COLOMBO DIARY | PK Balachanddran
Hindustan Times, August 16, 2004
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have now made it abundantly clear that they will not entertain any alternative to their proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) for the predominantly Tamil, North Eastern Province (NEP) of Sri Lanka.
In the immediate context of the peace talks, what the “Tigers” mean is that at the talks there should be only one basic document for discussion, namely, the ISGA as proposed by them in October 2003.
And going by justifications they give for the kind of ISGA they have proposed, it is clear that it is an “irreducible minimum” and “non-negotiable”.
The LTTE has, in other words, adopted a “take it or leave it”, stance which has put the Chandrika Kumaratunga government in Colombo, in a tight and unenviable spot.
President Kumaratunga will have to contend with serious problems while considering LTTE’s rather brazen stand.
She cannot give an impression to her Sinhala constituency in south Sri Lanka, that she is abandoning the concept of the supremacy of the Sri Lankan State, specifically, its sovereign right to present its own proposal for an Interim Administration or an Interim Self Governing Authority in a part of the country.
If she accepts the LTTE’s demand (in her anxiety to start peace talks and get the US$ 4.5 billion international development aid tied to progress in the peace process), she may lose the support of the ultra-Sinhala nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).
She needs JVP’s support to keep her United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA) in power. And she has to be in power for at least two years to enable the UPFA to fight the all-important Presidential election due in 2005 or 2006.
The JVP, which is beginning to be very belligerent in a number of fronts to the embarrassment of the President, has made it clear that it will not allow the peace talks to take up only the LTTE’s proposal.
Of course, Kumaratunga has the theoretical option of jettisoning the JVP and co-opting, in its place, the opposition United National Party (UNP) led by former Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe. Indeed, the UNF had made an offer of “unconditional support” if she jettisoned the JVP. But this is not a practical option for Kumratunga given the basics of present-day politics in South Sri Lanka.
Kumaratunga and Wickremesinghe are quintessential rivals who see only a sinister motive behind any offer one may make to the other. In the current context, Kumaratunga’s fear is that Wickremesinghe may dump her and topple her government once he weans her away from the JVP.
For Kumaratunga, the JVP may be an embarrassment as far as the peace process and the talks with the LTTE are concerned, but it is a useful ally in other, more vital, matters relating to Sri Lanka’s main political constituency, the Sinhala-Buddhist community living in the Southern, Central and Western parts of the island.
In fact, no Sinhala-Buddhist leader, including Ranil Wickremesinghe, will actually make a deal with the minority Tamils, risking the displeasure of this all-important political constituency. This being so, one is not surprised that Kumaratunga took Wickremesinghe’s offer of support for starting the peace talks on the basis of the LTTE’s proposal for an ISGA, with a pinch of salt. She rejected it off hand.
Stuck with the JVP, on the one hand, and faced with the adamant stance of the LTTE, on the other, Kumaratunga is well and truly in a cleft stick. While the JVP and the LTTE can play their political games without adverse consequences to themselves, Kumaratunga and her Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) cannot.
Both the JVP and the LTTE are in a happier position. The JVP is hoping that a tough stand against Tamil separatism now, will enhance its future political prospects and help it move up the political ladder from the present position of a junior partner in a government, to being in power all by itself. The LTTE is hoping that by maintaining an adamant and extremist posture, it can get what it considers to be an “irreducible minimum” in the current stage of its politico-military struggle for an independent Tamil Eelam.
Why does the LTTE think that its proposal is an irreducible minimum? A perusal of the proposal, both the text and the preamble, will tell us why.
The proposal takes into account certain concerns, which have their basis in the nature of the long drawn out, and hard Tamil struggle for rights, and the LTTE’s role in it. The parameters are as follows: –
1.The history of broken promises made by the Sinhala – majority governments in Colombo since the 1950s.
2.The scant respect shown by the Sinhala leadership for the peaceful struggle of the Tamils to secure their rights, forcing them to take to arms.
3.The power and sway the Tamils have managed to acquire over the NEP through an armed struggle.
4. The politico-military dominance the LTTE has acquired over the NEP.
5. The popular sanction that the LTTE has got for its claim to be the “sole representative of the Tamils” through the 2001 and 2004 elections in the NEP, which it fought through a proxy outfit, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).
6.The need to secure control over the landmass and the seas of the NEP to enable the people of the NEP to enjoy the benefits of their natural resources untrammeled by the hegemonic control of the Centre in Colombo.
7.The need for an independent and efficient system of government in view the bad job done thus far by the Sri Lankan government which, according to the LTTE, has been traditionally anti-Tamil, corrupt and inefficient.
8.The need to maintain an independent security system, with an independent army, navy and police, to safeguard the hard-earned gains of the people of NEP against intrusion from Colombo and overseas.
9.The need to venture out of the confines of the present constitution of Sri Lanka with a view to securing justice for the Tamils, who had not participated in the earlier constitution making exercises in the country in 1972 and 1978.
10.The need to fashion an interim administrative structure in accordance with other internationally sanctioned interim structures in other areas of conflict in the world.
Beginning on a conciliatory note, Art 2.1 of the LTTE’s proposal says that the size of the ISGA will be open to negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. Art.2.2 says that the ISGA will have members appointed by all three stakeholders in the NEP, namely, the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government, and the minority Muslim and Sinhala communities.
But given the fact that it exercises effective control and jurisdiction over the majority of the areas of the North East, and has the electoral mandate of the majority of the Tamil people in the North East to be their “authentic” representative, the LTTE has given itself an “absolute majority” in the body. In other words, more than 50% of the members of the ISGA will be from the LTTE.
The absolute majority will give the LTTE the requisite numbers to get any measure it wants, passed by the ISGA.
The ISGA will elect a Chairperson, who will function as its Chief Executive. The Chairperson will, in turn, acquire the right to appoint and sack the Chief Administrator of the NEP.
Art.9.1 and Art.11 say that the ISGA will have “plenary” (full) power for the governance of the NEP, including powers in relation to land, settlement, rehabilitation, development, raising revenues, expenditure and the maintenance of law and order.
Again, to be accommodative, the proposal says that the detailed modalities of the exercise of such powers shall be subject to further discussion by the parties to the agreement.
Art.12 says that the ISGA shall have powers to borrow both internally and externally, provide guarantees and indemnities, receive aid directly, and engage in internal and external trade.
Art.17, dealing with the resettlement of land occupied by the Sri Lankan armed forces, says that the “denial to the rightful civilian owners of unfettered access to such land is a violation of the norms of international law.” It goes on to say that such land must be immediately vacated and restored to the possession of the previous owners and that the Sri Lankan government should pay compensation to them.
Art 17 further says that the resettlement of people shall fall entirely within the jurisdiction of the ISGA.
Art 18 lays claim to the marine offshore resources of the NEP.It says that the ISGA shall have power to regulate access thereto.
Art.19 says that the ISGA will have control over the natural resources of the NEP.While existing agreements relating to any such resources shall continue in force, the Sri Lankan government shall ensure that all monies due under such agreements are paid to the ISGA. Future agreements shall be entered into with the ISGA only.
Art.22 says that in the event of any disagreement about any provisions of the Agreement on the ISGA, there could be bilateral discussions. If the conflict is not resolved, the Norwegian government (the official facilitators of the Sri Lankan peace process) could attempt conciliation. If this too fails, there could be an arbitration committee comprising two appointees from each side, and a chairperson on whom there is a mutual agreement. In case there is disagreement on the chairperson, the parties shall ask the President of the International Court of Justice at The Hague to appoint a chairperson.
As for the duration of the ISGA agreement, Art.3 says it shall be in force for five years, unless, the peace talks had resulted in an agreement on a final settlement of the ethnic question before that period.
At the conclusion of five years, if no final settlement had been reached, there would be elections to the ISGA. But these would be conducted by an “independent Election Commission appointed by the ISGA,” and held under “international supervision.”
In defense of its ISGA proposal, the LTTE would say that it embodies the ground situation, the political and military balance of power in the NEP, the expressed will of the Tamil people in respect of all aspects of the administration of the NEP, and the dismal track record of past agreements arising from the failure of mainstream Sinhala leaders to negotiate in good faith and keep their word.
It is argued that without plenary powers of the sort outlined in the proposal, the Tamils will not be able to lead the kind of life they have been fighting for, for close to half a century, sacrificing over 70,000 men and women, and suffering displacement and deprivation of epic proportions.
The retrieval of rights over the land and the sea resources of the NEP are critical for the survival of the Tamil people, the LTTE contends. So are the clauses dealing with the structures to protect these rights.
The Sri Lankan government’s draconian regulations on land acquisition and re-occupation and restrictions on fishing had deprived thousands of Tamils of rich agricultural lands and denied thousands of Tamil fishermen their rightful livelihood.
The Tamils also say that the LTTE has to keep its separate army and navy and not disarm, because these forces are necessary to regulate outsiders’ access to the land and maritime resources of the NEP.
Pro-LTTE observers point out that the LTTE has been reasonable enough not to ask for the right to secede in exercise of the Tamils’ right to self-determination. Clearly, the LTTE is serious about its commitment to finding a solution within a united Sri Lanka, they say. They contrast this with the case of the rebels in Southern Sudan who had sought and secured a provision for an internationally supervised referendum on secession at the end of a six-year agreement they had entered into with the Sudanese government at Machakos in July 2002.
The LTTE is acutely aware that the present unitary Sri Lankan constitution does not permit the establishment of the kind of structure it has proposed. The proposal does impinge very adversely on the powers of the Centre. But it argues that if the Tamil problem is to be solved and peace is to be restored to the country, the Sri Lankan polity will have to agree to go beyond the constitution.
It is also pointed out that the ISGA is only an interim arrangement with a tentative five-year time period. The proposal also commits the LTTE to begin discussing the final settlement even as the ISGA is being set up and is running (Para five of the preamble).
The government has been changing its stand from time to time. The earlier stand was that any Interim Administration vested with high power could be established only at the penultimate stage of the peace talks when a final settlement was already in sight. The government had also been saying that any Interim Administration would have to be in consonance with the final settlement and must anticipate its nature.
But recently, there has been a change in the government’s stand. It is now saying that the LTTE’s proposal can be “discussed” but the ISGA as suggested by the LTTE cannot be “established” at this stage. It also wants to place its own scheme for an Interim Administration for consideration at the talks.
The government will find it very difficult to get the consent of the Sinhala people for the dilution of the powers of the Centre to the extent demanded by the LTTE. Government will be giving up control over land, which is a third of the total landmass, and over marine resources along two thirds of the total coastline. Its army may have to vacate vast areas of land. It has to give up the idea of settling Sinhalese in the NEP on a planned basis.
There are legal problems in going for structures outside the constitution of Sri Lanka because there is a set procedure for amending the constitution. A two-thirds majority in parliament is needed. In certain cases, a referendum might have to be ordered.
The LTTE has now shot down even the government’s watered-down proposal to discuss the ISGA along with its own proposal. “Establish the ISGA as proposed first, and then start discussions on a final political settlement,” says the LTTE.
There seems to be no meeting ground between the two.