Peace in Sri Lanka – Some Thoughts
Part I – Equality.
by R. Cholan, September 20, 2004
sangam.org/articles/view2/556.html
No one expected the peace talks in Sri Lanka to progress without a hitch.
But, the manner in which the process has stalled, without a single concrete step beyond the December 2002 Oslo accord, and with a real prospect of return to war, is a matter for alarm. It is not for want of enthusiasm or energy on anyone’s part; rather the opposite. The vigorous involvement of powerful players in the international community in Sri Lanka is out of the ordinary. The international bigwigs, who normally engage in low-key, behind-the-scenes, maneuvers, have cast aside these niceties in this matter. There is no lack of fervor among the Sri Lankans either. The peace process occupies center stage in the media, and in the daily political dialogues in Sri Lanka. Why then are we not able to move forwards?
At the summit held in Oslo (Dec 2002), both sides agreed to ‘explore a political solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka’.[1] What everyone understood by this was that, the Sinhalese agreed to give up the ‘unitary state’, and the Tamils agreed to relinquish ‘secession’, both long held positions, in exchange for ‘federalism’.
The rapidity with which this agreement was achieved was surprising, and at the same time encouraging. Even though it was only an agreement to ‘explore’ federalism as a possible compromise solution, it was universally welcomed. But the subsequent events, following this accord are not so heartening. The rhetoric coming out of Sri Lanka since December 2002 makes one feel that there was no accord at all in Oslo.
There are Tamils who are angry at the LTTE for having ‘abandoned’ Eelam, but the resistance among the Tamils is rather muted. The Sinhala opposition to giving up the unitary state, on the other hand, is both vocal and militant. Although this Sinhala opposition is from extremists, there seems to be a general, gut-level, reluctance among most Sinhalese also to the idea of giving up the unitary state.
It is natural for the Sinhala people, who have for the last 56-years enjoyed the benefits of the ‘winner-takes-all-parliamentary-democracy’ (with permanent right to rule), to be reluctant to cede some of that power to the effectively disenfranchised Tamils (right to vote but no power to rule). Some Sinhalese, I believe, understand that this selfish attitude is neither fair nor tenable under the circumstances, but there is something, perhaps at a subconscious level, that is fueling a mass reluctance to relinquishing the ‘unitary state’.
Subconscious sentiments, like religious-faith, are hard to define or explain, but in this case they are easier to identify because they have found expression through the extremists. Let’s look at some of these viewpoints.
One is about the concept of ‘equality’ of the Sinhalese and the Tamils. There is an ethereal inability to accept Tamils as equals or as fellow stakeholders in the island. “How can Tamils who are a minority claim equal status?” goes the expressed sentiments. That the LTTE has dared to ask for equal status at the negotiating table is roundly criticized by the extremists, to the silent applause of the majority Sinhalese.
Another of these viewpoints is a spurious logic. It goes like this. Sharing power with Tamils will somehow lead to a division of the country. Even a small step in that direction, such as the ISGA, will inexorably march the country towards division, and therefore let us not take even the first step. They don’t see any wrongness in this, of keeping the Tamils effectively and permanently disenfranchised, or even the absurdity of this logic.
Although these expressed sentiments are those of the extremists, most Sinhala people have found these to be comforting enough not to oppose them. In fact, the last election results, with the shift towards the extremist parties, bears testimony to an increasing acceptance of the extremist positions among the Sinhalese people. The so called Sinhala extremists are no longer fringe elements in Sri Lanka.
Additionally, in spite of the frequent use of the word ‘federalism’ in the Sinhala dialogue, mostly to disparage it, the concept itself has not been adequately explained to the Sinhala masses. As a result there is an instinctive opposition to federalism which adds to the above.
Let us look at these problems – ‘equality’, ‘fear of secession’, and the ‘lack of knowledge about federalism’ – in somewhat greater detail.
Equality
The inability to accept the concept of ‘equality’ is a psychological barrier to sharing power with the Tamils. Most Sinhalese, however, would not publicly admit to this flaw, and would actually claim that ‘we are all equal in this country’.
This is mere rhetoric, not matched by deeds. Nevertheless, it is a claim that is frequently made. A good example of this is the following Q&A being used in a brochure distributed at a recent international conference in Oslo sponsored by the Sinhala extremists.
Q: Are Tamils being discriminated in Sri Lanka?
A: No. Tamil language has the same equal status as the majority’s Sinhala language. The religions mostly Hinduism and Roman Catholic of the Tamils have the equal treatment as the Buddhism does in every respect…
The brochure goes on to say similar untruths about education, employment etc., but for the sake of brevity let us look at the claim of language and religious equality only.
Taking the subject of equality of the languages first, everyone knows about the 1956 Official Language Act, which made Sinhala the ONLY official language of Sri Lanka. This policy was then reiterated in the 1972 and 1978 constitutions.
For the sake brevity, let me quote only the latest (1978) Constitution.
Chapter IV: LANGUAGE:
18. The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala.
19. The national languages of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and Tamil.
One needs vivid imagination to interpret this as “Tamil language has the same equal status as the majority’s Sinhala language”, as claimed in the above referenced brochure. But wait, there is more.
In 1987, under Indian intervention and coercion, this official language policy was changed by the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution. It was announced that Tamil will be elevated to the status of an official language equal to Sinhalese, but by a deceitful maneuver an inequality was introduced.
The Amendment ‘renumbered’ Article 18 of the 1978 Constitution as Paragraph (1), thus retaining the clause ‘The Official Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala’. Beneath this, the following paragraph was added: ‘(2) Tamil shall also be an official language.’ See endnote for the full text.[2]
Wouldn’t it have been simpler to just say, “The Official Languages of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala and Tamil”? This is a classic example of the reluctance to accepting Tamils as equals.
The claimed equality of religions in Sri Lanka loses credibility if one reads the constitution in its entirety. Article 10 and 14 provides for equality of all religions, but takes it away in Article 9.
Article 9: The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(2)(e).
The national symbols are another example of this problem. Over 90% of the space in the Sri Lankan flag is allocated to a box containing the lion (depicting Sinhala race) and the Bo leaves (depicting Buddhism), and less than 10% to the non-Sinhala-Buddhists (who incidentally constitute nearly 30% of the population), in the form two narrow stripes. The national seal is a lion.
This is the status of equality of Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and regrettably, the majority of the Sinhala people have no problem with this.
Now, let us look at examples of how other countries with ethnically and linguistically diverse citizenry have handled the subject of equality.
The constitution of Serbia and Montenegro has the following article.
Article 2; Principle of Equality: Serbia and Montenegro shall be based on the equality of the two member states, the state of Serbia and the state of Montenegro.
If one claims numerical superiority of the Sinhalese as reason for the inequality in Sri Lanka constitution, one needs to look at the demographics of Serbia and Montenegro. Serbians constitute 62.6% and Montenegrins a mere 5%.[3] Contrast this with the Tamil population of Sri Lanka of nearly 20% (which swells to around 28% if you add the Muslims who too are Tamil speaking).
Canada has the following in it constitution:
16 (1) English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.
In Canada the French speaking people constitute only 23% of the population.
The equality demanded by the Tamils is certainly not about a half-share of the economic pie. Montenegrins or the French Canadians don’t ask for half the wealth in their respective countries, nor do the Tamils in Sri Lanka. What the Tamil people want is an ‘Equality of Status’, just like the Montenegrins and the French Canadians.
The inability of the Sinhala people to accept Tamils as equals is a major impediment to peace. Tamils and Sinhalese are equal stakeholders in the island, and each has an equal right to manage their own internal affairs on their own terms, and this could be accomplished within a united Sri Lanka.
Next: Part 2 – Fear of Secession
[1]…From the transcript of the press conference held at the conclusion of the third session of the first round of Peace Talks in Oslo, Norway30 December, 2002.
[2]…Amendment of Article 18 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
Article 18 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) is hereby amended as follows:-
(a) by the renumbering of that Article as paragraph (1) of that Article;
(b) by the addition immediately after paragraph (1) of that Article of the following paragraphs:
(2) Tamil shall also be an official language.
(3) English shall be the link language
[3]…[1] In Serbia and Montenegro, the remaining population of approximately 32% live in UN administered Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and of Kosovo and Metohija within the territory of Serbia.