by R. Shan
Former Maddakalapu –Amparai LTTE women wing leader Nilavini went to Colombo with Karuna, escaped and rejoined LTTE in Maddakalapu. Speaking to the BBC Tamil service on Sunday( 20/6/04) she said: “Initially we were all together in Colombo under Sri Lanka n Army(SLA). Later Karuna moved to a separate place.” She and four other former women cadres of LTTE escaped and rejoined LTTE on Friday( 18/6). Three of her female colleagues who returned to the LTTE on Friday were also present at the press meet in the LTTE conference center in Solayakam, about 18 km southwest of Maddakalappu. Government should know that LTTE is now in a position to prove the claim that the SLA were heavily involved in Karuna affairs.
In the interview she also said that UNP national list MP, Mr. Ali Zahir Moulana Seyed took them personally in his own vehicle to Colombo and were first put up at the Colombo Hilton Hotel for 3 days. Thereafter they, including Karuna and Varathan were moved to a SLA safe house somewhere in Colombo for 7-8 days during which a high-ranking intelligence official regularly visited Karuna for discussions. Later they were moved to another safe house near the Sri Lankan Army camps in Narahenpita Apollo hospital by the intelligence unit of SLA. On the 13th of June, about three months after their escape, Karuna told Nilavini that he was going abroad with his family and left the safe house the same day in a SLA vehicle. Following Karuna’s departure Nilavini made a call to a relative in Maddakkalappu and escaped with his help. She said that the SLA security at the safehouse was lax after the renegade commander’s departure.
This is clear evidence of the involvement of SLA and we must assume that Nilavini had more to say to LTTE than she revealed in the interview. Special LTTE Commander for Maddakalapu- Ampara, Col. Ramesh said on Saturday ( 19 June) that the Sri Lanka military is trying to use Karuna against the Liberation Tigers.
Ali Zahir Moulana’s deep involvement in Karuna’s escape cannot be ignored as a private relationship. Help of this kind involves great political and physical risk. Personal relationship with Karuna would not have been enough for Ali Zahir Moulana to take this risk. It is my considered opinion that without a firm request from SLA and a firm assurance about the safety Ali Zahir Moulana would not have provided this safe journey to Karuna. It also indicates Ali Zahir Moulana’s close relationship with the SLA. He may also be in close contact with Lionel Balagalle who is close to Chandrika Kumaratunge.
SLA not only helped Karuna’s escape, it is also keeping Karuna under its control. There are many reasons for SLA’s help to Karuna, other than his future usefulness. SLA is probably grateful to Karuna for what he has done to them and the damage done to Tamils. In plotting against LTTE he has also developed personal relationship with the commanders of the SLA. Words of support and sympathy for Karuna emanating from hard-line Sinhala leaders sound more like words of gratitude than future usefulness. These Sinhalese leaders seem to know more about Karuna’s services to Sinhala people than what is public knowledge. They may have been briefed by the SLA in confidence.
Douglas Devananda’s interview to BBC suggests that there are plans for a traitor’s role for Karuna in the future. For now, all evidence suggests that Karuna had been living in Colombo during the past three months. Therefore the killings both inside LTTE controlled areas and the army-controlled areas in Maddakalapu, must have been the work of SLA and not Karuna as suggested by the media. There were reports that the miscreants who killed LTTE members in the LTTE controlled areas went back to the government-controlled areas. There were also reports of these attackers returning to an army camp in a white van. These reports cannot be ignored. All areas of Maddakalapu- Amparai are either controlled by LTTE or SLA. All attacks against LTTE are obviously the work of the SLA because there are no other possibilities. It is against the principles of memorandum of understanding and therefore a breach of agreement. If a third force is operating in government-controlled area, then the government must take responsibility for it. Now there is enough evidence that there is no third force in Maddakalapu. SLA attack on LTTE is dangerous and will backfire. Recent SLMM statement condoning these covert military activities of SLA is a mistake that may even be considered as an unscrupulous statement. SLMM must do an honest job here. They must look at the actual ground situation and act to prevent resumption of war. Like UNICEF, SLMM will also lose its credibility with Tamil people if it allows itself to be used as a stick against Tamils by the government.
With the currently available information about Karuna’s close connection with SLA, we can make some interesting conclusions about the conduct of SLA during LTTE’s military action that removed Karuna from Maddakalapu. SLA professed neutrality and openly acted neutrally, while covertly assisting Karuna. It may have been forced to take this position because it was immediately after the elections and Chandrika Kumaratunge was busy forming government and trying to win support from minor parties. Also the government did not expect LTTE to win in three days. Had LTTE delayed its move or had it taken longer to win, government’s reaction may not have been the same. War may have been unavoidable. LTTE’s swift victory had also acted as a demonstrator of LTTE’s military capability and would have killed any thought of SLA involving in the war openly. Winning the war in Maddakalapu and consolidating her political position with the help of Karuna would have become attractive proposition for the president if the war against Karuna had continued till she had consolidated her political power. Fortunately that did not happen and the peace process survived.
We must hope that she realizes that the Tamil –Sinhala conflict cannot be solved by war. She must realize that negotiations are the only way to go and that duplicity in negotiations is not possible again, because she has used that trick before. She must also accept that Sinhalese people hate Tamil people, they are willing to commit wholesale violence against them, discriminate against them and humiliate them. Therefore Tamils need a mechanism under which they can live without violence, discrimination and humiliation by the Sinhalese. Considering the positions taken by the Sinhalese and the Tamils, reaching an agreement on a permanent solution is well nigh impossible at present. We must adopt a tried and tested method to solve this problem. Interim Self Government Authority had been tried and tested successfully in other countries recently. Negotiations between the government and LTTE started more than two years ago and has taken many turns before reaching the stage of LTTE submitting the ISGA proposals to the government. The promised international aid package is part of this two-year-old negotiating process, which the new government must continue if it is serious about a negotiated solution. Agreement on ISGA proposals will enable LTTE and government and donors to address the immediate need of the people while negotiations on long-term solution is continued. It is hoped that the government will agree to continue from where the previous government left to reach a mutually acceptable solution soon.