The Case for Direct Economic Assistance to the NorthEast

by Ana Pararajasingam; published January 18, 2004

[The writer is an Australian based Management Consultant, who, between March 2003 and June 2003 this year, was in Sri Lanka working with the LTTE’s Planning & Development Unit and the World Bank, UN agencies and the Asian Development Bank, to assess the needs of the war torn Northeast. The report was for submission at the Tokyo Conference, which the LTTE did not attend. During this period, he had the opportunity to see for himself the ground realities, which were of considerable value in writing this paper.]

While it may be an exaggeration to suggest that the peace process has come to a halt, there is little doubt that it has stalled.

When the process began back in February 2002 with the signing of the MOU, the hope for an enduring peace loomed large. However at that time the cessation of hostilities and its immediate aftermath alone seemed good enough reasons to welcome the cease-fire. To the people of the Northeast, it meant the likelihood of the economic embargo being lifted and an end to the constant bombardments. To the people of the South, it meant being able to move about freely not being subject to the stifling security checks and the nagging fear of being caught up in a bomb blast. The blowing up of several aircraft in Katunayake in July the previous year had amply demonstrated the Government’s inability to confine the war to the North East

While the South continues to enjoy the truce and pursue its political (albeit turbulent), cultural and economic life unhindered, the situation in the NorthEast is far from satisfactory. Although the lifting of the economic blockade and an end to the shelling have provided relief, the improvement in the material conditions of the people is negligible.

The state of the material condition in the North East is encapsulated in the grim findings of the Report titled “Sri Lanka: Assessment of Needs in the Conflict Affected Areas (Districts of Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara)” (Prepared with the support of the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations and the World Bank) for submission to the Tokyo Conference in May 2003. Given below are excerpts from relevant paragraphs.

Paragraph 7

· “It is estimated that some 65,000 people have been killed, and several times that may have been disabled. The armed conflict created over 800,000 internally displaced persons from the North East. Overall, at least a quarter million families have been uprooted, many experiencing several displacements. In addition, there are a significant number of displaced people outside Sri Lanka. While the whole population of Sri Lanka suffered from the consequences of the war, the North East has borne the brunt of the conflict.

Paragraph 55

· Conditions are not yet conducive to large-scale, organised resettlement of IDP’s and refugees.

Paragraph 62

· Conditions conducive to physical, legal, material and social safety must be created before displaced populations can return.

Paragraph 96

· The two-decade long conflict has pushed the health sector in the North East to the brink of collapse.

Paragraph 114

· All aspects of the education system – pre-school, primary, secondary, tertiary and technical-vocational17 – are severely damaged in the North East.

Paragraph 136

· It is estimated that nearly 326,700 houses are damaged partly or totally in the North East, nearly 58% of the damaged units remain totally uninhabitable, and about half of these are in Jaffna and Batticaloa districts alone.

Paragraph 154

· The infrastructure of the North East is greatly debilitated due to the armed conflict and needs significant rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.

Paragraph 210

· The total demand for power in the North East is about 110MW. Households currently electrified in the North are 22%, and in the East 40%, as against a national average of 56%.

Paragraph 249

· The situation of water and sanitation at primary schools and health facilities in the North East is precarious.

Paragraph 262

· In the North East the conflict has seriously affected rural families and has resulted in levels of poverty not seen hitherto in Sri Lanka.

Paragraph 291

· Twenty years of war has severely affected the livelihood capabilities of many families and communities in the North East… In the diminished economy of the North East, unemployment and underemployment further reduce individuals’ and families’ incomes, even to the point of no income at all.

Paragraph 312

· Inevitably, two decades of conflict have resulted in serious damage to administrative and technical capacities. The overall impact has been a marked deterioration in the quality of basic health, educational and administrative services and increased reliance on under-qualified and largely voluntary teachers and technicians, serving within under-resourced parallel administrative structures.

There was hope that SIHRN (Sub Committee on Immediate Humanitarian & Rehabilitation Needs in the North East), which was established through negotiations between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE to provide ‘immediate humanitarian relief,’ would deliver the much-needed relief. But, it was soon evident that SIHRN was dysfunctional mainly due to the Sri Lankan Government’s failure to honour its commitments. The frustration felt by the people of the Northeast was almost palpable as SIHRN’s attempt to provide relief was thwarted at every stage. This writer, who worked as a consultant in the Northeast with the LTTE’s Planning & Development Unit and Multi-Lateral donor agencies had direct experience of hope turning into frustration and then into dismay as the days went by with SIHRN unable to deliver.

It was at this juncture that the LTTE decided to stay away from the Tokyo Donor Conference having realised the futility of proceeding to Tokyo while there was just no mechanism to deliver much needed funds to provide relief, rehabilitation or reconstruction, even if the donor countries were prepared to pledge the 1.95 billion US dollars (see footnote) envisaged for the Northeast by the Multilateral Donor Agencies.

It is the writer’s view that the LTTE had little choice in making this decision given the increasingly resentful attitude of the people frustrated by SIHRN’s impotence. Earlier, there were concerns expressed by several academics and technocrats (whom the writer met during the Needs Assessment Program) that the LTTE’s attempt to accommodate the Government through agreeing to a fifty-fifty participation in SIHRN had rendered SIHRN ineffective.

The LTTE’s subsequent proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority with sufficient powers to channel funds towards relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development projects was meant to address this weakness and take the peace process forward. This, too, now appears to have hit a snag as the Sinhala political establishment is in the throes of a power struggle.

Where does this leave the current peace process? Although the LTTE has pledged to not commence hostilities, it cannot continue to indefinitely stay in limbo while the lot of people whom it claims to represent has changed little!

The International Community, which has played a significant role to-date in persuading the parties to the conflict to a cease-fire and to commence negotiation, can, and indeed should, play a role in ensuring that steps are taken to improve economic conditions in the Northeast.

Such a move can strengthen the peace process in many ways.

Firstly, by providing the people with hope of a better life, it can eliminate the frustration that can reignite the war.

Secondly, significant economic improvement itself can be the incentive for the people to support what is bound to be a long period of negotiations for an enduring political arrangement for the Tamil and Sinhala people to coexist as equals in the Island of Sri Lanka.

Thirdly, an improvement in the economy of the Northeast may well serve to demonstrate the axiom that ‘no man is an Island’ and that all inhabitants of the Island are inextricably linked through the economy and, as such, need to build an overarching identity for the entire Island. (A process that in its most advanced form is now under way as several European nations seek to forge an overarching European identity under the EU label.)

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Footnote: See Annexure 1A,B and C of the Report “Sri Lanka: Assessment of Needs in the Conflict Affected Areas (Districts of Jaffna, Killinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara

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