala domestic elite and leaders’ political sincerity.

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